But I am quite tiered of this interplay. Enjoy. — javra
My name keeps being brought up. — apokrisis
suddenly you all seem to be reading papers on biosemiosis — apokrisis
But if you define a phenomenon so that its first-person-ness is part of the phenomenon, we're in "Hand me the book on the shelf" territory. — Srap Tasmaner
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science. — Daniel Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science
Many other scholars and academics, including John Searle and Thomas Nagel, agree that Dennett's attempt to account for the first person perspective in objective terms, is conceptually flawed from the outset. — Wayfarer
objective physical sciences exclude the first person as a matter of principle — Wayfarer
I think you're aware of this discussion in exactly the same sense that I'm aware of this discussion. — Srap Tasmaner
in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain...Here is the paradox of this exchange: I am a conscious reviewer consciously answering the objections of an author who gives every indication of being consciously and puzzlingly angry. I do this for a readership that I assume is conscious. How then can I take seriously his claim that consciousness does not really exist?
Does ChatGPT have a first person perspective? — RogueAI
No, ChatGPT does not have a first-person perspective. It is an artificial intelligence language model that generates text based on patterns it has learned from a large dataset. It does not possess personal experiences or consciousness. Instead, it provides responses based on the information it has been trained on. Its purpose is to assist users in generating human-like text based on the prompts and questions it receives. — ChatGPT
ChatGPT knows something that Dennett doesn't. — Wayfarer
But that takes for granted that you and I are both subjects of experience, so that you can safely assume that I will understand what you mean. — Wayfarer
So is the argument that consciousness is off-limits because it's first-person, or that one of the things psychology needs to account for is that it is first-person? — Srap Tasmaner
David Chalmer's doesn't say that consciousness is off-limits. He says it is intractable from the third-person perspective, due to its first-person character — Wayfarer
The grammatical differences among first, second and third person sentences present some interesting quirks, — Srap Tasmaner
greatest mystery of all metaphysics... — apokrisis
Apparently there's a difference! — Wayfarer
The objective point of view doesn't take the subject into consideration - it is only concerned with what is amenable to quantitative analysis from a third person point of view. — Wayfarer
Nolan goes on to explain that “the color scenes are subjective” and “the black-and-white scenes are objective. — Wayfarer
I’m not seeing a mind’s eye in the brain images provided. — javra
No one can in any way see that aspect of themselves which visually perceives imagined phenomena via what is commonly termed “the mind’s eye”. — javra
What I am seeing are individual slides empirically depicting a certain set of a brain's functions which are inferred to correlate with empirically evident self-reports concerning something that might or might not in fact be. — javra
were philosophical zombies to be real,... — javra
In other words, these illustrations of a brain’s functioning so far do not falsify the proposition which was provided. — javra
No one can in any way... — javra
So minds and brains are different? What are the differences? — RogueAI
We use mentalistic vocabulary about others as readily as we do about ourselves, attribute knowledge and beliefs and awareness and forgetfulness and consciousness to other people all day long, and we mean the same thing as when we describe ourselves as being in these mental states. What matters is the book, not its being on the shelf. — Srap Tasmaner
Can you think of any knowledge you have at all that isn't inferred from evidence? — Isaac
Why is being inferred from evidence suddenly being treated with such suspicion? — Isaac
If you think the images I've shown you are not 'the mind's eye' then you'll have to come up with a better counter argument than "that's not what I was expecting it to look like" — Isaac
your proposition attempts to rule our physicalist/naturalist interpretations. It doesn't merely rule-in dualism. We're not here arguing if dualism is a possible way to think about consciousness. You're arguing that physicalism isn't. To make that you have to show that this view is incoherent, not that it doesn't match the way you like to think about things. — Isaac
That I am right now looking at the keyboard I'm typing on is knowledge that is not (consciously) inferred by me from evidence - but, instead, is knowledge of direct experience. — javra
I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. — javra
empirical data - i.e., data obtained via the physiological senses - are one aspect of experience-based knowledge — javra
Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers. — javra
one cannot see the minds eye because it has no look whatsoever. See below. — javra
we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. — javra
When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra
In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. — javra
I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination — javra
I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle. — javra
I agree with Chalmers, on the grounds that objective physical sciences exclude the first person as a matter of principle. — Wayfarer
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