After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it.
According to the entirety of your methodology (and not just the hierarchy), there is no justification for this claim you have made here. You can’t say it is less cogent, even when it seems obvious that it is, for a person to say “no it doesn’t seem silly to just go off of the probability”. Without a clear criteria in your view, the vast majority of scenarios end up bottoming out at this kind of stalemate (because the hierarchy is unapplicable to the situation). — Bob Ross
I totally am (; I mean:
The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.
You can’t say this if you generated two separate, uncomparable hierarchies and there is nothing else in the methodology that determines cogency of inductions! Philosophim, you are admitting it is more cogent and that there’s absolutely no justification in your methodology for knowing that! — Bob Ross
I 100% agree with you that it is most rational, but the problem in your view is you cannot justify it.
Let’s make the danger in having no means of determining cogency of the inductions more clear in this scenario: imagine that if you guess incorrectly they kill you. Now, we both agree that the obviously more cogent and rational move is to bet it is a BWA; but imagine there’s a third participant, Jimmy, who isn’t too bright. He goes off of the probability. Now, he isn’t misapplying your methodology by choosing to go off of the probability: he carefully and meticulously outlines the hierarchies involved in the context just like you, and realized (just like you) that he cannot compare them and is at a stalemate. He decides that he will use the probability. — Bob Ross
But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy.
I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone?
You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context.
Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference.
Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.
In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold. — Bob Ross
In the scenario, which let’s say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you can’t compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the pattern—there’s no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1. — Bob Ross
If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean? — Bob Ross
Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose.
The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context."
If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.
If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation
So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?
Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge?
I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesn’t give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogent—which, to me, is a major problem. — Bob Ross
rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesn’t account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. — Bob Ross
I wouldn’t count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; — Bob Ross
Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross
I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA”. Epistemology doesn’t leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide. — Bob Ross
To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. — Bob Ross
If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.
You aren’t giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and that’s what is most cogent. — Bob Ross
For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross
Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?
Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want.
The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around
Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.
Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross
The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction."
But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.
For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross
But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you
Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?
I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why.
So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.
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I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical.
Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!
Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want.
You are confusing what a person can do with what they should do epistemically. It doesn’t matter if a person can act irrationally: it is still irrational because it isn’t what they should be doing. — Bob Ross
You are confusing what is most cogent to do with our expounding of it (to ourselves). Distinctive knowledge us just out ability to discretely parcel reality: it doesn’t tell us in itself what is most cogent to hold nor what is even most cogent to parcel. — Bob Ross
The epistemic theory is supposed to attempt to get at what in reality, beyond our mere distinctive knowledge, is most cogent to do. — Bob Ross
Philosophim, conceptualizing and abstracting what one thinks is most cogent to do is useless if it is not closely married to reality, which is what furnishes us with what actually is most cogent to do. — Bob Ross
If I want to survive and there’s a bear coming at me, then there is actually a best sequence of counter moves to maximize my chances of getting out alive—and my decisions in terms of what to distinctively classify and parcel could go against that most cogent sequence of events. — Bob Ross
I am allowed to, after the coin flipping and placing of the dog (or not placing of the dog) is finished, stand outside of the room with the door closed. I clearly hear a dog barking in that room and, to put the icing on the cake, my dog’s bark matches that bark exactly (as I have experienced it for 60 years). This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies). — Bob Ross
Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross
The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction."
This is irrelevant to what I was saying: just because I can decide to not use the hierarchy that does not entail that I am determining the most cogent solution. — Bob Ross
For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross
But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you
I was just clarifying the record: I am not going to derail into that right now. I would much rather you just answer the question. My statement here is irrelevant to the question: — Bob Ross
Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?
I am asking that within the context that we have two hierarchies, H2 and H1, in context S and that is it: there is no over-arching hierarchy at play here. I think I made the question very clear. So, does your epistemology account for a method of determining the cogency of the hierarchies or not? — Bob Ross
I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical.
I think my question is very clear, and I am not going to speculate at trying to provide potential solutions to your theory if you already have a solution. The critique is of your theory, now it is time for you to rebut it or concede it. — Bob Ross
I already stated in the context of the question that the hierarchies are legitimate: it’s the comparison of hierarchies I am asking about. — Bob Ross
Happy Saturday Bob!
you keep saying things that show you don't understand the paper...I think it would help you greatly to re-read the paper first
The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.
This part alone should have been obvious to you if you've been listening to me, and you should have easily predicted how I would respond
This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies).
You're smart as a whip Bob, but I think you're still in attack mode, not discussion mode, and you're not thinking through it correctly here
You are claiming that because it does not claim to have a rational comparison between identity sets, that its somehow broken. That's a straw man
You claim that it is more rational to pick H2. It seems to be a crux of your argument against the hierarchies inadequacy, so I want to know what justification you have for making that claim.
No, its not clear, that's why I'm asking you to give your rationale! Also, lets not put ultimatums like "rebut or concede". Lets not make the discussion one sided, please address my points so that I can better address yours.
I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you.
We both agreed that it is more cogent to pick H2 over H1 in S, so I was asking you why it would be more cogent under your view. — Bob Ross
The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.
If you think it is more rational, then I can ask “why under your view is it more rational?”. — Bob Ross
Correct me if I am wrong, but we have discussed well enough for me to get an answer to those: we both agree that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies (H2 and H1) work perfectly fine, but is there any criteria in place to compare those hierarchies themselves?
I think the aspect of the papers you are saying I am forgetting pertains to the claims I made about distinctive knowledge, but that is irrelevant to whether you can briefly answer those questions. — Bob Ross
Right now, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent to pick H2 (which you said, and I quoted above, in a previous message) if you can’t compare the hierarchies themselves (which is what you were also claiming). — Bob Ross
But since you asked, I will tell you why I think H2 is better than H1 in the box example: I think that, in that situation, in a nutshell, that the overwhelming experiential correlation of the BWA with design X and design X exclusively on BWAs outweighs the 1% increased probability that it is a BWOA; and so I go with it being a BWA (and thusly not with the probability). Why do I think it outweighs the other? Just because, in this situation, because to go with the other option is to have to makeup unparsimoneous explanations of the situation: it is more parsimonious, all else being equal, to say “yeah, that’s probably a BWA”. — Bob Ross
Sorry, I am not trying to give you an ultimatum; but I feel as though you are avoiding the question (perhaps unintentionally or I am misunderstanding your response): I’ve asked the same question now four or so times and you haven't answered nor have you demonstrated why my question is currently unanswerable. You say we need to clarify some things about how the methodology works (as I am misremembering), but you can still answer the question with the terms from your methodology and then note if my response confuses the terms. You haven’t even responded. — Bob Ross
I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you.
Are you not saying that the hierarchy is the most cogent means of determining which induction to hold when they have the same identity sets? If so, then you are telling them what they should do. — Bob Ross
To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.
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I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I don’t believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.
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I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality.
Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered
Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy.
But regardless, parsimoneous is just something we want, it doesn't make it rational.
A desire is not a rational argument.
That is a separate question that must be asked of the distinctive knowledge sets themselves. Which if you understand this part, we can go into next.
You are claiming that the two sets, H1 and H2, can only be evaluated as more or less cogent than one another insofar as you know which factors are being considered relevant — Bob Ross
but, most importantly, the person can decide which factors are relevant, being distinctive knowledge, and thusly it is not more or less rational (i.e., cogent) to use factors X/Y and A/B (or to just use A/B, or just X/Y). Is this correct? — Bob Ross
I think I have finally pinned down my disagreement here (assuming my above summary is accurate): the relevant factors of the actual situation are not themselves distinctive knowledge but, rather, are applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross
My distinctive knowledge of what the relevant factors are, which is just my ability to cognitively enumerate different options and single out different entities, is really an asserted hypothesis of what they actually are; and I can only confirm this by application of a test. — Bob Ross
Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered
The problem is that you don’t get to decide what to consider in the context: the relevant factors are there in reality within that context. In the box example, the designs and the probability are relevant factors. All you are noting is the enumeration of which are more cogent depending on what they consider as relevant, but I am saying they don’t get to choose that part. — Bob Ross
To be rational, is to be parsimonious, logically consistent, to assess the reliability of the evidence, to be internally + externally coherent, and empirically adequate—all to the best of one’s ability. — Bob Ross
Desires, ultimately, are what define what “being rational” is. There’s no way around that. That I am irrational for violating the law of noncontradiction is grounded in my desire that I ought to define “being rational” as including “abiding by the LNC”. That doesn’t make my argument irrational. — Bob Ross
I feel we're back to discussing the situation properly now and can continue.
I am not saying that H1 or H2 is more cogent.
I am not applying the hierarchy to whether I should chose H1 or H2
Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?"
I am saying the hierarchy does not involve making any claim to the rationality of the distinctive properties a person chooses
You'll need to prove that you cannot choose your essential properties.
but it took 2 hours of examination to figure it out? If I only had 3 hours to sort
Bob, hypothetically what if there was a color difference of red and green on A and B boxes
"If I have an option to make a property essential to an identity, when should I?"
This is not a hierarchy question. I repeat, this is not a hierarchy question. At this point, we must leave inductions behind and focus on this question alone.
Recall that the hierarchy is based on its distance from applicable knowledge within the distinctions chosen. I applicably know the probability. I don't distinctively know the probability. I applicably know the pattern. I don't distinctively know the pattern. Finally, I don't applicably know that I can get a box that has half air, and not half air. So if I choose an induction, whether I'm going to get an A or B box next, I have to choose an induction that strays away the least from the applicable knowledge that I have. In this case, its the probability.
So then, the relevant factors of the identity set are the distinctive knowledge that you see as essential.
The relevant factors within the hierarchy are your applicable knowledge involving those distinctions.
"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):
But you didn't demonstrate logical consistency.
If you want to equate parsimonious with rationality, you have to demonstrate that rationality. As it was, your claim is its rational because its "rational".
The law of non-contradiction is a distinctive bit of knowledge that when applied to reality, has always been confirmed. What is rational is to create applicable identities which assess reality correctly. We know this if reality does not contradict these applications.
Our desires to not change this
Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.
You are saying that, as far as I am understanding, the hierarchy which is more cogent is dependent on what essential properties the person uses; so you are indirectly speaking to which is more or less cogent in that sense. — Bob Ross
I just want to clarify that the determination of which relevant factors to use in the context is a comparison of the hierarchies. — Bob Ross
Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?"
My question, is which induction do you think, in totality of your analysis of the situation, is most cogent to hold in the box scenario?
Your answer seems to be contingent on the relevant factors used in the situation, and it seems as though you may have a criteria for deciphering which is more cogent to include (in terms of relevant factors). Perhaps now you can answer the original question (above)? — Bob Ross
That is fine; my original question seems to boil down to what makes a factor relevant; but I want to clarify that I am not talking about properties but, rather, relevant factors. — Bob Ross
I will say it again: an accidental property of an entity within a context can be a relevant factor: not just essential properties. — Bob Ross
The essence of a thing is just the properties that it cannot exist without; in the box scenario, the designs are not essential properties but are relevant factors to the scenario nonetheless. — Bob Ross
I think we may have veered off from the original scenario and I think it is time we revisited it: I am not asking how one should determine the essential properties of an entity—I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which factors are relevant. — Bob Ross
"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):
I would like you to, in light of these criteria you gave, tell me which induction within the box scenario is more cogent to use; and no I am not asking you to compare them within your induction hierarchy criteria because we already agreed that they are in two separate hierarchies and cannot be compared in that manner. — Bob Ross
Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.
For now this is really an offshoot of our conversation, so I will refrain from going too deep into it for now. — Bob Ross
I do not have a term "relevant factors" in my theory. I noted the term was ok as long as you understood it was a synonym for "essential properties in consideration of the induction".
Whatever you involve in creating your inductions, are essential properties for that formation of that induction
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It becomes an essential property in an induction about whether that X/Y pattern determines whether the box has air in it or not.
The question is not about comparing the H1 and H2 set then, its about deciding what essential properties you're going to use in your inductions. So we don't compare hierarchy sets. We decide what essential properties we're going to use, then that leads to us into a place where we can make comparisons of our inductions.
You're not comparing the hierarchies to determine which essential properties to use.
What you seem to imply is that there is something in the hierarchy that is the end all be all of rationality that shows one set to be more rational than another. There is not.
It depends on a great many contextual factors, so its not a blanket, "This is always better" situation.
The X/Y are accidental on just a box. But when you now tie them in with the identity of having air or not, they are now an essential property of whether the box has air or not.
In this very specific scenario you originally mentioned, overlapping the two is ideal.
So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.
What I don't have an answer for you, is whether you should use a distinctive knowledge set where X/Y is irrelevant to whether the box has air or not, vs where it is.
So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.
Change the set and context and we have to re-evaluate which distinctive knowledge set would be more rationale to take, or if there is no answer for that specific scenario.
What I will note is that your claim that H2 is more rational to choose than H1 has only provided a confirmation bias justification.
The fourth is coming up btw! I don't know if you're American, but happy 4th regardless!
We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross
First, I ask you to trust my good faith that if a point is proven, I will concede. I trust you'll do the same.
Because we can have different distinctive knowledge sets, we could create a different set of inductions to compare within each knowledge set.
Once you choose your distinctive knowledge set, you then look within the hierarchy that results within that distinctive knowledge set to choose the most rational induction.
This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?"
I have not seen any justification from your end that we should view "relevant properties" as anything different than I've noted
Demonstrate how you can create the induction pattern that involves X and Y without using X and Y. If X and Y are accidental or secondary to the induction, then they are not needed for the formation of the induction.
We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross
If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do.
Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob.
I've proposed what is rational within the theory,
1. That one has to compare the inductions in the box scenario or leave it up to an arbitrary decision. — Bob Ross
This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?"
What is most rational to distinctively hold is what corresponds best to reality. — Bob Ross
That relevant factors of a situation for resolving a dilemma are not necessarily essential properties of any induction: the former is a piece of information that could affect the conclusion, whereas the latter is a property that a formulated induction cannot exist without. — Bob Ross
The relevant factors of a situation are not distinctive knowledge, they are applicable knowledge. One can formulate distinctive knowledge about the relevant factors, but there are necessarily a set of relevant factors to the situation irregardless of what one distinctively claims to know — Bob Ross
That because you have only provided a method of determining cogency of inductions within your concept of a “hierarchy induction” (and have adamantly asserted that we cannot determine cogency otherwise), I am left to conclude that the applicability of your epistemology to decipher what is most cogent to believe is severely wanting—as the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations force the person to compare two inductions that have different essential properties. — Bob Ross
That I have provided a clear and concise definition of “rationality” (i.e., to be, to the best of one’s ability, logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, empirically adequate, considerate of credence, considerate of explanatory power, parsimonious, a person that goes with intellectual seemings, and a person that goes with their immediate apprehensions — Bob Ross
Although I haven’t mentioned this yet, noting essential properties of an induction is trivial: — Bob Ross
if that is the case, then there are no inductions which have the same essential properties. — Bob Ross
Again, a induction being a probability and another being a possibility likewise would be, under your definition here, essential properties which one has and the other doesn’t; so they don’t have the same essential properties. — Bob Ross
We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross
If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do.
This is clear straw man. We can both explicate what we think “rationality” should be and see where it goes from there. You haven’t even defined it yet. — Bob Ross
Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob.
Again, straw man. I am not saying that “well, I want it to be that, so I am not going to hear what you think it should be”. That’s nonsense. I am saying that, fundamentally, how we define rationality is dependent on our obligation (as it is literally a definition about how we ought to behave), and obligations are subjective; so it will bottom out at a desire (because of Hume’s guillotine). That doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it just like morals. Are you a moral realist? — Bob Ross
I've informed you that not only do we not have to compare the inductions between the hierarchy sets, we logically can't justify doing so.
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We can reason why we should choose certain knowledge sets over others, and I've set different scenarios to demonstrate this.
This truly is the core of rationality without any extra detail. Just to specify a tad more, I would say it is that which is not contradicted by reality
As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established.
As the person who's established the theory, I want to see a contradiction or a lack using the terms involved first. If you can do so, then we can discuss trying to figure out what is missing
You compare the distinctive knowledge sets, not the inductions.
You: People want to compare inductions across different distinctive knowledge sets.
Me: Can't do that. Its incorrect thinking. If they want to think correctly, they need to look at the distinctive knowledge sets.
You But I don't want to. (I'm poking fun a little bit, I just don't see anything else in your argument so far)
The theory has a logical solution to the problem you've proposed, to look at the distinctive knowledge sets and compare those instead.
So I see no lack on my part
Please explain what you mean by this. By my example below:
P1: Probability of A with X and B with Y is Z%
P2: Pattern of A with X and B with Y predicts the next pull will be an AX
P3: Plausibility of A with Y will be pulled next time, even though it hasn't happened yet.
How is that not a set of three different types of inductions that use the same essential properties to create those inductions?
This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right.
The problem is you're saying its subjective, then asserting it can't be a certain way.
If its fully subjective, then I subjectively believe you're wrong, and you have to agree with me to keep your proposal.
Something which is fully subjective cannot be wrong if the subject says its right.
I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong
ts just a contradiction Bob
As for morality, I may one day post my thoughts on it. Its a little more complicated then something as simple as moral realism. You have to have knowledge before you can know morality. So we'll have to finish this up first.
I am saying that choosing between “knowledge sets” is a comparison. — Bob Ross
Why is rationality that which is not contradicted by reality? Why cannot not be “to be illogical”? — Bob Ross
I don’t think you can justify this without it bottoming out at a desire: the desire to obtain and abide by that which most closely aligns with reality. — Bob Ross
As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established.
I can’t because there is no term for it. They aren’t essential properties necessarily of anything. — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “distinctive knowledge sets”? You said inductions are distinctive knowledge, and the sets (hierarchies) of inductions are also distinctive knowledge; so when you compare the hierarchies (sets) themselves, you are doing so to compare the inductions within different hierarchies to determine which one to use. — Bob Ross
You compare the sets to compare the inductions. The end goal is to pick an induction and if there are two in different sets then you compare the sets to compare them. — Bob Ross
The lack of applicability is if you actually can’t compare the inductions, which I don’t think you are truly saying (although you keep saying it). If you can’t compare them, then you can’t say one set is more rational to hold than another and, in turn, that one induction (within one set) is more rational than another (in another set). At that point, you theory is effectively useless. — Bob Ross
P1 is not an induction itself: a probability is a deduction itself and the induction is the inference made utilizing it. So P1 should really be “the next pick is a A with X because there is a Z% chance of it happening”: I am going to call this rP1 (revised-P1). rP1 has an essential property of Z% chance of getting an A with X, which neither the pattern nor plausibility can ever have.
Without the utilization of Z%, rP1 is not longer rP1: it is another probability. That’s why I said talking about essential properties of particular inductions is trivial and useless.
Likewise, P2 has an essential property of the pattern (as, again, the patter itself is not the induction, the inference made about it—e.g., I will pull an A with X because of this pattern), and the probability, rP1 can never have that property. Without the pattern, the induction is not longer that induction: it is something else.
Same thing with the P3.
Now, the only other option when speaking about essential properties is the essence of a general class of things and, in this case, the essential properties of an induction (i.e., what makes an induction, at its core, an induction?)--and that affords no foreseeable use to your argument. — Bob Ross
I think you are thinking that the essential properties of the inductions are the “A with X” and “B with Y”, but that’s just plainly false. Firstly, the inductions themselves are not the patterns nor probabilities; — Bob Ross
secondly, if we are talking about the essential properties of a particular induction (which is what you were talking about), then every property thereof is essential (because without even one property it would not longer be that exact induction). — Bob Ross
This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right.
If we have conflicting views on what rationality is, then I would be wrong relative to you and you to me. We aren’t both right. Propositions that are subjective are indexical. — Bob Ross
I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong
This just pushes the more important question back of what you think rationality is, as you are implicitly using it by saying that you demonstrate that my idea of rationality is wrong. — Bob Ross
If by this you are just noting that it is possible for “rational is X” to be false for you and true for me (and that there is nothing objective to decipher which is “right”), then, yeah, that’s true. However, people tend to have productive conversations nonetheless — Bob Ross
But a knowledge set is the distinctive properties you are using at its base, not the inductions. The inductions rely on the base. You can compare inductions between the bases, but it always comes back to the bases in the end. I've noted there is no rational justification for comparing inductions between knowledge sets. So far you have not provided any either.
Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is.
The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality.
Bob, I read this a few times and I could not understand what you were trying to say at all. Please see if a second pass can make this more clear.
We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction.
I have a set of distinctive properties I consider important to a decision.
Its just like these statements, "Nothing is true." Is that a true statement?
I can just say you're wrong and I'm correct under your statement.
When your point allows a contradiction of your point to stand, that's reality contradicting your point.
I've been formerly trained in philosophy and have been around some incredibly intelligent, learned, and capable people. Every single one of them would dismantle your point without a second thought
…
Your statement on rationality is a well tread and thoroughly debunked idea in any serious circle of thought
it just sounds like you aren’t cross-comparing inductions that are not in the same hierarchies; however, in a more broad sense, you are comparing the inductions by comparing the hierarchies because those “bases” you speak of are what decide the properties of the inductions themselves—so you are comparing the properties of the inductions via those structures. — Bob Ross
The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality.
To me, your second sentence here is a just a more complicated way of saying that the end goal is to pick an induction. — Bob Ross
Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is.
I was saying essentially this:
1. The probability of … is Z% is not an induction. — Bob Ross
If by it you mean:
We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction.
Then, as shown above, no induction which is not completely identical to another can be compared, which is clearly not what you are trying to argue for. — Bob Ross
Philosophim, I am not interested in comparing our (or others’) egos or credentials; but, since you brought it up, I have studied metaethics in depth, so I know for a fact that moral anti-realism is not an irrational position nor has moral realism thoroughly debunked it. The fact of the matter is that there are rational and good arguments on both sides. There have been many great philosophers that have been one, and many the other. — Bob Ross
I have no problem with your adamant support for moral realism here (which, as I was saying before, is the crux of our dispute about rationality); but to say that your prominent opponents (even in the literature itself) are all irrational and that anyone who is serious can debunk them in a heart beat is a straw man, inaccurate, borderline dogmatic, and unproductive to think. — Bob Ross
For example, if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not; however, whether I should be healthy or not is not grounded in objectivity—it is subjective. — Bob Ross
P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational. — Bob Ross
We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross
I made a bad judgement call, so my apologies and I will never use an appeal to authority again in our discussions.
I did not say I supported moral realism, nor was I debunking anyone who opposes moral realism. That's the straw man here Bob.
True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.
if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not
Rationally you should choose not to smoke if you want to retain good health. But you don't have to be rational
I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as “should”) are assertions. I can assert that “I should eat food in 5 minutes”--you can’t say that isn’t an assertion. Secondly, P1 is not ambiguous at all: it is the claim that “one who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational”--it doesn’t get any clearer than that. The person is saying, apart from what is the case, that what should be the case is that…. . Thirdly, I purposely made the premises have “oughts” in them: you can’t just arbitrarily change them to descriptive statements. If you want to do that and it not be considered irrelevant to the conversation, then you must demonstrate that rationality is objective—then you can claim they are descriptive statements. I am saying rationality is just epistemic norms, which are prescriptive statements.P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational. — Bob Ross
P1 is not an assertion because of "should". That's just an ambiguous sentence. A proper claim for logic is "One who is incoherent in their beliefs IS considered irrational, or even IS NO considered irrational. "Should" leaves the point incomplete. Why should it? Why should it not? What does should even mean? Does that mean the outcome is still uncertain?
Unclear premises are allowed to be rejected in any logical discussion because they are open to interpretation by each subject and are the root of many logical fallacies.
Correct! But….:Each person subjectively decides what rationality means. Because of this, there is no objective rationality, or something which is rational apart from our subjective experience.
Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.
A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card.
We've deduced the induction, but deducing an induction does not make the induction not an induction.
Distinctive knowledge set 1: Fac
…
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and num
Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create.
The set of inductions I can form when considering only A and B are potentially different when considering the full property sets of A, B, X, and Y.
you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.
Absolutely no worries my friend! I think, with all due respect, that we are completely speaking past each other on this dispute about “rationality”. — Bob Ross
Within that interpretation of our dispute, I think you are noting that “truth” is not relative (which I agree with) but are semantically associating it with “rationality”. I am associating “rationality” with an act which is in accordance with one’s primitive epistemic standards, which inevitably are norms (and norms are either categorical or hypothetical). — Bob Ross
True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.
Wanting to be in good health and being obligated to be in good health are both norms; — Bob Ross
if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not
Your “resolution” section is the exact same thing I said but you substituted “should” for “want”, and , since they are both normative statements, it doesn’t matter: normative statements are subjective. — Bob Ross
I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as “should”) are assertions. I can assert that “I should eat food in 5 minutes”--you can’t say that isn’t an assertion. — Bob Ross
P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.
NO. I am saying that in truth there is nothing it is to be irrational or rational apart from one’s (or our) epistemic standards (which are normative statements) and so to claim that there is an objective standard of rationality is to, from my point of view, hold a false belief; BUT, I cannot say they are objectively irrational for holding it. — Bob Ross
A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card.
No! The 4/52 chance of pulling a jack is not an induction: that is a deduction. — Bob Ross
Distinctive knowledge set 1: Fac
…
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and num
Please outline exactly what the essential properties are that you keep referring to in this example. By my lights, it is not what is essential to the formulation of the inductions; so I am confused what you mean by “essential properties” of the inductions. — Bob Ross
Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create.
What I am saying is that we create distinctive property sets, but there are, in reality, relevant factors to the situation. Period. It isn’t distinctive knowledge itself. — Bob Ross
you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.
I already have. — Bob Ross
This kinda breaks down as you don’t really demonstrate we have discrete experiences but just assert we do. — Darkneos
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.
Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim
Also the differences between the forms of induction are just splitting hairs than any actual distinction between them, apart from irrationality. — Darkneos
I found your “split” between knowledge and truth iffy at best. Knowledge does capture the truth at times but not always. — Darkneos
And my usual final question, what’s the point here? — Darkneos
It sounds like you would like to terminate the discussion, so, out of respect, I am going to refrain from responding to your points and let you have the last word.
As always, I hope you have a wonderful day and cannot wait to hear what else you have to say on this forum! — Bob Ross
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.
Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim
This is fair as I paired this down a bit. The difference between each type of induction is how many steps it is from what is applicably known.
When you know the entire composition of a deck of cards and that it will be shuffled without intent, the next immediate induction you can make is that a Jack has a 4/52 chance of being drawn. There's nothing in between right?
Now look at possibilities. I've seen a jack drawn before. I believe its possible that it will be drawn on the next pull. But its less rational of an induction then utilizing the applied knowledge of the card counts, the suits, and the face. Something being possible only indicates that it was applicably known once. It has no bearing on whether it will happen again.
This allows me a set way to compare two inductions and determine which one is more rational to hold. I'ld say that's pretty useful right? — Philosophim
Could you specify what was iffy? Let me sum what the difference was.
Truth: What exist in reality.
Knowledge: A set of identities which when applied as matching with reality, are not contradicted by reality.
The point here is that knowledge can never "know" that what it holds is truth. All it can know is that what it currently holds has not been contradicted by reality.
As an example to this abstract, distinctively and applicably known physics from the 1700's is not the same as physics from today. There were certain identities in physics that when applied with the tools available, were not contradicted by reality. However, eventually certain contradictions were found such as with orbiting large bodies. What was applicably know for small bodies could no longer be applied to planets. Eventually relativity came along. Today, we distinctively and applicably know things in science that in 100 years, may no longer stand.
What was the problem you were thinking this missed? — Philosophim
A fantastic question, perhaps the best one. I find epistemology to be one of the core unsolved questions of philosophy, and the most important one. "How do we know what we know," is incredibly important before any serious discussion can occur. Being able to identity what another person distinctively and applicably knows is immensely valuable in debating another person. If you see that the conflict is merely over the distinctive differences in identities, you can refocus energy and efforts on that instead of the applicable.
As well, to my knowledge there is no theory in epistemology at this point in history which allows us a reasoned way to compare inductions and ascertain that one is more cogent than another in a particular situation. Intuitively we feel this, but no one has ever actively given an objective means to do so. Sometimes this is called "The problem of induction". The theory here gives a solution to this problem. — Philosophim
This also assumes you know the state of the minds of others and just assume people do this. — Darkneos
On could also un knowingly be able to experience discretely and yet not be able to comprehend the idea of it, I would cite animals as this case (at least I assume from their behaviors). So this act of creation is more an assumption than a fact of living things, or in this case humans. — Darkneos
I guess that probability is more a likelihood within a known quantity like a deck. Possible is if it can happen. Plausible is more like a maybe it COULD be. I'm still not sure how one is more useful than the other though. — Darkneos
I guess I have a more loose version of truth. For me truth is what IS and what comports with reality and evidence. Because one can "know" something and it be false (flat earth, autism and vaccines). It's why I said that knowledge sometimes yields truth. — Darkneos
Science I wouldn't really use as an example as it's designed to be a constantly evolving process, and even then it's complex. Like classical and quantum physics. It's not that classical is "Wrong" per se, just useful at our level of complexity (and that it is if you see what we've done with it). But in terms of reality as it is then the quantum world is where it's at, maybe. — Darkneos
I guess I never really give much thought as to how I know what I know because in the past I tend to spiral into some radical skepticism where I know nothing and end up catatonic. — Darkneos
While "how do we know what we know" is a nice question to ask, at some point we have to realize that everything ends in some irrational position, according to the Munchausen Trilemma. — Darkneos
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