in other words, secondary and primary qualities, respectively. :up:What I'm arguing is that 'how the object appears' is dependent on the observer. 'What it is' can be specified in the case of physical objects, in terms of its quantifiable attributes, which appear to be observer-independent, but may better be thought of as 'measurably consistent for any observer' ... — Wayfarer
The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36
Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".
If I were an auto salesperson, what would I make of this in my everyday experience? — jgill
Would it make a difference were I to be a mathematician? — jgill
But the object is what appears in experience ... — Wayfarer
How do you differentiate between the object as it is in itself, and as it appears to us? That is the question. — Wayfarer
These properties, if we talk about them as objects, are better classified as imaginary, fictional objects, because we cannot seem to be able to give them proper independent existence in practise.
How it appears to me might be different from how it appears to you. How it appears might be different under different conditions. Are we talking about the same object or different objects when there is a difference in appearance? — Fooloso4
I think the central issue here is in how we separate objects from their environment. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thoughts? — wonderer1
The mind-independent world is not naturally divided into individual parts: At the most fundamental level, we can say that external reality is a continuous flow of ongoing cosmic process. Consequently, facts or events in the sense of individual happenings do not exist in the universe at large. When you speak of a fact or event, you mean something bounded that has been lifted out of the flow of continuous activity. Since a fact must be very precisely extruded from the background, this requires that the observer who lifts it out have a purpose—a motive for undertaking to extract this one particular thing. In a universe without an observer having a purpose, you cannot have facts. As you may judge from this, a fact is something far more complex than it appears to be at first sight. In order for a fact to exist, it must be preceded by a segmentation of the world into separate things, and requires a brain that is able to extract it from the background in which it is immersed. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p92)
Right, it is merely a logical or conceptual distinction, and according to its own lights cannot ever be anything more than that. And yet the distinction seems to be the catalyst for so much speculation. Given the completely unknowable character of the noumena as it is defined can it provide any cogent grounds for such speculation? — Janus
Something that occurs to me in respect of this argument: when people say they're 'sceptics' in this day and age, you can bet your boots they generally mean 'scientific sceptics', i.e. they will question anything for which there isn't or may not be scientific evidence. Yet 'scientific scepticism' generally starts with the firm belief that the 'sensory domain' (a.k.a. 'the natural realm') is inherently real. They're never sceptical about the obvious reality of the sensory domain in a manner that is very different to the ancient sceptics
In Chalmers own words, from "The Hard Problem of Consciousness":
This example works against your claim. If I am anesthetized I do not dream. Signals in the nervous system are blocked.
So, you agree there is a mind-independent world, you just don't agree that it is physical?
I have no argument with that since the definition of 'physical' derives from how things appear to us: tangible and measurable.
I think Kant's claim that we don't know what things are in themselves stands
Saying that things are fundamentally mental is an example of the same kind of category error, because 'mental' is a term denoting how certain phenomena: thoughts, feelings, volitions and so on, seem to us. That is to say they seem to be different than the objects of the senses in that they seem intangible and are not measurable.
meaning that the former can be reductively modeled in a mechanical or causal way, and the latter cannot, which makes it seem as though there will always be am unbridgeable explanatory gap.
I have never heard a convincing argument that this gap can somehow be crossed by an explanation that holds together on both sides of it
On the other hand, as an electrical engineer, it seems rather ludicrous to think that we are having a discussion via the internet, yet there is no external reality. — wonderer1
So, if you find a philosophical term that combines both these two kinds of philosphical views, I would be much obliged!
However, Eastern philosophers, as well as Western ones who have borrowed elements from Eastern philosophy, as I have already mentioned, talk a lot about metaphysical subjects but they almost always offer a detailed description of as well as examples for them
Yet, "obscurity" and lack of explanation for me means lack of real undestanding. And this holds for both physical and non-physical things.
Yes, I know that. Yet, it does not explain what "consciousness" is. This was my point.
But there are a few I know that have descibed this quite well and in a plausible way.
Still, I can safely say, as general description, that consciousness is perception
By materialistic I don't mean the materialism worldview.
By materialistic I mean the mind obeys space-time.
1. the duality of mind (spacetime) and 2. the non-duality of non-mind (spacetime-less)
I mean that you simply cannot express it fully since systems of thought will always be limited.
And yes in different periods of human history it has to adapt and evolve to make sense.
There isn’t a proof, per se, only an internal affirmative logical consistency.
Yes, I could elaborate on the rationality justifying the categories, but to do so is a foray into the seriously transcendental, which may be a different idealism then is represented in the theme of your thread.
Without appeal to obscurity, reductive physicalist approaches can account for qualia at least as well as any other position.
I would argue better than, especially if obscurity is unacceptable.
There's a need for you to elaborate on exactly what counts as qualia, for that is precisely what any approach is supposed to be taking account of
The position you're working from and/or arguing in favor of presupposes that there is a distinction between biological machinery doing it's job and so-called 'subjective' experience.
I'm also quite unsure of the invocation of 'mechanical awareness', in terms of AI or something akin. I've not likened experience to that, nor would I. It's a red herring. Unnecessary distraction.
Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for?
Without appeal to obscurity, reductive physicalist approaches can account for qualia at least as well as any other position. I would argue better than, especially if obscurity is unacceptable. — creativesoul
I disagree: it can’t account for it at all. — Bob Ross
Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for? — creativesoul
...my claim is not that they can’t account for a particular subgroup of qualia but, rather, all of it. — Bob Ross
We're very much conditioned to be oriented with respect to the objective domain - the process of 'objectification'. It's woven into the fabric of the culture. If you read some of the idealist philosophers - Berkeley and Schopenhauer, for example - you will see they are quite sane and sober individuals.
Well, as above shows nicely, you've just contradicted yourself.
I'm not sure what you're claiming
Perhaps it's better to take this slowly. Our respective positions are very different, and that seems to be on a foundational/fundamental level. Right now, I'm just wanting to ensure that I am aiming at the right target, so to speak. So, I ask...
Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for?
Not a single mental event is explained as actually produced by brain states nor could it be explained in that reductive physicalist manner. All they can do is point to another correlation (or causation) between mental and physical states which doesn’t further progress the physicalistic explanation of qualia.
The process of objectification goes deeper than cultural conditioning — wonderer1
What problem do you have with positing the physical as an outward expression of the mental? — Bob Ross
It is a foundational unprovable assumption/premiss, resting its laurels on terminological consistency(coherence) and/or 'logical' possibility alone(scarequotes intentional).
Indeed, there are all sorts of things that could be said to follow from it, if accompanied by some other premisses, but - by my lights anyway - 'logical' possibility alone does not warrant belief, and untenability is completely unacceptable. — creativesoul
I didn’t find anything I disagree with in the quote from Chalmers you made: was there something in it you thought is a problem for my view? — Bob Ross
The question of why and how biological functions give rise to experience has everything to do with science!
What you described here is a purported soft problem of consciousness, — Bob Ross
It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.
The physical “transmission” is the extrinsic representation of the mental. — Bob Ross
Secondly, anesthesia causing you to not dream and the signals in the nervous system being blocking thereby is expected under idealism too — Bob Ross
Anesthesia, like everything else, is fundamentally mental under idealism ... — Bob Ross
...the outward expression of the mental idea of anesthesia disrupting your mind — Bob Ross
Another significant problem I have with the idea is that there is a huge body of consistent and coherent scientific evidence that tells us there we many cosmological events long before there were any minds. In order to accept the view that mind is fundamental I would need to discount all that evidence. — Janus
On the other hand, I think philosophy should provide the ability to explore the matter directly without needing to rely on neuroscientific research. After all, Socrates was recommended to 'know thyself' by the Oracle of Delphi, and I don't know if his endeavours were hampered by the absence of modern neuroscience.
Another thing to bear in mind are the discoveries of neuroplasticity and how neural configurations can be changed 'top-down' so to speak. Neuroplasticity has shown that mental activity influences brain structure, that engaging in specific mental activities, such as learning a new skill or practicing a particular cognitive task, can lead to structural changes in the brain. For example, studies have shown that individuals who learn to juggle experience an increase in gray matter volume in areas involved in motor control. Another fascinating study showed that subjects who learned to practice piano in their minds (i.e. no actual piano!) showed neurological changes similar to those who practiced with a piano (ref).
I suppose cultural conditioning might also affect neural configurations and not necessarily in a good way.
I agree(?) that the way our perceptual systems are apt to chunk stuff, and even sequences of events, into things tends to lead to misconceptions, but in many cases I would be more inclined to call 'things' being discussed "simplistic but epistemically pragmatic abstractions" rather than fictions. — wonderer1
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