Oh, I wasn't referring only to that post. Just generally, the Wittgenstein you talk about bears little resemblance to the one with which I am familiar.

But that should be obvious.

My critiques of Witt proper had to do with ideas that his critique of certainty really made sense more in the context of early analytics and logical positivists. I was saying that folks like Schopenhauer were already concerned with everyday things (the human condition) and things such as this... Other philosophies that aren't looking for a kind of certainty whereby language precision is paramount. I remember reading about Carnap and Ayer and such making fun of the Continentals for not being precise, for example. So there are other traditions that don't rely on such. Thus the critique about certainty, to me, becomes less relevant (as far as language precision), the more a philosophy is about "what is going on", in a more holistic sense.

But what about him are you familiar with that you think "bears littler remembrance"?

One could call Schopenhauer an altogether crude mind. I.e., he does have refinement, but at a certain level this suddenly comes to an end; he is as crude as the crudest. Where real depth starts, his finishes. — Wittgenstein

On a quick search, I wasn't able to find the source of this. Is it apocryphal? Does anyone have the original location?

I agree with you on your summation of Wittgenstein, great mind though he was, he appeared more concerned with language use then actual philosophy perhaps giving birth to philosophy of language in the meantime slightly inflated his reputation as a philosopher at the time and although significant in his own way he holds nothing to say Locke, Hobbes, Hume or Kant imo.

I agree with you on your summation of Wittgenstein, great mind though he was, he appeared more concerned with language use then actual philosophy perhaps giving birth to philosophy of language in the meantime slightly inflated his reputation as a philosopher at the time and although significant in his own way he holds nothing to say Locke, Hobbes, Hume or Kant imo. — simplyG

Recognizing that this is all personal sensibilities and such but... :up:

On a quick search, I wasn't able to find the source of this. Is it apocryphal? Does anyone have the original location? — Banno

Many philosophers shit-talked each other. That doesn't prove much. Schop on Hegel!

Sure. That's not what I was asking. Schop hasn't interested me enough to move past tertiary sources. I wondered why Wittgenstein admired him, if somewhat begrudgingly.

Not that Stackexchange is any authority, but this answer seems apt:

No one can enter Wittgenstein's mind of course, there is however a bit of history to it. In his youth Wittgenstein was enamored with Schopenhauer's epistemology (largely inherited from Berkeley and Kant), but when he became interested in logic and mathematics he found it wanting on account of their nature and role. In particular, he was impressed by Frege's critique of "psychologism" about logic and converted into his conceptual realism. Youthful disappointments cast a long shadow. — Conifold

But just as anyone can take potshots at anyone, it is well to consider this next comment on that same thread:

Late Wittgenstein wrote that because he was very critical of Schopenhauer's philosophy. You may think his criticism was maybe too strong, but it is natural among philosophers to employ that kind of strong criticism. Wittgenstein has also been heavily criticized by the philosopher Mario Bunge, who said "Wittgenstein is popular because he is trivial" (Bunge 2020). So no philosopher, not even Schopenhauer or Wittgenstein, are free of that kind of "rude criticism". — James Walker

That's not addressing my question.

That's not addressing my question. — Banno

I wondered why Wittgenstein admired him, if somewhat begrudgingly. — Banno

This looks promising:

Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. The Logical Positivists, who believed that only the phenomenal existed, took this as the paradigm for their philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, moved away from it and proposed a new and different analysis in his book Philosophical Investigations, and this became the most influential text in linguistic philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein produced two different philosophies, each of which influenced a whole generation that remained largely oblivious of its Schopenhauerian origins. — Bryan Magee

I do enjoy Brian Magee's analysis of Schopenhauer, and wrote some well-known secondary literature on Schop, so he is a good place to start. I get Tractatus, but I'd be interested to know where the influence is in Later Witt.. especially in light of that (Witt) quote.

I’m not that interested. My question was quite specific.

Are you wanting an answer for why Witt admired..., or indirectly showing your dislike for wanting to learn any Schop (or at least his influence)? I know it's the latter, but you were on the verge of having an interesting conversation. Sigh.

I wondered why Wittgenstein admired him, if somewhat begrudgingly. — Banno

I saw a similar start of an approach in the quotes @schopenhauer1 posted, which I began to flesh out here.

My guess is that Schopenhauer gets mixed up somewhere along the way, as others do (Plato, Kant, Descartes, Hume, etc), not because their inquiry is totally misguided, or otherwise useless, but because of the prerequisite they have for an answer (before the “first step” that “escapes notice” Witt says #305]. This might strike Witt as an inability to notice subtlety (only focused on purity), and thus the critique: “crude”.

I saw a similar start of an approach in the quotes schopenhauer1 posted, which I began to flesh out here. — Antony Nickles

Students and scholars of all kinds and of every age aim, as a rule, only at information, not insight. They make it a point of honour to have information about everything, every stone, plant, battle, or experiment and about all books, collectively and individually. It never occurs to them that information is merely a means to insight, but in itself is of little or no value. — Arthur Schopenhauer

Yes, I think this accords with what you were saying of Witt's idea of "responsibility" perhaps.

This mirrors Wittgenstein’s insights about the limits of knowledge, and our desire to have knowledge be everything, that knowledge might equal virtue, will be an answer in place of us, of our responsibility to see for ourselves, to expand our vision; that the value of philosophy is an insight beyond what can be told. This is why I’ve been saying we have a desire to have knowledge (purity) replace our other relations to the world (and others) beyond it, apart from it. — Antony Nickles

Indeed and this goes right to the heart of what I am trying to convey about why philosophies like Schop's allude the criticism of "certainty". That is because the very essence of his philosophy was about an intangible unknowable(s). The artistic genius has "something" (a sort of attunement to the Forms) in his conception. Music has "something" (it's as if the "thing-itself" (Will) personified in representational form. Will is only ever discussed as a subject-for-object, but cannot be fully understood in its unitary state as Will-proper, etc. See this whole discussion.

That is to say, this resembles nothing of the kind of "certainty" of a Russell or a Kant. Thus, this critique:

My guess is that Schopenhauer gets mixed up somewhere along the way, as others do (Plato, Kant, Descartes, Hume, etc), not because their inquiry is totally misguided, or otherwise useless, but because of the prerequisite they have for an answer (before the “first step” that “escapes notice” Witt says #305]. This might strike Witt as an inability to notice subtlety (only focused on purity), and thus the critique: “crude”. — Antony Nickles

Schop has an "answer". Perhaps he was overly ambitious with his construction, but I see it more as an attempt for holistic understanding of reality, and is trying to elaborate on an insight he has (in his synthesis of Kant, Plato, other philosophers in the Western tradition, and Eastern philosophy, mainly). That is to say, philosophy is about one's (hopefully well-thought out) way of conveying one's insights and not so much a project of understanding "certainty". Wittgenstein himself was sharing his insights. So that is more the project.

…the value of philosophy is an insight beyond what can be told. - Antony Nickles

Indeed and this goes right to the heart of what I am trying to convey about why philosophies like Schop's allude the criticism of "certainty". That is because the very essence of his philosophy was about an intangible unknowable(s). — schopenhauer1

To say something is “unknowable” (that I am, or aesthetics are) is not to elude our desire for purity, it is to judge in contrast to it; to find an “answer” despite conceding that standard can’t be reached; to live, but only cynically, in the shadow of skepticism. Now of course I don’t know Schopenhauer is doing this because I have not read him, but Wittgenstein concluded in the Tractatus that parts of our world were unknowable. In the PI he finds that there is rationality despite not being purely logical; he finds our ordinary criteria which embody our interests in the different kinds of things we do, in different situations, filling in the areas set aside by him (and by Kant), and learning why we are compelled to see the world as either pure or unknowable.

…philosophy is about one's (hopefully well-thought out) way of conveying one's insights…. Wittgenstein himself was sharing his insights. — schopenhauer1

Now some take it that when Witt says: some things can’t be told, but only shown, that this is just a different way of conveying knowledge (he’s just being cagey). But Witt’s method is not to impart knowledge; it’s to get you to see the world (yourself) differently. So he’s not telling you “his insights”; he’s “showing you” examples of what we say (in a context), in a sense to ask: “can you see this for yourself?” in order to grasp why we desire a single standard (or give up); so you must change yourself, your “need” (#108), not what you think. He shares his style of autobiographical confessions with Montaigne, and I thought perhaps Schopenhauer, though maybe not.

So when I say there is more to our relation to the world than knowing it, I am not saying it is unknowable. For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works. P. 225. This insight is a shift in our attitude (as a position in relation to others), a realization of our responsibilities.

#305 — Antony Nickles

Where?

That's just quibbling over the definition
— Luke

Similar and same mean different things. "The Eiffel Tower is similar to the Blackpool Tower" is true. "The Eiffel Tower is the same as the Blackpool Tower" is false. — RussellA

I have been foolishly following you down this rabbit hole. @Banno has pointed out what's important here:

What matters is that when the builder calls "slab", the assistant brings a suitable piece of stone. — Banno

That is, your individual or private concept of "slab" can be whatever you like; it makes no difference provided that you act/react appropriately in the language-game. Like Wittgenstein's beetle, your individual or private concept "drops out of consideration as irrelevant". As I quoted from PI 199: "To understand a language means to have mastered a technique."

What is the correct use of Form of Life ? — RussellA

As I quoted from the SEP earlier:

What enables language to function and therefore must be accepted as “given” are precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein’s terms, “It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that is required” (PI 242), and this is “agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” (PI 241)...Forms of life can be understood as constantly changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc.; or as a background common to humankind, “shared human behavior” which is “the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language” (PI 206); or as a notion which can be read differently in different cases – sometimes as relativistic, in other cases as expressing a more universalistic approach.

I can define the word "peffel" as "part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower", and I can define "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", but I cannot put into words what the words "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" mean to me, as my concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" have grown and developed over a lifetime of unique multiple experiences. — RussellA

What the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower" mean to you are irrelevant to the meaning of "peffel", which means "part [your] pen and part the Eiffel Tower". Is this not what "peffel" means?

Even in Wittgenstein's terms, as my personal concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others, it is part of my private language. — RussellA

In what way is the concept of "peffel" inaccessible to others? You have already defined it for us. Also, in what way is "peffel" a part of any language? Do you ever use the word "peffel" and, if so, how do you use it?

For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works. — Antony Nickles

I have to disagree with you here. At PI 246, Wittgenstein says:

If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. — PI 246

Language Idealism presumably means that language shapes reality for humans. — schopenhauer1

A two way process, language shapes reality and reality shapes language.

Richard Gaskin discusses Linguistic Idealism in the YouTube Determinate Content #3: Richard Gaskin on Linguistic Idealism

Suppose someone names an object in the world consisting of the the top half of an apple and the bottom half of an table and names it "appable". Pretty soon people would discover that this object named "appable" had no practical use, and the word would drop out of language. Suppose someone names an object in the world consisting of the top half of an apple and the bottom half of an apple and names it "apple". Pretty soon people would discover that this object named "apple" had a practical use, and the word would become a part of language.

We are told to "bring me an apple". On the one hand, we discover an apple in the world, and are than able to take it to them. Our language has determined not only our conception of the world but also the kind of contact we have with the reality of the world. But on the other hand, the world has shaped our language in that there has been something in the world that has been named "apple" in language.

There has been a synergy between he world and our language. A mutual dependence of which neither takes precedence.

That is to say, there are fundamental things underlying language that means that language might not be the foundational way humans interact with the world. — schopenhauer1

Yes, life began on Earth about 3,700,000,000 years ago, and for about 3,699,900,000 years life managed to survive and evolve within a harsh and unforgiving world, suggesting that language is not fundamental in how life is able to interact with the world.

Thus, we have a direct correlation of object with its "use". — schopenhauer1

There would be no word in language for an object that had no use.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

There are an almost infinite number of possible objects that may be discovered in the world outside language, each of which can be named. Objects found useful outside language may be named, such that the word "appable" is discarded and the word "apple" is kept. This leaves about 500,000 useful words in a typical language.

Wittgenstein wrote that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within the world outside language, the object appable is as real as the object apple, but within language, the word "appable" may be discarded as of no practical use outside language whilst the word "apple" may be kept as having practical use outside language.

Note that some words such as "unicorn" don't exist in the world outside language but do have a use in language.

Therefore, all possible words have a meaning, whether "appable" or "apple". Yet some of these words are more useful than others, meaning that PI 43 can be reworded as "all possible words have a meaning, but only those words that have a use, whether inside or outside language are used in language.

Embodied embedded cognition...................The theory states that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world. — schopenhauer1

Behaviour emerges from an interplay between brain and world.

George Lakoff talks about Embodied Cognition in the YouTube How Brains Think: The Embodiment Hypothesis

This is related to Enactivism, the proposal that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.

He says that we are born with certain embodied structures in place, within the 100 billion neurons and between 100 trillion and 1 quadrillion connections between these neurons

Within these neurons and connections are embodied concepts. This has the consequence that, in a sense, cognition drops out. When I see a glass of water, it is not the case that "I think I need to drink" but rather "I need a drink".

This is the same point Wittgenstein makes in PI 246:"It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain", because when "I am in pain", there is no point in saying "I know I am in pain".

It may be wrong to describe human behaviour as "intelligent behaviour" if cognition has dropped out of consideration. Unless one defines "a behaviour that allows the body to survive" as "intelligent".

After 3.7 billion years of evolution, the brain has evolved in synergy with the world in which it is living. The structure of the neurons in the brain and their connections is therefore a direct consequence of the particular world in which it exists.

It is then the case that behaviour emerges from an interplay between the brain and the world, accepting that the structure of the brain is a direct consequence of the particular world within which it exists.

So personal and private (as Wittgenstein terms it) are two different things, and you are using the word "private" in the place of both, — Antony Nickles

The experience within my mind caused by a wavelength in the world of 700nm is a private experience, inexpressible to others, in the same sense as Wittgenstein's use of the word.

The point being, if two objects are "red" (based on the context), the color is the same, and not because our personal experiences match up (or that we "agree"). — Antony Nickles

I agree, this is the point of PI 293, that the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game. Within the communal language game we can talk about the colour "red".

If we take the case of someone actually being blind, philosophy would say they have never "experienced" color. But we can still explain the experience of color. — Antony Nickles

I can talk about the colour "red" as being defined as having a wavelength of between 625nm to 750nm, but I can't talk about the private experience within my mind caused by a wavelength of 700nm in the world, as this is inexpressible to others.

Simply pointing to an object and uttering simple words sound like a limited elementary ability of language use by young children just starting to learn languages rather than key ability for the general language users. — Corvus

Sounds like something that happens routinely in engineering labs.

Points to waveform on oscilloscope and says, "The op amp doesn't have the balls to do the job."

Pointing at objects seems not a key ability to use language. Pointing at objects is primarily for learning words for children.........................Our key ability to use language is, from my point of view, not just uttering simple words, and simple sentences pointing at the object, but also being able to explain the situations, problems as well as trying to solve the problems by giving out some kind of verbal instructions or more information on the object...............I was unsure of your claims that pointing at objects is our key element to use language. — Corvus

We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully.

Consider the word "angst".

We could use the dictionary, where "angst" is defined as "a feeling of deep anxiety or dread, typically an unfocused one about the human condition or the state of the world in general". "Anxiety" is defined as "a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease about something with an uncertain outcome". Continuing, "worry" is defined as "feel or cause to feel anxious or troubled about actual or potential problems". "Troubled" is defined as "beset by problems or difficulties". Either the definitions become circular or are never ending.

The alternative to understanding the word "angst" is by reference to the world outside language. If "pointing" to something in the world cannot be used in our learning of a word such as "angst", then what is the alternative? How do we learn the meaning of "angst" without resorting to "pointing"?

I am using "pointing" to include its synonyms, such as signalling, showing, indicating, gesturing, flagging, labelling, motioning, etc.

Just generally, the Wittgenstein you talk about bears little resemblance to the one with which I am familiar. — Banno

Par for any commentary on Wittgenstein. Each and every one of us is familiar with a different Wittgenstein. Add to that the premise that multiple interpretations are most often caused by ambiguity from the author, and the logical inference is that Wittgenstein is very likely highly ambiguous. Therefore the direction of discussion in a focused commentary on Wittgenstein ought to be the question of how to distinguish intention behind ambiguity, and, the relevance of the intentional use of ambiguity in philosophy. And here we find issues like what type of rhetoric ought the intentional use of ambiguity be classified as, is this a form of "sophistry", "deception", etc..

What the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower" mean to you are irrelevant to the meaning of "peffel", which means "part [your] pen and part the Eiffel Tower". Is this not what "peffel" means? — Luke

There are different uses of the world "meaning". The absence of pain means a lot to me and "pain" means "a sharp unpleasant sensation usually felt in some specific part of the body".

In what way is the concept of "peffel" inaccessible to others? You have already defined it for us. Also, in what way is "peffel" a part of any language? Do you ever use the word "peffel" and, if so, how do you use it? — Luke

My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person?

There are different uses of the world "meaning". The absence of pain means a lot to me and "pain" means "a sharp unpleasant sensation usually felt in some specific part of the body". — RussellA

This is why I emphasised the distinction between meaningfulness (significance) and word meaning (definition, sense) in my previous post, where I said: "What the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower" mean to you are irrelevant to the meaning of "peffel"". That is, the personal significance to you of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" are irrelevant to the meaning or sense of "peffel", which you defined as "part [your] pen and part Eiffel Tower". The word "peffel" can be used by anyone to mean ""part [your] pen and part Eiffel Tower" regardless of your personal feelings about the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower".

My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. — RussellA

Violet is not your concept. But your understanding of the concept is accessible to others, depending on how you use it.

Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person? — RussellA

I don't need to describe my personal experience in order to use the word "violet" appropriately. And neither does a colour blind person.

The point is that our experiences are irrelevant to linguistic meaning; to language use. This is not to say we don't have experiences. Things can still be significant or meaningful to you; but the way it feels or looks or tastes, etc. is irrelevant to the meaning or use of a word.

We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully. — RussellA

This is obviously not true especially when you consider how a child learns.

My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person? — RussellA

I don't see how these are inaccessible in the same way. Violet is inaccessible because experiential qualities are inherently indescribable. Peffel is inaccessible presumably only because its an unusual concept but I see it as no different from a concept like a liger or mule or any other kind of hybrid thing that actually exists in reality and so is therefore an accessible concept.

Tbh I don't think Wittgenstein's private language is about inaccessibility apart from the trivial notion that all my immediate experiences are inaccessible. The point, as I interpret it (maybe I am wrong), is not the inaccessibility but that of I am the only one using the language, the language becomes totally redundant.

Sounds like something that happens routinely in engineering labs.

Points to waveform on oscilloscope and says, "The op amp doesn't have the balls to do the job." — wonderer1

It is not just humans, but machines such as oscilloscopes use language. They don't use phonetic utterance like humans do, but they use wave forms to say the op. amp has no balls to do the job. Human engineer looking at the wave form displayed on the oscilloscope, obviously knew what the oscilloscope was saying, and interpreted it in human language form.

In computer programming, there are Programming Language called "Machine Language", which only computer processors (such as Motorola 68000) can understand.

Or if you write programs in C language, you first write the instruction in high level language which is friendly to humans. Then you must compile the program using machine compiler, which will read your instructions to machine only readable code. Most of the Apps, and software system runs as the machine only readable language.

In the PI he finds that there is rationality despite not being purely logical; he finds our ordinary criteria which embody our interests in the different kinds of things we do, in different situations, filling in the areas set aside by him (and by Kant), and learning why we are compelled to see the world as either pure or unknowable. — Antony Nickles

It's almost as if Witt, in his enthusiasm for Frege's new project of logic realism, (during Tractatus period), took the opposite approach to Schop. For early Witt, all is phenomenal. Anything that cannot be discussed in an observable way was meaning-less or non-sense. Of course, if he read Schop's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, he might save himself the whole Picture Theory.

But anyways, Schop's books are all about understanding the "inner" part of existence (subect-for-object), and how that is that the internal and external interact, etc. Early Witt, could not stand philosophy venturing into the internal aspects. But that's my point is that one does not need a precision of "sense and reference" to describe one's metaphysical theory. One does not need things to be observed. One can describe abstract ideas and felt sensations, intelligibly. Now, later Wittgenstein, might grant this, but then say that one can always be in error of what one really means, understands, or thinks they said. But I don't think that this disproves that communication about abstract ideas (non observational), are thus irretrievably hopeless. Rather, as perhaps you are getting, it is your "responsibility" to see if there is insight there (for yourself, regarding the world).

So he’s not telling you “his insights”; he’s “showing you” examples of what we say (in a context), in a sense to ask: “can you see this for yourself?” in order to grasp why we desire a single standard (or give up); so you must change yourself, your “need” (#108), not what you think. He shares his style of autobiographical confessions with Montaigne, and I thought perhaps Schopenhauer, though maybe not. — Antony Nickles

Ugh, this is now your problem. You (Witt perhaps) seems to be fitting all philosophers in this idea of trying to find a single standard, which creates a strawman that the Great Wittgenstein can then "show" is in error.

Besides the fact that this whole "showing and not telling" is besides the point to my point (because insights can be demonstrated to the audience in many different ways.. as I have been trying to convey regarding Schop), I can tell you that because we might have various ways of viewing words that might be in conflict, it doesn't mean that we turn off our ability to think about the bigger questions of life. Schopenhauer was all about the bigger questions. The way you phrase it, if you are not reading an engineering manual or learning a sports game, or talking about last night's dinner, you are a fool. And you know what, for the pedantic fool who thinks we should go back to pedantic banter and minutia, well they can do something with themselves. They can keep their self-important heads right up their ass, as they seem to like it there. Either way, Wittgenstein is sharing his in-sight... Whether you think through some clever demonstration of language-games or through clear and eloquent exposition (often on abstract/subjects like unitary Will.. like Schopenhauer).

But Witt’s method is not to impart knowledge; it’s to get you to see the world (yourself) differently. — Antony Nickles

And this is what most good philosophers are trying to do! Witt is not special. Sorry.

So when I say there is more to our relation to the world than knowing it, I am not saying it is unknowable. For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works. P. 225. This insight is a shift in our attitude (as a position in relation to others), a realization of our responsibilities. — Antony Nickles

That is just describing forms of empathy.. Witt's hatred for psychologism (Frege's influence especially) is seen throughout early and later Witt, to his detriment, I'm afraid to say.

We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully. — RussellA

People can and do use words without knowing the meaning of the word. I am not sure if there is such a thing as absolute right meaning of words anyway. Meaning is arbitrary and contingent, i.e. it changes, gets obsolete, newly made up etc. You can learn a meanings of some words, but you may not know the hidden meanings of the word used by another group of people or a person as well. In that case, can you communicate with the group of the people with the word you thought you knew the meaning of? Highly unlikely.

And I might use a word thinking it is the right meaning to mean what I think, but you might interpret it in totally different way. Is meaning then precondition of using language? No.

Many things follow from this, but two are central here. The first is that we do not need a theory of the meaning of "slab" in order to do the task at hand - to build the structure. — Banno

In the world is something X that has been named "X". The foreman experiences this something X in the world in his mind as the concept Y. His assistant experiences this something X in the world in his mind as the concept Z.

As shown by PI 293, the beetle, the concepts Y and Z, drop out of consideration in the language game.

It is true that what the something X is in the world is irrelevant as long as foreman says "bring me X" and the assistant brings X.

It is true that the foreman's concept Y may be different to the assistant's concept Z

The foreman may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Y, they would be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to say "bring me X". Similarly, the assistant may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Z, they would also be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to bring X.

In order for something to happen, for there to be an activity, there must be all the following:

1) There must be an X in the world
2) X must have been named "X"
5) The foreman must say "bring me X"
3) The something X that the foreman looks at must give rise to his inner concept Y
4) The something X that the assistant looks at must give rise to his inner concept Z

If one of these is missing, then nothing will happen. There will be no activity and the assistant won't bring X.

The same principles apply also to "bring" and "me".

If "X" didn't mean X, then nothing would happen and there would be no activity.