When we perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is a considerable amount of work involved in ‘creating’ the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the lightwaves reflected or emanated from it, your mind synthesises the image with regards to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – acknowledging it or ignoring it depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc - this is the process of 'apperception').
And you will do all of this without you even noticing that you are doing it; it is largely unconscious.
In other words, your consciousness is not the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them. Instead, your consciousness is an active agent which constructs experiential reality - partially on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of a huge number of unconscious processes, including memories, intentions and cultural frameworks. This is how we arrive at what Schopenhauer designates as 'vorstellung', variously translated as 'representation' or 'idea'. And that is what reality consists of. It includes the object, but it is not in itself an object. As Schopenhauer says in the first paragraph of WWI, discerning this fact is the beginning of philosophical wisdom. — Wayfarer
Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.
What idealism, analytic or transcendental, is drawing attention to, is that the mind creates the framework within which our judgements about the stone — Wayfarer
SARS-CoV-2 particles are spherical and have proteins called spikes protruding from their surface. These spikes latch onto human cells, then undergo a structural change that allows the viral membrane to fuse with the cell membrane.
Their remains no scientific account of which neural systems are able to generate the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer
the key is that researchers aren't primarily studying the holistic aspect of our brain/body, we look too heavily into detailed parts of us trying to find consciousness when consciousness might only exist with all parts as a whole. Just like when we look at a video on our phones and we experience the result of the holistic system of a phone that cannot be taken apart and still be able to show that video in the way that we experience it, it is the sum of it that produces the ability, not some part, or a few parts, but the whole system, the holistic entity. — Christoffer
Which is more about how our subjective experience, perception, and cognition might be emergent factors that we can never find because they're emergent out of the whole body/mind configuration. — Christoffer
On the contrary, sir – for example, (my preferred "scientific account") Being No One (or its non-technical synopsis The Ego Tunnel) by the neuroscientist, philosopher & (afaik) practicing Buddhist Thomas Metzinger. I'm sure I've cited him and his works many times in our exchanges over the years, but apparently you're still incorrigibly stuck on your 'idealist' dogma. :sparkle:Their remains no scientific account of which neural systems are able to generate the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer
People are thus what Metzinger calls naïve realists, who believe they are perceiving reality directly when in actuality they are only perceiving representations of reality. The data structures and transport mechanisms of the data are "transparent" so that people can introspect on their representations of perceptions, but cannot introspect on the data or mechanisms themselves. These systemic representational experiences are then connected by subjective experience to generate the phenomenal property of selfhood. — Wikipedia
Consciousness plays the central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and also the coherence and reality of the world of appearance. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves and the objects of our perception to exist is dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness, most of which are unknown to us. We have no more knowledge of them than we do of cell division or of our hair growing or our food digesting. — Wayfarer
This is not true that idealism has been 'solved' or refuted generally. There are quite a few people of scientific bent, of whom Bernardo Kastrup is one, who have made detailed arguments for philosophical idealism, which have not been refuted.
When discussing these matters, just be aware that your physicalist views are not supported by philosophical argument, but are simply expressions of your 'gut feel' as to what can and can't be true. Incredulity is not itself an argument. — Wayfarer
You are incorrect Wayfarer. Idealism, in the sense that there is no proof of something outside of our perception, has been refuted. — Philosophim
This is not the thread for it, but if you wish to create a Bernardo Kastrup thread: — Philosophim
By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). — Bob Ross
all we know of existence — whether of a specific thing, or the Universe at large — is the product of our cognitive and intellectual capacity, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. All that processing power generates our world, and that’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. — Wayfarer
But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the neural binding problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.
You haven't addressed the argument, — Wayfarer
Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape — Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order
the so-called hard problem specifically calls for a causal, IE physical, explanation. — Janus
In perception, the threesome of pennies has its own identity, separate from that of the individual coins: For instance, the threesome has a triangular appearance in our eyes. Does the threesome exist as a separate unit in the mind-independent world? Are there three things in the world (namely the three coins) or are there four things (the individual coins and the threesome-of-coins)? This is not an easy or trivial question, for it depends on what you understand by "existing". If existence is limited to the material, then you have only three things, because no new material is added when the threesome is formed. However, if reality were limited to what is material, there would be no such things as structure or form, because they neither add to, nor take away from matter. The threesome of coins is a separate reality for us because it has a separate quality in perception. What is there in the mind-independent world to make it something separate? What is there in the material world to make any Gestalt group of objects exist on its own merits, over and above the individual objects in it? There are groups of objects that come together naturally. Think of a table: It has five parts, namely a horizontal top and four legs. However, the table has a proper function which is only achieved by the whole. The same idea applies to living animals, which have numerous organs that work together and jointly make the animal. What distinguishes these examples is that the composite object depends functionally on its parts. It exists only as a dynamic combination of its components. There are many other systems of objects in the world that interact naturally, and by their interaction form cohesive groups. For instance, the planets revolve around the sun and interact gravitationally, thus forming a planetary system. However, material systems which belong together because they function as a unit are few and far between. In contrast with functionally related groups of things, there are innumerable random groups of objects which are nothing more than chance combinations, without purpose. Hypothetically, every collection of objects could be separated out of its background and assigned an identity as a group, in which case everything would be a Gestalt. If that were the case, the very notion of Gestalt would be meaningless. This shows that a Gestalt is more than an arbitrary joining together of objects. There must be a reason, a purpose, for bringing particular things together and taking them to form a coherent whole. But in the mind-independent universe, there are no such things as reasons and purposes. We are led to conclude that it requires a living subject to mentally extract a dynamic group of objects from a background in which it is deeply embedded, and make it stand out as something existing. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (pp. 43-44). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition
People are thus what Metzinger calls naïve realists, who believe they are perceiving reality directly when in actuality they are only perceiving representations of reality. The data structures and transport mechanisms of the data are "transparent" so that people can introspect on their representations of perceptions, but cannot introspect on the data or mechanisms themselves.
If one only "knows" ideas because there are only ideas
and if each mind is an idea
then all minds are properties of each mind
One statement that I think we both agree on in layman's terms is that the perception of a 'thing' is real in itself, and that the perception cannot exist without the perceiver.
If it is true that physicalism...can't explain consciousness then it is not a hard problem but an impossible problem. It then follows that it is not a problem at all.
Or the question then becomes 'is there any alternative to a physical explanation'? and of course the answer would be 'no' sinve the so-called hard problem specifically calls for a causal, IE physical, explanation.
Chalmer's language was more directed to reductive models. We don't know what is 'physical' but we can make models based upon what is observed. So, it is only a problem if it is interesting that consciousness has properties that other phenomena do not, as explored through scientific models. — Paine
What they fundamentally are is just a separation of molecular structures.
What fundamental thing or substance is it that you mean isn't defined?
Every prediction Einstein made has been verified in a number of different ways, so what does that tell about a mind-independent world?
What is it that you are trying to convey?
We are a limited species in our perception, in order to let us function better for the existence we have.
Our mind does not represent anything accurately.
In reality, however, these objects are not anything in themselves, outside of our interpretation of reality these objects blend together and are just formations of accumulations of matter through entropic processes
I think that arguments that try to distinguish reality from our perception in a "do a tree fall in the woods if no one is observing it" way, is rather an error from how our minds functions
It is simply that emergent consequences form when a complex system reaches hyper-complexity
The key here is that instead of looking inwards to try to understand these emergent properties, we need to observe other places where complexity exists and see such behaviors over time.
If we agree that there aren't any religious and supernatural aspects of reality, then we are part of nature/reality and we function the same as all other organic matter around us.
In relation to what I wrote above, our consciousness is a hyper-complex ecosystem that is self-aware of being such and this self-awareness is part of the emerging abilities out of this system.
So….anything I said find a place in your analytic idealism?
It is merely a claim. It is not a theoretical or metaphysical issue, but an actual practical one
Your metaphysical assumptions are an impediment.
This is nonsense. First, Aristotle's physics rests on its own metaphysical assumptions. Second, if you want to hamstring science by requiring it to adhere to the authority of Aristotle, you are too late. If Aristotle were alive today his physics would look quite different.
So, first you fault science for smuggling in metaphysics and then appeal to metaphysical theories.
The fact of the matter is that advances being made in neuroscience do not get tangled up in metaphysical questions of substance monism, dualism, pluralism.
Speculative ontology is not something I take seriously beyond its limited entertainment value.
I am arguing that the claim that the universe is experiential in essence is, as I said, not something we experience or know.
Glad to hear names like Kastrup coming up in this medium!
It's the first time since about two years ago when I joined TPF ...
So I would llike to know where does "What are your thoughts" refer to.
From a few replies I read from other people, they don't seem to have such a "problem". But I have!
Yes there is an alternative explanation (in fact, there are many): idealist will argue that the brain states are extrinsic representations of the mental states. Substance dualism argues they are two independent things. Physicalists argue that the mental state is an intrinsic (or extrinsic depending on how one wants to view there qualia) representation of brain states. The hard problem is only a hard problem for physicalists, and different views (like idealism and substance dualism) attempt to provide a metaphysical theory that be rid us of the problem. — Bob Ross
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