I'll put it this way: there can be matter without mind but not mind without matter. — Fooloso4

But then, one of the factors that has undermined materialism in the 20th Century is that science has not really been able to arrive at a definitive account of matter. And that furthermore, the attempt to do so opened the whole can of worms that is quantum theory and its related 'observer problem'. As is well known, even early in the last century James Jeans and Arthur Eddington interpreted these discoveries as more supportive of the primacy of mind - you know, 'the stuff of the world is mind-stuff', and 'the world seems more like a great mind than a great machine'. Werner Heisenberg argued that the implications of quantum physics were more suggestive of Plato than Democritus. And so on. As I said, a can of worms, although Bernardo Kastrup has quite a bit to say on it - see his Physics is pointing inexorably towards mind (which incidentally takes a shot at the much touted 'information realism')

Agreed, but with respect to the case at hand, the form of the perceived, but as yet undetermined, object, is not the same as the shape of it, which is its extension in space and belongs to the object alone. — Mww

As having "extension in space" is simply how we represent objects, conceptually. "Space" is conceptual, or intuitive, as a tool of representation, it really has no place outside of the mind. What is out there, is surely not "space" as we conceive of "space". So unless we say that the object only exists within the mind, like space only exists within the mind, then we cannot truthfully sat that "space belongs to the object".

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would answer that they are ‘connected’ in the sense that they are perceiving the same objective world: it just isn’t fundamentally a physical world. — Bob Ross

So, you agree there is a mind-independent world, you just don't agree that it is physical? I have no argument with that since the definition of 'physical' derives from how things appear to us: tangible and measurable.

I think Kant's claim that we don't know what things are in themselves stands, and if physicality is an attribute of things as they are sensorially perceived, then imputing that to things as they are unperceived would seem to be a category error.

Saying that things are fundamentally mental is an example of the same kind of category error, because 'mental' is a term denoting how certain phenomena: thoughts, feelings, volitions and so on, seem to us. That is to say they seem to be different than the objects of the senses in that they seem intangible and are not measurable.

I agree that science will not explain, nor is it its business to, but a reductive physicalism is required, by their own view, to expect neuroscience to explain it one day. — Bob Ross

The subjective 'feels' of experience cannot be explained by science and it is hard to see how science could explain exhaustively how neural processes can give rise to those subjective feels, since the former are third person observable processes and the latter are not; meaning that the former can be reductively modeled in a mechanical or causal way, and the latter cannot, which makes it seem as though there will always be am unbridgeable explanatory gap. I have never heard a convincing argument that this gap can somehow be crossed by an explanation that holds together on both sides of it, so to speak. It seems to me an issue of basic incommensurability.

That it would be, to summarize, a category error to class the in-itself as either physical or mental entails, I think, that we have good reason to eschew any form of ontological dualism. So, I see monism, the idea that there are not ontologically different categories of being or substance, as the most rational conclusion to hold to.

Thank you Bob for this extensive and very informative reply! :up:

I see: are you an idealist? — Bob Ross

I'm certainly not a materialist. However I cannot call myself an "idealist" either. Besides, there are different kinds of "idealism"! And even then I cannot identify or confine myself with(in) any of them.
See what happens, here ... My reality, my view of the world --as I have often expressed in here and elsewhere-- is mainly based on experiencing and reasoning. But then, these may be considered in conflict: one belongs to "empiricism" and the other to "rationalism", which are considered if not opposite, different philosophies! So, if you find a philosophical term that combines both these two kinds of philosphical views, I would be much obliged! :grin:
(That was indeed a long answer to an apparently simple question! :grin:)

idealism’s weak point prima facea is that it doesn’t give an incredibly detailed depiction of consciousness, which it is positing as fundamental. — Bob Ross

:up: Thanks for this. It explains a lot. I thought it was only a "local", personal phenomenon. :grin:

Every metaphysical must stop its explanation at something which is metaphysically necessary, and for idealism it is mind. — Bob Ross

Nice. See, I don't know these things. I have never studied or talked extensively about "idealism", or any "ism" for that matter. I was never interested. But it is alsways good to know.

However, Eastern philosophers, as well as Western ones who have borrowed elements from Eastern philosophy, as I have already mentioned, talk a lot about metaphysical subjects but they almost always offer a detailed description of as well as examples for them. Which means that metaphysics have not necessary to be only theoretical or exclusively just a mental endeavor.

So there’s going to be a bit of obscurity in how it works not only because we have been living in a physicalist world so long that we haven’t bother to try and look for explanations in mind but also because we are trying to understand the bedrock of reality (which is certainly much harder to understand than entities within phenomenal experience). — Bob Ross

Nicely put. Yet, "obscurity" and lack of explanation for me means lack of real undestanding. And this holds for both physical and non-physical things. I always refer to Einstein her, who said "If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough.” I'm very positive in this.

distinction between being “in consciousness” and “having consciousness” — Bob Ross

Yes, I know that. Yet, it does not explain what "consciousness" is. This was my point.

I don’t think Kastrup claims to know exactly how all of consciousness works, — Bob Ross

That's fair. I don't think that anyone can know exactly how consciousness works. But there are a few I know that have descibed this quite well and in a plausible way.
The difficulty maybe lies mainly on the fact that "Consciousness can only be experienced" as I often say. And I base this on my extensive knowledge about the mind and how it works as well as my experiencing of awareness. (Still, I can safely say, as general description, that consciousness is perception. I believe that this says a lot.)

Yet, onece more, the Eastern traditional philosophy has a lot more to say on the subject. And, from what I know, all descriptions are based on personal experience --or better, "experiencing", as I say-- and what these experiences have revealed to some wise individuals. But this of course is far from our scientific world, for which "experience" means nothing.

I think he would say that consciousness is, at its base, mental events “interacting” with each other ... — Bob Ross

Interesting view.

“consciousness proper”, under analytic idealism, is not to be confused with physicalist usages of the term “consciousness” — Bob Ross

Certainly not. As I say, to explain what Science considers "consciouness", is that it is talking about bodily consciouness, i.e., based on senses, with anesthesiologists being the experts on the subject. :grin:

Under analytic idealism, consciousness can be attributed to the entirety of your being, including your organic processes that you don’t directly control, and the aspects that are within your every day-to-day experience — Bob Ross

Right.

I am also not convinced that the entirety of myself is an illusion, but can get on board with the ego being an illusion — Bob Ross

I'm glad to hear that! :smile:

We are concretely separate from others and the universal mind in the sense that two whirlpools in the same body of water are distinct but yet made of the same water. — Bob Ross

Nice! :up:

Unlike non-conscious objects, it is very clear (in a non-arbitrary way) where my conscious experience ends and yours begins if we were to touch hands. There is no illusion here.
... We reassimilate into nature, which is what I would expect and not that we are illusions. — Bob Ross

Nice!

***

That's a great and fruitful exchange, Bob!

A stone carried along in a river will either continue on downstream or get stuck if it bumps up against some other object or objects depending on its shape. — Fooloso4

The stone either moves along with the current or not. This happens whether we observe it or not. — Fooloso4

I've thought some more about this. The same principle applies to all phenomenal experiences whatever. Stones move, mountains form, things get taken from the fridge. Philosophical idealism plainly has to be able to account for the fact that things appear to exist in our absence and without our knowledge. The basis of the idealist argument is all such phenomena still occur within experience - including the objective evidence of the age or location of the object. If you show the same things to to me, then they will also appear in my experience, and I can validate what they are along with any number of people (although not necessarily with other kinds of intelligences, which I'll leave aside). That is inter-subjective agreement, and a highly effective heuristic.

Now the philosophical problem is that you can't therefore say with absolute certainty that there is something beyond that experience, beyond the phenomena, which is the source of, and independent of, your experience of it. Materialism accounts for that, by saying that there is something called matter that is the cause of all these experiences, that exists independently . But what matter is, as distinct from what it appears to be, is the point at issue! If we break anything down - the stone or whatever - the we see the fragments it breaks into, but these too appear within experience. We can assume that all those things exist outside experience - when nobody is looking - but it will only ever be an assumption drawn from experience. This, as one of the sources I noted above mentions, can also be regarded as a strict form of empiricism (namely, phenomenalism, of which Berkeley is an example.)

But as we're talking about the real existence of material objects, then plainly the arbiter of that claim must be physics. And that is precisely where the assumption of an independently-existing domain of real objects has been challenged (torpedoed, many would say). Why was Albert Einstein obliged to ask Abraham Pais, 'does the moon continue to exist when nobody's looking at it?' Of course, he believed it did and it was a kind of rhetorical question - but what compelled him to have to ask it? (There's a very big story behind that.)

It is not coincidence that in all traditional metaphysics you see the theme: The truth that is spoken is no longer the truth. — TheMadMan

Would make for a very sparsely populated philosophy forum, however.

This is worth a watch. At 6:30 he addresses the pre-existence of the Universe.

I don’t think our mind works materialistic: I think that the modernist era has produced a predominant metaphysical view in favor of materialism. Also, why would our mind working materialistically entail duality? Are you saying materialism entails irreductive materialism? — Bob Ross

By materialistic I don't mean the materialism worldview.
By materialistic I mean the mind obeys space-time.
The thinking mind works in time through space albeit at a subtler level than gross matter.
This functioning of the mind in space-time entails duality since non-duality is beyond spacetime.

If you have noticed, scientists, artists, religious people tend to report that in the moment of their greatest creativity the mind "stops functioning" and something else, a muse, a spirit, god, the universe etc. works through them.
Of course this is poetic and all but for me it suggest that consciousness (in humans) can work in two ways: 1. the duality of mind (spacetime) and 2. the non-duality of non-mind (spacetime-less).

Do you mean that metaphysical theories evolve? Or that they don’t give absolute truth? — Bob Ross

I mean that you simply cannot express it fully since systems of thought will always be limited.
And yes in different periods of human history it has to adapt and evolve to make sense.

Would make for a very sparsely populated philosophy forum, however. — Wayfarer

Philosophy is like being in a dark room and looking for a black cat.
Metaphysics is like being in a dark room and looking for a black cat that isn't there.
Theology is like being in a dark room and looking for a black cat that isn't there, and shouting "I found it!"
Science is like being in a dark room looking for a black cat while using a flashlight.
Social Science is like being in a dark room suspecting from the beginning that there is a black cat somewhere, and emerging from the room with scratches on the forearm as vindication.

:lol: :lol:

That it would be, to summarize, a category error to class the in-itself as either physical or mental entails, I think, that we have good reason to eschew any form of ontological dualism. So, I see monism, the idea that there are not ontologically different categories of being or substance, as the most rational conclusion to hold to. — Janus

So you describe two distinct categories, the physical/mental and the independent, then you conclude monism. That doesn't make any sense. How can you claim these two distinct categories, and the ensuing category mistakes you refer to, then conclude no ontologically different categories (monism)?

Could you elaborate on the proof? — Bob Ross

There isn’t a proof, per se, only an internal affirmative logical consistency.

Yes, I could elaborate on the rationality justifying the categories, but to do so is a foray into the seriously transcendental, which may be a different idealism then is represented in the theme of your thread. And even if it isn’t that different, the categories are a few magnitudes of depth below what’s been presented in your thesis so far.
————-

As having "extension in space" is simply how we represent objects, conceptually. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really. Having extension in space is that by which objects are sensed and represented intuitively as phenomena. Objects represented conceptually is that by which they are thought. Technically, albeit theory-specific, re: intrinsic human cognitive duality, having successions in time is how we represent objects conceptually, space not being a condition for conceptual representation.

we cannot truthfully sat that "space belongs to the object" — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Extension belongs to an object, space does not. Shape, then, just is the kind or degree of extension it possesses.

The same principle applies to all phenomenal experiences whatever. Stones move, mountains form, things get taken from the fridge. — Wayfarer

There is a difference between a stone or mountain and phenomenal experience.

The basis of the idealist argument is all such phenomena still occur within experience — Wayfarer

By definition the phenomena occur within experience.

If you show the same things to to me, then they will also appear in my experience, — Wayfarer

The things shown and their appearance in your experience are not the same. The phenomenal experience is of the thing shown.

"Space" is conceptual, or intuitive, as a tool of representation, it really has no place outside of the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Distance between Moon and Earth is in our heads...? :chin:

I think the case for idealism is greatly strengthened by the failure of the materialism/physicalism model to give a coherent answer on machine intelligence. We will soon reach a point where people will want to know whether these Ai's are conscious or not and science will be unable to figure it out.

Intelligence and consciousness are not the same.

Suppose it gets to the point where there is general agreement that AI has become conscious. This would weaken rather than strengthen the case for idealism.

Suppose it gets to the point where there is general agreement that AI has become conscious. This would weaken rather than strengthen the case for idealism. — Fooloso4

How is that agreement going to come about? I don't think it will happen. There will be panpsychists arguing with eliminative materialists arguing with computationalists, etc. Thre's a consensus now, because we're all pretty much built the same way and we can point to a lot of neural correlates (even thought I think that's mistaking causation with correlation, but nevermind). How is that going to apply to machines? Are scientists going to point to lines of code and say, "this is where the computer's conscious experience of vision happens"?

How is that agreement going to come about? — RogueAI

Start by banning the philosophers.

Seriously, general agreement, if and when it occurs, might be along the same lines as has occurred with animal consciousness. There are some who still deny that a dog, for example, is conscious, but they are now in the minority.

There are some who still deny that a dog, for example, is conscious, but they are now in the minority. — Fooloso4

Yeah, but again, that's because animals have sophisticated brains like us. That all goes out the window with machines.

Distance between Moon and Earth is in our heads...? :chin: — jorndoe

take the time to watch Andrei Linde, above.

The things shown and their appearance in your experience are not the same. The phenomenal experience is of the thing shown. — Fooloso4

How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself?

How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer

It is a logical or phenomenological distinction.

How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer

I differential, as you did, between the thing I show to you and what will also appear in your experience. I can hold that thing and bring it to you, but cannot hold what appears in your experience.

The things shown and their appearance in your experience are not the same. The phenomenal experience is of the thing shown. — Fooloso4

If I were an auto salesperson, what would I make of this in my everyday experience? Would it make a difference were I to be a mathematician?

I can hold that thing and bring it to you, but cannot hold what appears in your experience. — Fooloso4

But the object is what appears in experience - what you and I see, touch, hold, carry, and so on. Hence it is designated a 'phenomenal object' existing in both your experience and mine. The question is the sense in which the object exists apart from or outside of that. I think what you're wanting to say is that the object persists in the absence of any observer, which is what I am saying is a presumption. How do you differentiate between the object as it is in itself, and as it appears to us? That is the question.

...the question you asked for: “can physicalism possibly account for qualia under its reductive physicalist methodological approach without appeal to an obscurity?”. That is essentially the question that expresses the hard problem of consciousness. If one answers not, then it is a hard problem; however, if they answer yes, then it is a soft problem. — Bob Ross

Without appeal to obscurity, reductive physicalist approaches can account for qualia at least as well as any other position. I would argue better than, especially if obscurity is unacceptable.

There's a need for you to elaborate on exactly what counts as qualia, for that is precisely what any approach is supposed to be taking account of. So, it seems we need to set out a bare minimum criterion for exactly what counts as qualia, such that if some candidate or other satisfies the criterion, then it counts as qualia.

The position you're working from and/or arguing in favor of presupposes that there is a distinction between biological machinery doing it's job and so-called 'subjective' experience.

I'm also quite unsure of the invocation of 'mechanical awareness', in terms of AI or something akin. I've not likened experience to that, nor would I. It's a red herring. Unnecessary distraction.

Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for?

How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer

Cannot be done. Noumena are untenable. In order to know that what appears is not the way things are(the thing in itself), one must have access to both what appears and the thing in itself in order to perform comparative analysis, and determine that the one is not the other. Given that Noumena, by definition, are what we do not have access to... there can be no comparison. No way to know.

:fire:

:100:

:up:

Not really. Having extension in space is that by which objects are sensed and represented intuitively as phenomena. Objects represented conceptually is that by which they are thought. Technically, albeit theory-specific, re: intrinsic human cognitive duality, having successions in time is how we represent objects conceptually, space not being a condition for conceptual representation. — Mww

But space is conceptual. We do not sense space we think it. It might be the way that we make sense of, or understand our sensations as sensations of objects with spatial extension, and space between them, but space really is not part of the sensation.

I believe the issue here is the nature of objects. It may be the case that space is required for the conception of "objects", as a principle of individuation, which is necessary to separate one object from another, but we do not actually sense objects. Objects as well as space are conceptual. We do not sense anything which is object, like we do sense taste, smell, colour, sound, etc., Object is something created by the mind, conceptually, and so is space.

So I think it is only from this misunderstanding, the idea that we sense objects, that the idea that space is required for sensation is derived. So all these ideas, "object|", extension", and "space", are all conceptual, and not at all sensed, because none of them is proper to any particular sense, they are proper to the mind, as apprehended by the mind rather than the senses.

Distance between Moon and Earth is in our heads...? :chin: — jorndoe

If you know the distance between here and earth, it's in your head. I don't, so it's not in my head. Of course distance is something in human heads, it's a value, something measured. There is no value without the measurement.

:down:

↪180 Proof :down: — Metaphysician Undercover

:lol:

Right, it is merely a logical or conceptual distinction, and according to its own lights cannot ever be anything more than that. And yet the distinction seems to be the catalyst for so much speculation. Given the completely unknowable character of the noumena as it is defined can it provide any cogent grounds for such speculation?

What I'm arguing is that 'how the object appears' is dependent on the observer. 'What it is' can be specified in the case of physical objects, in terms of its quantifiable attributes, which appear to be observer-independent, but may better be thought of as 'measurably consistent for any observer' (since their observer-independent nature has been called into question by quantum physics.)

as per the quote provided by Tom Storm:

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned. — Dan Zahavi (quoting Hillary Putham)

Zahavi is a phenomenologist, and this, (along with 'enactivism' and 'embodied cognition') brings home the fundamental importance of the subject as subject - not as an object of analysis by biological or neurological sciences, but as a subject who brings a perspective to the world. By contrast, many forns of naturalism presumes that 'the world' exists just as it is, whether observed or not, outside of any perspective (which, I think, is Sellars’ ‘myth of the given’). That is the conceit of naturalism, with it's appeal to common sense and the implicit reliance on what 'everyone knows must be true'.