We are biologically identical, to all intents and purposes. Sure, science can tell our DNA apart but from a biological perspective, we're both members of the same species, and all our fundamental biological traits are identical.
States only experienced by a conscious sentient being. Not an anaesthetized being, nor a corpse.
The point isn't that you cannot know what it is like to be a bat. The point is that there is something it is like to be a bat. And, while we are not aware of any consciousness that is independent of a brain's activity, knowing everything about a bat's brain's activity doesn't give us any insight on the bat's inner experience. It doesn't suggest the bat has any inner experience. It's all just physical processes.
The law of identity, the fact that I’m here and you’re there, the fact that you do not have a single cell I have, proves there is nothing about us that is identical. — NOS4A2
If I’m to avoid question-begging and deification, — NOS4A2
He (David Chalmers) gives the crowd what it wants. — apokrisis
I know what you mean. There are cases however, where the word "thing", although very general, is unsuitable. For example, I wouldn't use it to say "a conscious thing", since the word "conscious" refers to beings, living entities and the word "thing", although very general, normally refers to an object, i.e. something material, inanimate. I wouldn't say "conscious being" or "conscious creature" either, because it would be a pleonasm, since beings/creatures are conscious anyway. In these cases, I believe the word "entity" is more suitable, since it covers both living and non-living cases. So, I would say "speaking about a conscious entity" or, better, "speaking about consciousness".That thing is the object we need to analyze because it is that thing we are speaking about when we speak about a conscious thing. — NOS4A2
Right.So in my opinion we need to abandon the question begging and the reification, not only because they are fallacious, but because they tend to lead us to false conclusions. — NOS4A2
Where in the animal kingdom does sentience begin? — Janus
I rather like the idea of, say, having an AI guide to Plato's Dialogues, which would read the text on demand, and then also provide commentary from authors of your choosing. I'm sure all this is going to be happening soon. — Wayfarer
You don't get academic tenure for that, — Wayfarer
I've come to realise the cogency of the 'philosophical zombies' argument, having always dismissed it up until now. — Wayfarer
The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not. — Wayfarer
Indeed. Which is why it's called "the hard problem of consciousness."I cannot assume inner lives because whenever we take a peak inside there is nothing of the sort in there. What we can see and what we can confirm is that there is biology in there, and this biology, its complexity, and the whole range of movements it makes are largely imperceptible to everyone involved. The fact that the phenomenology and the actuality differ so much suggests the one is unable to grasp or comprehend the other. — NOS4A2
There is no empirical way of telling that we are subjects of experience. No empirical explanation for why we are. No empirical explanation for why the physical things and processes that we see are not p-zombies.I've come to realise the cogency of the 'philosophical zombies' argument, having always dismissed it up until now. The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not. It shows that consciousness cannot be solely explained by physical processes because the physical processes that can were exhibited by those creatures the absence of subjective experience would provide no way of telling whether they were really subjects of experience or not. I still don't like the argument much, but at least I think I get it. — Wayfarer
Because macro characteristics/properties emerge from micro characteristics/properties. Whether we're looking at a characteristic (like liquidity) or process (like flight), we can see how it reduces to the micro. It doesn't seem reasonable that the macro characteristic of consciousness is not also reducible to micro characteristics. But what micro characteristics are things like subjective experience and the different types of awareness reducible to? Mass? Charge?Why jump from arguing that a flesh and blood person could in fact be a secret zombie to the conclusion that fundamental particles must therefore have the feels? — apokrisis
You may pursue a spiritual route if you wish. Not my cup of tea. I don't have a problem with that new name, but it doesn't help explain what I just said above.↪Patterner
Perhaps it should be called the hard problem of biology, but then it wouldn’t have that nice spiritual ring to it. — NOS4A2
The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not.
— Wayfarer
But why spin this epistemological argument as if it were a ontological one? — apokrisis
You may pursue a spiritual route if you wish. Not my cup of tea. I don't have a problem with that new name, but it doesn't help explain what I just said above.
I do not "assume" an inner life. I experience it. It is, in truth, the only thing I know is a fact. I don’t know that you have an inner life. I am willing to assume that you are like me in various ways, including being a human with an inner life. But you may try to prove me wrong if you want.If we do not assume “inner lives”, like Chalmers does, consciousness can be reduced to biology. In fact consciousness and biology are one and the same. The hard problem disappears and all that remains are the easy problems. — NOS4A2
I do not "assume" an inner life. I experience it. It is, in truth, the only thing I know is a fact. I don’t know that you have an inner life. I am willing to assume that you are like me in various ways, including being a human with an inner life. But you may try to prove me wrong if you want.
Because macro characteristics/properties emerge from micro characteristics/properties. — Patterner
Oh, and who? — Wayfarer
G. F. Stout argued that if epiphenomenalism (the more familiar name for the ‘conscious automaton’ theory) is true,
it ought to be quite credible that the constitution and course of nature would be otherwise just the same as it is if there were not and never had been any experiencing individuals. Human bodies would still have gone through the motions of making and using bridges, telephones and telegraphs, of writing and reading books, of speaking in Parliament, of arguing about materialism, and so on. There can be no doubt that this is prima facie incredible to Common Sense (Stout 1931: 138f.).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
A cone cell switches on when it exposed to dominantly “red” spectrum, and then signals the opposite when exposed to dominantly “green” spectrum. A neural correlation for reported experience is available in a way that makes complete explanatory sense. — apokrisis
No ontological conclusions are being drawn from it.
— frank
Panpsychism is an ontological claim. — apokrisis
The “evidence” is that standard physicalism or functionalism fail to explain consciousness - which is an epistemic claim. — apokrisis
Where in the animal kingdom does sentience begin? I find it plausible to think it begins with a CNS, which AIs currently lack.
But why is any experience at all correlated with that? — bert1
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