@Janus @Fooloso4

I applaud your dogged patience. :clap:

So when of comes to deep causes you disagree with the first premise? — Fooloso4

No. Knowledge of deep causes comes through experience, but mediated by a fair bit of reasoning. As I said, not through "direct experience." But the point here is that Aristotle's theological claims, such as the one about thought thinking itself, are conclusions and not premises.

Cheers 180 :cool:

Responding to you is time-consuming and seems to provide little benefit to either of us or to anyone else. I need that time to work on my articles for publication. So, I have decided to spend it there.

With kind regards,
Dennis Polis — Dfpolis

Thanks for the time Df, I do not think it was wasted. I know you've helped me to reconsider and better understand some things in the past, and I'm looking forward to more of the same in the future. Anyway, despite my criticism I do like your work. As a novel variety of science based metaphysics, it's like a breath of fresh air. That's why I'm quick to engage you when you post a thread, I like you.

I think we also agree that is not something we should argue about since neither of us knows — Fooloso4

I’m not putting myself up as an exemplar. Like you, I’m citing sources - for instance, Pierre Hadot's, whose interpretation varies considerably from yours, I think. Exclusive emphasis on negation, that nobody can know anything like a higher truth, neglects the sapiential dimension of ancient philosophy.

In philosophy, what distinguishes, or differentiates, a "higher truth" from a truth? I'm quite familiar with P. Hadot but please put it in your own words based on your own understanding, sir. Thanks.

An insight that requires virtue and reason to obtain; not commonly found amongst the uneducated or untrained; the aim of the philosophic life.

See e.g. these excerpts from the Nichomachean Ethics on 'contemplation as the highest form of happiness'. Also the entry under Hadot on 'the askesis of desire'.

An insight that requires virtue and reason to obtain; not commonly found amongst the uneducated or untrained; the aim of the philosophic life. — Wayfarer

Not your intention, but that does sound like elitist, status seeking dogma.

Not your intention, but that does sound like elitist, status seeking dogma. — Tom Storm

It's incompatible with //some aspects of// democratic liberalism. That's why most of the exponents of the various forms of the perennial philosophy are hostile to modernism. In modern culture, the only arbiter of truth is what is objectively measurable and subject to social consensus, but that's also the source of the 'meaning crisis' that Vervaeke is constantly webcasting about. This shows up in the fact/value dichotomy first elaborated by David Hume (not coincidentally.) The motto of modern culture is 'nihil ultra ego'.

It's incompatible with democratic liberalism. That's why most of the exponents of the various forms of the perennial philosophy are hostile to modernism — Wayfarer

As a democratic liberal and (for the most part) a modernist I guess I am cursed to forever find fault.

When I was involved with the Theosophical community one of the things you heard most often was how this or that doctrine or set of teachings was 'only for those who have done the right initiation, and are truly sensitive' which was generally a way of dealing with any differing point of view. Everyone who did not agree in full was deemed 'less developed'.

Curiously, those who understood and were sensitive were also subject to identical substance abuse issues, anxieties, jealousies and status seeking as those who weren't, so it was hard to see what substantive difference any of these word games made to a life. It seemed more like it involved collecting a set of putative virtues and participating chiefly in a self-congradulatory abstract dialogue with those who shared the perspective. This could be true also for postmodernists, Pentecostal Christians.. or fans of Taylor Swift.

The question is how can we tell if someone has the right virtues or attributes?

The question is how can we tell if someone has the right virtues or attributes? — Tom Storm

It’s a shame you see it like that but I don’t want to derail the thread any further. I suppose I could say that I’m a moral realist, I believe there is a vertical dimension, the dimension of value, and not just as a matter of subjective opinion.

Not your intention, but that does sound like elitist, status seeking dogma. — Tom Storm

That seems like a rather cynical take. Are you of the opinion, then, that everyone is equally virtuous? Equally reasonable? Equally knowledgeable?

I should add, I'm not of the view that the kind of values I'm seeking ought to be imposed on others, or that they necessarily form the basis for a political philosophy (although there will be some connection.) It's more a matter of seeing that the traditional virtues associated with philosophy are at odds with today's materialistic culture in many respects. But at the same time, I also acknowledge that this culture provides the freedom to explore and pursue these kinds of aims, even if, at the same time, it conditions you against it, by encouraging a hedonistic attitude. It's a kind of inconvenient truth.

Oh, and speaking of Hadot, just acquired this splendid volume.

That seems like a rather cynical take. Are you of the opinion, then, that everyone is equally virtuous? Equally reasonable? Equally knowledgeable? — Leontiskos

I think this rather misses the point.

I am outlining how certain elitists can employ an elusive criteria of value to exclude certain folk from being seen as fully human or fully sentient. Are you of the view that this doesn't happen in religion and spirituality? My experience has demonstrated this is fairly common.

But as has said this is derailing the thread.

Typical in Australia that ‘elite’ is a pejorative :wink:

:wink:

But it definitely has something to do with the act of measurement, does it not? “No phenomena is a phenomena until it is observed”, said Bohr. — Wayfarer

As I said, the the wave function collapses because the detection process (used in measuring) is nonlinear and cannot sustain superposition.

Quantum mechanics provides a very good example of the incompatibility between being and becoming I've been talking about, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. "Being", is represented here as the describable state of a fundamental particle. It is what is, at any specific point in time, what you call a stage of becoming. But change, "becoming" is what occurs between these points in time, how the particle gets from A to B, etc., and this is represented as a wave function.

So the wave function, as a representation of a form of becoming, must be expressed as linear or else it would be completely unintelligible to us, as totally unrelated to our points of observation. However, the points of observation (providing the states of being) must be adapted, manipulated artificially to match up with the information we have about what occurs between these points, rendering the representation as nonlinear, involving substantial unknowns. Therefore each, the representation of being and the representation of becoming, are left compromised due to the attempt to bridge the underlying gap of incommensurability, as the incompatibility between being and becoming manifests itself in particle physics.

Knowledge of deep causes comes through experience, but mediated by a fair bit of reasoning. — Leontiskos

Experience of what? Does reasoning discover the truth of first things? Why doesn't he teach it to us? He does say that the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach.

But the point here is that Aristotle's theological claims, such as the one about thought thinking itself, are conclusions and not premises. — Leontiskos

Mind was a well know and frequently discussed topic in the Academy and Lyceum. It is not as if it was a reasoned discovery.

Pierre Hadot's, whose interpretation varies considerably from yours, — Wayfarer

I have read Hadot and found it instructive. If I remember correctly, he had an early interest in mysticism but later moved away from Plotinus’ Neoplatonism. In any case, I have no experience of a transcendent reality and so for me, whether such exists or not, nothing turns or rests on it.

It is often difficult to determine whether it is worth it. Although where someone has entrenched beliefs and views they are not likely to change them, there may be some reading the thread who have not made up their mind and are willing to evaluate based on the text and arguments.

I agree with what you say, but I see imagiation as involved in both interpreting or undertsnding something as something and in imagining something that does not actually exist. Note that this latter function of imagination relies on the combining of preformed images of objects that do exist. — Janus

We agree.

Of course, if I read other authors I will be moved to agree or disagree depending on how what they say accords with that experience or not. — Janus

My point was that I chose what to read and, implicitly, what to think about, even though I was not yet neurally informed by the printed word. So, my later neural state was, to a degree, a result of my prior intentional state.

I don't experience myself as being able to freely decide what to value or agree with; I experience that as being determined by what I have, through my own experience, been led to think. — Janus

Suppose that your experience leads you to a fork in the road. On one fork is said to be a place of great natural beauty, on the other a person you have texted with and are interested in, but not met or made any commitment to. I am saying that your choice of which fork to take is based on how you choose to value these incommensurate goods. On your theory, how is this valuation made?

Anyway, despite my criticism I do like your work. As a novel variety of science based metaphysics, it's like a breath of fresh air. That's why I'm quick to engage you when you post a thread, I like you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for the kind words.

how the particle gets from A to B, etc., and this is represented as a wave function. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum observations are completely explainable without invoking the "particle" concept. Modelling the physics using the concept of particles works in many, but not all cases. Modelling it in terms of waves works for all the observations.

Mind was a well know and frequently discussed topic in the Academy and Lyceum. It is not as if it was a reasoned discovery. — Fooloso4

No, "thought thinking itself" in chapters 7 and 9 of Metaphysics 12. It's what Dfpolis spoke of <here>. It is Aristotle's famous description of God's activity.

Why doesn't he teach it to us? — Fooloso4

I would suggest that you try actually reading him. As in, beyond the first few sentences of the Metaphysics. :wink:

I think this rather misses the point. — Tom Storm

No, I don't think so. Wayfarer made a very obvious and rational comment. Do you actually disagree with it? If not, why are you objecting?

The "dogma" here seems to be on your part. Someone says there are "insights that require virtue and reason to obtain; not commonly found amongst the uneducated or untrained," and you object. I don't see how yours could be a rational objection. Usually such knee-jerk reactions have to do with quasi-religious or ideological indoctrination, where any time anyone says that <some people are better than others in some way>, the secular ideology requires the adherent to object to the claim, no matter how rational and true it is. And yes, the reactionary comment tends to include the vague charge of 'elitism'.

If this is right, then this is just the Theosophical community in a new key, where instead of being "less developed" the one who has spoken contrary to the creed is an "elitist." Neither charge is able to be substantiated; both are identity markers.

I am outlining how certain elitists can employ an elusive criteria of value to exclude certain folk from being seen as fully human or fully sentient. — Tom Storm

I am outlining how Wayfarer's words imply no such thing, and that to read them in such a manner is cynical. I don't think such an interpretation is defensible.

It's incompatible with //some aspects of// democratic liberalism. That's why most of the exponents of the various forms of the perennial philosophy are hostile to modernism. — Wayfarer

I have never understood what "modernism" means, because I have never seen it precisely defined. As I read it, it seems to mean whatever recent changes the author does not like. Instead of discussing them pro and con, they are labeled and dismissed.

Similarly, "liberalism" is another ill-defined label. As I read history, American liberalism grew out of (1) disgust for British government inaction in response to the Irish potato famine and (2) the abolitionist movement. Neither of these roots seem poisonous to me.

Of course, there are abuses labeled "liberal" as there are abuses labeled "conservative." Unless these abuses can be shown to be a consequence of the principles of these movements, which I have rarely seen, condemnation by label only serves to divide people. Wanting to preserve the true values of the past does not mean you are a racist unless you view past racism as a "true value." Wanting to advance human freedoms and dignity does not mean you reject the true values of the past.

What actually happens is that people who want to preserve privilege or free themselves of moral constraint dress themselves in one of these labels as a disguise. Which one is a matter of convenience, because there is no real difference between continuing in immorality and seeking to be free of moral restraint.

One question here asks what relation equality mongering has to modernity. Why have we become obsessed with equality in modern times? Even to the point that we feel obliged to assert that people are equal in ways that they are manifestly not?

For me the answer lies in secularization. The older Judeo-Christian culture had an anchor for equality, namely the imago dei and a "balancing" afterlife, which was thought to reestablish justice. The religion and the anchor were lost, and at that point equality became an all-or-nothing affair. E.g. A Rawls-or-Nietzsche affair.

Any well-grounded theory of mind has to take that into account. So, we cannot divide extended reality from human mental reality. — Dfpolis

Descartes categorically "divided" Soul from Body ; which in more modern terms might translate to a conceptual distinction between Mind and Brain. So it does seem possible to think of them as two different but inter-related Things. Since we can and do "divide" the world into conceptual categories, from what perspective do you conclude that we "cannot divide" Res Extensa from Res Cogitans?

A Monistic Materialist might assume that ultimately Mind is just a different kind of Matter, so the distinction is artificial, not natural. But philosophers use such artificial analysis as an essential tool of their trade. Or, a Monistic Idealist might make the opposite argument : that Brain is merely a tangible form of ethereal Mind. Yet both feel justified in making conceptual sub-classifications underneath the umbrella of their preferred fundamental substance. Apparently, you have either a different meaning of "divide", or a different Prime Substance, in mind. Please explain. :smile:

It's obvious that Minds are always Embodied ; unless you give credence to invisible intangible ghosts. — Gnomon
No, one need only give credence to logical analysis such as that by which Aristotle established the existence of an immaterial unmoved mover, described as "self-thinking thought." — Dfpolis

I agree that we can reason from sensory evidence (specific things) to non-sensory conclusions (generalizations ; principles). But Aristotle's "Self-Thinker" sounds like a dis-embodied Mind, and for a Materialist, would fall into the same nonsense category with Ghosts and Circular Logic.

Like you, I am not a Materialist, except for commonsense practical purposes. Yet, for philosophical reasons, I accept that all of the Minds in my sensory experience have been associated with meat Brains. However, I can cogitate from other evidence (e.g. Quantum Physics) that Mathematics (e.g. Fields) may be more fundamental than Matter. And Mental Information can be defined in terms of both Math and Logic.

So, the question arises : what is the relationship between Math and Mind? My answer is that both are subvenient (dependent) forms of the universal Power-to-Enform (Energy + Information = EnFormAction). That unconventional notion is not a derivative of pure Idealism, but a conjugation of Idealism & Physicalism. Or, as I like to call it Enformationism. :smile:

PS___ Are you familiar with the Mass-Energy-Information Equivalence postulation in physics?


Enformationism :
A philosophical worldview or belief system grounded on the 20th century discovery that Information, rather than Matter, is the fundamental substance of everything in the universe. It is intended to be the 21st century successor to ancient Materialism and Spiritualism. An Update from Bronze Age to Information Age. It's a Theory of Everything that covers, not just matter & energy, but also Life & Mind & Love.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

No, "thought thinking itself" in chapters 7 and 9 of Metaphysics 12. — Leontiskos

Yes, I know. That which thinks itself is Nous or Mind or Intellect.

In the Phaedo Socrates says:

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything.

(97b)

In the Apology he says the books of Anaxagoras are sold in the marketplace and can be bought for a drachma. (26d).

So, the idea of Mind as the arche was well known.

When at Metaphysics 1075a Aristotle says:

One must also consider in which of two ways the nature of the whole contains what is good and what is best ...

he is referring to Socrates criticism of what he finds in Anaxagoras. [Edit. Socrates] continues the quote above:

I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.

A divine mind is a premise or endoxa not a conclusion.

I would suggest that you try actually reading him. As in, beyond the first few sentences of the Metaphysics. — Leontiskos

I have. He does not provide such an argument.

You say:

Relevant here is Aristotle's distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known in itself. We only come to the latter through the former. — Leontiskos

and yet rather than proceeding from what is better known to us you jump ahead to what is unknown to us and treat it as if it is known.

You have not said what experience or reasoning is involved that leads us to knowledge of the truth of first things. You downplay experience and are unable to provide the reasoning that leads to this knowledge. If it were a matter of reasoning then, as is the case with mathematics, Aristotle could reach clear, definitive, undisputed, and necessary conclusions. But he does not, and neither has anyone else.