I think it is fair to say that no model is off the "beginning" is definitive. You can say the beginning is God (all powerful external intelligence), the Big Bang (something that miraculously evolves into the equivalent of God), or the Dao (intelligence that is embedded in the universe), or a myriad of variations.

Now the question what happens after? Those who believe in all powerful forces, whether God or the Big Bang (again the two are absolutely equivalent) are forced into a position of predetermination or predestination, with some "illusion of choice" thrown in by the all powerful force for some unknown reason. One had to buy into this piece of trickery to buy into determinism or compatibilism. The cause and effect chain had been entirely laid out by an immutable non-evolving force.

With the non-deterministic view, everything is real. Intelligence is real. It was there at the beginning (the Daoist view), we are really making choices, and we are really learning and creating. This is the actual experience of every day life.

So why even bother with determinism or compatibilism? The answer is that those who adhere to these ideas start off with the idea that there must be all powerful forces (God or the Laws of nature) so it is necessary to come up with a philosophy that fits into their desired goal. One can just accept things as they are (an evolving intelligence that makes choices) and eliminate the need to resort to all of these miracles and illusions that are required by the "all powerful force" philosophies all of which have relevant historical, social and political contexts. The cart was put in front of the horse for a reason.

The relevance comes from the Kantian 'ought implies can' formula according to which you can't hold responsible someone for having done something that she could not possibly not have done (i.e. didn't have the power to refrain from doing, or didn't have an opportunity to so refrain). — Pierre-Normand

This is a peculiar consideration, really, because if we don't have free will then whether or not I hold you responsible/punish you is also determined and not something I freely choose to do.

This is a peculiar consideration, really, because if we don't have free will then whether or not I hold you responsible/punish you is also determined and not something I freely choose to do. — Michael

It's true that if determinism is true, and agents have no alternative possibilities (abilities) for doing otherwise than what they actually do (or judge), then Kant's formula appears to lead to a contradiction (or rather, to an imperative that can't be consistently obeyed in conjunction with the knowledge that determinism is true) when applied to the act of holding people responsible. So, there are three solutions to this. (1) Deny Kant's formula (and thus also PAP). (2) Deny determinism. And (3) provide a sensible conception of rational abilities (and thus of "can") such that PAP is consistent with determinism. (Kant seems to have endorsed (2) in the Critique of Practical Reason, saying that freedom is a postulate of practical reason; although the Third Antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason might be read as a proposal for (3) accomplished through distinguishing the empirical character of causality from the intelligible character of causality.)

On my view there's nothing particularly interesting about moral responsibility with respect to the free will issue, because there are no facts about moral responsibility. I find the free will issue interesting simply because of the ontological question--whether freedom is even possible, and then it's interesting with respect to just how will phenomena would be connected to ontological freedom.

The cause and effect chain had been entirely laid out by an immutable non-evolving force.

With the non-deterministic view, everything is real. Intelligence is real. It was there at the beginning (the Daoist view), we are really making choices, and we are really learning and creating. This is the actual experience of every day life. — Rich

I am not sure if there is a distinction between the future being 'laid out' and unknowable to us human beings, and a future that is not already pre-determined. Is it an academic (or is this what is meant by ontological) difference?

I am also puzzled by the statement that 'free will is an illusion' - if it is, it is an illusion which can never be found to be an illusion or not, and something we will never know. Also our world would not look any different. It is different from a magician's illusion where we can say that the magician makes it look like
he is levitating, for example, but we find that in reality he is being supported by an invisible support.

I have lately come to believe that there is some relationship between the Western and Eastern religions, for example Christianity and Taoism in that the Christian doctrine teaches of a more personal, 'human - like ' deity although I would think Christian theologians would be the first to admit that God's actual nature transcends all understanding and imagination, perhaps like the concept of Dao?

An essential characteristic that governs the Dao is spontaneity (ziran), the what-is-so-of-itself, the self-so, the unconditioned. The Dao, in turn, governs the cosmos: “The ways of heaven are conditioned by those of the Dao, and the ways of Dao by the Self-so.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Daoism

On my view there's nothing particularly interesting about moral responsibility with respect to the free will issue, because there are no facts about moral responsibility. I find the free will issue interesting simply because of the ontological question--whether freedom is even possible, and then it's interesting with respect to just how will phenomena would be connected to ontological freedom. — Terrapin Station

It seems to me that even if one is an eliminativist, anti-realist or error-theorist regarding personal responsibility for one's own actions, it still figures as an inherent part, not just of our self-conception as rational agents, but also, quite prominently, in the phenomenology of practical deliberation, conscious choice and voluntary action. We feel like there is a difference between the actions that we performed because we voluntarily chose to do them, and the events happening to us (and to our bodies) which we aren't responsible, on a personal level, for having brought them about (e.g. so called involuntary 'actions' such as sneezing, say). One issue for the libertarian is to explain how this phenomenal distinction between deliberate choices or intentional actions, on the one hand, and things that merely happen to us, on the other hand, is to be explained such that intentional actions aren't merely occurring non-deterministically but rather constitute exercises of the agent's own abilities to chose to do them and thereafter remain in control of them. Such an account still has to contend with the problems of control, luck and intelligibility regardless of one's metaphysical stance regarding specifically moral responsibility, or so it seems to me.

BBC discussion covers a lot of ground:

www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00z5y9z

BBC discussion covers a lot of ground:

www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00z5y9z — FreeEmotion

Thanks for that again! You always find interesting stuff. A discussion involving Helen Beebee, Simon Blackburn and Galen Strawson ought to be interesting. The three of them are very smart and articulate even though Strawson's hard deterministic view seems rather deeply misguided to me.

Beebee wrote an engaging introduction to the topic: Free Will: An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan (2013). The very short conclusion of her book might be worth quoting in full:

"If you’ve managed to get this far, you now really know quite a lot about the contemporary debate about free will. More importantly, I hope you are now armed with the resources to decide – provisionally, of course! – what you think. Is free will compatible with determinism, and, if not, which kind of incompatibilist view is right? More importantly – or so I think – is it plausible to think that we actual human beings routinely act freely? And, if not, what consequences does that have for our responses to, and relationships with, other people, and for our conception of ourselves? My own (again, provisional) general view is, I think, clear enough; but, of course, you most certainly should not take my word for anything. One of the great joys of philosophy is that you don’t have to take anybody’s word for anything . Of course, that also poses a major challenge: When so much is up for dispute, it’s hard to know where to start. Overall, however, I think it’s more of a blessing than a curse. I hope you agree." -- Helen Beebee

An essential characteristic that governs the Dao is spontaneity (ziran), the what-is-so-of-itself, the self-so, the unconditioned. The Dao, in turn, governs the cosmos: “The ways of heaven are conditioned by those of the Dao, and the ways of Dao by the Self-so.”

Daoism does embrace creative evolution (the evolving intelligence that permeates the universe). In this c respect, it is similar to the philosophy of Heraclitus (the evolving Lagos), and most recently the Creative Evolution of Henri Bergson.

The Daoists were simply observers, and did not start out with preconceived objectives, e.g., create a metaphysics that makes room for super-forces such as God or the Laws of Nature which govern and determine everything. Their observations were quite straightforward without the gymnastics of most Western philosophers, i.e.:

1) The universe is permeated with intelligence (the Dao)
2) The universe is characterized by Yin/Yang opposites (positives and negatives) that are waves (quantum waves)
3) Opposites (+, -) create energetic motion (Qi) which creates everything else.

The above is the One (Dao/Intelligence) that creates Waves (Yin/Yang) that create Energy Qi) which describes the nature of the universe. It it's very simple, very real, and pretty much explains everything. The universal intelligence (including humans) is an creating, learning, evolving force that learns with memory and creates with intelligence. That's it.

The reason Western philosophy gets so messy and far-fetched is that historical forces insisted on metaphysical philosophers that either had to include God (or else you get burned at the stake) or had to include all powerful and all determining Laws of Nature (science has its own axe to grind). Ideas like "determined free will", "the illusion of free choice", or "selfish genes" are the result of the torturous problem of trying to get a square peg in a round hole.

We feel like there is a difference between the actions that we performed because we voluntarily chose to do them, and the events happening to us (and to our bodies) which we aren't responsible, on a personal level, for having brought them about (e.g. so called involuntary 'actions' such as sneezing, say). — Pierre-Normand

I don't see how that's not projection on your part. I feel as responsible for my sneezing, say, as I do for choosing to respond to you again in this thread.

I don't see how that's not projection on your part. I feel as responsible for my sneezing, say, as I do for choosing to respond to you again in this thread. — Terrapin Station

Maybe if you would put a little more thought in your replies, and a little less anger, it wouldn't feel like you were sneezing. But if you would rather elect not to sneeze in my direction anymore, I have no objection to that either.

So no concern with issuing claims about how people think about something when it's clear that some people don't think about it that way?

So no concern with issuing claims about how people think about something when it's clear that some people don't think about it that way? — Terrapin Station

I hadn't anticipated that you would object to my observation that people hold themselves (and each other) responsible for their voluntary actions in a way that they don't for their involuntary behaviors. You suggest that I am unjustifiably projecting my own personal sentiments since you yourself feel responsible for your own sneezes. It may make sense for you to say this if you are conflating responsibility for intended actions with strict liabilities for their unintended consequences. Strict liabilities are a thing, for sure, but they don't normally figure in the phenomenology of action (let alone in the phenomenology of involuntary behaviors) until after their unintended consequences (if any) have occurred.

I hadn't anticipated that you would object to my observation that people hold themselves (and each other) responsible for their voluntary actions in a way that they don't for their involuntary behaviors. — Pierre-Normand

And do you care if your observation is wrong?

And do you care if your observation is wrong? — Terrapin Station

I would care if you would supply an argument rather than just a bold claim that seems to rest on a conflation. If you won't care to explain in what sense you are holding yourself responsible for your own sneezes, then it is difficult for me to evaluate the philosophical import of this alleged counterexample to a prima facie quite uncontroversial observation.

You made the claim that people do not feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.

I said that that's not the case for everyone. I said that I feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.

That doesn't require an argument. It's simply a fact that I feel responsible for sneezing when I sneeze, and many other people I know would say the same thing.

So then you wanted to change it to whether responsibility for voluntary actions is the same as responsibility for involuntary events. Obviously it's not in a very trivial way: namely that voluntary actions are not the same thing as involuntary events. Of course, this has nothing to do with the claim you'd initially made, which was simply that people do not feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.

If you'd like to modify your claim, maybe I'd agree with it.

don't normally figure in the phenomenology of action — Pierre-Normand

There you go again, by the way, with simply reporting norms--and unfortuantely demonstrating that you seem not to be able to think very well outside of them. Philosophy shouldn't be simply learning what other people typically say and parroting it. I'd rather you didn't even bother with what other people say and learn to think for yourself instead. That would be more valuable.

You made the claim that people do not feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.

I said that that's not the case for everyone. I said that I feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing.

That doesn't require an argument. It's simply a fact that I feel responsible for sneezing when I sneeze, and many other people I know would say the same thing.

So then you wanted to change it to whether responsibility for voluntary actions is the same as responsibility for involuntary events. Obviously it's not in a very trivial way: namely that voluntary actions are not the same thing as involuntary events. Of course, this has nothing to do with the claim you'd initially made, which was simply that people do not feel responsible, on a personal level, for events such as sneezing. — Terrapin Station

No. I didn't "want to change" my initial claim with another claim. You have not been paying attention. From the very start my point was to contrast the phenomenology of actions with the phenomenology of involuntary behaviors or of unintended bodily motions: things that merely happen to us. Here is what I had said again:

"We feel like there is a difference between the actions that we performed because we voluntarily chose to do them, and the events happening to us (and to our bodies) which we aren't responsible, on a personal level, for having brought them about (e.g. so called involuntary 'actions' such as sneezing, say)."

Also, I didn't ask you to justify your feeling that you are responsible for your sneezes. I asked you in what sense are you feeling responsible for them. That would help me to assess if the phenomenon of sneezing constitutes a counterexample for the general thesis that I meant to illustrate, or if, rather, they just aren't a good example and I ought rather to pick another one. It is difficult to imagine that the former rather than the latter might be the case unless you really mean to suggest that people feel responsible for all their consciously occurring bodily movements and reflexes regardless of their involuntariness.

I wouldn't say there are different senses of responsibility that I'm using in this regard.

What different sorts of senses of responsibility are you using?

I wouldn't say there are different senses of responsibility that I'm using in this regard.

What different sorts of senses of responsibility are you using? — Terrapin Station

I already provided the example of strict liabilities, a legal concept that can rather straightforwardly be extended to cases of ordinary life, e.g. when we accidentally bump into someone and incur a felt obligation to apologize. Likewise if we would sneeze during a quiet moment at a public recital. Another sense attaches to the voluntary production of intended results when we act intentionally. I would have guessed that it's not quite in that sense that you mean that you feel responsible for sneezing.

I wouldn't say that those are using the idea of responsibility differently, though. They apply different legal upshots to responsibility based on whether something was voluntary or not, but it doesn't seem to me that they're employing different senses of responsibility.

I wouldn't say that those are using the idea of responsibility differently, though. They apply different legal upshots to responsibility based on whether something was voluntary or not, but it doesn't seem to me that they're employing different senses of responsibility. — Terrapin Station

Whether you are conceiving of them as different ways to apply of the very same concept, or different senses of 'responsibility', is rather beyond the point. We were discussing the phenomenology of action. There is no special phenomenology that attaches to the unintended production of an effect that you are responsible for due to a context of strict liability. You may not even be aware that this effect is being (or will be) produced until long after the fact.

Whether you are conceiving of them as different ways to apply of the very same concept, or different senses of 'responsibility', is rather beyond the point. — Pierre-Normand

No it isn't. There are either different senses of responsibility being used, or it's the same sense and there are simply different penalties. You claimed that there are different senses of responsibility.

No it isn't. There are either different senses of responsibility being used, or it's the same sense and there are simply different penalties. — Terrapin Station

...and a different phenomenology, obviously. But the point is moot if you aren't conceiving of your own alleged sentiment of responsibility when you are sneezing as something akin as a strict liability. Are you? If not, are you also feeling responsible for your arm rising if someone else suddenly grabs it and raises it? If not, what's the difference? Is endogenous production of bodily movements sufficient, in your view, for your feeling responsible for them?

First, let me clarify if you're talking about legal liabilities per se.

First, let me clarify if you're talking about legal liabilities per se. — Terrapin Station

I suggested that the concept could straightforwardly be extended to non-legal contexts and provided the examples of accidentally bumping into someone or sneezing in the concert hall.

the examples of accidentally bumping into someone or sneezing in the concert hall. — Pierre-Normand

Which could just as well be meant legally. I'm just clarifying what you're asking about.

What is a strict versus non-strict liability in a non-legal sense?

If was not familiar with the philosophy community, however I was really happy to listen in on this discussion. To answer deep philosophical questions on a radio discussion, and to give instant replies is not an easy task I would think. The discussion covered many aspects of the debate, seems like they talked about everything.

For some reason, the spoken word is much easier to understand that the written word, for me at least.

Here is another video which is quite thought provoking to say the least "you don't determine your thoughts'
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fecQUZ-ehKQ

Daoism does embrace creative evolution (the evolving intelligence that permeates the universe). In this c respect, it is similar to the philosophy of Heraclitus (the evolving Lagos), and most recently the Creative Evolution of Henri Bergson. — Rich

So the question is, is this predetermined (according to Daoism?)

Which could just as well be meant legally. I'm just clarifying what you're asking about.

What is a strict versus non-strict liability in a non-legal sense? — Terrapin Station

The criterion for 'strictness' of liability is simple enough and just the same in the legal context as it is for my suggested extension to ordinary contexts. In both contexts, for cases of strict liability, Mens rea and good or ill will are irrelevant since the outcome (or involuntary bodily movement) was not consciously intended. It wasn't even a result of recklessness and it doesn't reflect on one's rational abilities or moral character and in any way. It's just like sneezing. It has nothing to do with the will.