Would say that Kant thought we could gather knowledge of the world (…) or he thought that we could never acquire such knowledge (…)? — Bob Ross

Technically, it is only knowledge of representations, hence not of the world per se. The amendments to our representations over time corresponds to the relative correctness of our knowledge, which we call experience. The world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does in our own, so it is obvious there is a major distinction between the two.

To me, Kant goes dangerously close to (if not actually argues for cryptically for) epistemic solipsism. — Bob Ross

If it is to say epistemic solipsism is the notion that the only absolutely certain knowledge is that which belongs to the subject capable of it, then the proposition is an analytical truth, a mere tautology, carrying the implication there’s no need to argue for it, insofar as it is a given. Put another way, its negation is impossible. Kant is arguing, not for the certainty of our knowledge but the warrant for it, the illusory nature of its origins a priori, and thereby its limits. A critique of the given, not a proof for it.
————

How does Kant even know, if he cannot know anything about things-in-themselves, that his mind is representing objects — Bob Ross

Sensations. The thing of sensation is the same thing as the thing of the ding an sich. The thing of sensation is as yet undetermined, and only possibly determinable. Plato’s “knowledge that”, Russell’s “knowledge of acquaintance”. Sensation is just of an undetermined something, called an object mostly I suppose, because it is opposed to, distinct from, yet an affect upon, a subject.

Why not “the unknown which may not be an object at all”? — Bob Ross

It is an object for the sake of communication, for talking about it. As far as the system is concerned, in and of itself as a system, it isn’t an object, it is an effect by that which is external to it, sometimes called an appearance. Sometimes called that which awakens internal awareness.
————-

….we only come to realize that our minds are the best explanation for the production of the conscious experiences we have which, in turn, show us that we are representing something…. — Bob Ross

Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.

…..but this doesn’t work if one is positing that all of it is mere phenomenon that cannot furnish them with knowledge of things-in-themselves — Bob Ross

All of it, re: conscious experience, is not phenomenon, and experience, as a methodological terminus, is not itself a mere representation. In Kant, the last rendition of a representation is in judgement, an aspect of understanding, which, in the form of a logical syllogism, is way back at the point of the manifold of minor premises, whereas experience stands as the conclusion.
————-

one can’t even argue that their mind is representing anything but rather that there’s just given conscious experiences. — Bob Ross

Which is fine, but reason will always ask….experience of what, exactly? Convention allows that all we need, under the most general of conditions, to grant is conscious experience; it is, after all, what is most readily apparent to us; the philosopher wants to make the clear exposition of just what is involved with such convention, in order to sustain, or falsify, it, once and for all. Or, bluntly, to…..

“…. raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel.…”
————-

The only thing I will say now is that the universal mind, under Analytic Idealism, doesn’t will them completely into our representations: there are “objective” ideas that our faculty tries represent (and depending on how well that faculty is, it may not be represented all that accurately) — Bob Ross

With respect to accuracy….agreed. Judgement requires exercise, exercise amends experience.

With respect to representations, on the other hand, how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?

Hello Janus,

So, if our brains are representations like anything else, then how can consciousness be said to reside there?

For analytic idealism, consciousness does not reside in the brain: the brain is an extrinsic representation of aspects of mind. The mind is beyond the perceptions of the brain.

For (reductive) physicalism, to make it work, I would say that the phenomenal brain is the intrinsic (within conscious experience) representation of an noumenal (or otherwise non-phenomenal) brain. At this point, to me, there’s no warrant to posit a noumenal brain: the only way would be, to me, if a (reductive) physicalist could account for how the noumenal brain is producing the conscious experience (which would have to be to account for it in the phenomenal brain and, once that is done, posit that that brain has a noumenal correlate); but at that point it is becoming a bit absurd to posit a brain outside of or beyond the mere phenomenal one.

If the brain is a representation, then the consciousness that seems to reside there, and the self-model that comes with it must also be representations.

Under analytic idealism, not all of conscious experience are perceptions: my ideas are not perceived by me by means of sensory input (that gets generated into a perception): it originates in me (as a mind). Therefore, we can acquire knowledge of what is being represented (i.e., perceived) within the tangible representations in our conscious experience: immaterial ideas.

I think your argument affects physicalists much more than it affects idealists: if your mind is an emergent property of a brain and that brain is only ever phenomenal, then why would we expect to come to understand what is outside of that mind? We wouldn’t. Why would we even have reason to believe that the phenomenal brain has a noumenal brain correlate?--and, thusly, why would we expect to prove that the mind is emergent from the brain simply because brain states affect mental states? We shouldn’t.

The question then is what is doing the representing? Perhaps nothing? Or everything?

For analytic idealism, consciousness is fundamental; and so we can know what is being represented (because not all of our experience is a representation made by an emergent mind from a physical brain): immaterial ideas: will.

Bob

Hello Mww,

Technically, it is only knowledge of representations, hence not of the world per se
…
The world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does in our own, so it is obvious there is a major distinction between the two.

If you can only have refined knowledge of representations, then how can you know that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does?

If it is to say epistemic solipsism is the notion that the only absolutely certain knowledge is that which belongs to the subject capable of it

I am saying that Kant’s original view is a form of epistemic solipsism, which is to say that since one cannot know anything about things-in-themselves they cannot know that anything exists other than their own “mind” (even if you would like to use a weaker usage of the term “mind”, such as a faculty of understanding that creates representations of the things-in-themselves). For example, I don’t see how you can know that there are other people with minds that have the same kind of a priori understanding (in Kant’s terms) that produces representations: that requires a metaphysical jump into the things-in-themselves.

Sensations. The thing of sensation is the same thing as the thing of the ding an sich.

I think this just pushes the same question a step deeper: how does Kant know that he has sensations without appealing to the phenomena, which are supposed to give us no knowledge of the things-in-themselves? I don’t see how Kant can claim there is a ‘bridge’ of sensations which are of the thing of things-in-themselves without such an appeal (which self-undermines his argument).

To me, Kant can’t claim that phenomena give us no understanding of the things-in-themselves and posit that we have sensations of them: what do you think?

In other words, I agree that we are affected by sensations, but this fundamentally requires the concession that phenomena gives us some access to things-in-themselves—even if it is very limited or what have you.

It is an object for the sake of communication, for talking about it.

Fair enough.

Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.

Your first sentence here suggests you agree that phenomena give us access to things-in-themselves to some degree (otherwise, I don’t understand how you could agree with me there). Your second sentence I didn’t fully follow: why does conscious experience presuppose sensations which are being represented necessarily theoretically without appeal to phenomena?

Again, how do you know what kind of ‘system’ humans know things without granting that phenomena (which are supposed to be mere representations that give us nothing beyond them) do give us some access (even if it is transcendental or slightly transcendent)?

All of it, re: conscious experience, is not phenomenon, and experience, as a methodological terminus, is not itself a mere representation. In Kant, the last rendition of a representation is in judgement, an aspect of understanding, which, in the form of a logical syllogism, is way back at the point of the manifold of minor premises, whereas experience stands as the conclusion.

Interesting; but how do you come to understand that there is such a faculty of understanding without appealing to phenomena (appearances)?

With respect to representations, on the other hand, how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?

We are within the ‘objective’ world of the mind-at-large and, as such, we come to know that the reality in which we reside is superordinate; and this is distinguished by our intuitive distinctions between what is a part of our will vs. a port of another’s will vs. a part of a will greater than ours.

In terms of Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism, we are only separate minds insofar as we perceive the world from different ‘angles’ and, at rock bottom, we are a part of the one mind which produces our experience: we are two characters in a dream, but when that universal mind ‘wakes up’ the two characters were facades—but that doesn’t take away from the fact that those two characters has real, distinguishable experiences of the dream world. We are two whirlpools in on ocean, when we die down we re-assimilate into the ocean and even when we were distinguishable two different whirlpools we still were of the same ocean.

Bob

You might expect that. I don't expect that. The majority of the medical community does not expect that. The majority of those working in cognitive science do not expect that. — Fooloso4

From the little I know about you and have gathered from you, this has taken me by surprise!
Are you a materialist?

Are you a materialist? — Alkis Piskas

Yes, although particular things that are ascribed to materialism might not stick.

In other words, disembodied consciousness (i.e. spirits) :roll:

In other words, disembodied consciousness (i.e. spirits) :roll:

Yes, in a sense, if you wanted to use that terminology, then fundamentally there is one Universal Spirit whereof there are derivate "spirits" (viz., alter perspectives within the one spirit).

Out of curiosity, what ontology would you subscribe to? Do you think that consciousness can be provably determined as reducible to brain states? What problems do you find with positing a Universal Spirit?

Bob

I like this question. I suspect that Kastrup would say that consciousness manifests as a brain, in a skull, in a body, in a world when viewed across the dissociative divide. It's just the form it appears to come in. Given that legs are as illusory as brains, I guess the functionality implied in a 'physical' body is a kind of combined hallucination to begin with. That's all I got.... — Tom Storm

The interesting thing is that that is an untestable speculative explanation just as the idea that there are real mind-independent physical/ energetic structures is. The difference is that the latter seems to be more in accord with the whole consistent body of scientific knowledge as well as commonsense, while the former seems to be motivated by wishful thinking.

:up: The deadly infinite regress !

how can you know that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does? — Bob Ross

Are you implying the difference in knowledge from the human olden days to the human current days, is a reflection of a changing world? If so, sure, why not. That lightning came from angry gods reflected the ontological status of the old world, lightning as electrostatic discharge reflects the ontological status of the current world. It is impossible to prove or disprove the world changed on the whim of a universal mind.

How do we know? We don’t, but we raise more questions by supposing our changing knowledge reflects a changing world, then we do if we suppose the world stays constant and it is our knowledge that changes.

We got the whole passel of folks, all through the ages, experiencing a certain thing, in exactly the same way, when they push the very same kind of round something down a hill. Basic mathematics hasn’t changed since the invention of numbers.
————

I don’t see how you can know that there are other people with minds that have the same kind of a priori understanding (in Kant’s terms) that produces representations…..

Again, we don’t, in the strictest sense of knowledge. It is just abysmally counterproductive and quite irrational, to posit that they don’t. Logical inference a priori grants all human have minds; experience grants a posteriori only that they act like they do.

…..that requires a metaphysical jump into the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Only if the thing-in-itself is conceptually maligned, usually by invoking a theory that defines it differently or finds no need of such a thing, than the theory in which it was originally contained. I swear, I am sorely puzzled by how much trouble people have grasping this rather simple dichotomy.
————-

”Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.
-Mww

Your first sentence here suggests you agree that phenomena give us access to things-in-themselves to some degree — Bob Ross

Nope. You said conscious experience is the representation of something. It isn’t representation, its knowledge. Conscious experience is knowledge of something, whether a determined something or just a plain ol’ something, depends on whether or not the tripartite logical part of the system, the proper cognitive part, comprised of understanding, judgement, and reason (but not intuition or consciousness, or the mere subjective condition) can all get their respective functional eggs in the same basket, re: the synthesis of representations conforms to the effect the object causes on perception.

Phenomena just give the functionaries something empirical to work on, having nothing to do with the thing-in-itself. The methodology by which we can say we know what an object is, mandates the necessity of representing them, by whichever means one thinks fit to employ.

….how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?
-Mww

We are within the ‘objective’ world of the mind-at-large and, as such, we come to know that the reality in which we reside is superordinate; and this is distinguished by our intuitive distinctions between what is a part of our will vs. a port of another’s will vs. a part of a will greater than ours. — Bob Ross

I’m fine with distinguishing my will from yours, given the similarities or differences in our behaviors. But how I’m going to distinguish my will from a mind that wills the universe, is inconceivable.

I understand what you mean, but there’s no way I personally can conclude to its rational feasibility. Of course, by the same token, I can’t rationally deny the possibility either.

Which gets us back to why propose such a thing in the first place.

But you acknowledge all this is groundless speculation, right? There are no experiments we can do to confirm whether phenomena predicted by this conjecture are observed or not, right?

Out of curiosity, what ontology would you subscribe to? — Bob Ross

By ontology I understand the consititutive, necessary and sufficient conditions of all human practices; therefore, it makes most sense to "subscribe" to naturalism (à la Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Dewey ... )

Do you think that consciousness can be provably determined as reducible to brain states?

I think "consciousness" – phenomenal self modeling – supervenes on the brain's neurological systems bodily interacting with its local environment.

What problems do you find with positing a Universal Spirit?

Well, for starters, I don't find any compelling reasons to believe that entities such as "ghosts" or "spirits" exist (except in fictions) and so "positing a Universal Spirit" seems to me merely an ad hoc projection of wishful or magical thinking akin to e.g. aether, phlogiston, chi, juju, mojo, astral planes, "The Force", etc. "Universal Spirit" certainly is not parsimonious, probably violates conservation laws and as a conjecture does not explain anything.

OK. Then --just for checking-- I guess you must believe that thoughts, ideas, memory, knowledge, emotions and all mental activities and contents of the mind in general are composed of matter, produced by the brain and stored in the brain. Right?

I guess you must believe that thoughts, ideas, memory, knowledge, emotions and all mental activities and contents of the mind in general are composed of matter — Alkis Piskas

No. See my previous answer to your question. Mental activities are not composed of matter, but organisms that think are.

See my previous answer ... — Fooloso4

In your previous answer you talked about "particular things that are ascribed to materialism might not stick". But mental things are not just "particular" things. They consist a whole world, in contrast with the material one!

I don't want to waste more of your time on this. It was maybe wrong to make such a question in the first place. Thanks, anyway.

In your previous answer you talked about "particular things that are ascribed to materialism might not stick". But mental things are not just "particular" things. They consist a whole world, in contrast with the material one! — Alkis Piskas

Throughout the long history of the term there have been various things ascribed to "matter". By particular things I mean some of the things that are said about matter that I am not in agreement with.

Nothing wrong with asking someone where they stand on an issue. I usually address the question in terms of embodied minds. The term "matter" has become problematic. In my limited understanding matter is not inert stuff but actively forms self-organizing systems.

Nothing wrong with asking someone where they stand on an issue — Fooloso4

Of course not. I talked about my specific question "Are you a materialist?". If not anything else it's too general. And one may also identify to it only in part, as I undestood you do. In fact only (conventional) scientists I think can full identify with it. And ... about 80% of the people in TPF! :smile: (Based on a poll that I conducted out a long time ago.)

So, it would be much more appropriate if I had asked you instead the question of my second message (about "mental things").

The term "matter" has become problematic — Fooloso4

I agree. I believe QM is responsible for that. Matter, as we new it until then was something very concrete and tangible. Yet, even so, I believe we can still differentiate between physical and non-physical, animate and inanimate things. We can also use the terms life, beings, organisms, existence, etc. as opposed to objects. In this way mabe we can avoid using the term "matter".

BTW, there's another kind of "matter", which Vedantists --and maybe otjher-- call "subtle matter", in contrast to "gross matter", and which refers to the mind. I like that. Also, I consider thoughts to consist of some kind of "energy" different from the one we know and which is we cannot call "physical".

Hello Mww,

Are you implying the difference in knowledge from the human olden days to the human current days, is a reflection of a changing world? If so, sure, why not. That lightning came from angry gods reflected the ontological status of the old world, lightning as electrostatic discharge reflects the ontological status of the current world. It is impossible to prove or disprove the world changed on the whim of a universal mind.

How do we know? We don’t, but we raise more questions by supposing our changing knowledge reflects a changing world, then we do if we suppose the world stays constant and it is our knowledge that changes.

My point is that under Kantianism, we don’t get knowledge of the world: we just get phenomenon; and, so, how can you claim that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge does? Are you inferring from phenomena something about the things-in-themselves?

We got the whole passel of folks, all through the ages, experiencing a certain thing, in exactly the same way, when they push the very same kind of round something down a hill. Basic mathematics hasn’t changed since the invention of numbers.

But, under Kantianism, I don’t see how you can claim that those observed regularties are anything but phenomena: they don’t tell you anything about the world beyond that. Would you agree with that?

Only if the thing-in-itself is conceptually maligned, usually by invoking a theory that defines it differently or finds no need of such a thing, than the theory in which it was originally contained.

Can you elaborate on what you mean by things-in-themselves vs. phenomena?

Nope. You said conscious experience is the representation of something. It isn’t representation, its knowledge. Conscious experience is knowledge of something, whether a determined something or just a plain ol’ something, depends on whether or not the tripartite logical part of the system, the proper cognitive part, comprised of understanding, judgement, and reason (but not intuition or consciousness, or the mere subjective condition) can all get their respective functional eggs in the same basket, re: the synthesis of representations conforms to the effect the object causes on perception.

I see. Would you say that the logical part of the system is a thing-in-itself or a phenomenon (or neither)?

I’m fine with distinguishing my will from yours, given the similarities or differences in our behaviors. But how I’m going to distinguish my will from a mind that wills the universe, is inconceivable.

It’s everything not associated with a will already (until proven its association with a different will).

Which gets us back to why propose such a thing in the first place.

To give the most parsimonious metaphysical account of reality. Under your view, it seems like you may be committed to ontological agnosticism: is that correct?

Bob

Hello Janus,

But you acknowledge all this is groundless speculation, right? There are no experiments we can do to confirm whether phenomena predicted by this conjecture are observed or not, right?

Metaphysics is not science: it doesn’t posit a hypothesis that can be empirically tested. Metaphysics is in the business of trying to give the best general account of what reality is: it is about that which is necessarily beyond the possibility of all experience, but pertains to that experience (e.g., Universals vs. particulars).

Science can only be a negative criteria (i.e., it can falsify some metaphysical theories, but its inability to do so does not thereby affirm any of them either). Instead, metaphysics uses intuitions, parsimony, explanatory power, coherence, internal consistency, etc. to determine the best general account.

Physicalism (like all other metaphysical theories) is no exception either: if you say analytic idealism is groundless speculation, then so is physicalism. There are no scientific tests that will ever falsify nor prove physicalism either.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

By ontology I understand the consititutive, necessary and sufficient conditions of all human practices; therefore, it makes most sense to "subscribe" to naturalism (à la Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Dewey ... )

Interesting. Let me phrase it a bit differently: what ontology of being/reality would you subscribe to (if any)?

To me, I don’t mind if you use ‘ontology’ to refer to the conditions of all human practices, but that doesn’t say anything about what fundamentally is: it just determines what is required for humans to do what they do. To me that’s not what ‘ontology’ is about (as a shorthand for the philosophical practice--of course there are many ontologies of different things).

By ‘naturalism’, are you distinguishing it from ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’? Are you referring to ontological or/and methodological naturalism? Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you may be a methodological but not ontological naturalist (e.g., Nietzsche, which you cited, is definitely not an ontological naturalist but was a staunch methodological naturalist).

I think "consciousness" – phenomenal self modeling – supervenes on the brain's neurological systems bodily interacting with its local environment.

Would you say that “consciousness” is reducible to the brain or is it just supervenient? Would you classify yourself as a property dualist (i.e., irreductive physicalist)?

probably violates conservation laws and as a conjecture does not explain anything.

Why would it violate conservation laws?

Bob

Metaphysics is in the business of trying to give the best general account of what reality is — Bob Ross

I don't think that is what metaphysics is, I think it is a purely speculative exercise of the imagination; that is it consists in what we are capable of imagining might be the nature of reality. In the absence of ways to test these speculations, we have no possibility of determining what could be "the best general account of what reality is", Each person will have their own preferences, which will depend on what their basic presuppositions are. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that what their presuppositions are will depend on their preferences.

Hello Janus,

I don't think that is what metaphysics is, I think it is a purely speculative exercise of the imagination; that is it consists in what we are capable of imagining might be the nature of reality.

I somewhat agree, we are certainly in the business of plausibility and not certainty; but this is also true of scientific theories: it is likewise an “speculative exercise” of what we imagine is the best explanation of the scientific facts. I think if you are being consistent, then a lot of science goes out the window to.

In the absence of ways to test these speculations, we have no possibility of determining what could be "the best general account of what reality is",

This is dangerously close to scientism (to me): no, we do not only gain knowledge via empirical, scientific tests. For example, we don’t gain the knowledge that every change has a cause by scientific inquiry; in fact, it presupposes it. If I were to take what I think you are saying to its fullest extent, then the very necessary presumptions we make for science (as well as a large portion of our knowledge in general) goes out the window as “purely speculative”.

Each person will have their own preferences, which will depend on what their basic presuppositions are. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that what their presuppositions are will depend on their preferences

True, we cannot separate ourselves from our own inquiry of the world; but this doesn’t mean that we can only acquire knowledge by empirical inquiry (and, honestly, even empirical inquiry has a layer of psychological interpretation to it as well).

Bob

In my limited understanding matter is not inert stuff but actively forms self-organizing systems. — Fooloso4

:100: :up:

For example: thermodynamics, nucleogenesis, dissipative structures, chaotic systems, autopoiesis, etc And in philosophy: e.g. Democritean-Lucretian atomism, Meillassoux's speculative materialism.

Interesting. Let me phrase it a bit differently: what ontology of being/reality would you subscribe to (if any)? — Bob Ross

Ontological naturalism (à la Spinoza).

By ‘naturalism’, are you distinguishing it from ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’?

I conceive of the latter two as distinctly methodological approaches within the former's paradigm.

Are you referring to ontological or/and methodological naturalism?

Ontological (since that's what you asked about). However, I also "subscribe", as you say, to methodological naturalism.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you may be a methodological but not ontological naturalist ...

Well, I "subscribe" to both.

Would you say that “consciousness” is reducible to the brain or is it just supervenient?

I've already answered this in my last post:

I think "consciousness" – phenomenal self modeling – supervenes on the brain's neurological systems bodily interacting with its local environment. — 180 Proof

Check out the linked article for more clarification.

Would you classify yourself as a property dualist (i.e., irreductive physicalist)? — Bob Ross

Yes, more or less.

Why would it ["Universal Spirit"] violate conservation laws?

If your "Universal Spirit" is conceived of as a separate nonphysical substance that interacts with (or even generates) a physical substance, then that would violate the physical law of the conservation of energy, etc.

I somewhat agree, we are certainly in the business of plausibility and not certainty; but this is also true of scientific theories: — Bob Ross

The difference is that scientific theories are testable by seeing if the phenomena they predict obtain. Of course, that doesn't prove they are true.

This is dangerously close to scientism (to me): no, we do not only gain knowledge via empirical, scientific tests. — Bob Ross

As I understand it, scientism is the claim that science can answer all our questions and will save us. Of course, there are ethical and existential questions that science cannot answer, although it may certainly inform them.

Hello 180 Proof,

I conceive of the latter two as distinctly methodological approaches within the former's paradigm.

Interesting: what would you say are the methodological distinctions between them?

Well, I "subscribe" to both.

Fair enough.

Would you classify yourself as a property dualist (i.e., irreductive physicalist)? — Bob Ross
Yes, more or less.

I am never gotten the opportunity to discuss with a property dualist, so forgive me but I would like to pick your brain a bit pertaining thereto. Would you consider consciousness strongly emergent then (as opposed to weakly emergent)? If so, then how does its irreducibility not warrant the positing of another substance (i.e., substance dualism) as opposed to merely another property? Since the reductive methodology doesn’t work on consciousness (which is, and correct me if I am wrong, what I am interpreting you to be agreeing with me on as a property dualist), do you deploy a different methodological approach that still retains (ontological) naturalism? If so, then could you give a brief elaboration thereon?

If your "Universal Spirit" is conceived of as a separate nonphysical substance that interacts with (or even generates) a physical substance

I am a substance monist, so I don’t claim that one entity from a mental (i.e., nonphysical) substance is “producting” or “interacting with” an entity (or entities) within another physical substance: all of reality is of a mental substance—there is no, under Analytic Idealism, physical substance. With that in mind, do you still think it violates the law of conservation of energy (and what not)?

Bob

Hello Janus,

The difference is that scientific theories are testable by seeing if the phenomena they predict obtain. Of course, that doesn't prove they are true.

This is true that science uses testable hypothesis (and that doesn’t positively prove the theories) while metaphysics isn’t as engaged in that (all it still does to some extent): however, that would just mean that metaphysics is more speculation than science, but both are engaged in speculation. My point is that I don’t think you can consistently reject metaphysics as “pure speculation” while fully pardoning scientific theories. Once one realizes that we are fundamentally engaging in some speculation no matter what, then it really becomes a question of how much is too much.

As I understand it, scientism is the claim that science can answer all our questions and will save us. Of course, there are ethical and existential questions that science cannot answer, although it may certainly inform them.

Scientism is the idea that we only gain knowledge via the scientific method; and, thusly, that all other forms of inquiry (such as metaphysics) doesn’t get at the truth. It sounds like you may be in agreement with me that we can come to know things without the scientific method (e.g., ethics). I would merely add metaphysics in there too.

Bob

My point is that I don’t think you can consistently reject metaphysics as “pure speculation” while fully pardoning scientific theories. Once one realizes that we are fundamentally engaging in some speculation no matter what, then it really becomes a question of how much is too much. — Bob Ross

I see the speculative part in science as consisting in abductive reasoning, and I would say that even those speculative aspects of science are informed by the general picture of the world that is yielded by science, or else they may be informed by mathematics.

I can't think of any speculative what we might call "pure metaphysics" that is like this, but that doesn't mean there isn't any. I'm open to learning about things I was not aware of.

The main thing I have against Kastrup's metaphysics is that "will" or "mind at large" are notions derived from our understanding of the human and some higher animals. @Apokrisis refers to global constraints (i.e. entropy) as 'desire' sometimes, but again, in that context entropy is a scientific idea that does not derive specifically from the human. I guess we can't help being somewhat anthropomorphic in our thinking, since our thinking itself is "human-shaped".

Scientism is the idea that we only gain knowledge via the scientific method; and, thusly, that all other forms of inquiry (such as metaphysics) doesn’t get at the truth. It sounds like you may be in agreement with me that we can come to know things without the scientific method (e.g., ethics). I would merely add metaphysics in there too. — Bob Ross

Right, except I don't count ethics as knowledge. I also think ethics can be framed as "if we want to achieve that, we should do this" and ethical action can be understood as what promotes rather than detracts from human flourishing. Human flourishing is hard to quantify scientifically, but I think we can all more or less recognize it. I think it counts as a kind of 'know-how' as distinct from being determinate propositional knowledge.

I can think of analogies between ethics and aesthetics, but I can't think of analogies between ethics and metaphysics. There is a modern post-Kantian metaphysics associated with analytical philosophy and modal logic, but I'm not much interested in that, because I think it only represents what is coherently imaginable, and I think it is unnecessarily laborious and not needed for that task.

I do think we can only gain definitive knowledge from observation and logic.

Interesting: what would you say are the methodological distinctions between them? — Bob Ross

(I assume you meant 'distinctions between these methodologies'.) In sum, by methodological materialism I understand a criteria for eliminating 'immaterial entities' (e.g. non-instantiates) from observational / experimental data and by methodological physicalism a criteria for eliminating 'non-physical concepts' (e.g. un-conditionals) from the composition of explanatory models of (aspects of) nature; wherein the inclusion of 'immaterial Xs' and/or 'nonphysical Ys' are indicative of incomplete (i.e. untestable) data-sets and/or models, respectively.

Would you consider consciousness strongly emergent then (as opposed to weakly emergent)?

No. A much more so "weakly emergent" function like e.g. breathing or digesting or walking.

Since the reductive methodology doesn’t work on consciousness (which is, and correct me if I am wrong, what I am interpreting you to be agreeing with me on as a property dualist), do you deploy a different methodological approach that still retains (ontological) naturalism?

Yes.

If so, then could you give a brief elaboration thereon?

Nonreductive physicalism. I've previously (twice!) provided you a link to an article summarizing T. Metzinger's phenomenal self model which seems to me a highly cogent and experimentally supported research program within a nonreductive physicalist framework.

[ ... ] all of reality is of a mental substance—there is no, under Analytic Idealism, physical substance. With that in mind, do you still think it violates the law of conservation of energy (and what not)?

Well, "no physical substance" implies there are no physical laws to "violate"; and so, without physical laws, how do you suppose "Analytic Idealism" accounts for the fact of physical sciences and their prodigious efficacy in contrast to far less reliable (or probative) psychological / social sciences?

Or rather, how is it that "the physical" is publicly accessible if "all of reality is mental" and "the mental" is not publicly accessible? :chin:

This is true that science uses testable hypothesis (and that doesn’t positively prove the theories) while metaphysics isn’t as engaged in that (all it still does to some extent): however, that would just mean that metaphysics is more speculation than science, but both are engaged in speculation. My point is that I don’t think you can consistently reject metaphysics as “pure speculation” while fully pardoning scientific theories. Once one realizes that we are fundamentally engaging in some speculation no matter what, then it really becomes a question of how much is too much. — Bob Ross

'How much speculation is too much?', isn't the important question at all, from my perspective.

Much more important, it seems to me, is how undisciplined is the the speculation. Scientific speculation is disciplined, by looking to external reality for support or falsification. Mother Nature can smack you upside the head if you get it wrong.

A metaphysics that denies the existence of a non-mental external reality simply isn't comparable.

Mother Nature can smack you upside the head if you get it wrong. — wonderer1

:up:

Hello Janus,

I see the speculative part in science as consisting in abductive reasoning

Abductive reasoning is the most speculative type of reasoning we have, and metaphysics is also engaged in abductive reasoning.

and I would say that even those speculative aspects of science are informed by the general picture of the world that is yielded by science, or else they may be informed by mathematics.

Having speculation be informed by the world around us is not special to science: metaphysics also tries to inform its theories based off thereof.

I can't think of any speculative what we might call "pure metaphysics" that is like this, but that doesn't mean there isn't any. I'm open to learning about things I was not aware of.

Firstly, I grant, and agree with you, that metaphysics is usually more speculative than science, but there’s a couple things I would note:

1. Some science is actual metaphysics (e.g., Einstein’s “scientific” theory, to explain the facts of his field equations, that there is a mind-independent space-time fabric is a metaphysical commitment—not scientific itself).

2. Science and metaphysics are both engaged in abductive reasoning (i.e., trying to discern the best explanation to account for the data). Neither claim certainty nor absolute truth, and both are meant to get at a better picture (a model) of the world. The jursdiction of the models is just different: science is about modeling the relationship between (i.e., behavior of) the world we experience, whereas metaphysics is about modeling what the world fundamentally is. For example, science tells its best guess at how a car works (e.g., gas, engine, friction, etc.), metaphysics tells its best guess at what the car fundamentally is (e.g., an instantiation of a universal Car, fundamentally mind-independent, etc.). Both, I would say, are useful in their own ways.

3. Metaphysics is ‘purer’ than science because it deals more heavily in the realm of ‘pure reason’, but science still deals with ‘pure reason’ as well. They both need it to determine their axioms, jurisdiction of inquiry, etc. ‘Pure reason’ is not special to metaphysics: it just is more prominent.

4. If one gets rid of metaphysics, as a practice, then there’s no method of inquiry for us left to decipher what world we live in. Science doesn’t tell us what metaphysically exists: it is just a pragmatic tool for navigating and discovering how things behave.

The main thing I have against Kastrup's metaphysics is that "will" or "mind at large" are notions derived from our understanding of the human and some higher animals.

It is derived from our understanding of all life: not just higher animals. Kastrup posits that all life is a grade of consciousness. Of course, we only immediately, through introspection, have access to our own, so that is where we typically start.

@Apokrisis refers to global constraints (i.e. entropy) as 'desire' sometimes, but again, in that context entropy is a scientific idea that does not derive specifically from the human. I guess we can't help being somewhat anthropomorphic in our thinking, since our thinking itself is "human-shaped".

Under analytic idealism, everything is will and representation; so entropy, as well as all observable phenomena, are extrinsic representations of mentality—of will. It isn’t that entropy is a special case of which it is associated with an extra will that isn’t the case for everything else but, rather, that the entire phenomenal world is fundamentally the representation of the will of a universal mind. So the natural forces, as well as entropy and everything else, is within the universal mind and thusly is upheld by the will thereof. The will is ‘outside’ of the system of which represents it, just as necessarily as my mind’s will to dream of a beautiful forest is ‘outside’ of that dream forest.

Right, except I don't count ethics as knowledge

Are you saying that you don’t think you can come to know what is right and wrong (even if the propositions are indexical: subjective)? Because then I don’t know how you could assess what is right and wrong (even subjectively).

I also think ethics can be framed as "if we want to achieve that, we should do this" and ethical action can be understood as what promotes rather than detracts from human flourishing
…
distinct from being determinate propositional knowledge.

You can’t invoke hypothetical conditionals without propositions, and, as far as I understand you, you are claiming ethics is non-cognitive (non-propositional): you can’t assess that “if p, then q” (“if we want to achieve that, we should do this”) if ethics doesn’t provide propositional or otherwise knowledge.

I do think we can only gain definitive knowledge from observation and logic.

I disagree if by observation you mean scientific inquiry. For example, if one can only gather knowledge by observation and logic, then they can never come to know what a concept of concepts is. One will never observe the concept of concepts and logic (which is just the form of an argument) does not provide any means of determining the content necessary to figure out what the true concept of concepts is. I do not empirically observe the concept of concepts, and simply making a logically valid argument for what it is does not entail whatsoever that I have nailed down what a concept of concepts truly is.

Bob