It doesn't even make metaphysical sense — apokrisis

Not if your metaphysics is physical, it don't.

We are biologically identical, to all intents and purposes. Sure, science can tell our DNA apart but from a biological perspective, we're both members of the same species, and all our fundamental biological traits are identical.

The law of identity, the fact that I’m here and you’re there, the fact that you do not have a single cell I have, proves there is nothing about us that is identical.

States only experienced by a conscious sentient being. Not an anaesthetized being, nor a corpse.

If I’m to avoid question-begging and deification, I’ll have to say the states and the conscious being are the same. Altering the state alters the consciousness for this reason, for instance with anaesthetics and death.

The point isn't that you cannot know what it is like to be a bat. The point is that there is something it is like to be a bat. And, while we are not aware of any consciousness that is independent of a brain's activity, knowing everything about a bat's brain's activity doesn't give us any insight on the bat's inner experience. It doesn't suggest the bat has any inner experience. It's all just physical processes.

I cannot assume inner lives because whenever we take a peak inside there is nothing of the sort in there. What we can see and what we can confirm is that there is biology in there, and this biology, its complexity, and the whole range of movements it makes are largely imperceptible to everyone involved. The fact that the phenomenology and the actuality differ so much suggests the one is unable to grasp or comprehend the other.

The law of identity, the fact that I’m here and you’re there, the fact that you do not have a single cell I have, proves there is nothing about us that is identical. — NOS4A2

That we're not the same people means nothing to a biologist.

If I’m to avoid question-begging and deification, — NOS4A2

I'll happily accept deification, thanks!

He (David Chalmers) gives the crowd what it wants. — apokrisis

You don't get academic tenure for that, and his books are certainly not written as crowd pleasers.

I've come to realise the cogency of the 'philosophical zombies' argument, having always dismissed it up until now. The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not. It shows that consciousness cannot be solely explained by physical processes because the physical processes that can were exhibited by those creatures the absence of subjective experience would provide no way of telling whether they were really subjects of experience or not. I still don't like the argument much, but at least I think I get it.

I don't find it at all plausible to think that a "creature" that looked exactly like a human, but had no internal self-model, would act like a human.

That thing is the object we need to analyze because it is that thing we are speaking about when we speak about a conscious thing. — NOS4A2

I know what you mean. There are cases however, where the word "thing", although very general, is unsuitable. For example, I wouldn't use it to say "a conscious thing", since the word "conscious" refers to beings, living entities and the word "thing", although very general, normally refers to an object, i.e. something material, inanimate. I wouldn't say "conscious being" or "conscious creature" either, because it would be a pleonasm, since beings/creatures are conscious anyway. In these cases, I believe the word "entity" is more suitable, since it covers both living and non-living cases. So, I would say "speaking about a conscious entity" or, better, "speaking about consciousness".

So in my opinion we need to abandon the question begging and the reification, not only because they are fallacious, but because they tend to lead us to false conclusions. — NOS4A2

Right.

Yes, I agree with you, and that's what I had always said. But what made me realise the cogency was the discussion about whether AI is sentient, which is kind of a hot-button topic. I mean, how could you tell if it had become sentient? Me, I don't believe it can or ever will, but the fact that it's a contested subject says something about the presence of consciousness not being empirically verifiable.

Yes, AI sentience, not to mention sapience, is a contentious issue. Where in the animal kingdom does sentience begin? I find it plausible to think it begins with a CNS, which AIs currently lack. I'll believe an AI is conscious when it spontaneously declares that it cares about anything. I don't think it is likely to ever happen, but I don't entirely dismiss the possibility. I think an AI would need to be able to feel pain and pleasure in order to care and to empathize. The cat's definitely out of the bag: no stopping it now, and we'll just have to wait and see how it all unfolds.

Where in the animal kingdom does sentience begin? — Janus

I am attracted by the idea that the emergence of life IS the emergence of sentience in the Universe. I found an Evan Thompson paper on that Could All Life be Sentient? (which I'm in the process of reading.)

But I agree that AI, no matter how powerful, is insentient, although clearly it can mimic some aspects of sentience. I've been using ChatGPT since the day it came out, and I can imagine it becoming ever more person-like in its responses - it already 'apologises for the confusion' and says 'thanks for providing additional context' and things like that. I rather like the idea of, say, having an AI guide to Plato's Dialogues, which would read the text on demand, and then also provide commentary from authors of your choosing. I'm sure all this is going to be happening soon.

I rather like the idea of, say, having an AI guide to Plato's Dialogues, which would read the text on demand, and then also provide commentary from authors of your choosing. I'm sure all this is going to be happening soon. — Wayfarer

I was thinking similarly re Heidegger. You could choose the AI guide of your preferences - the existentialist reading or the post-modern reading, say, and do immediate contrasts from the text. Do we need to get out more often?

I think it's just a much easier way of absorbing complex texts. (I've got the audio book of Being and Time, though haven't made a lot of progress with it yet.) But it would be great if Alexa or Siri could deal with exercise plans, reading material, meal planning, motivational talks, morning meditation topics.... Just tried Google Bard for the first time, I'm going to explore that also.

(Anyway, we're derailing, I will shutup now :yikes: )

:up: Lots of possibilities and hopefully not too many downsides...I haven't found myself attracted to using them much as yet...I wonder if I will

You don't get academic tenure for that, — Wayfarer

You’d be surprised. Bums on seats matter.

I've come to realise the cogency of the 'philosophical zombies' argument, having always dismissed it up until now. — Wayfarer

And who did Chalmers nick that from?

The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not. — Wayfarer

But why spin this epistemological argument as if it were a ontological one?

Why jump from arguing that a flesh and blood person could in fact be a secret zombie to the conclusion that fundamental particles must therefore have the feels?

Must admit I didn’t read that implication into it. Oh, and who?

I cannot assume inner lives because whenever we take a peak inside there is nothing of the sort in there. What we can see and what we can confirm is that there is biology in there, and this biology, its complexity, and the whole range of movements it makes are largely imperceptible to everyone involved. The fact that the phenomenology and the actuality differ so much suggests the one is unable to grasp or comprehend the other. — NOS4A2

Indeed. Which is why it's called "the hard problem of consciousness."

I've come to realise the cogency of the 'philosophical zombies' argument, having always dismissed it up until now. The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not. It shows that consciousness cannot be solely explained by physical processes because the physical processes that can were exhibited by those creatures the absence of subjective experience would provide no way of telling whether they were really subjects of experience or not. I still don't like the argument much, but at least I think I get it. — Wayfarer

There is no empirical way of telling that we are subjects of experience. No empirical explanation for why we are. No empirical explanation for why the physical things and processes that we see are not p-zombies.

Perhaps it should be called the hard problem of biology, but then it wouldn’t have that nice spiritual ring to it.

Why jump from arguing that a flesh and blood person could in fact be a secret zombie to the conclusion that fundamental particles must therefore have the feels? — apokrisis

Because macro characteristics/properties emerge from micro characteristics/properties. Whether we're looking at a characteristic (like liquidity) or process (like flight), we can see how it reduces to the micro. It doesn't seem reasonable that the macro characteristic of consciousness is not also reducible to micro characteristics. But what micro characteristics are things like subjective experience and the different types of awareness reducible to? Mass? Charge?

The pressure of a gas in a container is literally determined by the billions of individual particles bouncing into the walls. Of course, we don't calculate pressure particle-by-particle, because that's far too unwieldy. Still, that's what's happening.

We can explain why we reach for things in the same way. Vastly more unwieldy, since we have photons hitting retina, signal traveling along optic nerve to brain, triggering of physically stored information from previous instances of the same patterns of photons hitting the retina, action potentials, muscle contractions, and a million steps I didn't write down.

But none of that suggests why that system has a subjective experience of the event. And that's not at all the same question as why that system is aware of the event, of itself, and it's own awareness. Lacking the subjective experience and awareness would not stop the photons from hitting the retina, the signal from traveling along optic nerve to brain, from the triggering of physically stored information from previous instances of the same patterns of photons hitting the retina, from creating action potentials, from muscles contracting, or the million steps I didn't write down.

The answer doesn't have to be something like panprotopsychism. But particles interacting in the only ways they can, according to their properties and the four forces, don't have these characteristics, and don't need them to bring about those interactions.

↪Patterner

Perhaps it should be called the hard problem of biology, but then it wouldn’t have that nice spiritual ring to it. — NOS4A2

You may pursue a spiritual route if you wish. Not my cup of tea. I don't have a problem with that new name, but it doesn't help explain what I just said above.

The point of the argument is that if there were a creature that looked and acted like a human being, there would be no empirical way of telling whether they were subjects of experience or not.
— Wayfarer

But why spin this epistemological argument as if it were a ontological one? — apokrisis

It's not ontological. It's about whether an explanation of functional consciousness also explains phenomenal consciousness. No ontological conclusions are being drawn from it. It's about whether the job of science ends at explaining function.

You may pursue a spiritual route if you wish. Not my cup of tea. I don't have a problem with that new name, but it doesn't help explain what I just said above.

If we do not assume “inner lives”, like Chalmers does, consciousness can be reduced to biology. In fact consciousness and biology are one and the same. The hard problem disappears and all that remains are the easy problems.

If we do not assume “inner lives”, like Chalmers does, consciousness can be reduced to biology. In fact consciousness and biology are one and the same. The hard problem disappears and all that remains are the easy problems. — NOS4A2

I do not "assume" an inner life. I experience it. It is, in truth, the only thing I know is a fact. I don’t know that you have an inner life. I am willing to assume that you are like me in various ways, including being a human with an inner life. But you may try to prove me wrong if you want.

No ontological conclusions are being drawn from it. — frank

Panpsychism is an ontological claim. The “evidence” is that standard physicalism or functionalism fail to explain consciousness - which is an epistemic claim.

I do not "assume" an inner life. I experience it. It is, in truth, the only thing I know is a fact. I don’t know that you have an inner life. I am willing to assume that you are like me in various ways, including being a human with an inner life. But you may try to prove me wrong if you want.

This is naive theory of consciousness. You are unable to connect your “inner life” to your inner biology. You can’t see or feel past your senses to what is actually there and what is actually occurring, so you rely on what little fleeting sensations they offer you as as facts.

Because macro characteristics/properties emerge from micro characteristics/properties. — Patterner

As someone who studied both neurobiology and systems science, I can say that what we know is that life and mind are properties of systems that are biosemiotic. They have the new thing of internal codes with which to form an organismic modelling relation with their environments.

So the basic trick of it all is currently understood science. Genes and neurons result in “Bayesian brains” that model the world in predictive fashion. The reason it feels like something to be conscious is that we are busy modelling the world - a world in which our self is the enactive anchor of that model.

Any discussion of the hard problem has to deal with the current best theory as it stands. But studying contemporary neurobiology is so … hard. :roll:

Oh, and who? — Wayfarer

Zombies go back to GF Stout in the 1930s as an argument against epiphenomenalism. Chalmers retreaded them as “philosophical” zombies. That is, to legitimate a new epistemic line of attack … which he then didn’t follow through to the right conclusion.

G. F. Stout argued that if epiphenomenalism (the more familiar name for the ‘conscious automaton’ theory) is true,

it ought to be quite credible that the constitution and course of nature would be otherwise just the same as it is if there were not and never had been any experiencing individuals. Human bodies would still have gone through the motions of making and using bridges, telephones and telegraphs, of writing and reading books, of speaking in Parliament, of arguing about materialism, and so on. There can be no doubt that this is prima facie incredible to Common Sense (Stout 1931: 138f.).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/

The right conclusion, IMHO, is that what folk claim as a special problem for theories of consciousness is simply the general problem of all epistemology. Our understanding of reality - the pragmatic modelling relation we have with it - fails when theories run out of counterfactuals.

Theories have to have facts that can properly support them in the sense that those same facts can be known to be otherwise. Falsified, in short.

So we can chase the feeling of seeing red all the way down to the neurobiology of opponent channel processing. A cone cell switches on when it exposed to dominantly “red” spectrum, and then signals the opposite when exposed to dominantly “green” spectrum. A neural correlation for reported experience is available in a way that makes complete explanatory sense.

But then the next step - why does that red response “feel” just like red at that moment, and not anything else - can’t be answered, as the “anything else” is not being presented as a counterfactual of some further level of neural mechanicsm.

The theory has run out of road as a matter of its logical construction. And that is a general epistemic issue all theories share.

We can ask cosmology, “Why anything? Why not just nothing?”. It seems like a “gotcha” for the same reason.

To compound the methodological confusion, folk who push such rookie epistemic doubt then like to invent their substitute counterfactuals, like suggesting particles must have feels … even if in principle of course that could never be detected. Or brains are occupied by spirits … even if in principle no material evidence of spirit stuff could ever be recorded.

So science - as pragmatic reality modelling based on counterfactual logic - accepts its epistemic limits.

All the Hard Problem acolytes simply fail to understand that what they gleefully parade as the special problem for consciousness studies is just the usual problem for all rational epistemology.

They use this misunderstanding to push theories like Panpsychism - theories that are formally constructed in the mould of “theories that aren’t even wrong” - and also as an excuse not to invest time in contemporary theories of mind based on semiotics and the modelling relation.

A cone cell switches on when it exposed to dominantly “red” spectrum, and then signals the opposite when exposed to dominantly “green” spectrum. A neural correlation for reported experience is available in a way that makes complete explanatory sense. — apokrisis

But why is any experience at all correlated with that? Why can't that happen without an experience with it?

No ontological conclusions are being drawn from it.
— frank

Panpsychism is an ontological claim. — apokrisis

Panpsychism is not the conclusion of the p-zombie argument. The conclusion is that a functionalist will have to explain how an explanation of functional consciousness also explains phenomenal consciousness.

The “evidence” is that standard physicalism or functionalism fail to explain consciousness - which is an epistemic claim. — apokrisis

I don't know what "standard physicalism" has to do with this topic. The stance of a functionalist is that explaining function also explains phenomenal. Chalmer's p-zombie argument shows that the functionalist will have to explain how that works.

I think functionalism is mostly defunct at this point, so it's not a major bone of contention.

Where in the animal kingdom does sentience begin? I find it plausible to think it begins with a CNS, which AIs currently lack.

Something to be aware of, in thinking about this subject, is that neuromorphic hardware seems to be rapidly approaching a level of technological development that will dramatically increase the cognitive power of AIs as well as dramatically reduce the power consumption of AIs compared to the sort of systems making news today.

It appears inevitable that at some point in the not too distant future physical systems which are much closer analogies to a CNS will be feasible to build.

I'm inclined to agree that sentience won't arise in the sort of systems we see today, but I think it is highly likely that we ain't seen nothin yet.

I’m with you on all that. Except to recall that metaphysics, in the post-Kantian sense, comprises conjecture of what must be the case for the world to be as it is - what are the explanatory metaphors or paradigms that best account for what we experience as the world. But it has a broader remit than science, because its concerns include the subjective realm, it doesn’t stop at the analysis of objects and forces. That includes consideration of the human condition and its discontents, few of which are amenable to a strictly scientific formulation, and also where in the general scheme of things humanity belongs (from a broader perspective than is provided by evolutionary biology.)

As for the facing the hard problem of consciousness argument, it is aimed specifically at the kind of physicalism paraded about by Daniel Dennett et al, and I think it does a perfectly good job of puncturing it - something that I don’t think this particular OP comes to terms with in my view.

But why is any experience at all correlated with that? — bert1

Always the same refrain. And always the same answer.

I provided you with a counterfactually-framed theory – "consciousness" is a neural model of a world with "us" in it. There is no life or mind – no organism – without this general natural thing of a neurobiological modelling relation, a process of semiosis that produces a felt Umwelt.

So now you have to give a good counterfactual reason for why it wouldn't "feel like something" to be modelling the world from a point of view. Where is the scope for reasoned doubt.

The fact you simply don't understand the science is not a reasonable source of such doubt.