Would say that Kant thought we could gather knowledge of the world (…) or he thought that we could never acquire such knowledge (…)? — Bob Ross
To me, Kant goes dangerously close to (if not actually argues for cryptically for) epistemic solipsism. — Bob Ross
How does Kant even know, if he cannot know anything about things-in-themselves, that his mind is representing objects — Bob Ross
Why not “the unknown which may not be an object at all”? — Bob Ross
….we only come to realize that our minds are the best explanation for the production of the conscious experiences we have which, in turn, show us that we are representing something…. — Bob Ross
…..but this doesn’t work if one is positing that all of it is mere phenomenon that cannot furnish them with knowledge of things-in-themselves — Bob Ross
one can’t even argue that their mind is representing anything but rather that there’s just given conscious experiences. — Bob Ross
The only thing I will say now is that the universal mind, under Analytic Idealism, doesn’t will them completely into our representations: there are “objective” ideas that our faculty tries represent (and depending on how well that faculty is, it may not be represented all that accurately) — Bob Ross
So, if our brains are representations like anything else, then how can consciousness be said to reside there?
If the brain is a representation, then the consciousness that seems to reside there, and the self-model that comes with it must also be representations.
The question then is what is doing the representing? Perhaps nothing? Or everything?
Technically, it is only knowledge of representations, hence not of the world per se
…
The world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does in our own, so it is obvious there is a major distinction between the two.
If it is to say epistemic solipsism is the notion that the only absolutely certain knowledge is that which belongs to the subject capable of it
Sensations. The thing of sensation is the same thing as the thing of the ding an sich.
It is an object for the sake of communication, for talking about it.
Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.
All of it, re: conscious experience, is not phenomenon, and experience, as a methodological terminus, is not itself a mere representation. In Kant, the last rendition of a representation is in judgement, an aspect of understanding, which, in the form of a logical syllogism, is way back at the point of the manifold of minor premises, whereas experience stands as the conclusion.
With respect to representations, on the other hand, how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?
From the little I know about you and have gathered from you, this has taken me by surprise!You might expect that. I don't expect that. The majority of the medical community does not expect that. The majority of those working in cognitive science do not expect that. — Fooloso4
Are you a materialist? — Alkis Piskas
In other words, disembodied consciousness (i.e. spirits) :roll:
I like this question. I suspect that Kastrup would say that consciousness manifests as a brain, in a skull, in a body, in a world when viewed across the dissociative divide. It's just the form it appears to come in. Given that legs are as illusory as brains, I guess the functionality implied in a 'physical' body is a kind of combined hallucination to begin with. That's all I got.... — Tom Storm
how can you know that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does? — Bob Ross
I don’t see how you can know that there are other people with minds that have the same kind of a priori understanding (in Kant’s terms) that produces representations…..
Again, we don’t, in the strictest sense of knowledge. It is just abysmally counterproductive and quite irrational, to posit that they don’t. Logical inference a priori grants all human have minds; experience grants a posteriori only that they act like they do.
…..that requires a metaphysical jump into the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
”Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.
-Mww
Your first sentence here suggests you agree that phenomena give us access to things-in-themselves to some degree — Bob Ross
….how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?
-Mww
We are within the ‘objective’ world of the mind-at-large and, as such, we come to know that the reality in which we reside is superordinate; and this is distinguished by our intuitive distinctions between what is a part of our will vs. a port of another’s will vs. a part of a will greater than ours. — Bob Ross
By ontology I understand the consititutive, necessary and sufficient conditions of all human practices; therefore, it makes most sense to "subscribe" to naturalism (à la Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Dewey ... )Out of curiosity, what ontology would you subscribe to? — Bob Ross
I think "consciousness" – phenomenal self modeling – supervenes on the brain's neurological systems bodily interacting with its local environment.Do you think that consciousness can be provably determined as reducible to brain states?
Well, for starters, I don't find any compelling reasons to believe that entities such as "ghosts" or "spirits" exist (except in fictions) and so "positing a Universal Spirit" seems to me merely an ad hoc projection of wishful or magical thinking akin to e.g. aether, phlogiston, chi, juju, mojo, astral planes, "The Force", etc. "Universal Spirit" certainly is not parsimonious, probably violates conservation laws and as a conjecture does not explain anything.What problems do you find with positing a Universal Spirit?
I guess you must believe that thoughts, ideas, memory, knowledge, emotions and all mental activities and contents of the mind in general are composed of matter — Alkis Piskas
In your previous answer you talked about "particular things that are ascribed to materialism might not stick". But mental things are not just "particular" things. They consist a whole world, in contrast with the material one!See my previous answer ... — Fooloso4
In your previous answer you talked about "particular things that are ascribed to materialism might not stick". But mental things are not just "particular" things. They consist a whole world, in contrast with the material one! — Alkis Piskas
Of course not. I talked about my specific question "Are you a materialist?". If not anything else it's too general. And one may also identify to it only in part, as I undestood you do. In fact only (conventional) scientists I think can full identify with it. And ... about 80% of the people in TPF! :smile: (Based on a poll that I conducted out a long time ago.)Nothing wrong with asking someone where they stand on an issue — Fooloso4
I agree. I believe QM is responsible for that. Matter, as we new it until then was something very concrete and tangible. Yet, even so, I believe we can still differentiate between physical and non-physical, animate and inanimate things. We can also use the terms life, beings, organisms, existence, etc. as opposed to objects. In this way mabe we can avoid using the term "matter".The term "matter" has become problematic — Fooloso4
Are you implying the difference in knowledge from the human olden days to the human current days, is a reflection of a changing world? If so, sure, why not. That lightning came from angry gods reflected the ontological status of the old world, lightning as electrostatic discharge reflects the ontological status of the current world. It is impossible to prove or disprove the world changed on the whim of a universal mind.
How do we know? We don’t, but we raise more questions by supposing our changing knowledge reflects a changing world, then we do if we suppose the world stays constant and it is our knowledge that changes.
We got the whole passel of folks, all through the ages, experiencing a certain thing, in exactly the same way, when they push the very same kind of round something down a hill. Basic mathematics hasn’t changed since the invention of numbers.
Only if the thing-in-itself is conceptually maligned, usually by invoking a theory that defines it differently or finds no need of such a thing, than the theory in which it was originally contained.
Nope. You said conscious experience is the representation of something. It isn’t representation, its knowledge. Conscious experience is knowledge of something, whether a determined something or just a plain ol’ something, depends on whether or not the tripartite logical part of the system, the proper cognitive part, comprised of understanding, judgement, and reason (but not intuition or consciousness, or the mere subjective condition) can all get their respective functional eggs in the same basket, re: the synthesis of representations conforms to the effect the object causes on perception.
I’m fine with distinguishing my will from yours, given the similarities or differences in our behaviors. But how I’m going to distinguish my will from a mind that wills the universe, is inconceivable.
Which gets us back to why propose such a thing in the first place.
But you acknowledge all this is groundless speculation, right? There are no experiments we can do to confirm whether phenomena predicted by this conjecture are observed or not, right?
By ontology I understand the consititutive, necessary and sufficient conditions of all human practices; therefore, it makes most sense to "subscribe" to naturalism (à la Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Dewey ... )
I think "consciousness" – phenomenal self modeling – supervenes on the brain's neurological systems bodily interacting with its local environment.
probably violates conservation laws and as a conjecture does not explain anything.
Metaphysics is in the business of trying to give the best general account of what reality is — Bob Ross
I don't think that is what metaphysics is, I think it is a purely speculative exercise of the imagination; that is it consists in what we are capable of imagining might be the nature of reality.
In the absence of ways to test these speculations, we have no possibility of determining what could be "the best general account of what reality is",
Each person will have their own preferences, which will depend on what their basic presuppositions are. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that what their presuppositions are will depend on their preferences
:100: :up:In my limited understanding matter is not inert stuff but actively forms self-organizing systems. — Fooloso4
Ontological naturalism (à la Spinoza).Interesting. Let me phrase it a bit differently: what ontology of being/reality would you subscribe to (if any)? — Bob Ross
I conceive of the latter two as distinctly methodological approaches within the former's paradigm.By ‘naturalism’, are you distinguishing it from ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’?
Ontological (since that's what you asked about). However, I also "subscribe", as you say, to methodological naturalism.Are you referring to ontological or/and methodological naturalism?
Well, I "subscribe" to both.Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you may be a methodological but not ontological naturalist ...
I've already answered this in my last post:Would you say that “consciousness” is reducible to the brain or is it just supervenient?
Check out the linked article for more clarification.I think "consciousness" – phenomenal self modeling – supervenes on the brain's neurological systems bodily interacting with its local environment. — 180 Proof
Yes, more or less.Would you classify yourself as a property dualist (i.e., irreductive physicalist)? — Bob Ross
If your "Universal Spirit" is conceived of as a separate nonphysical substance that interacts with (or even generates) a physical substance, then that would violate the physical law of the conservation of energy, etc.Why would it ["Universal Spirit"] violate conservation laws?
I somewhat agree, we are certainly in the business of plausibility and not certainty; but this is also true of scientific theories: — Bob Ross
This is dangerously close to scientism (to me): no, we do not only gain knowledge via empirical, scientific tests. — Bob Ross
I conceive of the latter two as distinctly methodological approaches within the former's paradigm.
Well, I "subscribe" to both.
Would you classify yourself as a property dualist (i.e., irreductive physicalist)? — Bob Ross
Yes, more or less.
If your "Universal Spirit" is conceived of as a separate nonphysical substance that interacts with (or even generates) a physical substance
The difference is that scientific theories are testable by seeing if the phenomena they predict obtain. Of course, that doesn't prove they are true.
As I understand it, scientism is the claim that science can answer all our questions and will save us. Of course, there are ethical and existential questions that science cannot answer, although it may certainly inform them.
My point is that I don’t think you can consistently reject metaphysics as “pure speculation” while fully pardoning scientific theories. Once one realizes that we are fundamentally engaging in some speculation no matter what, then it really becomes a question of how much is too much. — Bob Ross
Scientism is the idea that we only gain knowledge via the scientific method; and, thusly, that all other forms of inquiry (such as metaphysics) doesn’t get at the truth. It sounds like you may be in agreement with me that we can come to know things without the scientific method (e.g., ethics). I would merely add metaphysics in there too. — Bob Ross
(I assume you meant 'distinctions between these methodologies'.) In sum, by methodological materialism I understand a criteria for eliminating 'immaterial entities' (e.g. non-instantiates) from observational / experimental data and by methodological physicalism a criteria for eliminating 'non-physical concepts' (e.g. un-conditionals) from the composition of explanatory models of (aspects of) nature; wherein the inclusion of 'immaterial Xs' and/or 'nonphysical Ys' are indicative of incomplete (i.e. untestable) data-sets and/or models, respectively.Interesting: what would you say are the methodological distinctions between them? — Bob Ross
No. A much more so "weakly emergent" function like e.g. breathing or digesting or walking.Would you consider consciousness strongly emergent then (as opposed to weakly emergent)?
Yes.Since the reductive methodology doesn’t work on consciousness (which is, and correct me if I am wrong, what I am interpreting you to be agreeing with me on as a property dualist), do you deploy a different methodological approach that still retains (ontological) naturalism?
Nonreductive physicalism. I've previously (twice!) provided you a link to an article summarizing T. Metzinger's phenomenal self model which seems to me a highly cogent and experimentally supported research program within a nonreductive physicalist framework.If so, then could you give a brief elaboration thereon?
Well, "no physical substance" implies there are no physical laws to "violate"; and so, without physical laws, how do you suppose "Analytic Idealism" accounts for the fact of physical sciences and their prodigious efficacy in contrast to far less reliable (or probative) psychological / social sciences?[ ... ] all of reality is of a mental substance—there is no, under Analytic Idealism, physical substance. With that in mind, do you still think it violates the law of conservation of energy (and what not)?
This is true that science uses testable hypothesis (and that doesn’t positively prove the theories) while metaphysics isn’t as engaged in that (all it still does to some extent): however, that would just mean that metaphysics is more speculation than science, but both are engaged in speculation. My point is that I don’t think you can consistently reject metaphysics as “pure speculation” while fully pardoning scientific theories. Once one realizes that we are fundamentally engaging in some speculation no matter what, then it really becomes a question of how much is too much. — Bob Ross
I see the speculative part in science as consisting in abductive reasoning
and I would say that even those speculative aspects of science are informed by the general picture of the world that is yielded by science, or else they may be informed by mathematics.
I can't think of any speculative what we might call "pure metaphysics" that is like this, but that doesn't mean there isn't any. I'm open to learning about things I was not aware of.
The main thing I have against Kastrup's metaphysics is that "will" or "mind at large" are notions derived from our understanding of the human and some higher animals.
@Apokrisis refers to global constraints (i.e. entropy) as 'desire' sometimes, but again, in that context entropy is a scientific idea that does not derive specifically from the human. I guess we can't help being somewhat anthropomorphic in our thinking, since our thinking itself is "human-shaped".
Right, except I don't count ethics as knowledge
I also think ethics can be framed as "if we want to achieve that, we should do this" and ethical action can be understood as what promotes rather than detracts from human flourishing
…
distinct from being determinate propositional knowledge.
I do think we can only gain definitive knowledge from observation and logic.
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