The relevance comes from the Kantian 'ought implies can' formula according to which you can't hold responsible someone for having done something that she could not possibly not have done (i.e. didn't have the power to refrain from doing, or didn't have an opportunity to so refrain). — Pierre-Normand
This is a peculiar consideration, really, because if we don't have free will then whether or not I hold you responsible/punish you is also determined and not something I freely choose to do. — Michael
The cause and effect chain had been entirely laid out by an immutable non-evolving force.
With the non-deterministic view, everything is real. Intelligence is real. It was there at the beginning (the Daoist view), we are really making choices, and we are really learning and creating. This is the actual experience of every day life. — Rich
An essential characteristic that governs the Dao is spontaneity (ziran), the what-is-so-of-itself, the self-so, the unconditioned. The Dao, in turn, governs the cosmos: “The ways of heaven are conditioned by those of the Dao, and the ways of Dao by the Self-so.”
On my view there's nothing particularly interesting about moral responsibility with respect to the free will issue, because there are no facts about moral responsibility. I find the free will issue interesting simply because of the ontological question--whether freedom is even possible, and then it's interesting with respect to just how will phenomena would be connected to ontological freedom. — Terrapin Station
BBC discussion covers a lot of ground:
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00z5y9z — FreeEmotion
An essential characteristic that governs the Dao is spontaneity (ziran), the what-is-so-of-itself, the self-so, the unconditioned. The Dao, in turn, governs the cosmos: “The ways of heaven are conditioned by those of the Dao, and the ways of Dao by the Self-so.”
We feel like there is a difference between the actions that we performed because we voluntarily chose to do them, and the events happening to us (and to our bodies) which we aren't responsible, on a personal level, for having brought them about (e.g. so called involuntary 'actions' such as sneezing, say). — Pierre-Normand
I don't see how that's not projection on your part. I feel as responsible for my sneezing, say, as I do for choosing to respond to you again in this thread. — Terrapin Station
So no concern with issuing claims about how people think about something when it's clear that some people don't think about it that way? — Terrapin Station
I hadn't anticipated that you would object to my observation that people hold themselves (and each other) responsible for their voluntary actions in a way that they don't for their involuntary behaviors. — Pierre-Normand
And do you care if your observation is wrong? — Terrapin Station
don't normally figure in the phenomenology of action — Pierre-Normand
You made the claim that people do not feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.
I said that that's not the case for everyone. I said that I feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.
That doesn't require an argument. It's simply a fact that I feel responsible for sneezing when I sneeze, and many other people I know would say the same thing.
So then you wanted to change it to whether responsibility for voluntary actions is the same as responsibility for involuntary events. Obviously it's not in a very trivial way: namely that voluntary actions are not the same thing as involuntary events. Of course, this has nothing to do with the claim you'd initially made, which was simply that people do not feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing. — Terrapin Station
I wouldn't say there are different senses of responsibility that I'm using in this regard.
What different sorts of senses of responsibility are you using? — Terrapin Station
I wouldn't say that those are using the idea of responsibility differently, though. They apply different legal upshots to responsibility based on whether something was voluntary or not, but it doesn't seem to me that they're employing different senses of responsibility. — Terrapin Station
Whether you are conceiving of them as different ways to apply of the very same concept, or different senses of 'responsibility', is rather beyond the point. — Pierre-Normand
No it isn't. There are either different senses of responsibility being used, or it's the same sense and there are simply different penalties. — Terrapin Station
First, let me clarify if you're talking about legal liabilities per se. — Terrapin Station
the examples of accidentally bumping into someone or sneezing in the concert hall. — Pierre-Normand
Daoism does embrace creative evolution (the evolving intelligence that permeates the universe). In this c respect, it is similar to the philosophy of Heraclitus (the evolving Lagos), and most recently the Creative Evolution of Henri Bergson. — Rich
Which could just as well be meant legally. I'm just clarifying what you're asking about.
What is a strict versus non-strict liability in a non-legal sense? — Terrapin Station
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