the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory — goremand

There is an entire Enlightenment philosophy predicated on a similar conclusion. So either your conclusion isn’t as radical as you supposed, or, your conclusion is as outdated as the original.

If it were me I’d have said judgement instead of interpretation, but other than that I’m in general agreement.

So the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory — goremand

Not a radical conclusion, but a very sensible one.

If I perceive certain phenomena, of touch, sight, sound, taste or smell, my perceiving such phenomena cannot be mistaken. My judgement of what caused these phenomena may be mistaken, in that I may think the postbox is red, but this would be an illusion, in that the postbox is actually emitting a wavelength of 700nm.

, an illusion happens at the level of perception, while a misinterpretation happens (obviously) at the level of interpretation — goremand

Many psychologists and philosophers today would argue that perception is interpretation all the way down.

While it may be that it's not human nature to perceive without also interpreting, I think the two are distinct. I would say a camera is an example of perception without interpretation in the sense I mean.

While it may be that it's not human nature to perceive without also interpreting, I think the two are distinct. I would say a camera is an example of perception without interpretation in the sense I mean. — goremand

The camera is recording, not perceiving. When humans perceive something they are not just detecting it with their eyes, there is a whole perceptual apparatus attached to the act of seeing that just isnt present in a camera, yet.
I think that you are anthropomorphizing here, rather that making a real distinction. Simple recordings like from a camera are distinct from human perception but are not a distinction of the word/act of perceiving. Apples and oranges.

First there is perception and then there is cognition.

There seems to be two levels of perception.

First is the perception of simple concepts, such as colours, shapes, sizes, smells, sounds, tastes, feelings, etc. As these are directly from sensations and sense data, the observer cannot be mistaken about having perceived them.

Second is the perception of complex concepts, such as apples, trees, mountains, governments, etc. The brain combines simple concepts into complex concepts. As no cognitive judgment has been made, the observer cannot be mistaken about having perceived them.

Although the observer cannot be mistaken about what they have perceived, what they have perceived may not exist outside their perception of it.

With cognition, the brain combines these simple and complex concepts using memory, reasoning and language to understand what has been perceived, enabling propositions such as "the apple is on the table". As a cognitive judgment has been made, the observer can be mistaken about what they have judged to be the case.

There is an entire Enlightenment philosophy predicated on a similar conclusion. — Mww

Is there a name for it I can look up?

Usually when people say many X believe Y it’s usually none or little

There isn’t a difference between “simple” and “complex concepts. You’re just inventing distinctions between the two.

And secondly you can absolutely be mistaken about having perceived something. It literally happens every day.

That said the only way for illusion to really carry any meaning is to know what is real and that’s a whole can of worms right there.

Transcendental Idealism generally, particularly, with respect to the OP, the first Book in CPR, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic.

Don’t hate the messenger.

Transcendental Idealism generally, particularly, with respect to the OP, the first Book in CPR, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic.

Don’t hate the messenger. — Mww

Kant to me was always the epitome of the philosopher who makes everything more complicated than it has to be and expresses that complicated understanding in obscure language. More recently I've come to find some of his thinking interesting and helpful. So... I won't blame you. I'll take a look.

Good luck. Just remember it’s only a theory. If this, then that kinda thing. Whether or not there ever is a this….ehhhhh, you’ll have to decide.

↪goremand

, an illusion happens at the level of perception, while a misinterpretation happens (obviously) at the level of interpretation — goremand

Many psychologists and philosophers today would argue that perception is interpretation all the way down. — Joshs

↪Joshs

While it may be that it's not human nature to perceive without also interpreting, I think the two are distinct. I would say a camera is an example of perception without interpretation in the sense I mean. — goremand

The camera is recording, not perceiving. When humans perceive something they are not just detecting it with their eyes, there is a whole perceptual apparatus attached to the act of seeing that just isnt present in a camera, yet. — DingoJones

The above quoted posts are an interesting exchange.
Perception implies the mind and beliefs (true belief or false belief). So, a distinction between perception and interpretation does not make sense. (To understand this further, I mentioned in another thread at one time that when we talk (philosophically, scientifically) of awareness/consciousness, we are talking about the central nervous system. But there is a sort of a zombie nervous system that does not require our mind in order for it to function, and that is the enteric nervous system. (Look this up please).

That said, Goremand's analysis of illusion is a good one. Where does the error -- or the illusion -- occur? In the epistemological analysis of beliefs, it is a matter of various facts associated with an assertion. Should we prefer being justified or possessing the truth?
I believe that every individual walking around has a brain inside their skull. But I could not attain the truth of this belief because I wouldn't be able to open every person's skull to check if there's a brain inside.

What I want is to single out the process prior to anything resembling the generation of a proposition (i.e. something that can be true/false), perhaps calling this "perception" is an abuse of terminology. There is a causal connection between me seeing a red apple coming to believe the proposition "that's a red apple", but the apple does not speak out to me and tell me about itself, I am the one creating that proposition. So if the proposition is false, I have only myself to blame.

The camera analogy does the job insofar as the camera perceives/records/whatever-you-want-to-call-it without making judgments whose truth-value could be subject to evaluation.

You are dealing here with two different subjects: "illusion" as a concept and "illusionism" as a philosophical idea.

In the first case, most dictionaries and even Wikipedia, treat the concept of "illusion" from a physical view, and more specifically related to human perception and senses. For example, we all know of course about optical illusions. But surprisingly enough, they miss another huge area of application of the term.
Dictionary.com (former Oxford LEXICO), defines "illusion" as follows:
"1. Something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality.
2. The state or condition of being deceived; misapprehension."
See the "space" that these definitions open up?

In the second case, although there are different theories of "illusionism" in philosophy, I think that the most common and what I personally came to know about is one that has to do with the nature of consciousness. A view belonging to "eliminative materialism", which considers and describes phenomenal consciousness as an illusion.

In the article "Eliminative Materialism" of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, we read:
"'Illusionism' about consciousness [is] a label designed to help indicate why it seems to us that phenomenal consciousness is real (Frankish, 2016, 2017). Illusionism is motivated in part by broader theoretical considerations, such as the problematic nature of consciousness from the standpoint of physicalism and the observation that even reductive accounts of phenomenal experience typically suggest some sort of misapprehension of what is really going on."

So the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory because there simply is no such thing as an illusion, — goremand

I don't know why you say that there is no such thing as an illusion. I believe that after clearing the term, as I did above, you must give the concept of "illusion" a second chance! :smile:
Otherwise, I agree with you that the phenomenal properties cannot be illusory, at least as far as consciousness is concerned, but for another reason. What you are experiencing is always real. As what you are dreaming is always real. It just happens. It is kind of "registered". Now if the contents of what you are experiencing and what you are dreaming are nonsense, contrary to facts or logic, etc. this is something else. We are talking here about relative reality, relative truth, which are on a scale from totally illogical or unreal to very logical and real. Because there's no such thing as absolute reality or truth. Hypothetically maybe yes, but not on practical level, i.e. a level that we can talk about, that we can express, explain or describe. What is real or true for me, may not be for you. And vice versa. The same goes for illusion. My reality about a subject may look illusionary to you and vice versa.

"1. Something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality.
2. The state or condition of being deceived; misapprehension."
See the "space" that these definitions open up?

In the second case, although there are different theories of "illusionism" in philosophy, I think that the most common and what I personally came to know about is one that has to do with the nature of consciousness. A view belonging to "eliminative materialism", which considers and describes phenomenal consciousness as an illusion. — Alkis Piskas

I am thinking of illusion in that first sense, as a "deceiving appearance", and yes by Illusionism I was referring to the eliminative theory or at least broadly the idea of phenomenal properties being illusory (and thus presumably targets of elimination). I think that the "illusion" is taken to be sensory, the sense-introspection analogy is very important to the theory and I think illustrated well by a passage in SEP just below what you quoted:

"Illusionism claims that introspection involves something analogous to ordinary sensory illusions; just as our perceptual systems can yield states that radically misrepresent the nature of the outer world, so too, introspection yields representations that substantially misrepresent the actual nature of our inner experience."

Good. But I'm not sure if you still believe that illusion is something inexistent. Also, if you believe that phenomenal consciousness is something inexistent too ...

BTW, in such cases, where a lot of concepts are involved and their analysis leads to doubt, conflict, confusion, etc., I believe the best thing to do is to try to use one's experience, i.e. first-hand knowledge. In this case, forgeting about terms and concepts, just be aware of your environment and yourself in it and inside you (one at a time! :smile) If all that feels real to you and you can repeat it whenever and for how many times you want, would you think that it is an illusion? That is, your environment, yourself, your thoughts, etc. do not actually exist?

As I said in the OP I am skeptical of phenomenal properties, my main point is that skepticism should not be equated with Illusionism. Skepticism of phenomenal properties has been my position for a long time, it does not mean I am in an emotional state of doubt, confusion etc.

I see. OK.

Seems to me that even if we are mistaken, viz. interpretation, about what is there, when we are faced with some illusion, we are never mistaken that there is something there. We are only ever mistaken about what it is.

Seems to me that even if we are mistaken, viz. interpretation, about what is there, when we are faced with some illusion, we are never mistaken that there is something there. We are only ever mistaken about what it is. — NotAristotle

Yes, this is the gist of the cogito.

:100:

Yes, if introspection is to be likened to a sense it must detect something. The question is whether phenomenal properties are a part of this something. The ability to detect internal states alone does not require phenomenal properties in my opinion as even a computer can do it.

A rainbow is an illusion. Prior to our understanding of refracted light we would make up some other explanation. Regardless of what a rainbow is or how one is formed it is an illusion in the sense that something appears to be there but is not there. And the obvious stick in water illusion too.

All experience is not an illusion.

Experience happens. Illusions and delusions are part of experience. Once we recognise a delusion it becomes an illusion. That is all.

The idea that a rainbow "appears to be an object" rather than a refraction of light is a good example of what I mean by a privileged interpretation. In truth both interpretations are in line with the actual appearance of a rainbow and it is unclear why I should prefer one over the other based only on that appearance.

Our sense of the passage of time is also illusionary most of the time ;)

The same idea would apply to our sense of time if that too is to be considered a form of perception (which I believe is reasonable now that you made me think of it).

One of the more powerful arguments Dennett (I think it's Dennett) makes is that we are wrong about consciousness in the same way that an ancient Greek is wrong that, when standing still, he's not moving through space at an incredible speed, and that given enough time, we will realize we are just as in error about what consciousness is.

Similar things can be said of for example flat earth, the appearance of the horizon is obviously consistent with a round earth but even some who don't believe in a flat earth will still insist that "it looks flat". "Flat earth" is the privileged interpretation here.

Something is an illusion only if there is consciousness to be fooled by it. The stick in the water is not an illusion to the stick, or the water, or the stick and the water. It's not an illusion to a camera that captures the image. It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know.

If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction? The idea that consciousness is, itself, an illusion, but an illusion that perceives itself as real, is like picking yourself up by your own bootstraps.