I think you've equivocated between inheriting an identity and being subject to its systemic vectors of oppression when you count as it. If you look like a duck, people will treat you like a duck. — fdrake

Fair. I wasn't terribly confident in the analogy as I was writing it, but thought 'fuck it, it's going in anyway'. I don't think there is an analogy for gender because there's really no other protected characteristic that is determined by different people in different ways. In a sense, that's the problem the disambiguation the EHRC are suggesting is aimed at fixing.

There were so few non-overlapping elements in the public conception of things, anyway. Those instabilities were going to implode as soon as anyone shone light on them. I think it's a good thing this is happening. — fdrake

Yeah, me too. I think where me might differ is I don't see something like the trans movement as being part of that process so much as working against it. Replacing the false 'woman'='has a womb', with the equally false 'woman'='feels like a woman' doesn't get us where we need to be in terms of understanding the multi-faceted way the term is used and, to be realistic, is going to continue to be used. Human language is pretty resistant and will not be tamed. 'Woman' is going to continue to be a term used different ways in different contexts. We can profit by understanding that, or we can bang our heads against the wall trying to make it not so.

For example, I don't think "It's a girl" is something like a scientific categorisation by a midwife - it's a declaration, a use of the term 'girl' (she looked at the reproductive organs and used the word 'girl'). but when later that girl decides she expresses herself more like a man, then she'll use the word 'man' and ask others to do so too. That also is a use of the word. Both legitimate uses of a word which has different felicitous uses in different contexts. The midwife wasn't wrong, nor the trans man later in life. It's just that gender terms are not fixed to one use in one context. Nor do I see the slightest reason why they ought to be.

Aye. I think if this was a choice on the ballot, I would take it. More categories, more protective laws, more tailorable specificity.

I imagine you believe the same of masculinity, it's not an "all or nothing" thing? It's instead a big wibbly wobbly ball of manny-mascy stuff? — fdrake

Yep, absolutely. It's just a word, they're slippery beasts.

Fair. I wasn't terribly confident in the analogy as I was writing it, but thought 'fuck it, it's going in anyway — Isaac

You can find TERFish references to the same analogy on SEP's Feminist Perspectives On Trans Issues. I think comparisons between identity categories are a helpful way of highlighting differences. I'm sure you've heard the lines about objectifying objectivity and appropriation before, so I shan't rehearse them.

For example, I don't think "It's a girl" is something like a scientific categorisation by a midwife - it's a declaration, a use of the term 'girl' (she looked at the reproductive organs and used the word 'girl'). — Isaac

Yeah! "Assigned woman at birth" and all that jazz.

but when later that girl decides she expresses herself more like a man, then she'll use the word 'man' and ask others to do so too. That also is a use of the word. Both legitimate uses of a word which has different felicitous uses in different contexts. The midwife wasn't wrong, nor the trans man later in life.

Yes. I can read that and know you intend the bolded "she" as a continued reference to the person with female natal sex who was declared a woman at birth and then identified as/behaved as/became a man later. I don't think I immediately need to read you as intentionally misgendering. Which could well have happened. Since my Internal Twitter picked up on it, and it is usually quite good.

I do not think that is productive. Though I can understand, in the climate of these discussions, there are so many disingenuous actors that it can make a lot of sense to assume bad faith on any interlocutor's part. And in that regard reinforce the worst excesses.

My Internal Twitter, when reading the EHRC report, wanted to scream at it for denying the reality of trans identity by equating natal sex with gender . Ultimately that would be based on a misperception, though. Unless there was further context that the EHRC report's recommendation came out for purely political reasons as a curtailment of rights (which I can imagine being the case, since I don't know what knock on effects this will have on current trans protections).

It's just that gender terms are not fixed to one use in one context. Nor do I see the slightest reason why they ought to be.

Also yes.

As an aside, I do hope that we can keep TPF able to have these kind of discussions in a respectful manner, it's something we've needed to argue about in the mod thread on numerous occasions.

I can read that and know you intend the bolded "she" as a continued reference to the person with female natal sex who was declared a woman at birth and then identified as/behaved as/became a man later. I don't think I immediately need to read you as intentionally misgendering. Which could well have happened. Since my Internal Twitter picked up on it, and it is usually quite good. — fdrake

This, then, is actually a really good example of the some of the issues. I thought about that use. My thought process went "I ought to say 'he' as the person I'm now talking about is a man"..."but if I say 'he' no-one will know who I'm talking about as the whole purpose of these identifiers is to save having to repeat the act of reference" ..."but there's only one person in this story, I'm sure I'll get away with swapping to 'he'"..."but if there was more than one person, I wouldn't get away with it, it'd cause confusion, I need to have one rule that covers all situations"..."do I though?"..."fuck it, it's only a pronoun for an hypothetical person, I'll work it out properly if ever I need to refer to a real person in these circumstances"...

At no point did "Ha! I'll misgender them...that'll show 'em", come into the mix. And I very much doubt my thought processes are far off most people's. This is all very new to most people and a little transition time is not an unreasonable request.

Unless there was further context that the EHRC report's recommendation came out for purely political reasons as a curtailment of rights (which I can imagine being the case, since I don't know what knock on effects this will have on current trans protections). — fdrake

Do you think? It's funny how from different sides (only slightly different, I hope) the world looks so different. I can't, off the top of my head, think of a single act on the part of any institution at all in Britain that's been aimed at curtailing trans rights. I can see how the trans community might think the necessary changes aren't happening fast enough, but changes in the wrong direction...? I certainly don't know of any. We only narrowly avoided the Scottish bill to have birth certificates replaced. Maybe they should have been, that's a legal argument, but the bill was pro-trans and it didn't progress. It wasn't that an anti-trans bill did progress.

I think it's clear (from where I'm sat - leather wing-back armchair in ivory tower, of course), that the political climate is pro-trans but with the brakes on. Anti-trans I just don't see.

The situation in America, I understand, is not so tolerable.

As an aside, I do hope that we can keep TPF able to have these kind of discussions in a respectful manner, it's something we've needed to argue about in the mod thread on numerous occasions. — fdrake

Me too.

Respect is a loaded term, but it consists of more (much more) than just not swearing. And the mods shouldn't have to work so hard to maintain it. It's up to us as a community to develop the sense of the place - what's acceptable and what's not. We rely on moderation too much.

We rely on moderation too much. — Isaac

Saw what you did there.

Saw what you did there. — Srap Tasmaner

Thank you. That one's going on the wall.

There are issues of moderation and extremism woven throughout this thread.

Here's a note from those centrist souls at Niskanen on Goldwater and Aristotle. (Possibly relevant to the Ukraine debate as well.)

Nobody wants only some of their rights, or to have their rights recognized and protected "to a degree." Nobody thinks a misogynist should just be a little less misogynistic. But systemically, incremental change is the reliable way. "Trudge up that hill," as Barack Obama put it.

But I'd also say that Goldwater was striking a masculine note with his remarks, entrenching the connection between the right and a particular view of masculinity. For US politics the next crucial moment is not Reagan but Gingrich, the scorched-earth compromise-is-surrender approach.

It's all packaged together: the left is trying to feminize the world; to give them even an inch, to compromise, to appease them, would also be effeminate.

Do you think? It's funny how from different sides (only slightly different, I hope) the world looks so different. I can't, off the top of my head, think of a single act on the part of any institution at all in Britain that's been aimed at curtailing trans rights. I can see how the trans community might think the necessary changes aren't happening fast enough, but changes in the wrong direction...? I certainly don't know of any. We only narrowly avoided the Scottish bill to have birth certificates replaced. Maybe they should have been, that's a legal argument, but the bill was pro-trans and it didn't progress. It wasn't that an anti-trans bill did progress. — Isaac

Maybe! By curtailing I also meant to suggest "blocking the advancement of". We could talk about rejecting the Scottish Bill if you like, my understanding was that the official reason was largely "we haven't changed the law in England yet, so making this easier in Scotland would cause some chaos down here".

I think it's clear (from where I'm sat - leather wing-back armchair in ivory tower, of course), that the political climate is pro-trans but with the brakes on. Anti-trans I just don't see. — Isaac

Eh. I saw a lot of people donating to an anti trans charity just before the bill. They were getting donations on the streets of Edinburgh. People would go by and tell them all kinds of things. I know they were anti trans because of their pamphlets, and the "all trans women are rapists" rhetoric they were spewing onto the street. I can understand why people would get that impression.

My org kept poaching their punters though, they soon left. Buggers also couldn't stand light rain.

And the mods shouldn't have to work so hard to maintain it — Isaac

;)

That's an interesting take. There were aspects of Wilkinson's argument I quite liked (but not all).

I think the issue with moderation (and also moderation) is that it cannot itself sit outside of politics. We can't sort of look down on politics (including ourselves) - see the whole gamut - and derive from that what is moderate and what extreme. Yet - the extent to which I agree with the argument - we must try to do so anyway because tolerance is necessary outside of the extremes, which should not be tolerated. We need to know when it's D-Day and when it's not, but that decision is viewed through the lens of our political position and our right-wing neighbours aren't going to have the same answer as us.

It always annoys me intensely in gardening books (and other guides - but gardening seems the worst offender) when it'll say something like "don't plant the bulbs when the soil is too wet". It's such meaningless advice, I mean, that's what 'too wet' means, more wet than is ideal.

There's something of that with the maxim that we "don't tolerate racists, sexists, homophobes and transphobes". Obviously we don't tolerate those people, those labels imply people not to be tolerated. It doesn't help guide our behaviour because our behaviour requires that we identify them, that we know where the line is between the 'Terf's' genuinely held belief that the everybody's welfare is best served by retaining the connection between 'woman' and birth sex, and an actual transphobe who's just let their conservatism turn to hatred. Where that line is is already coloured by where you stand on the issue politically.

Then there's the other way around, the Overton Window of what's acceptable. You touched on Ukraine as an example. I think both war and, worse, mass starvation (particularly in Africa for some reason) have been normalised, brought into the Overton Window as acceptable policy outcomes. We hear people casually dismissing both as if their necessity hardly needed a second thought, like the decision was in the category of what rate to set the upper tax bracket, or whether to relax planning legislation. To me, that's extremism, and I've been pretty blunt at times about the kind of people who espouse it. To others my bluntness looks like unprovoked asperity, worthy of moderation (and moderation, at times too). Our different political perspectives have yielded a different bright line of where extremism becomes tolerable, the exception that proves the rule.

On the other side, I've been the recipient of some pretty blunt attempts at 'intolerance' of positions that I think are non-extreme, presumably because others think them extreme enough to be more 'exceptions which make the rule'. Again, their political positions colour their judgement of where the line is.

Coming back to the topic (so sorry @Moliere - there's just so many interesting threads to pull on from this topic)...

But I'd also say that Goldwater was striking a masculine note with his remarks, entrenching the connection between the right and a particular view of masculinity. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. there's something 'masculine' about knowing where that line is. Intolerance is masculine - certainly if Hollywood knows anything about what masculine is (and who's going to argue with Hollywood?). Knowing the line and being decisive about it is the square-jawed hero of the film, unsure of the line and dipping a toe into the wrong side is at least the wayward sidekick, if not the antagonist themselves.

But where I think conservatism used to be the main bastion of unquestioning certainty about lines of tolerance, the new left has taken up that torch and now - in very masculine fashion - are fighting their own D-Day without compromise.

By curtailing I also meant to suggest "blocking the advancement of". We could talk about rejecting the Scottish Bill if you like, my understanding was that the official reason was largely "we haven't changed the law in England yet, so making this easier in Scotland would cause some chaos down here". — fdrake

Here's the official statement of reasons - https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-reasons-related-to-the-use-of-section-35-of-the-scotland-act-1998/html-version

They basically come down to three matters - the effect on reserved characteristics in the Equalities Act, the effect of having two different sex records cross border, and the inadequate protection against fraud.

There's clearly a lot of political wrangling though, with the UK parliament itching for an opportunity to give the Scottish parliament a bloody nose on anything, so...

I saw a lot of people donating to an anti trans charity just before the bill. They were getting donations on the streets of Edinburgh. People would go by and tell them all kinds of things. I know they were anti trans because of their pamphlets, and the "all trans women are rapists" rhetoric they were spewing onto the street. I can understand why people would get that impression. — fdrake

As I said 'ivory tower' for me at the moment. I think what's happening among real people out there is quite divorced from what's happening institutionally. From the sounds of your experience, that's probably a good thing - eugh!

My org kept poaching their punters though, they soon left. Buggers also couldn't stand light rain. — fdrake

Your org can make it rain! Powerful org.

You org can make it rain! Powerful org. — Isaac

We couldn't stop it though.

I like this because "should" finally entered the theory -- I really believe this is a topic in ethics more than ontology/epistemology! But it's hard to get there. — Moliere

Yes. Isn't that why you posted the thread in the 'Ethics' subforum?
Why is it hard to get to a 'should'? Is this all Hume's fault? The is-ought problem?

When you see something that is clearly wrong, isn't there an impulse to do something about it?
But not everybody knows or cares enough about whatever 'it' might be.
Some believe it is above their pay grade.
Sometimes, we feel helpless, frustrated, and impotent. After all, what power do we have?

However, when enough people are adversely affected, there can be spontaneous collective action. Sometimes there can be coordinated efforts by different activist groups.
Unfortunately, even after apparent success or progress, the problem is shown never to have gone away.

Today, I read of Iran's 'reinstatement' of the 'morality police': 'to deal with civilians who “ignore the consequences of not wearing the proper hijab and insist on disobeying the norms”.
This comes 2 months ahead of anniversary of the death in custody of Mahsa Amini for not properly wearing the Islamic headscarf.

Among those killed during protests after Amini’s death was Minoo Majidi, a 62-year-old mother who was shot with 167 pellets. She reportedly said to her family before attending protests in Kermanshah: ‘If I don’t go out and protest, who else will?’ Her daughter Mahsa Piraei said her mother always valued women’s rights and freedom. — No other option but to fight - Iranian women defiance against morality police

***
I admit my ignorance. I had wrongly assumed that those policing the women, in what some term 'gender apartheid' by the clerical regime, would be a male-only force. So, I was surprised when I looked at the Guardian's headline photograph of 'Two veiled ‘morality police’ approach women on the streets of Tehran.' Then again, there is nothing new about women v women. Females are not all 'sisters'. Just as males are not all 'brothers'.
So, who are the morality police?

For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the Komiteh was comprised of religiously devout followers of the regime who joined the force at the encouragement of clerics. However, by the early 2000s, Iran’s population was comprised mostly of young people. When Ahmadinejad made the Komiteh an official police force, a number of young men joined to fulfill their mandatory military conscription. This younger generation was more lax than their older counterparts, leading to inconsistent patrolling. — Who are Iran's Morality Police? - The Conversation

And here we have it. A question for @wonderer1: Is this a result of 'evolutionary psychology'?
A changing sense of morality? Young men unwilling to act against their modern (possibly secular) beliefs yet are forced to do so.

A line from the film 'Australia':
Just because something 'is', doesn't mean it should be.
Who polices the 'morality police'?

Do you mean trans women? With trans individual you're in danger of falling into the very caricature Tzeentch was painting where 'patriarchy' is simply a rather misandrist catchall term for every bit of oppression going on, and misogyny likewise for just 'being a dick'. — Isaac

At least insofar as I understand things, no. I believe patriarchy targets trans people as it targets women -- it's the same systematic cause. I don't think this is accidental or the result of a generalization to oppression, but rather that trans people are targets because they are living counter-examples to the belief that one's identity is determined by one's trait-based biology.

It's because of erroneous and emotionally volatile views on gender that a trans person is a target for patriarchy. Women are the declared targets of this enforced gender binary, as the group which is born to be subservient to men. Trans individuals, as living counter-examples, are also objects of patriarchy. Trans men aren't really given any more credence than trans women by our hypothetical misogynist, and it's still a disgust, at least, born from this view -- not quite resentment, but disgust, another ugly emotion.

The point of Baroness Falkner's argument, the point of the Equalities Act itself, is to protect a group of people who've been abused, both historically (and so in need of reparation) and currently. That group is defined by the abuser, not the abused, and it is based on biological characteristics (mostly to do with reproduction). That group need protection from that abuse, which means they need to be identified as a group. — Isaac

Heh. I don't think I'm ready to bring the law into the mix. The law is a whole perspective unto itself -- the need for identification is the need of bureaucrats who want their jobs to be easy. But as soon as we write it into words then the original method I proposed for knowing a person's identity -- asking them -- can no longer be relied upon. If a law is written then there's usually a reason to lie somewhere because the law is not a reflection of our identity, or even anywhere close to what an identity is. The law is an ancient bit of social technology which simultaneously protects the rights of kings and commoners in a weird mish-mash of historical concerns that gets us whatever the beast is now. In terms of politics the law is the description of the front -- what claims you can enforce, what claims you can't, and so on. The law is written by a small party of motivated interests, and the primary viewpoint that's never questioned in the law is the viewpoint of administration -- if your view cannot be administered, then the law is a feel-good law that has little effect. But if it can be put into a manner which others can deliberate then you can ensure something is going to happen, whatever that happens to be (we hope as intended, but...)

The scenario we were debating before would never be as crystalline as it is in our imaginations. One of the things about the scenario is we can simply specify "and this boss is a misogynist" when in real life that'd be a lot harder to determine. It's perfectly acceptable to posit that in a scenario to judge how our concepts, in this conversation, are relating to one another -- but I don't think it wise to take crystalline imaginations as a model for laws.

Lastly, I suspect that identity is such that the law cannot be satisfied. Even if we were to take the perspective of a gender-based definition in law, what then would our administrator think of the gender-fluid person, whose gender identity changes by the day? That would make an administrator's life difficult.

But surely we can identify however we identify, have it be genuine, even if the legal administrator can't understand us?

Women can be just as committed to their bliblical understanding of gender roles as the men they marry and whose children they raise. — Srap Tasmaner

Oh yes. Something that's often missed is that women can be patriarchal -- it's not an identity, but a system which is supported through cultural habit and technology. For it to persist you'd better not ignore roughly half of the population's habits!

We need to know when it's D-Day and when it's not, but that decision is viewed through the lens of our political position and our right-wing neighbours aren't going to have the same answer as us. — Isaac

The whole topic is very tricky for me, because I am pretty committed to a certain take on masculinity -- my sense of what it is to be a "good man" -- but there are two problems with that: one is that there's some overlap I'm afraid with what people I don't like take as their ideal of being a "real man"; the other is that there's no definably masculine "content" to the ideal -- what it's good for a man to do is generally good for a woman to do as well, so it's really more a matter of style, of a man's way of being good, of enacting the generic ideal, what it is to be good as a man.

For instance, your point about political perspectives almost completely co-opts what I think is one of my core expectations of a good man: standing up to bullies. Good men see followers of the real-man ideal, machismo, toxic masculinity, whatever, as bullies, or at least as bullies in training. Even if they don't have consciously malicious intent, but are just acting on what they understand as their prerogative, the effect is that they become bullies. --- The political point, before I forget: in the US, the right regularly paint themselves as standing up to bullies, big tech, the liberal media, corporate wokeness, blah blah blah. And there is a sense in which they are fighting forces more powerful than them, so it's not completely irrational for them to read the situation that way. It's just that in many cases their opponents, while hegemonic, are not actually bullying them and have not targeted them; and what they are fighting for is generally the freedom to bully trans kids and queers and black and brown people. (Here in Georgia, you will still hear people say the Civil War wasn't about slavery, but states rights -- which, yeah, the right of states to allow slavery. Similar logic here. The federal government is by definition a bully in red states.) So the left says they're obviously standing up to bullies -- racists and sexists and the rest -- and the right says they're standing up to the bullies on the left.

Standing up to bullies -- how does that work? If bullying is the stronger taking advantage of the weaker, the weaker could always stand up for themselves, which would be noble perhaps, or brave, but also probably foolish. They'll need help, and the usual options are many more of their weak brethren pitching in, so all of them together are stronger than the bully, or someone about as strong as the bully stands up for them. (In revenge fantasies, your ally is way bigger than your bully.) This is the guy who says, "Hey, why don't you pick on someone your own size." (I'm not quite 5'10" and a buck fifty, so I can only use that line or your smaller bullies.)

I just don't know if it's true elsewhere, but I'm convinced that this is a core element of how America sees itself. Hitler was a bully, Europe was in a general way too weak to stand up for itself, the minorities Hitler especially targeted like Jews and Gypsies and the mentally ill -- I'm telling the American version here -- they were obviously weak and needed a Captain America to stand up for them. It's why I posted that stuff about the American ideal of the reluctant warrior. It's why Shane is the quintessential analysis of American manhood. --- Shane is particularly interesting because he is a reformed gunfighter. He, like America, has a dark past in which he was the bully, so he has the capability but has forsworn using it. He only takes his guns out of the bottom of the trunk when there's no avoiding the conclusion that there's a bully in town the farmers and womenfolk just can't handle on their own.

(This is also why it's complicated talking to Americans about foreign policy. The belief that we are the good guys runs really, really deep. Some of us, a lot of us, learned when we were teenagers that the history of the US's foreign interventions doesn't reflect entirely well on us, so the critics of American foreign policy aren't telling us anything we don't know. But we understand the American self-image and treat it as aspirational. We have not always been the good guys, but it's baked into us to want to be. And it's why Captain America says, "I'm loyal to nothing, General -- except the Dream." --- I looked it up. It was Frank Miller, of all people, who wrote that line. Even Frank Miller, glorifier of masculine violence, gets it.)

What's really uncomfortable about this whole analysis though is that it does accept that the world is divided into strong and weak, and while the good man stands with the weak as a matter of choice, he is with the bully as a matter of nature, being strong. That also means that as a matter of psychology, choosing to see yourself as a protector of the weak is choosing to see yourself as not one of them, but as strong. And that means unavoidably making strength a part of your self-image rather than incidental to it. The other famous superhero line fits here: with great power comes great responsibility. If you accept the responsibility, it's a way of seeing yourself as powerful.

Usually all of this relies on a simplistic understanding of power or strength as something some people have and some people don't, but you can take it as situational. That was always my understanding of Oppenheimer, that he acted as he did because he recognized he was uniquely positioned to act (to try to stop the super, for instance) and that granted him power he had a responsibility to exercise.

(And this is all another reason for the right to cast itself as standing up to the bullies on the left -- it's a way to indirectly cast yourself as strong rather than weak. The real-men crowd despise weakness and will do whatever it takes not to see themselves as weak, and the first option is usually bullying. Can't be a bully if you're not strong. This seems to be Trump's deal, and why he thrived at the military school he was sent to.)

Coming back finally to my first paragraph -- that being a good man is a man's way of being good -- if you recognize that your society has given men privileges and authority, and that includes you, then you ought to recognize you've been given power to act for the good. That power is situational, not inherent to you, but it's real. And it's not necessarily something you wanted, but you have it. (Refusing more power than you've already been given, or more power than you need to do what's right, is another classic good man move, from Cincinnatus to Washington to -- Mike Pence. For all his flaws, and they are considerable, when he told Trump he did not have the authority to pick the winner of an election, Trump (or was it Eastman? I don't remember) asked him, "Yeah, but if you could, wouldn't you want to?" To which Pence replied, "No! Of course not. No one should have that kind of power." Apparently even Christian dominionists can understand that power corrupts.)

So it may well be that the ideal of the "good man" is largely an artifact of patriarchy. (There may also be something in the inherent differences in physical strength between men and women, on average, and using that relative strength responsibly too.) Being a good man is an adaptive behavior, a way to be as good as you can given that the society you live in has given you unequal power, something like that.

Yikes, this was a long, rambly one. Hope there's something in here worth taking up.

trans people are targets because they are living counter-examples to the belief that one's identity is determined by one's trait-based biology. — Moliere

That makes sense, yes.

Women are the declared targets of this enforced gender binary, as the group which is born to be subservient to men. Trans individuals, as living counter-examples, are also objects of patriarchy. Trans men aren't really given any more credence than trans women by our hypothetical misogynist, and it's still a disgust, at least, born from this view -- not quite resentment, but disgust, another ugly emotion. — Moliere

Yeah. I can see that. I'm wary though of putting too much stock in 'that sounds plausible'. I've had too many theories that sounded plausible turn out not be the case on examination. But still, for what it's worth... that sounds plausible.

as soon as we write it into words then the original method I proposed for knowing a person's identity -- asking them -- can no longer be relied upon. If a law is written then there's usually a reason to lie somewhere because the law is not a reflection of our identity, or even anywhere close to what an identity is. — Moliere

See, here's where I part company from the modern identity culture. I don't think the law is the oddity here. I think the notion of a part of our language being inaccessible to the language community is the oddity. Can you think of any other examples of words whose meaning resides with the object? Does the meaning of 'tree' depend on the tree? The meaning of 'Zebra' depend on the zebra? It's not a casual and everyday change that's being proposed here. The notion that the word 'woman' now describes, not a loose family resemblance type collection of public traits, but rather a thing called an 'identity' which I don't even believe exists, let alone has a state.

I can think of a few words that have entered the lexicon of a similar nature. People say a person had a 'bad energy', which I think is also nonsense. Or maybe saying someone is a 'Libra'... but none of these have attempted to enforce compliance. I simply don't believe in the notion of an identity which someone is. I don't see any compelling evidence that I should. It seems very much the sort of thing that belongs in the same category as personality theory, or some of the spurious DSM classifications. But instead it's become a thing, the denial of which, is grounds for accusations of bigotry.

The thing I'm being asked to refer to is a thing I don't think exists. Can you see how that's a problem for me?

there are two problems with that: one is that there's some overlap I'm afraid with what people I don't like take as their ideal of being a "real man"; — Srap Tasmaner

So true. I'm glad you said it first.

there's no definably masculine "content" to the ideal -- what it's good for a man to do is generally good for a woman to do as well, so it's really more a matter of style, of a man's way of being good, of enacting the generic ideal, what it is to be good as a man. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. Not to get all Evolutionary Psychology (let's not go there), but men are different. We're a different toolset, so 'using' us to do good is going to involve a different set of behaviours from those which make use of a woman. Typically.

Returning to a favourite theme of mine (narratives), boys growing up need some narrative options that will suit them, and that requires a culture to have some archetypes, even if they don't apply to everyone. The various male-types are just that - or at least that's how they should work.

the left says they're obviously standing up to bullies -- racists and sexists and the rest -- and the right says they're standing up to the bullies on the left. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, both in a sense using the trope to lend authority to their political objectives which are more about group membership tokens than archetypes of the hero. It's like using the all the props from a story without playing out the actual story.

What's really uncomfortable about this whole analysis though is that it does accept that the world is divided into strong and weak, and while the good man stands with the weak as a matter of choice, he is with the bully as a matter of nature, being strong. That also means that as a matter of psychology, choosing to see yourself as a protector of the weak is choosing to see yourself as not one of them, but as strong. And that means unavoidably making strength a part of your self-image rather than incidental to it. The other famous superhero line fits here: with great power comes great responsibility. If you accept the responsibility, it's a way of seeing yourself as powerful. — Srap Tasmaner

That's really interesting. I know nothing about football, but in England we're notoriously shite at it (we never win the world cup), despite being absolutely passionate about it, as a nation. I've thought it odd, but the resolution I think, shows a difference which may separate the 'proper' man from the bully. To be a good footballer, one has to be dedicated to practice, but being a 'football fan' in our culture is opposed that sort of dedication as being indicative of something a bit too 'Germanic', all to organised and taking oneself far too seriously. So we're shit. I think your bully is like that compared to the 'real man' which stands up to bullies. It takes dedication and training to be the sort of person who can fight. A bully is never going to commit to that because if they were prepared to make that kind of self-sacrifice, they wouldn't need to bully. Does this actually play out in bigger social circles? Don't know. There's certainly plenty of bullies built like brickhouses, but none of them are Chang Caine.

being a good man is a man's way of being good -- if you recognize that your society has given men privileges and authority, and that includes you, then you ought to recognize you've been given power to act for the good. That power is situational, not inherent to you, but it's real. And it's not necessarily something you wanted, but you have it. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is inevitable at some level even without society. One sex is generally stronger then the other, so the narratives for that sex are going to need to deal with that power imbalance. They can do so badly (ownership, control), or they can do so well (standing up when needed, stepping back when not), but what they can't do is not address it at all. Accumulated power is different in the sense that divesting oneself of it is an option, but even doing so is an act of power (those without don't get the chance to play the magnanimous ruler). I think a lot of what comes under masculinity is embedding the notion that it's one's job to unthinkingly help those weaker than one. The key here is unthinkingly, and that requires it be done even in circumstances where it's not needed. The point is to not think about it. The point is to take responsibility for being stronger. And that sometimes applies to men in relation to women.

There may also be something in the inherent differences in physical strength between men and women, on average, and using that relative strength responsibly too. — Srap Tasmaner

Ha!. You know how I confessed before to replying to posts one paragraph at a time without reading the whole thing first...? Still great minds....

Being a good man is an adaptive behavior, a way to be as good as you can given that the society you live in has given you unequal power, something like that. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. Couldn't agree more.

It takes dedication and training to be the sort of person who can fight. A bully is never going to commit to that because if they were prepared to make that kind of self-sacrifice, they wouldn't need to bully. — Isaac

And because the whole point is to pick on those who are weaker. The stereotypical bully is a big guy who just takes advantage of his god-given advantage, with no effort. (Hence the way older brothers treat their younger siblings.) More important is the guy who's smart enough to spot people's weaknesses and manipulate them, bullying them through psychology. That's Trump, that's Finchy in The Office.

boys growing up need some narrative options that will suit them, and that requires a culture to have some archetypes, even if they don't apply to everyone — Isaac

We haven't talked enough about this. I think it was @Moliere who mentioned that the key opposition is not man/woman, but man/boy. There's so much to say about this, but the first thing is that it's not just archetypes but your father that is your primary exemplar of manhood, so it's inevitable that you chose to emulate his example or reject it, and for most a mix of both they don't recognize until they're older. A child's first definition of woman is going to be "someone like my mom" and of man "someone like my dad".

The thing I'm being asked to refer to is a thing I don't think exists. Can you see how that's a problem for me? — Isaac

Yes. That would certainly make everything confusing! You'd have to more or less ask the other person to make clear what we're talking about, and here I am saying "it's not clear, but it's not that -- you have to take people at their word" :D

I asked someone earlier if they believed gender-identity to be on par with, say, horoscopes -- a meaningful set of phrases that are all of them false, more or less offering an error theory of gender-identity. It seems that you'd commit to that? -- it's identity-talk, but we generally understand that as a set of phrases horoscopes cannot hold without context because they're purposefully written to be ambiguous so that we can find the correct context, and so it doesn't work to the standard of, say, a definition of a set.

I don't think error-theory works here, though, because gender is one of those things which gets re-expressed in many different ways throughout various cultures. At the very least, looking as societies as under a kind of natural selection, those which landed on rules where reproduction excels will have more numbers which leads to more relative power, which in turn, throughout history, has overwhelmingly favored patriarchal societies. The patriarchy is older than most of the systematic social structures I point out -- outlasting even the major economic changes, to go against some interpretations of the Base-Superstructure theory of Marx. And here I am certainly talking about the patrilineal descent and control of property as the background social structure that this all gets organized around

So I see it as there being something very basic, which is hard to get at that underlies this re-expression (what I've referred to as a way-of-being, in contradistinction to both traits and behaviors). I'd say our identities exist, but maybe not in the same way, or at least the way we usually talk about existence doesn't seem to work here since it's neither traits nor behaviors. I'm not sure that identity is amenable to scientific analysis, though I think historical analysis works. I've been situating gender within culture, because I think that's what gives shape and meaning to gender identity.

But when I do that -- that's when I land on these notions which are far from the lock tight demonstrations. The concepts are fragile, half-formed, and morphing along the way. How does anyone describe a way of doing things? We can say, in general, Being-in-the-world -- but that's the ontological expression rather than an expression of identity.

What I'm brought back to is that I think we all do this with respect to identity. How we relate to others isn't so much about the traits they hold, and is only partially dependent upon behaviors (consider how you can judge the same behavior as good or bad -- the perception of a person's overall reputation will guide how a perceiver judges a behavior).

Yeah. I can see that. I'm wary though of putting too much stock in 'that sounds plausible'. I've had too many theories that sounded plausible turn out not be the case on examination. But still, for what it's worth... that sounds plausible. — Isaac

Heh please don't put too much stock into it. I don't think it a universal theory, as much as a generalized observation of how people react to trans people. Especially on the psychological side -- it's pretty hard to predict what emotion is going to be the reason for actions in general, at least for me. I'm not sure it's always disgust, but it can be all kinds of emotions which still functionally lead to enforcing the central patriarchal norm -- the gender binary -- which is where I think the connection really comes from. It's because the binary is being violated that they are targets, since patriarchy relies upon the binary for its own justification.

And because the whole point is to pick on those who are weaker. The stereotypical bully is a big guy who just takes advantage of his god-given advantage, with no effort. (Hence the way older brothers treat their younger siblings.) More important is the guy who's smart enough to spot people's weaknesses and manipulate them, bullying them through psychology. That's Trump, that's Finchy in The Office. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, that's it. It's like two different relationships with strength (above average) that define both how it was acquired and how it is used. If our stories are to be believed (and who's going to doubt such an authoritative text as The Lord of the Rings?), the brutes lose.

it's not just archetypes but your father that is your primary exemplar of manhood, so it's inevitable that you chose to emulate his example or reject it, and for most a mix of both they don't recognize until they're older. A child's first definition of woman is going to be "someone like my mom" and of man "someone like my dad". — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah - which comes back to my favourite neglected topic. Parenting. The aspect of socio-political strategy which is simultaneous the most important and the most ignored. Which is the stronger role model for abuse of power - the mansplaining work colleague with his outdated use of "bird", or the figure who can command an entire room to sit, stand, speak, and move exactly when told and has the power to determine your dress, your haircut, your speech, can imprison you on a whim, and against whom you have absolutely no say and recourse...?

(I'm not a big 'school' fan - if that comes across)

We have these superlatively draconian figures in every child's life five days a week, every term for their entire childhood, and when looking for reasons why children might grow up to abuse the power they have we're casting around for things like men spreading their legs when sitting down, or misusing some outdated terminology.

I'm not here saying that that stuff is fine. It's not fine, but it's the tools by which the bullying is done, it's not the reason why.

Yes. That would certainly make everything confusing! You'd have to more or less ask the other person to make clear what we're talking about, and here I am saying "it's not clear, but it's not that -- you have to take people at their word" — Moliere

Do I? That seems to be begging the question. If there's such a thing as an 'identity' and it's as important as you claim, then yes, I'd obviously have to take people at their word on it, it'd be mean not to. But that's only if such a thing exists. If it doesn't, then taking people at their word on it would be saying that I have to buy into their model, but they don't have to buy into mine, ever. Is conversation not a two-way cooperation?

gender is one of those things which gets re-expressed in many different ways throughout various cultures. — Moliere

Gender as behaviour does. Gender as 'identity'...? I've seen no evidence for it.

I can classify societies by literally any loose set of characteristics, and because we tend to form sub-sets, it's not too hard to find some kind of statistically robust boundaries. Teenage culture, for example - emos, goths, sporty types, geeks.... Cultures have 'man' and woman' as ready-to-hand sub-types into which most people fit, with a lot of the behaviours and expression related to reproductive biology, but many not, just pure cultural affectation.

And sure - if a person with a beard and a deep voice etc. came up to me and said "I feel more like a woman", I don't for a moment imagine his beard, voice, or any other biology puts a lie to that. But it remains that all he's saying, in that instance, is that he wants to behave like that class we call 'women' (in this context). If he/she were to invoke some 'identity' as a thing with a fixed value, I can't see any evidence from his actions that there is such a thing.

So I see it as there being something very basic, which is hard to get at that underlies this re-expression (what I've referred to as a way-of-being, in contradistinction to both traits and behaviors). I'd say our identities exist, but maybe not in the same way, or at least the way we usually talk about existence doesn't seem to work here since it's neither traits nor behaviors. I'm not sure that identity is amenable to scientific analysis, though I think historical analysis works. I've been situating gender within culture, because I think that's what gives shape and meaning to gender identity.

But when I do that -- that's when I land on these notions which are far from the lock tight demonstrations. The concepts are fragile, half-formed, and morphing along the way. How does anyone describe a way of doing things? We can say, in general, Being-in-the-world -- but that's the ontological expression rather than an expression of identity.

What I'm brought back to is that I think we all do this with respect to identity. How we relate to others isn't so much about the traits they hold, and is only partially dependent upon behaviors (consider how you can judge the same behavior as good or bad -- the perception of a person's overall reputation will guide how a perceiver judges a behavior). — Moliere

That all sounds perfectly reasonable, but I don't see things that way. What you're describing is more like a world view, it sounds vaguely Heideggerian, maybe? Fine. Not my cup of tea, but I'm not starting a crusade.

The point here is that it's not bigotry to disagree with the world-view you've just so carefully laid out. It's fine you think that way, but others don't. You can see, surely how those couple of paragraphs of nebulous uncertainty cannot drive even mandated social relations, let alone law. I can't justifiably be compelled to act in accordance with a notion you can even explain without resort to "hard to get at", "not sure that identity is amenable to scientific analysis", and "Being-in-the-world"...?

Why ought I believe someone who believes in the notion of 'identity', any more than I believe someone who believes in the notion of 'an eternal soul', or 'innate evil', or 'destiny'?

Do I? That seems to be begging the question. If there's such a thing as an 'identity' and it's as important as you claim, then yes, I'd obviously have to take people at their word on it, it'd be mean not to. But that's only if such a thing exists. If it doesn't, then taking people at their word on it would be saying that I have to buy into their model, but they don't have to buy into mine, ever. Is conversation not a two-way cooperation? — Isaac

It is.

To be fair, most people don't think identity simply does not exist -- they think there is this or that thing to be said about identity. Further, that's the usual sentiment that trans individuals face -- that they are non-existent or confused -- so it's unlikely to find a person who has to deal with that on the daily be willing to entertain it in a philosophical spirit. It's like saying "I do not exist" -- the reverse cogito which disproves itself.

But this is a space for philosophical thinking, and I'm willing to entertain the notion. You've certainly entertained mine.

If there is no such thing as identity then my method is question-begging (as an aside, I tend to believe all beliefs about existence beg the question, but that would take us way too far astray).

So you'd commit to error-theory, then? Or at least the analogy that all identity talk is as existentially important as talk of horoscopes?

The point here is that it's not bigotry to disagree with the world-view you've just so carefully laid out. It's fine you think that way, but others don't. You can see, surely how those couple of paragraphs of nebulous uncertainty cannot drive even mandated social relations, let alone law. I can't justifiably be compelled to act in accordance with a notion you can even explain without resort to "hard to get at", "not sure that identity is amenable to scientific analysis", and "Being-in-the-world"...?

Why ought I believe someone who believes in the notion of 'identity', any more than I believe someone who believes in the notion of 'an eternal soul', or 'innate evil', or 'destiny'? — Isaac

By all means disagree with me. I've laid it out as philosophy, and that's the usual mode of conversation.

I don't think most people who are describing their identity are doing so in that vein, though. They're asking for recognition, which in turn means safety, whereas I'm attempting to at least reflect on the phenomena from a philosophical distance.

Disagreeing with a world-view is one thing. I think the push-back you receive is that it's not just a world-view that's at stake -- unlike here, where we really are just talking about ideas. Serious play, but at a distance so we can look at how we're thinking and reflect.

But once we exit the philosophy room the whirl begins again, and most people don't have a taste for philosophy, in my experience.

So you'd commit to error-theory, then? Or at least the analogy that all identity talk is as existentially important as talk of horoscopes? — Moliere

Yeah, that's right. Insofar as there's something immutable and sacred there. I mean, you made a really good showing, but you'd have to admit that your paragraph explaining what an identity is was hardly clear. I don't think it's beyond reason to think that the reason you're having trouble pinning it down is because there's nothing there to pin.

Let's say I ask you - what is your identity? How did you learn what word would do the job to explain to me what it is? Why 'Woman', or 'Man'? Why not 'cat'? How did you learn that 'Man' and 'Woman' were legitimate answers to that question, but 'cat', or 'the capital of France' didn't make any sense?

It's from you language community, right? So 'woman' has no meaning outside of what we use the word for -we, the language community. It can't mean only what you use the word for, that wouldn't make any sense, the word wouldn't do anything and you couldn't possibly know that you were using it to mean the same thing one day to the next (messy rehash of the private language argument).

But 'woman' is not like 'cat', it seems to be used to do different things in different contexts. Sometimes pretty biological taxonomy, sometime social roles, sometime behaviours... but these thing all have one thing in common, the one thing all language does... the terms are publicly available. I can learn from you what 'woman' means in your language game, and you can learn the same from me. That way we can use language in our cooperative ventures.

It's my belief that when we describe aspects of ourselves, we're reaching for these publicly constructed models to best explain what are essentially just interocepted nerve signals, memory re-firing of past neural patterns, and no small amount of random noise.

What I don't believe for a moment, is that a) some constitution of this mental goings on is correct, immutable and sacred, and b) known only to you and not picked off the shelf of publicly available models associated with the word you choose.

I don't believe (a) because we see too much the same mental goings on interpreted as different constructions by the same people at different times. We're wildly unfaithful even to our own models and we've absolutely no better idea what's going on than the person sat next to us.

I don't believe (b) because we don't just pick random words to describe these 'identities', we pick words we've learnt, and we can only have learnt those words from a community of language users, who must, therefore, know what the word means, which means, by definition, you could be wrong.

Toxic masculinity is an identity of the masculine which identifies itself with power, and the feminine with love, and denies itself the feminine. If you feel love, the feminine, then that is a weakness which the powerful wouldn't need to succumb to, and insofar that you feel love you should act to purge it to become a real man. — Moliere

I like this because "should" finally entered the theory -- I really believe this is a topic in ethics more than ontology/epistemology! But it's hard to get there. — Moliere

That is excellent, because the way it enters is via the devilish wrong understanding, like wot da Bible say.

But I think there is also a simpler, and much more general explanation of the conflict which is that identification is necessarily divisive. No us without them. No male without female. Hence the famous story about the Buddhist visiting N.Ireland being asked insistently, "Yes, but are you a Catholic buddhist of a Protestant buddhist?" The very idea of being both or neither threatens everyone's own identity and the very laws of logic themselves.

As an old hippy, I well remember the horrified complaint about men with long hair – "but you can't tell whether it's a boy or a girl!" And as I have said at tedious length, sex is of fundamental importance to a patrilineal society, and not so much if at all to a matrilineal one, thereby allowing more focus on which end one opens one's boiled egg at breakfast (all right thinking folk, men and women alike, are obviously little-enders), and other such vital issues.

What I don't believe for a moment, is that a) some constitution of this mental goings on is correct, immutable and sacred, and b) known only to you and not picked off the shelf of publicly available models associated with the word you choose.

I don't believe (a) because we see too much the same mental goings on interpreted as different constructions by the same people at different times. We're wildly unfaithful even to our own models and we've absolutely no better idea what's going on than the person sat next to us.

I don't believe (b) because we don't just pick random words to describe these 'identities', we pick words we've learnt, and we can only have learnt those words from a community of language users, who must, therefore, know what the word means, which means, by definition, you could be wrong. — Isaac

I like this, but I think I'd like it more if you aimed at the level of narratives instead of going all the ways down to words -- though I understand it looks like it's the use of individual words that's at stake, of course it isn't, they're pieces of a larger puzzle.

Somehow this all reminds me of a moment in The Sting, when Redford (I think) is at the apartment of a criminal associate of his. I think it's grandkids sitting on the floor listening to a cops and robbers show on the radio and one of them cheers the cop hero, which elicits from the old guy a "Hey! Who are y'all rootin' for?!" and possibly a gentle smack on the head (it would fit, but I'm not sure I'm not imagining that). Can be tricky to keep your identity fixed.

Here's another one from the criminal world -- so more masculinity stuff here -- that I would have heard on the radio I guess during the crack epidemic. There was a culture clash in America's high security prisons. I remember clearly some old cons who were interviewed who did not understand the new younger cons in their midst. "We were just outlaws," they would say. And there'd be talk of still having some kind of code. "These guys, though, they don't seem to care about anything, shoot anyone, for no reason, kids too." I remember some old guy particularly put off by these younger guys laughing when someone got shot in a cop show on TV. Just couldn't wrap his head around that.

Upshot of these little stories, I guess, is that identity is always something you perform, rather than something that you are, and your ideas about yourself play a part in that performance but are also a reflective simplification of that performance. There's a feedback loop, but I think it starts with the performance and it's the performance that will keep updating the ideas. (My motto these days, is "How can I know what I think till I see what I say.") If that coupling is too loose, you get people whose ideas about themselves and their performance diverge enough to be troublesome, and then we're talking about neurosis, I guess. But it's always a little loose.

I'd like it more if you aimed at the level of narratives instead of going all the ways down to words -- though I understand it looks like it's the use of individual words that's at stake, of course it isn't, they're pieces of a larger puzzle. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you're right. The words here are category words and that matters more than I've given due. 'Woman' is not like 'cat' in this context. It's more like 'free-thinker', or 'entrepreneur', or 'layabout'... But it is like 'cat' in another. I think 'women's' bathroom just means 'bathroom for those who need to sit down to pee'. It doesn't mean 'bathroom for those who wear dresses, ride side-saddle, and get captured by dragons in Disney films'.

identity is always something you perform, rather than something that you are — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's the sort of thing I was aiming at. I suppose with my focus on words I was trying to get at the way in which, with these identities being largely public, off-the-shelf options, they've usually all got names... 'Woman' being one such.

and your ideas about yourself play a part in that performance but are also a reflective simplification of that performance. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, so in modeling terms, your higher level cortices affect the priors in the models below them. You're more likely to interpret some collection of neural happenings as, say, a 'womanly' sensation, or drive, if that's already a meta-level model of how those cortices cohere (of course, they don't actually cohere at all).

Yeah, that's right. Insofar as there's something immutable and sacred there. I mean, you made a really good showing, but you'd have to admit that your paragraph explaining what an identity is was hardly clear. I don't think it's beyond reason to think that the reason you're having trouble pinning it down is because there's nothing there to pin. — Isaac

I agree that it's not beyond reason. An interpretation of Hume asserts that we're nothing but bundles without an intrinsic nature (another is that reason fails to grasp who we are while the heart doesn't). And, definitely it's not clear to me. That's part of why I find it interesting! And why I think about it from the philosophical perspective. Not just that it's unclear, but that it may be a feature of the very thing we're talking about. Or, at least, this is how I see things: that another explanation for vagueness is that the phenomena is such that it's not really pin-able. I tend to believe there are at least two "kinds" of knowledge -- scientific and historic. They are similar in that they are about reality, make claims about what's happened and what's happening and what will happen, and are based upon facts that can be demonstrated in some fashion. Historical knowledge is what a knowledge of identity is amenable under(though not uniquely, as I think self-knowledge isn't exactly history), but historic knowledge doesn't have all the benefits of scientific knowledge. Namely it's not falsifiable, and it comes in narrative form as its primary mode -- it's based on facts, but it's as much about the storyteller as it is the story because it's even more theory-laden than science without the benefit of being able to demonstrate a disproof from prediction. Further the notions of how the world works change between historians moreso than between scientists with respect to their subject of expertise (scientists disagree all the time, but usually there's a large body of agreement on the knowledge they're working on)

Think -- what are the scientific data which can even be correlated with, say, the meaning of Homer's epic poem? There are no ancient Greeks whose brain we can measure, but we're able to translate meaning from then into our own. Would the correlates which a person has while reading Shakespeare change the theme of Hamlet? Aren't most of the things in our life that we care about not really reducible in this way?

Primarily I'd say identity is like this. And reading your exchange with @Srap Tasmaner (ah! I didn't finish this thought because the post was too long already -- I picked up on the notion of performance and worked it in below though)

Let's say I ask you - what is your identity? How did you learn what word would do the job to explain to me what it is? Why 'Woman', or 'Man'? Why not 'cat'? How did you learn that 'Man' and 'Woman' were legitimate answers to that question, but 'cat', or 'the capital of France' didn't make any sense?

It's from you language community, right? So 'woman' has no meaning outside of what we use the word for -we, the language community. It can't mean only what you use the word for, that wouldn't make any sense, the word wouldn't do anything and you couldn't possibly know that you were using it to mean the same thing one day to the next (messy rehash of the private language argument).

But 'woman' is not like 'cat', it seems to be used to do different things in different contexts. Sometimes pretty biological taxonomy, sometime social roles, sometime behaviours... but these thing all have one thing in common, the one thing all language does... the terms are publicly available. I can learn from you what 'woman' means in your language game, and you can learn the same from me. That way we can use language in our cooperative ventures.

It's my belief that when we describe aspects of ourselves, we're reaching for these publicly constructed models to best explain what are essentially just interocepted nerve signals, memory re-firing of past neural patterns, and no small amount of random noise.

What I don't believe for a moment, is that a) some constitution of this mental goings on is correct, immutable and sacred, and b) known only to you and not picked off the shelf of publicly available models associated with the word you choose.

I don't believe (a) because we see too much the same mental goings on interpreted as different constructions by the same people at different times. We're wildly unfaithful even to our own models and we've absolutely no better idea what's going on than the person sat next to us.

I don't believe (b) because we don't just pick random words to describe these 'identities', we pick words we've learnt, and we can only have learnt those words from a community of language users, who must, therefore, know what the word means, which means, by definition, you could be wrong. — Isaac

I don't think I'd foist the problem of identity onto language use. I believe the Private Language Argument to hold in that it demonstrates there is no such thing as a private language. But I don't think that identity-talk relies upon a notion of a private language as much as it relies upon a standpoint of some kind, which is much more defensible than a full-blown Subject.

I think a lot of people feel that their identity is immutable, sacred, and private. Upon coming back to thinking on The Subject I think while they are technically incorrect there's more. While there are philosophical reasons to reject immutable and private -- sacred, I think, is something which most people still hold to, and I'm not sure there are philosophical reasons for that outside of a flat denial of the sacred (it's more an ethical question than an ontological one where the sacred shouldn't be profaned) -- In terms of how we converse people will know more about themselves than you know about them because they've been around themselves the whole time. This not in a fancy way, but the simple fact that people will be better able to construct a story about themselves than strangers who know nothing about them. There is a kind of knowledge there about themselves, their preferences, what they've done, what they'd like to do, how they feel, and all that which I only have access to through language if they are willing to tell me. I can make guesses, and be correct, and I can know an individual person better than themself in a particular way (especially in intimate relationships where you do share feelings), but they'll always have that perspective of themselves that I do not have.

To step away from gender and look at another scenario, how would you know a Baptist from a Buddhist? They are both ways of life that don't rely upon traits -- and, in truth, people rarely live up to the behaviors of their way of life. But a person could still be a Baptist or a Buddhist, yes? It's not like it's false for them to be either of these things, to feel this certain way about the world and their place within it, to know what they care about.

Now you've gone all the way so the analogy wouldn't work for you. Identity isn't real because...

It's my belief that when we describe aspects of ourselves, we're reaching for these publicly constructed models to best explain what are essentially just interocepted nerve signals, memory re-firing of past neural patterns, and no small amount of random noise.

But then how do Baptists and Buddhists talk to one another about the divine? Are they incommensurable worldviews, or could they find a way to talk to one another in spite of their differences?

I bring up religion because from the anthropological angle I don't see much of a difference between performances of Buddhism or Baptism from performances of Masculinity. They are central to a person's identity in a similar way and help guide a person in their place within the world. I'd go further and note that even though all identity is a kind of performance that doesn't make it false -- or, rather, the truth and falsity isn't as relevant as the significance of one's identity. Whether there is an existent which correlates with claims of identity isn't important at all. What matters is being heard and recognized as a person. (How could I respond to a person who believes I do not exist? What possible retort is there? What is true about asking others to do?)

That a particular language community doesn't have a language-game that recognizes me, for instance, wouldn't stop me from expressing myself as best I can within the context I find myself in. In fact, existentially, I couldn't stop expressing myself, as I am always myself regardless of the words I happen to know. If in a community of Morman's (switching to something I know more) who believe in the gender binary as at least sacred and immutable (though not private) I'll still say "I'm not that". The act of negation will always be open, even if the way the public uses words right now doesn't seem to match how I want to use them. That's not a private language, that's just how language works -- it morphs along with the use such that the meaning changes over time rather than sitting on a shelf for the public to pick up (at least, in my metaphor of language)

(a bit of an afterthought on the PLA -- you can jerrymander who the public is as to give your meaning preference)

self-knowledge isn't exactly history — Moliere

Oh! You should have said the opposite. Identity is precisely an issue of the autobiographical self.

But I don't think that identity-talk relies upon a notion of a private language as much as it relies upon a standpoint of some kind, which is much more defensible than a full-blown Subject. — Moliere

Same.

In terms of how we converse people will know more about themselves than you know about them because they've been around themselves the whole time — Moliere

There's obviously something to this; I know lots of things about my personal history that no one else does. But there's also the Burns Problem: we are biased when it comes to ourselves, and sometimes others can see us more clearly.

the simple fact that people will be better able to construct a story about themselves than strangers who know nothing about them. — Moliere

But it is a story and serves a purpose. It's not just the unvarnished truth.

even though all identity is a kind of performance that doesn't make it false -- or, rather, the truth and falsity isn't as relevant as the significance of one's identity — Moliere

Right. It is just not one of the purposes of the autobiographical self to be a truthful record of your life. So yes truth and falsehood are irrelevant to its function -- for you. Not entirely irrelevant to other people I think. We do tend to make judgements about how self-aware people are, because we need to know how seriously to take what they say about themselves.

Oh! You should have said the opposite. Identity is precisely an issue of the autobiographical self. — Srap Tasmaner

Heh. My thinking would differentiate between mere autobiography and History :D -- Biography, sure! That's history. Autobiography? That's primary literature.

Self-knowledge is precisely the autobiographical self? That's close, but then there's the kind of knowledge I act on without articulation and have to articulate later. I knew what I was doing and who I was the whole time, but the articulation -- categories -- come after the fact.

But it is a story and serves a purpose. It's not just the unvarnished truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Oh yes.

A simple fact that can be complicated.

Still, there is something to this kind of knowledge, as you admit. Even calling it a "knowledge" -- there are various known deficiencies in recollection, but I'll still know better than a total stranger about my life story, while in a court room or a psychotherapist's session I could come to believe entirely fabricated memories.

Right. It is just not one of the purposes of the autobiographical self to be a truthful record of your life. So yes truth and falsehood are irrelevant to its function -- for you. Not entirely irrelevant to other people I think. We do tend to make judgements about how self-aware people are, because we need to know how seriously to take what they say about themselves. — Srap Tasmaner

I make the judgment, but I'm not sure that I tend to make the judgment of others' self-awareness for the various things I've been thinking through and about. I think what I've found is that it's far too easy to believe you have judged another's self-awareness when there's something missed.

I think what I've found is that it's far too easy to believe you have judged another's self-awareness when there's something missed. — Moliere

Oh but I didn't say we make good, reliable judgements about the self stories of others, only that we do. All of our own biases will certainly be in play when we try to figure out how other people understand themselves.

But to come back to the point @Isaac was making, there seems to be a demand that we all not do what we all do, that we not even consider the possibility that particular sorts of stories people tell about themselves are not perfectly true. You argued that we need to just ask and take people's word for it when they answer, but we don't do that for anything and it's an unreasonable demand.

But we can still recognize that you construct your identity in part by telling these stories -- "We are who we pretend to be" -- and grant this constructive role without acquiescing to the folly that anyone ever simply reports the truth they find within.

I admit that politically this sounds like crap. People want to be told they are seen as who they know themselves to be. But that's not a courtesy we extend to anyone, so if we refuse here it's not singling out these claimants. But on the other hand, no one else makes the demand in so many words, perhaps because they know it's a non-starter. (As I write, I keep thinking of exceptions to these generalities, mostly in arguments among family, close friends, romantic partners.) But for whatever reason, no one else asking means no one else being turned down, so the effect of refusing here on general principles still looks like singling out trans people as not being trustworthy. So yeah, still political dynamite, even if perfectly consonant with psychology and our everyday ways of dealing with each other. The natural thing is to consider the political situation and make an exception. Maybe in time trans people won't have to ask to be seen the way they want, and we can go back to not treating their self-knowledge as uniquely privileged.

That is excellent, because the way it enters is via the devilish wrong understanding, like wot da Bible say. — unenlightened

Totally unintended -- I think we started with toxic masculinity in the old vein of trying to understand the normal from the abnormal.

But I think there is also a simpler, and much more general explanation of the conflict which is that identification is necessarily divisive. No us without them. No male without female. Hence the famous story about the Buddhist visiting N.Ireland being asked insistently, "Yes, but are you a Catholic buddhist of a Protestant buddhist?" The very idea of being both or neither threatens everyone's own identity and the very laws of logic themselves.

I, to prove your point, disagree with your opening, which means we are now two.

I think trans identity works as you describe though -- that it violates the very laws of logic by threatening everyone's identity.

As an old hippy, I well remember the horrified complaint about men with long hair – "but you can't tell whether it's a boy or a girl!" And as I have said at tedious length, sex is of fundamental importance to a patrilineal society, and not so much if at all to a matrilineal one, thereby allowing more focus on which end one opens one's boiled egg at breakfast (all right thinking folk, men and women alike, are obviously little-enders), and other such vital issues.

Heh. Weird that the conservative spaces I lived in can give similar experiences across time -- we called ourselves punk rock, but it's basically the same thing and I also got picked on for long hair.

I agree that sex is important only because of patrilineal descent of property. How else, prior to modern molecular biological technology, could you tell that your child was your child?

But on eggs -- as is typical, I'm that weirdo who starts in the middle

But to come back to the point Isaac was making, there seems to be a demand that we all not do what we all do, that we not even consider the possibility that particular sorts of stories people tell about themselves are not perfectly true. You argued that we need to just ask and take people's word for it when they answer, but we don't do that for anything and it's an unreasonable demand. — Srap Tasmaner

Is that the demand? I wouldn't go so far as to say people cannot tell false things about themselves. Sure they can, and we do.

But when it comes to someone's basic identity that they live with I'd say we take people's word for it almost always. Maybe we think there's this bit or that bit which we'd say different, but we don't ask if the person is talking about something unrelated without a reason. "Are you sure you're Baptist? That sounds Catholic"

In the case of gender I think that reason is there are individuals who don't follow popular beliefs about gender, but they are just as genuine as any expression of gender.