This sounds like maybe you don’t hold that we cannot know the things-in-themselves that appear to us, is that correct? — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know. If the thing-in-itself appeared to me it wouldn’t be as-it-is-in-itself, it would be as-it-is-in-me, as phenomenon. Remember: the thing and the thing of the thing-in-itself are identical. The only difference is the exposure to human systemic knowledge/experience criteria, which reduces to time. I call it the occasion, but, same-o, same-o.

We can’t know the thing-in-itself because it doesn’t appear in us. If that specific box….the only one that appeared to your senses…..had stayed at the post office, you’d never know anything of it, even while inferring the real possibility of boxes in general, iff you already know post offices contain boxes.
————-

…..what ontological status does the logical part of the representational system have it is not a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. I get it is a logical system, but ontologically what is it? — Bob Ross

I guess I can’t say why a logical part needs an ontological status. If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time, it follows that if logic is not conditioned by space and time but only time, thereby out of compliance with the criteria for existence, then the study of its ontological predicates from which its ontological status can be determined, is a waste of effort.

“…. Transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to wit, that the understanding is competent to effect nothing à priori, except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in general, and that, as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding….”

Keyword: things. With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing. If a label is required for some reason, I’d just call it a condition, or maybe a axiom or fundamental principle of a theory. Heck, maybe just a merely necessary presupposition, in order to ground all that follows from it. All of which lend themselves quite readily to analysis. This is metaphysics after all, immune to proof from experience, so there are some permissible procedural liberties, so maybe logic is just that which prohibits such liberties from running amuck.

Besides, it is possible that the human intellect is itself naturally predisposed to what we eventually derive as logical conditions, so maybe we put so much trust in the power of pure logic for no other reason than we just are logical intelligences. Maybe we just can’t be not logically inclined.
———-

I want to get back to something you said the other day, something like….the universal mind change the world to fit out knowledge, to which I thought it better that our knowledge changed to fit the constant world. If I got that right, I might have a thought up a decent counter-argument or two I’d like you to shoot down, in accordance with your thesis.

Way back when, and in the interest of the most general of terminology, that which contacted the bottom of human feet has never changed, even though through the ages more and more knowledge has been obtained about it.

Long ago, some humans knew the moon as some lighted disk in the sky. They also knew of periodically changing ocean levels, but had no comprehension of tidal effects caused by the moon and even less comprehension of effects a mere disk can have. Nowadays the relation between the tides and the moon are the same as they ever were, but there is resident knowledge of that relation derived from principles.

What say you?

Keyword: things. Logic is not a thing. If a label is required for some reason, I’d just call it a condition, or maybe a axiom or fundamental principle of a theory. Heck, maybe just a merely necessary presupposition, in order to ground all that follows from it. All of which lend themselves quite readily to analysis. This is metaphysics after all, immune to proof from experience, so there are some permissible procedural liberties, so maybe logic is just that which prohibits such liberties from running amuck.

Besides, it is possible that the human intellect is itself naturally predisposed to what we eventually derive as logical conditions, so maybe we put so much trust in the power of pure logic for no other reason than we just are logical intelligences. Maybe we just can’t be not logically inclined. — Mww

I like it. Nicely expressed.

Thanks. ‘Preciate it.

Hello Janus,

Perhaps it would be better to start afresh and in a more concrete way. You seem to be saying that by virtue of feeling our basic existences which you would characterize as "being a mind" (?) we can confidently extrapolate to a view of the basic nature of the cosmos. Are there other steps that need to be added in there or is that it?

Sounds like a plan!

I wouldn’t say that we should be idealists because we can “confidently extrapolate to a view of the nature of the cosmos” as mind, because one can be very confident in virtually any metaphysical theory. Here’s how I would word a simplified, general depiction of my view:

The theory of what reality fundamentally is that is the most parsimonious (viz., maximizes explanatory power while minimizing conceptual complexity), is internally & externally coherent (viz., how well does it cohere with one’s currently more highly prioritized beliefs, such as scientific facts?), is logically consistent (i.e., there’s no logical contradictions), is the most complete (i.e., what can’t it account for?), and aligns best with one’s intuitions (i.e., everyone relies, to some degree, on what “intellectual seems” to be the case). I submit to you that Analytic Idealism, that reality is fundamentally a mind, meets the aforementioned requirements better than physicalism (and any other possible metaphysical theory).

Why (is Analytic Idealism the best theory), you might ask? Well, long story short, it coheres perfectly with scientific knowledge, accounts for the entirety of our experience in the most parsimonious manner (in comparison to any other possible theory), and is logically consistent. The only areas, nowadays, where it suffers is that it is not intuitive to most people (although I think that after properly understanding it people could see it as intuitive) and it isn’t complete (but no other theory is other than the one’s that dream up magical wishful thinking to explain everything).

That would be the spark notes.

Bob

:kiss:

Hello Mww,

Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know.

If it never becomes a sensation, then it sounds like you are saying we never come in contact, even indirectly, with the things-in-themselves, is that correct? If so, then how do you know they even exist? If the representational system isn’t getting, as input, sensations of the things-in-themselves, it sounds like, to me, the former is completely accounted for without positing the latter.

Remember: the thing and the thing of the thing-in-itself are identical.

I didn’t follow this part: what is a “thing of the thing-in-itself”? Is that the substance of (or in) which the thing-in-itself is of?

The only difference is the exposure to human systemic knowledge/experience criteria, which reduces to time.

If we aren’t exposed to it as sensations (see my first quote of you), then how are we exposed to it?

We can’t know the thing-in-itself because it doesn’t appear in us. If that specific box….the only one that appeared to your senses…..had stayed at the post office, you’d never know anything of it, even while inferring the real possibility of boxes in general, iff you already know post offices contain boxes.

But when you do look in the box, are you seeing an indirectly contacted box-in-itself? Or is the box-in-itself completely barred from your reach?

If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time

If what exists is what is conditioned by space and time, then space and time do not exist.

it follows that if logic is not conditioned by space and time but only time, thereby out of compliance with the criteria for existence, then the study of its ontological predicates from which its ontological status can be determined, is a waste of effort.

Are you saying that the logical part of our representational system (for each and every one of us) only is conditioned by time? So it exists within the temporal world but non-spatially?

Keyword: things. With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing.

But it has to exist in a thing: what thing are you saying it exists in? If it is outside of space and time, then I would think you are claiming it is a thing-in-itself.

I want to get back to something you said the other day, something like….the universal mind change the world to fit out knowledge, to which I thought it better that our knowledge changed to fit the constant world. If I got that right, I might have a thought up a decent counter-argument or two I’d like you to shoot down, in accordance with your thesis.

Please feel free to critique away! I would love to hear your counter-arguments!

However, I think what you are referring to was one of my questions pertaining to your view and not mine (but correct me if I am misremembering): you were claiming that, despite us having no knowledge of the things-in-themselves which makeup the real world, we can still know that our knowledge of the world changes faster than the rate at which the world actually changes (or something along those lines); and I was merely inquiring how you could know that if you can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves—i.e., the real world. I still don’t understand, as of yet, how you resolve that.

In terms of my theory, I don’t think that the Universal Mind changes the world to fit our knowledge but, rather, our knowledge changes to fit reality (which is fundamentally a Universal Mind). The Universal Mind doesn’t have cognitive deliberation, isn’t meta-conscious, nor does it have the ability to enumerate possible motives: it is the most basic, fundamental will which makes up reality and we emerged as evolved beings which have developed the ability to do such “higher level” things. As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws.

Way back when, and in the interest of the most general of terminology, that which contacted the bottom of human feet has never changed, even though through the ages more and more knowledge has been obtained about it.

Long ago, some humans knew the moon as some lighted disk in the sky. They also knew of periodically changing ocean levels, but had no comprehension of tidal effects caused by the moon and even less comprehension of effects a mere disk can have. Nowadays the relation between the tides and the moon are the same as they ever were, but there is resident knowledge of that relation derived from principles

I have no problem admitting that our knowledge, in terms of our ability to cognize and deliberate as higher conscious forms, tries to conform to what the world is and, thusly, we slowly learn and adapt our theories to better account for it. My point was that I don’t see how you know that about reality when “reality” under your view, as I am understanding it, is things-in-themselves.

Bob

If so, then how do you know they even exist? — Bob Ross

The existence of things in themselves is an inference from the invariance and intersubjective commonality of sensations.

. I submit to you that Analytic Idealism, that reality is fundamentally a mind, meets the aforementioned requirements better than physicalism (and any other possible metaphysical theory). — Bob Ross

And I submit to you that all ideas of substance are groundless. The world seems physical and substantial and from that experience and the reificational potentiality of language we naturally extrapolate the notion of substance. We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense.

We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense. — Janus

I think this touches on something important. I've heard Chomsky make a similar statement. And of course, Chomsky concedes he is a Kantian in relation to human sense making and language being aspects of the human cognitive apparatus - we are 'contained' by these. But we keep wanting to escape our cognitive limitations and make pronouncements about reality as it is in itself.

Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live?

Yes, Kant himself says that the desire to, and idea that we can, discover a metaphysics which is more than merely a metaphysics of possible experience, is an inescapble aspect of the rational mind; if I remember rightly he refers to it as a kind of inherent pre-critical "illusion" of reason.

I really like how that was worded.

Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know.
-Mww

If it never becomes a sensation, then it sounds like you are saying we never come in contact, even indirectly, with the things-in-themselves, is that correct? If so, then how do you know they even exist? — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible, re:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd….”

Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things.

If the representational system isn’t getting, as input, sensations of the things-in-themselves, it sounds like, to me, the former is completely accounted for without positing the latter. — Bob Ross

This is correct, within the confines of this particular knowledge theory. The intuitive representational process itself, the only one determined by sensation, doesn’t care about anything except what is given to it by perception.

The only reason for positing the thing-in-itself, is to grant that even if things are not perceived, they are not thereby non-existent. It is meant to qualify the semi-established dogmatic Berkeley-ian purely subjective idealist principle esse est percipi, by stipulating that it isn’t necessary that that which isn’t perceived doesn’t exist, but only for that which is not perceived, empirical knowledge of it is impossible. It just says existence is not conditioned by perception, but knowledge most certainly is.

There’s also the confused impression/fact dichotomy inspired by Hume that needs examination, but that’s beyond the realm here, I think.

I didn’t follow this part: what is a “thing of the thing-in-itself”? — Bob Ross

Oh, that’s easy: once this thing, whatever it is, appears to perception, that thing-in-itself, whatever it was, disappears, that thing no longer “in-itself”, as far as the system is concerned.

Is that the substance of (or in) which the thing-in-itself is of? — Bob Ross

Can’t be substance, insofar as substance is never singular, which implies a succession, which implies time, which is a condition for knowledge, and by which the imposition makes the impossibility of knowledge contradictory.

Permanence is that by which the thing-in-itself, is of. Which makes the notion that if I’m not looking at the thing it isn’t there, rather foolish.

If we aren’t exposed to it as sensations (….), then how are we exposed to it? — Bob Ross

“It” taken to indicate the thing-in-itself…..we aren’t exposed to it; such is, qualified by definition, “in-itself”.

how you could know that if you can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves—i.e., the real world. I still don’t understand, as of yet, how you resolve that. — Bob Ross

That’s the epistemological issue, innit? We don’t know the real world as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us. Another kind of intellect will probably understand whatever world is common to both differently than we understand it, but it doesn’t matter one bit. We can only work with what we have to work with, and the uselessness of that tautology should tell us something. Like….stay in your own lane!!!!

The real world for us, is just how we understand what we are given. The world is only as real as our intellect provides. Whatever the world really is, we are not equipped to know, and if it really is as we understand it, so much the better, but without something to compare our understands to, we won’t know that either.
———-

If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time…
-Mww

If what exists is what is conditioned by space and time, then space and time do not exist. — Bob Ross

Correct, they do not exist in the same manner as that of which they are the conditions. They are objectively valid as presuppositions logically, but not objectively real as existences physically. They are the conditions for things, re: intuitions, but not the conditions of things, re: properties.

Are you saying that the logical part of our representational system (for each and every one of us) only is conditioned by time? So it exists within the temporal world but non-spatially? — Bob Ross

Pretty much, yep. First one must grant that in humans, all thoughts are singular and successive, from which arises the very notion of time in and of itself. It follows that it is more the case that logic, which is merely the assemblage of thoughts according to rules, makes the world temporal, than that logic exists in a temporal world.

With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing.
-Mww

But it has to exist in a thing: what thing are you saying it exists in? — Bob Ross

If it’s not a thing, why does it have to exist in a thing? That which exists in a thing is a property thereof, and logic is not a property. All I’m going to say about it, is that logic resides in human intelligence, and attempts to pin it down in concreto ultimately ends as illusory cognitions at least, or irrational judgements at worst.
————

….reality (which is fundamentally a Universal Mind) — Bob Ross

The reductionism required to get from reality to Mind must be truly intense!!! Even if I accept the human mind as a mere abstract placeholder to terminate infinite regress in intellectual cause/effect, I can still say that mind belongs to me. Which begs the most obvious of questions……

But that’s ok, you’ve circumvented the problem by relieving Mind from meta-cognitive deliberations, so it doesn’t need to belong. But in so doing, you’ve attributed to it a different form of intellectual cause/effect, re: will, which I must say, as I conceive it, also belongs to me.

As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws. — Bob Ross

There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is.

In human cognition, strict law is subsumed under the principles of universality and absolute necessity. The idea of a Universal Mind covers the former, but the latter must be merely granted without justification, in that the Universal Mind does not imbue the necessity of existence itself. In other words, the Universal Mind, if it doesn’t exist, cannot be legislated by law, which means if it is legislated by law it must exist. Which means it cannot be merely an idea.

But all universals are ideas……AAAARRRRGGGGG!!!!!!

As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws.
— Bob Ross

There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is. — Mww

Could it be that Universal Mind "adhering to strict laws" is merely the wrong choice of words? Maybe he means that reality (including laws of logic, physics, etc) have universal mind as their source. The foundations of reality are grounded in Universal Mind. Or something like that.

Now, sometimes I do hear physicalists rightly point out that an analytical idealist is not actually providing an explanation to consciousness at all but, rather, simply positing it as fundamental without a detailed account of mind (i.e., of how it works) which, to them, is more epistemically costly than obscurely explaining mind in terms of emergence from the brain. — Bob Ross

That criticism may also accurately describe Panpsychism, which is a philosophical generalization, not a detailed scientific account of mind. It simply assumes that "mind stuff" is more fundamental than "matter stuff". In which case, the emergence of Mind from Matter needs no further explanation, other than perhaps adding the holistic notion of "Emergence".

I'm not familiar with the "details" of Kastrup's theory of Analytical Idealism, but it sounds like a modern version of the ancient notion of Panpsychism. If so, it seems to be generally compatible with my own thesis of Enformationism. But the devil is in the details. And philosophical theories tend to be skimpy in the kind of empirical & mathematical details that "physicalists" prefer. The "analytical" preface seems to imply that Idealism can be boiled-down to fundamentals or details of some kind. Does Kastrup make any attempt to mathematize his non-empirical theory? Is his "fundamentally unitary phenomenal field" defined in mathematical terms, similar to a quantum field? :nerd:


What is analytical idealism?
Analytic Idealism is a theory of the nature of reality that maintains that the universe is experiential in essence. That does not mean that reality is in your or our individual minds alone, but instead in a spatially unbound, transpersonal field of subjectivity of which we are segments.
https://www.essentiafoundation.org/analytic-idealism-course/

↪Bob Ross
Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live? — Tom Storm

In my experience, most people act like Materialists in all practical phases of life. Only a few brain-washed nuts actually attempt to walk through walls, which, according to subatomic physics, are 99% empty space (image below).

AFAIK, It's only in the impractical hypothetical aspects of human existence that such literal "non-sense" arises. That's why Materialism is un-controversial : it is what it seems to be. But Idealism is inherently contentious, for the same reason that Art & Politics are questionable non-matters of taste --- along with "morality, human rights, climate change". Ideals exist in private minds, not in public space, where your freedom is restricted by hard objective physical laws, instead of soft subjective laws of propriety & decency.

Fortunately, on TPF, we have an unreal ideal impractical Forum, existing in the notional emptiness of cyber-space, where we can dispute our personal ideas & beliefs without physically coming to blows. Snarky remarks are meta-physical, and won't give you a physical black eye. :cool:

MEN WHO STARE AT GOATS and walk through walls

Could it be that Universal Mind "adhering to strict laws" is merely the wrong choice of words? — Tom Storm

Maybe, but more likely my misunderstanding of what the words I read are supposed to represent.

You know…..guy spends most of his philosophical life in one mindset, pretty hard to shake him loose.

I hear you. For me, with a mindset of philosophical ignorance, almost everything sounds like a violation of common sense. :razz:

Only a few brain-washed nuts actually attempt to walk through walls, which, according to subatomic physics, are 99% empty space (image below). — Gnomon

A cryptic answer to my question. I'm not sure I follow you.

As per Kastrup; mentation presents itself to us in the peculiar way we have come to understand as physical. We can leave this aspect of idealism in brackets.

My question is pragmatic and existential. I am a pragmatist - in the non-philosophical sense of this word.

Here we have a significant debate about ontology. I wonder what follows from one of the answers. How does how we live change if idealism is true?

How does how we live change if idealism is true? — Tom Storm

I think this is the pertinent question. What is important to humans is how the world seems to humans because that is all we have to work with. The world seems physical not ideal, but that still doesn't warrant asserting the physical as substance, even if that seems to make more sense than asserting the mental as substance; in my view both claims are groundless, or even worse, meaningless, and I don't think the question is; per se, very important except to obsessive philosophers who cannot rest until they know the truth. No doubt some people may have other reasons for wanting the ultimate nature of reality to be either physical or mental.

For example, it seems to me that very often, if not always, the motivation for believing in idealism is the hope that the self does not perish with the body. If one feels incurably distressed by the thought of the death of the self, then perhaps the best thing would be to comfort oneself with the belief that the self continues after the death of the body, and this belief might seem unsustainable alongside the belief that the world is ultimately physical through and through.

That said, holding to idealism would only become harmful if one devalued this life in consequence, Personally I think that learning to live always right in the present moment, and thus experientially 'out of time', is a worthy aim, since I think this is the only eternity we can sensibly hope for. That said, I respect the right of others to believe in an afterlife, provided their beliefs do no harm, that they do not, for example, contribute to complacency concerning the very real problems that afflict not only human life, but the whole of life on this planet.

But all universals are ideas — Mww

All universal common denominators are only ideas?

:gasp:

The world seems physical and substantial and from that experience and the reificational potentiality of language we naturally extrapolate the notion of substance. We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense. — Janus

The sun also seems to move across the sky, the Earth seems flat, and it seems like we're not moving 10,000+ mph through space. We should be careful about making leaps from what seems true to what is true.

A wise response, Janus.

For example, it seems to me that very often, if not always, the motivation for believing in idealism is the hope that the self does not perish with the body. — Janus

Of course, and like an idiot I didn't even consider this aspect.

How does how we live change if idealism is true? — Tom Storm

I can't help thinking that (e.g.) asylums, ashrams, seminaries, cult communes, (sectarian) kindergartens, wall-to-wall video gaming (plus 24/7 social media), etc habitualize 'idealist (antirealist) living'.

Of course, and like an idiot I didn't even consider this aspect. — Tom Storm

That cuts both ways. I know atheists who are so invested in their atheism and the idea they are simply biological machines, they embrace strange notions, like mind and consciousness don't exist or are illusions.

... mind and consciousness don't exist or are illusions. — RogueAI

What is meant here by "illusions"?

The claim that consciousness is an illusion of any sort, in any sense of the word "illusion", is absurd.

Sure, why not? Denominator indicates a underlying standardization, common denominator indicates an underlying standardization for all to which it conditions, and all to which it conditions indicates its universality, which would then be a mere idea. I guess it depends on how far, and on what, one wishes to extend the denomination.

Common denominator for footwear is that which separates the foot from the ground, but that separator in itself is hardly a universal idea. But that a foot should be separated from the ground is a universal idea insofar as far as the construction of all footwear whatsoever is conditioned by it.

Nothing you contribute here is easy, is it?

Either that, or you post stuff just to see how much of a mess folks will make of it. (Grin)

All universal common denominators are only ideas? — creativesoul

I wonder what they have in common? :chin:

The claim that consciousness is an illusion of any sort, in any sense of the word "illusion", is absurd. — RogueAI

Agree, in that illusions are artefacts of consciousness. This obvious objection never seems to stop Daniel Dennett, though.

I was just thinking about the cases when universal common denominators are discovered by us rather than stipulated. Such cases are examples of that which existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices, prior to our consideration, prior to our awareness of them... prior to using "universal common denominator" in order to pick them out to the exclusion of all else.

That's who I had in mind. Consciousness explained indeed.