It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know. — Patterner
If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction? — Patterner
True, it does not in a literal sense. But it does in an illusory sense. That's what gives us the sense of wonder and makes us laugh. No, the magician didn't break any laws of physics, and what she did was not a contradiction of reality. But I *know* she put the ball in her hand. I saw her so it. So htf is it in my pocket?!?It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know.
— Patterner
But the thing is the image does not "contradict what we know". To those who understand how light travels through water, the image is a straightforward representation of reality, no-one is getting fooled. — goremand
I'm not sure of the wording "phenomenal properties are by definition necessary for consciousness." More like "phenomenal properties wouldn't exist without conscious." Without consciousness, there would be nothing but particles and groups of particles, interacting as their properties and the laws of physics determine. But we have consciousness, and the physical interactions are accompanied by subjective experience/phenomenal properties. The Hard Problem of Consciousness being figuring out why/how it is not just physical interactions. So no, I don't think it's trying to lay claim to words inappropriately. (Love your last sentence!)If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction?
— Patterner
Illusionists do not believe consciousness is an illusion, only phenomenal properties. If you believe phenomenal properties are by definition necessary for consciousness, or that phenomenal properties are necessary for perception, I guess it amounts to the same thing. But I think that is a very trivial argument, basically laying claim to as many words as possible to increase the odds of the Illusionist undermining themselves with careless language. — goremand
we have consciousness, and the physical interactions are accompanied by subjective experience/phenomenal properties. — Patterner
I don't think it's trying to lay claim to words inappropriately. (Love your last sentence!) — Patterner
I am skeptical of phenomenal properties and argue that there is no "appearance of the phenomenal" (as opposed to the appearance being an illusion). — goremand
Has that question been answered in regards to when I see an actual object? I might suspect it would be the same answer, even if the source material is different.Now, the question is, when I see an illusion, what is the object that I see? — Ludwig V
Can you be more specific? Certainly, no part of my brain turns yellow and shapes itself like a rubber ducky if I see one floating in the water. So, yes, some thing that might be caught the conjuring trick. But how was it achieved?I maintain (and so do a lot of other philosophers) that this is a conjuring trick. — Ludwig V
Has that question been answered in regards to when I see an actual object? I might suspect it would be the same answer, even if the source material is different. — Patterner
Certainly, no part of my brain turns yellow and shapes itself like a rubber ducky if I see one floating in the water. — Patterner
But how was it achieved? — Patterner
I don’t understand what you mean by “we actually see internal images” or “ it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong.”Has that question been answered in regards to when I see an actual object? I might suspect it would be the same answer, even if the source material is different.
— Patterner
I think it has, in the second paragraph. My point there is that the idea of an internal image makes better sense in the context of an illusion or hallucination. The argument then is that if we actually see internal images when we see an illusion or hallucination, it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong. — Ludwig V
I don’t understand what you mean by “we actually see internal images” or “ it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong.” — Patterner
I understand the difference in the two ways of wording it in your first sentence, and it makes sense to me. However, rather than disposing if illusions, isn’t seeing a bent stick as straight (or seeing an image of a person projected onto a sheet of glass as a ghost, etc.) pretty much the definition of “illusion”?It is better (i.e. less misleading) to say that when we see an illusion of a bent stick in water we don't see an image of a bent stick, but we see a straight stick as bent. No image is required. I think this is what ↪goremand is saying. I also think that disposes of illusions. — Ludwig V
Is there reason to believe MacBeth’s hallucination of a dagger and his perception of an actual dagger are not of the same nature, even though they come about by different means?I extended the discussion to hallucinations, dreams, etc. to register that there are other cases of getting things wrong that are less amenable to this kind of explanation. It is very hard to maintain that when Macbeth hallucinates his dagger he is misinterpreting something that he is really seeing. (Dreams are even more difficult, because we are asleep (i.e. unconscious) while we are dreaming.) The psychological explanation that Shakespeare expects us to adopt is that Macbeth is secretly guilty, but that doesn't help philosophically. I don't have a pat answer to that, so to avoid misleading you any further, I'll stop there, at least for the time being. — Ludwig V
It is better (i.e. less misleading) to say that when we see an illusion of a bent stick in water we don't see an image of a bent stick, but we see a straight stick as bent. No image is required. I think this is what ↪goremand is saying. I also think that disposes of illusions. — Ludwig V
It is very hard to maintain that when Macbeth hallucinates his dagger he is misinterpreting something that he is really seeing. — Ludwig V
Is there reason to believe MacBeth’s hallucination of a dagger and his perception of an actual dagger are not of the same nature, even though they come about by different means? — Patterner
How I would put it is, the straight and the bent stick *share* the same appearance. If X looks like Y, then Y looks like X, it goes both ways. — goremand
hallucinations are blamed on the "faulty" perceptual or cognitive apparatus of the subject. — goremand
I’m only speaking of what my consciousness perceives, regardless of whether what it perceives is the result of signals from the retina, or the result of … whatever causes hallucinations. Either way, I see a dagger. My question is, are the two instances of my consciousness seeing a dagger - the moment of “Is this a dagger which I see before me?” Not what leads up to that moment - the same? At least as far as we can tell from any type of brain scan? Or could we look at brain scans and know that one is a hallucination? Maybe the vision centers of the brain are not active during (visual) hallucinations.Is there reason to believe MacBeth’s hallucination of a dagger and his perception of an actual dagger are not of the same nature, even though they come about by different means?
— Patterner
It depends what you mean by "of the same nature". They are clearly radically different, since there's no dagger. But they are clearly similar because Macbeth is behaving as if there is a dagger in front of him. The question is whether the similarity can only be explained by positing something dagger-like in his head or mind. I know it seems mysterious. But if you approach the question in a different way, it will seem (it has seemed to many philosophers) the best and only explanation possible. This is why philosophy is hard. — Ludwig V
"Illusionism claims that introspection involves something analogous to ordinary sensory illusions; just as our perceptual systems can yield states that radically misrepresent the nature of the outer world, so too, introspection yields representations that substantially misrepresent the actual nature of our inner experience." — goremand
But the very fact of having an inner experience is evidence in favor of the hard problem. — Marchesk
Calling them interpretive illusions doesn't dissolve the matter. Just shifts it over to explaining how the brain accomplishes these illusions. — Marchesk
You still have the appearance of colors, pains, etc that need explaining. Claiming they don't have phenomenal properties doesn't explain away their appearance — Marchesk
What Chalmers argues is that if the hard problem is an illusion (that we have phenomenal experiences), then this illusion needs to be explained. How does the brain produce such an illusion? — Marchesk
What do you mean by “ something dagger-like in his head or mind”? — Patterner
But the very fact of having an inner experience is evidence in favor of the hard problem. — Marchesk
An illusion can only be defined by its difference from reality. — Ludwig V
If the deliverances of consciousness are illusions, what is the reality? Oh, yes, physics. — Ludwig V
If the matter inside our skulls does not take on the shape or color of whatever we’re thinking of, in what sense is there a picture or model in my head?What do you mean by “ something dagger-like in his head or mind”?
— Patterner
Something like a picture or a model. — Ludwig V
Can you direct me to this thought experiment?I read the Nagel's original account and carried out the thought experiment he proposed. Nothing. Am I deficient? A zombie? Hard to bamboozle? — Ludwig V
All matter has properties. From primary particles like quarks, electrons, and photons, to atoms, to molecules, on up to galaxies. We can study these properties. We know how these properties and the four forces produce the interactions that take place between everything.The formulation of the hard problem is misleading. One day, perhaps, we will recognize that and develop less misleading ways of thinking about these things. But I'm not holding my breath. — Ludwig V
I think in the case of Illusionism, the counterpart would not be physics but phenomenological realism. The Illusionist says "phenomelogical properties appear to exist, but do not", the realist says "phenomelogical properties appear to exist, and do". — goremand
We’ve built machines that can perceive, discriminate, react, and learn, but don’t have the subjective or awareness. — Patterner
explaining why/how the physical is accompanied by subjective experience, — Patterner
Can you direct me to this thought experiment? — Patterner
No, there is not. Because, as you just explained, we know how it happens, and it’s all physical. If a rainbow started showing signs of consciousness, we’d have a problem. We would not have any idea how physical things and processes that produce this thing we understand - the rainbow - also produce these other characteristics at the same time. Characteristics that are not reducible to sunlight refracting through raindrops.A rainbow is distinct from the raindrops and light that create it. Yet it is an effect of the sunlight refracting through the raindrops, not an elusive something. There is no hard problem there, is there? — Ludwig V
H'm. We're talking about slightly different things. "Phenomenological properties exist" and "Phenomenological properties do not exist" are indeed contradictories. Whichever is true must be a contingent, empirical statement. Right? So where does the evidence that they exist, or not, come from? — Ludwig V
No, there is not. Because, as you just explained, we know how it happens, and it’s all physical. — Patterner
Characteristics that are not reducible to sunlight refracting through raindrops. — Patterner
For evidence, I think the realist would say "Phenomelogical properties appear to exist, so they probably do exist", and the Illusionist would say "Phenomelogical properties result in unsolvable philosophical problems, so they probably do not exist". — goremand
Certainly not. I don’t know why you are asking me that. I never intended to suggest such a thing. Maybe I worded something badly? Rainbows do exist. And we understand the physical reductionist explanation for them.No, there is not. Because, as you just explained, we know how it happens, and it’s all physical.
— Patterner
Fine. But you don't want to say that rainbows don't exist just because they are fully explained by physical processes, do you? — Ludwig V
We should not posit such a thing. I dare say that explanation is impossible.Now, we don't know what is going on when Macbeth sees the dagger. Why can't we leave it at that rather than positing some dagger-like phenomenon in his head? — Ludwig V
Sure. Sunlight refracting through raindrops does not bestow solidity to rainbows. Or audible output. Or the ability to store data. Or consciousness. It does the one thing it does. It makes a rainbow.Characteristics that are not reducible to sunlight refracting through raindrops.
— Patterner
I'm not sure what you have in mind in that sentence. Can you give an example or two? — Ludwig V
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