Okay, so that's where I think we would end up disagreeing. I don't think that phenomenon is absent from religion, but I don't think it explains all metaphysical beliefs. — Leontiskos

So, apart from the interpretations of altered states by individuals who experience them, and the prevailing prior cultural accretions of such interpretations that might influence new interpretations, what else do you believe explains metaphysical beliefs?

Okay good, and I conclude that listening to music is intrinsically valuable (for some, or most). Obviously this also exists at a cultural level, from Gregorian chant, to Beethoven, to Radiohead. Such composers aim to produce something that is intrinsically valuable, and which will be chosen as an end in itself.

Music, then, becomes a value and an object of discourse, even when conceived as an end: — Leontiskos

What about pop music, or heavy metal? Also, is music chosen as an end in itself or a means to enjoyment and/ or elevated feeling?

Nevertheless, the act of music appreciation is not publicly demonstrable in any obvious way, largely because appreciation is not the sort of thing done for the sake of demonstration. It would be incongruous to try to demonstrate appreciation (because demonstration pertains to means and appreciation pertains to ends). — Leontiskos

Yes, I've said the same about appreaciation of art and literature in general. I say the same thing goes for appreciation of religion or metaphysical ideas.

The idea here is that there are two kinds of human acts: acts which are instrumentally valuable (means), and acts which are intrinsically valuable (ends). So if someone tells me that there are no intrinsically valuable things, I must infer that there are also no instrumentally valuable things.

I think this is actually what is happening on a large scale: the culture tells us that there are no intrinsically valuable things, and the logical conclusion is that there are also no instrumentally valuable things (and this leads to a form of nihilism—more or less the form that I have been discussing with Tom Storm). — Leontiskos

I don't see it. I think people value things because the things them pleasure, inspire, them, uplift them or whatever. This could be art, music, literature, going to the gym, a spiritual discipline, watching sport, reading phislsophy etc,. etc.

How could intrinsic value be determined? Why would a lack of belief in intrinsic vale lead to nihilism, when people still value things? I'm not seeing any argument.

The statement quoted already was right out of the positivist playbook.

Positivism: a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism. — Wayfarer

You've reached a new low—this is not worth responding to.

I was referring to ancient philosophical "schools" such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, the Cynics, and Neoplatonism and also Eastern teachings such as Buddhism, Vedanta and Daoism that were more concerned with theory as an aid to practice than as an end in itself.

For example, remember that the Buddha cautioned against metaphysical views.

↪Gnomon
I was referring to ancient philosophical "schools" such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, the Cynics, and Neoplatonism and also Eastern teachings such as Buddhism, Vedanta and Daoism that were more concerned with theory as an aid to practice than as an end in itself.
For example, remember that the Buddha cautioned against metaphysical views. — Janus

Yes, but Plato and Aristotle also taught "philosophical schools", and they included both physical and metaphysical topics, with the end in mind of training young Athenians to become wise and virtuous citizens. Are Wisdom and Virtue physical or metaphysical concepts? Ironically, even the Buddha taught that the ultimate goal of his philosophy was the attainment of metaphysical Nirvana.

I was merely trying to point out that the "point" of Philosophy and of Science are proximately different, but ultimately compatible : what's "good" for humans in a complex and dangerous world, with both physical and metaphysical Goods. :smile:

. Are Wisdom and Virtue physical or metaphysical concepts? — Gnomon

It depends on what you mean by wisdom and virtue. Aristotle spoke of phronesis usually translated as 'practical wisdom'. Wisdom and virtue can be understood to be pragmatic virtues.

What Gautama thought nirvana consists in is a matter of debate, as he would not give a straight answer to those who wanted to settle on some metaphysical viewpoint concerning its nature.

Kant pointed out that metaphysical knowledge as transcendently conceived is impossible. We cannot know whether there is a God, we cannot know the "absolute truth", we cannot know whether there is an afterlife, rebirth, resurrection, heaven and hell and so on. All these ideas are matters of faith, not of knowledge.

What we can know is immanent, phenomenological—altered states of consciousness and personal transformation— and not what the "ultimate" metaphysical, transcendent implications of those phenomenologically knowable human possibilities might be.

Note, I'm not saying people shouldn't believe, just that they should be intellectually honest enough to admit that what they believe is faith-based whenever there is no empirical evidence or strict logical warrant. It follows that it is pointless to argue about faith-based beliefs, because there is no way to demonstrate their truth or falsity.

Everett’s Many worlds theory might get around the collapsing wavefunction problem. Not saying it’s the right theory, but it accounts for a sort of reason behind the becoming (each probability is really a separate world that did actually happen).

Why think there is information available to us, other than that which can come to us via configurations of physical stuff?
— wonderer1

All kinds of things. A lot of what we nowadays take for granted, or at least, see around us all the time, not long ago only existed in the domain of the possible, penetrated by the insights of geniuses who navigated a course from the possible, the potential, to the actual, by peering into that domain, which at the time did not yet exist, and then realising it, in the sense of 'making it real'. One parameter of that is physical, and it's an important parameter, but not the only one. — Wayfarer

Poetic, but it doesn't come across to me as a response coming from having seriously considered the question.

"Domain of the possible"? Is that a metaphor, or something reified in your thinking?

...penetrated by the insights of geniuses who navigated a course from the possible, the potential, to the actual, by peering into that domain, which at the time did not yet exist...

The bolded part doesn't seem to make sense if taken ontologically. Are you conflating epistemic with ontic?

Quantum leaps seem to be inherent in the foundations of the physical world, as revealed by 20th century sub-atomic physics. In the 17th century, Isaac Newton assumed that physical processes are continuous, but the defining property of Quantum Physics is discontinuity. When measured down to the finest details, Energy was found to be, not an unbroken fluid substance, but could only be measured in terms of isolated packets, that came to be called "quanta"*1. Yet, on the human scale, the brain merges the graininess of Nature into a smooth image. There's nothing spooky about that. If you put your face up close to your computer screen, you will see a bunch of individual pixels. But as you move away, those tiny blocks of light merge into recognizable images. — Gnomon

The first thing I need to correct you on, is that energy is not measured it is calculated. Measurements are made, a formula is applied, and the quantity of energy is determined. Because of this, it is not accurate to talk about energy as a substance, it is actually a property, as a predication.

Bohr, Planck, etc found the observed quanta & quantum leaps to be "unintelligible", and characterized by inherent Relativity & Uncertainty*2. — Gnomon

Since a quantity of energy is calculated through a formula, and uncertainty arises from application of the formula, this suggests that the formula being applied is in some way deficient, and this is the cause of the appearance of uncertainty.

Due to the "spooky action at a distance" that annoyed Einstein, sub-atomic physics defies common sense. But pragmatic physicists gradually learned to accept that Nature did not necessarily play by our man-made rules. — Gnomon

This is especially the case when the "man-made rules" are not well crafted.

*2. That Old Quantum Theory :
Einstein's two theories of relativity have shown us that when things move very fast or when objects get massive, the universe exhibits very strange properties. The same is also true of the microscopic world of quantum interactions. The deeper we delve into the macrocosm and the microcosm, the further we get away from the things that make sense to us in our everyday world. — Gnomon

Strong evidence that the formulas being applied are deficient.

Everett’s Many worlds theory might get around the collapsing wavefunction problem. Not saying it’s the right theory, but it accounts for a sort of reason behind the becoming (each probability is really a separate world that did actually happen). — schopenhauer1

I don't see how you can make such a leap from future to past. If the wave function deals with possibilities of what might be measured, that's a prediction for the future. But I see no reason to believe that when that predicted point in time moves into the past, we ought to believe all those possibilities have actually happened. If there are many possibilities as to what you will be doing in an hour from now, and that time moves past, there is no reason to believe that all those possibilities actually happened.

What about pop music, or heavy metal? — Janus

Sure.

Also, is music chosen as an end in itself or a means to enjoyment and/ or elevated feeling? — Janus

A reductive hedonist might say that only pleasure is sought and all pleasure is commensurable. My point here isn't to get into that debate, but to note that the enjoyment represents an end in itself. Ultimately, we act for ends in themselves. Or at least we should if we are rational.

Yes, I've said the same about appreaciation of art and literature in general. I say the same thing goes for appreciation of religion or metaphysical ideas. — Janus

Okay, sure. It seems to me that this fact will significantly undermine an overemphasis on public demonstrability, as well as the idea that ends are not proper objects of discourse (or that ends cannot be argued about, for example).

I don't see it. I think people value things because the things them pleasure, inspire, them, uplift them or whatever. This could be art, music, literature, going to the gym, a spiritual discipline, watching sport, reading phislsophy etc,. etc. — Janus

In this case the pleasure is of intrinsic value.

How could intrinsic value be determined? — Janus

But you are back to this question of public demonstration, are you not? I don't see why people are so obsessed with this question (well I do, but that's another story). As humans we all believe in and seek intrinsically valuable things. Whether or not these things can be "proven" to be intrinsically valuable is beside the point. To deny the existence of intrinsically valuable things makes no sense to me. If there are no intrinsically valuable things, then you must only ever carry out instrumental acts. Instrumental to what end? None, apparently. For example, if the hedonist denies that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, then their account of action collapses.

So, apart from the interpretations of altered states by individuals who experience them, and the prevailing prior cultural accretions of such interpretations that might influence new interpretations, what else do you believe explains metaphysical beliefs? — Janus

Metaphysics: reason. Religious doctrine: revelation. But this is for another thread.

To deny the existence of intrinsically valuable things makes no sense to me. — Leontiskos

Try this. Suppose your impression of things as valuable is like your impression that things have color - an aspect of how your brain models the world. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that I see things as valuable, like I see things as red?

- But it's more belief than sight. "I believe things are valuable," not, "I see/construe things as valuable." That's why we act: because we believe things are valuable. So then when someone asks us if anything is valuable, the honest answer is 'yes', because that is what we believe to be true. Yet if someone asks if we can prove with scientific rigor that something has intrinsic value, we are of course within our rights to say 'no'.

People often claim that nothing has intrinsic value while simultaneously believing that things have intrinsic value. What they mean to affirm is, "Nothing can be publicly and scientifically demonstrated to have intrinsic value." Yet the conflation is serious and problematic, for the honest point of departure for reasoning is always what we believe to be true, even though provability also has its place.

Ultimately, we act for ends in themselves. Or at least we should if we are rational. — Leontiskos

Sure, since means are pointless, they are not even means, without ends.

Okay, sure. It seems to me that this fact will significantly undermine an overemphasis on public demonstrability, as well as the idea that ends are not proper objects of discourse (or that ends cannot be argued about, for example). — Leontiskos

I see the pointlessness of arguing about ends as being entailed by the fact that ends are subjective; it depends on what we care about. It's like taste; if I prefer to listen to Beethoven than I do Mozart, and you prefer the opposite; what could be the point of arguing about it. Not to say we might not get something from hearing each other's reasons (if we have reasons) for preferring one or the other, but ultimately,
as the old saw goes "there's no accounting for taste".

In this case the pleasure is of intrinsic value. — Leontiskos

Yes, but the source of the pleasure cannot be of universal value, and that is really my only point.

As humans we all believe in and seek intrinsically valuable things. — Leontiskos

I don't think this is true; I think we all seek things that we find valuable to ourselves. Maybe we are simply talking at cross purposes, since you seem to have quite a different notion of "intrinsic" value than I do.

For example, if the hedonist denies that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, then their account of action collapses. — Leontiskos

This is a good example; the hedonist only needs to argue that pleasure is valuable to her in order to justify, or at least offer a rational reason for, seeking it. That said, someone addicted to hedonistic activities might explain that they don't think that what they seek is really valuable to them, but that they cannot help pursuing it because they are addicted to it.

Metaphysics: reason. Religious doctrine: revelation. But this is for another thread. — Leontiskos

Reason is involved in all "giving of reasons" whether the reasons given are strictly rational or not. I see metaphysics (if the ideas are novel) as consisting in exercising the creative imagination in thinking of possible scenarios that could explain why the world appears to us as it does.

People often claim that nothing has intrinsic value while simultaneously believing that things have intrinsic value. — Leontiskos

I don't believe things have intrinsic value, though I understand that I see things as valuable like I see things as yellow. It is an aspect of the sort of creatures we are, to see things as valuable.

What they mean to affirm is, "Nothing can be publicly and scientifically demonstrated to have intrinsic value." — Leontiskos

Why do you think that? Could it be you aren't as good a mind reader as you think yourself to be?

...for the honest point of departure for reasoning is always what we believe to be true, even though provability also has its place. — Leontiskos

Sure. So I believe value is something our minds project on the things in the world, rather than that things in the world have intrinsic value. Certainly there is much in the world that I see as valuable, because I'm the sort of creature that models the world that way. Do you have more than a naive intuition, that value is 'out there' rather than in the eye of the beholder?

But you are back to this question of public demonstration, are you not? I don't see why people are so obsessed with this question — Leontiskos

You have to see that something is either publicly demonstrable or it’s subjective. Intellectual honesty demands it.

A flippant remark. We have intersubjective or subjective: do you have an alternative or third categorization that can be rationally justified or is this just something you personally have a vague emotionally motivated belief about but cannot argue for? If the latter, then that is the very definition of subjective, isn't it?

Are Wisdom and Virtue physical or metaphysical concepts? — Gnomon
It depends on what you mean by wisdom and virtue. Aristotle spoke of phronesis usually translated as 'practical wisdom'. Wisdom and virtue can be understood to be pragmatic virtues. — Janus

That's true, but I was not asking about the practical application of those philosophical principles. My question was about how Aristotle would categorize those topics. Would he include them in the Physics section of his books, or in the section that later came to be known as The Metaphysics*1.

Ari covered both under the general title of Nature (phusis), but he covered what we would now call "Natural Phenomena" in the first books, and what we might call "Human Nature" (Reason, Essence, Noumena) in a separate book from his discussions of non-human Nature. Today, we pay little attention to his primitive-but-practical encyclopedia on the physical world. Yet, 2500 years later, we continue to argue about the immaterial philosophical concepts that he defined so succinctly.

Although he spoke of nature gods, they were more like Spinoza's deus sive natura than the anthro-morphic gods of Greece*2. That's why I interpret Metaphysics in terms of abstract philosophical concepts*3 instead of socio-cultural religious precepts*4. For similar reasons, I make a fundamental distinction between pragmatic technological Natural Science and theoretical intellectual Human Philosophy. When we discuss Universal Principles, such as Dualism vs Monism, on this forum, we are not doing Science, and we don't play by the physical rules of non-human nature. :smile:


*1. Aristotle’s Metaphysics :
Many of the issues Aristotle deals with—such as existence, essence, individuation, identity, Universals, . . . . . just to mention a few—are certainly issues that we would comfortably describe as metaphysical
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195389661/obo-9780195389661-0278.xml

*2. Aristotle on Religion :
Aristotle is a severe critic of traditional religion, believing it to be false, yet he also holds that traditional religion and its institutions are necessary . . . .
https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/classical-philosophy/aristotle-religion?format=HB&isbn=9781108415255

*3. Concept : an abstract idea. It is understood to be a fundamental building block underlying principles, thoughts and beliefs

*4. Precept : a general rule intended to regulate behavior or thought.

The first thing I need to correct you on, is that energy is not measured it is calculated. Measurements are made, a formula is applied, and the quantity of energy is determined. Because of this, it is not accurate to talk about energy as a substance, it is actually a property, as a predication. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your conclusion, but I'll stipulate that Energy is "measured" in terms of consumption, not substance. :nerd:

Since a quantity of energy is calculated through a formula, and uncertainty arises from application of the formula, this suggests that the formula being applied is in some way deficient, and this is the cause of the appearance of uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

The quantum pioneers considered the possibility that their calculations were somehow "deficient", but the "uncertainty" remains a century later. In fact, the Copenhagen Interpretation is based on that admission of the inherent "limitation" due to the statistical nature of the non-particular wave-function. So, the "appearance" of subatomic (i.e. fundamental) Uncertainty and Unpredictability appears to be a natural fact. :cool:


Uncertainty principle :
It states that there is a limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

Copenhagen Interpretation :
The Copenhagen interpretation refers to concepts such as Bohr complementarity and the correspondence principle, Born statistical interpretation of the wave function, and nondeterminism.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/mathematics/copenhagen-interpretation

Due to the "spooky action at a distance" that annoyed Einstein, sub-atomic physics defies common sense. But pragmatic physicists gradually learned to accept that Nature did not necessarily play by our man-made rules. — Gnomon
This is especially the case when the "man-made rules" are not well crafted. . . . . Strong evidence that the formulas being applied are deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you aware of some better-crafted or non-man-made rules that will make the non-mechanical quantum actions less spooky? Do you know of alternative formulas that are more efficient? :smile:

Here is something I jotted down last night after shutting off my computer:

Public demonstrability is not an end in itself. For this reason, the person who always responds with, "but your claim is not publicly demonstrable!," is not being rational. Not everything needs to be publicly demonstrable. Indeed, some things need to not be publicly demonstrable, and included in this group are the most important things of all.

The idea that everything needs to be publicly demonstrable is a bit like a novice bricklayer’s idea that every brick needs to rest on two other bricks. But this leads to an infinite regress, for there must be a foundation which itself supports the lowest bricks. "Every brick needs to rest on two other bricks," and, "Every claim needs to be publicly demonstrable," are false presuppositions which represent the generalization of a useful but limited rule.

Sure, since means are pointless, they are not even means, without ends. — Janus

Okay, agreed.

I see the pointlessness of arguing about ends as being entailed by the fact that ends are subjective; it depends on what we care about. It's like taste; if I prefer to listen to Beethoven than I do Mozart, and you prefer the opposite; what could be the point of arguing about it. Not to say we might not get something from hearing each other's reasons (if we have reasons) for preferring one or the other, but ultimately, as the old saw goes "there's no accounting for taste". — Janus

I don't know why you would think that ends are subjective like tastes.

Yes, but the source of the pleasure cannot be of universal value, and that is really my only point. — Janus

Do you have any arguments for these claims you are making? That ends are subjective, or that a source of pleasure cannot be of universal value, or that intrinsic value does not exist?

I don't think this is true; I think we all seek things that we find valuable to ourselves. Maybe we are simply talking at cross purposes, since you seem to have quite a different notion of "intrinsic" value than I do. — Janus

I have been very clear about what I mean by it: .

This is a good example; the hedonist only needs to argue that pleasure is valuable to her in order to justify, or at least offer a rational reason for, seeking it. — Janus

Hedonism is a theory that aims to do more than explain one's own actions. It is a moral theory of human action, not a theory of a single human's actions. The intrinsic value of pleasure is an axiom of hedonism.

What I would say is that instrumental acts have no value if nothing is intrinsically valuable, and I think we agree on this. Further, public demonstration is an instrumental act, a means to an end. So if nothing is intrinsically valuable, then public demonstration has no value.

You have to see that something is either publicly demonstrable or it’s subjective. Intellectual honesty demands it. — Wayfarer

I've grown fond of that bricklayer analogy given in the post above. The problem comes up in so many different areas nowadays, with relative value being mistaken for absolute value. It also applies to the epistemologies of scientism, which have no way to ground themselves or provide a foundation. But that's another tangent. :grin:

Public demonstrability is not an end in itself. For this reason, the person who always responds with, "but your claim is not publicly demonstrable!," is not being rational. Not everything needs to be publicly demonstrable. Indeed, some things need to not be publicly demonstrable, and included in this group are the most important things of all. — Leontiskos

I don't at all believe that everything needs to be publicly demonstrable; what I would count as the most valuable things in life cannot be. My point is only that if you want to argue for something, then you must appeal either to evidence or logic.

Many things get their rational support by consensus, by the fact that whatever the claim is commands wide or even almost universal support. I think this is the case with valid phenomenological claims. I see phenomenology as being the attempt to explicate how things seem to humans in general. It is reliant on assent not on strict public demonstrability. The point is that even such claims as enjoy virtually universal assent may nonetheless be mistaken or superceded.

Obviously, this goes for science too. The truth or falsity of scientific theories is not publicly demonstrable. As I keep repeating only direct observations and mathematical and logical truths are strictly demonstrable.

When it comes to metaphysical matters, we find ourselves even further away from anything that can be demonstrated or even find any kind of universal consensus.

I don't know why you would think that ends are subjective like tastes. — Leontiskos

Ends are subjective because they are based on what is valued. Some people value some things and others other things. There may be some intersubjective agreement of course; a lot of people like the Beatles or Mozart for example, heavy metal not so much. So, it's not an all or nothing thing but a spectrum from purely subjective to comprehensively intersubjective as I see it.

Of course, what I am arguing here is not publicly demonstrable, so I am happy to admit that what I am arguing is subjective, how things seem to me. But that is phenomenology.

So to this:

Do you have any arguments for these claims you are making? That ends are subjective, or that a source of pleasure cannot be of universal value, or that intrinsic value does not exist? — Leontiskos

I would answer that if something can be shown to be universally valued or agreed upon then we could say that it is as close as possible to being objective. But even if all humans valued something that still does not show that the thing valued has intrinsic value, it would only show that is has universal human value.

Hedonism is a theory that aims to do more than explain one's own actions. It is a moral theory of human action, not a theory of a single human's actions. The intrinsic value of pleasure is an axiom of hedonism.

What I would say is that instrumental acts have no value if nothing is intrinsically valuable, and I think we agree on this. Further, public demonstration is an instrumental act, a means to an end. So if nothing is intrinsically valuable, then public demonstration has no value. — Leontiskos

Hedonism explains not only my own actions but the actions of others. It seems that all organisms seek pleasure or comfort or ease or whatever you want to call it, but it does not seem to me that pleasure seeking is generally, or at least universally, considered to be the most important aim in life. I think this is shown by Robert Nozick's 'Pleasure Machine' thought experiment.

You say that instrumental acts have no value if nothing is intrinsically valuable, but I don't see valid reasoning in that. If something is a means to an end I value, then that means has value to me. It doesn't need to be shown to be intrinsically valuable in order to be valued by me. I don't even say you have to value public demonstration, but if you want to rationally convince someone of something being unquestionably true, then you need to appeal to public demonstrability in either empirical, mathematical or logical form. That is not to say you cannot convince someone to believe that what you claim is unquestionably and universally true by rhetoric; it seems obvious to me that that happening is commonplace.

My question was about how Aristotle would categorize those topics. Would he include them in the Physics section of his books, or in the section that later came to be known as The Metaphysics*1. — Gnomon

You're asking the wrong person: I'm no scholar of Aristotle's philosophy.

Yet, 2500 years later, we continue to argue about the immaterial philosophical concepts that he defined so succinctly. — Gnomon

Yes, agreement about metaphysical theories is unlikely since their truth or falsity cannot be demonstrated. By the way, I think of philosophical concepts as being material, but obviously not in the sense of saying they are physical objects.

Although he spoke of nature gods, they were more like Spinoza's deus sive natura than the anthro-morphic gods of Greece*2. That's why I interpret Metaphysics in terms of abstract philosophical concepts*3 instead of socio-cultural religious precepts* — Gnomon

I don't agree with your first sentence; I don't see Spinoza as an animist or a pantheist. And I don't know what your second sentence is attempting to say; surely metaphysics is to be found both in philosophy and in religion, no? Are you just saying that you personally prefer to focus on the philosophical context of metaphysical ideas rather than the religious context?

I don't at all believe that everything needs to be publicly demonstrable; what I would count as the most valuable things in life cannot be. My point is only that if you want to argue for something, then you must appeal either to evidence or logic.

Many things get their rational support by consensus, by the fact that whatever the claim is commands wide or even almost universal support. I think this is the case with valid phenomenological claims. I see phenomenology as being the attempt to explicate how things seem to humans in general. It is reliant on assent not on strict public demonstrability. The point is that even such claims as enjoy virtually universal assent may nonetheless be mistaken or superceded.

Obviously, this goes for science too. The truth or falsity of scientific theories is not publicly demonstrable. As I keep repeating only direct observations and mathematical and logical truths are strictly demonstrable.

When it comes to metaphysical matters, we find ourselves even further away from anything that can be demonstrated or even find any kind of universal consensus. — Janus

Okay, that is helpful. :up:

What's interesting here is that your theory of truth seems bound up with intersubjective agreement, which is nothing more than a form of consensus, but I leave this aside for now.

Ends are subjective because they are based on what is valued. Some people value some things and others other things. There may be some intersubjective agreement of course; a lot of people like the Beatles or Mozart for example, heavy metal not so much. So, it's not an all or nothing thing but a spectrum from purely subjective to comprehensively intersubjective as I see it. — Janus

If you conceive of intersubjective agreement as the contrary of subjective, then it seems to me that the intrinsic worth of pleasure is not subjective (because it possesses intersubjective agreement). Thus the end of pleasure is not subjective, according to your theory.

I would answer that if something can be shown to be universally valued or agreed upon then we could say that it is as close as possible to being objective. But even if all humans valued something that still does not show that the thing valued has intrinsic value, it would only show that is has universal human value. — Janus

So given the way you define reality, intrinsic value cannot exist. That is to say, it is tautologically true that on your system nothing can have intrinsic value, no?

Hedonism explains not only my own actions but the actions of others. It seems that all organisms seek pleasure or comfort or ease or whatever you want to call it, but it does not seem to me that pleasure seeking is generally, or at least universally, considered to be the most important aim in life. — Janus

Okay, but something can surely be intrinsically valuable without being the most important thing in life. Again, it seems to me that on your own system the intrinsic value of pleasure has as much a claim to objectivity as anything else.

You say that instrumental acts have no value if nothing is intrinsically valuable, but I don't see valid reasoning in that. If something is a means to an end I value, then that means has value to me. — Janus

Only because the end is believed to have intrinsic value.

It doesn't need to be shown to be intrinsically valuable in order to be valued by me. — Janus

Rather, it doesn't need to be shown to be intrinsically valuable in order to have intrinsic value, because by "shown to have intrinsic value" you mean to denote something that is literally impossible.* Further, you believe things have intrinsic value, even though you do not believe they can be proved to have intrinsic value (see my post <here>). This means that you yourself implicitly accept that things have intrinsic value, even though you cannot show it. Is that a contradiction?

I don't even say you have to value public demonstration, but if you want to rationally convince someone of something being unquestionably true, then you need to appeal to public demonstrability in either empirical, mathematical or logical form. That is not to say you cannot convince someone to believe that what you claim is unquestionably and universally true by rhetoric; it seems obvious to me that that happening is commonplace. — Janus

I rather doubt that we will arrive at the "unquestionably true" as opposed to merely arriving at intersubjective agreement. Do you have a notion of truth that transcends intersubjective agreement?


* This is more or less the knot, as I see it. When I say that something is intrinsically valuable, I am saying that it is an end in itself. When you say that something is intrinsically valuable, you are saying that it is an end in itself, and it is able to be demonstrated that it is an end in itself. But I would maintain that this is confusing things, and that "intrinsically valuable," and, "demonstrably intrinsically valuable," need to be kept conceptually separate if we are to avoid question-begging.

- Unfortunately my time is a bit short, so I am going to try to move the conversation towards our main disagreement as I see it: "Ends are not a proper object of discourse." Or more specifically and practically, "Ends are not a proper object of argument."

My initial argument is simple: Ends are the most important things in human life, therefore they should be the object of discourse and scrutiny (and argument). I am going to try to construct your own argument to the contrary in my post following your next reply, but feel free to set it out yourself if you like. You've already given a number of the pieces of that argument.

What's interesting here is that your theory of truth seems bound up with intersubjective agreement, which is nothing more than a form of consensus, but I leave this aside for now. — Leontiskos

True it is a form of consensus, but in relation to simple observations of phenomena and mathematical and logical truths there is really no room for disagreement.

That's why I said intersubjective agreement versus subjective belief is not a rigid dichotomy but is on a sliding scale, so to speak.

If you conceive of intersubjective agreement as the contrary of subjective, then it seems to me that the intrinsic worth of pleasure is not subjective (because it possesses intersubjective agreement). Thus the end of pleasure is not subjective, according to your theory. — Leontiskos

I wouldn't say they are contraries. Obviously subjective opinion is a component of all intersubjective agreement, although where there is no scope for disagreement as I indicated in my previous response, one might want to say there is no subjectivity at all involved. Even if all humans are bound to agree about something, though, this would still be a truth assented to be all human subjects and it might be claimed to have no provenance beyond that context.

Again, it seems to me that on your own system the intrinsic value of pleasure has as much a claim to objectivity as anything else. — Leontiskos

I think we've already been over this. If by "intrinsic value" you mean "universally valued (to some degree) by all humans" then I would agree.

Only because the end is believed to have intrinsic value. — Leontiskos

I don't find that I need to believe that something is universally valued by humans in order to value it myself. But even if I did need to believe that in order to value something, humans believing something has intrinsic value and something actually having intrinsic value (whatever the latter could mean) are two different things.

I rather doubt that we will arrive at the "unquestionably true" as opposed to merely arriving at intersubjective agreement. Do you have a notion of truth that transcends intersubjective agreement? — Leontiskos

I don't believe in context-transcendent truths if that is what you mean.

But I would maintain that this is confusing things, and that "intrinsically valuable," and, "demonstrably intrinsically valuable," need to be kept conceptually separate if we are to avoid question-begging. — Leontiskos

This confuses me because I cannot see how I would be justified in claiming that something has intrinsic value, as opposed to my claiming that it seems to me to have intrinsic value (which is not arguable), unless I could show that it was demonstrable or somehow could not fail to be self-evident.

My initial argument is simple: Ends are the most important things in human life, therefore they should be the object of discourse and scrutiny (and argument). I am going to try to construct your own argument to the contrary in my post following your next reply, but feel free to set it out yourself if you like. You've already given a number of the pieces of that argument. — Leontiskos

The argument over ends, it seems to me, will of course be inevitable and necessary in human life, since some peoples' ends (and the means they use to achieve them) may have consequences for others or even for the whole of humanity. So, it would not be the purported intrinsic value of the ends being argued over, but their likely consequences, and this is where it becomes an empirical, pragmatic issue, and good evidence for and/ or against the end in question might be presented.

True it is a form of consensus, but in relation to simple observations of phenomena and mathematical and logical truths there is really no room for disagreement. — Janus

Well to say that "there is no room for disagreement" is different from saying "there is intersubjective agreement."

I wouldn't say they are contraries. Obviously subjective opinion is a component of all intersubjective agreement, although where there is no scope for disagreement as I indicated in my previous response, one might want to say there is no subjectivity at all involved. — Janus

My conclusion that they are contraries comes from your own words. For example, "[it's] a spectrum from purely subjective to comprehensively intersubjective." The poles of a spectrum are contraries. Or, "if something can be shown to be universally valued or agreed upon then we could say that it is as close as possible to being objective," where objective is the contrary of subjective. Presumably your point about tastes is similar, where tastes are subjective because there is no intersubjective agreement.

The point here is that if intersubjective is the contrary of subjective, then the intrinsic value of pleasure is not subjective, and this is what your words seem to imply. If this is not correct, then you should present the alternative contrary of 'subjective', so that we can understand what that concept means when you use it. From what you have said so far, I am forced to believe that the intrinsic value of pleasure is "as close as possible to being objective."

(Note that if nothing is not-subjective, then the claim that something is subjective can have no force or meaning.)

I think we've already been over this. If by "intrinsic value" you mean "universally valued (to some degree) by all humans" then I would agree. — Janus

Okay, good. It seems that we have discovered an end which is not subjective. Remember: I asked why ends cannot be argued about, and you replied that ends are subjective. But the end of pleasure is not subjective, and therefore not all ends are subjective.

I don't find that I need to believe that something is universally valued by humans in order to value it myself. But even if I did need to believe that in order to value something, humans believing something has intrinsic value and something actually having intrinsic value (whatever the latter could mean) are two different things. — Janus

Here arises the question of whether there are universal human ends. If one answers negatively then they will say that we should not argue about what those ends are, whereas if one answers affirmatively then they will say that we should argue about what those ends are (or their priority, or how to achieve them, etc.).

I don't believe in context-transcendent truths if that is what you mean. — Janus

Well above you spoke about points on which there is "no room for disagreement," or that "all humans are bound to agree about." Surely not all intersubjective agreement is like this, and therefore there are at least two different kinds of intersubjective agreement. The stronger kind apparently points to a notion of truth that transcends intersubjective agreement, because in that case the intersubjective agreement is merely derivative on some other, more foundational, fact.

This confuses me because I cannot see how I would be justified in claiming that something has intrinsic value, as opposed to my claiming that it seems to me to have intrinsic value (which is not arguable), unless I could show that it was demonstrable or somehow could not fail to be self-evident. — Janus

Well, look at it this way. You speak about what you are justified in claiming. I am wondering what you are justified in believing. Are you allowed to believe things that you are not justified in claiming? (Apparently you believe things that you cannot demonstrate. What is the status of these things? And do you believe them rationally?)

The argument over ends, it seems to me, will of course be inevitable and necessary in human life, since some peoples' ends (and the means they use to achieve them) may have consequences for others or even for the whole of humanity. So, it would not be the purported intrinsic value of the ends being argued over, but their likely consequences, and this is where it becomes an empirical, pragmatic issue, and good evidence for and/ or against the end in question might be presented. — Janus

Okay, so you are saying, a la Liberalism, that we will inevitably end up arguing about individual ends, and the arguments will be presented in terms of means. That's not actually an argument for the thesis, "Ends are not a proper object of argument," but let me respond.

I am thinking of humans as a communal species, with common ends. For example, the curriculum of a school will reflect certain ends, but more than one child attends a school, and therefore the parents (and society) will need to argue about which ends the school should favor. Some parents will think that the end of education is better represented by the liberal arts, others the hard sciences, others religious teaching, others a community that prepares for civic life and civic involvement. These educational ends reflect the parents' ultimate ends. This is only a microcosm, and the first sentence could also have been, "For example, the policies of a nation will reflect certain ends, but more than one citizen belongs to a nation."

So maybe we agree that arguing about ends is inevitable. Let me say that I think it is also good. It is good that a school argues about its curriculum, or a nation about its ideals and laws. It is good that religious people argue about their religions. Then thinking of discourse rather than just argument, it is good that a grandfather introduces his grandson to the music that he believes to be intrinsically valuable. It is good that a coach teaches children how to play basketball, or piano, or chess. The idea that we spend our time and effort discoursing only on means and not on ends is backwards. What is most important deserves the most attention.

Well to say that "there is no room for disagreement" is different from saying "there is intersubjective agreement." — Leontiskos

I don't think it is necessarily different. There is universal intersubjective agreement that 2+2=4, and no room for disagreement (excluding insanity or perversity), for example. In fact, I would say "no room for disagreement" is equivalent to saying, "necessary intersubjective agreement".

My conclusion that they are contraries comes from your own words. For example, "[it's] a spectrum from purely subjective to comprehensively intersubjective." The poles of a spectrum are contraries. — Leontiskos

I'd agree that in one sense purely subjective and completely intersubjective would count as contraries, but in a different sense all intersubjective agreement consists in agreement between subjectively held opinions. Or in other words the intersubjective is comprised of the subjective.

But the end of pleasure is not subjective, and therefore not all ends are subjective. — Leontiskos

Perhaps not all people seek pleasure, some may prefer pain or enjoy being depressed. You might object that then those are sources of pleasure, but if everything people do, whether painful, depressing or whatever is stipulated as being pleasure-seeking, then it will be tautologously true, but uninformative that all human activity is pleasure seeking.

So, it depends on how broadly you define 'pleasure'. Anyway, to be honest, I'm not getting much sense of where you want to go with this discussion; what conclusions are we supposed to draw from the idea that all human activities are pleasure-seeking in some sense of other?

The other question that comes to mind is whether you think there are other ends which are not subjective.

Here arises the question of whether there are universal human ends. If one answers negatively then they will say that we should not argue about what those ends are, whereas if one answers affirmatively then they will say that we should argue about what those ends are (or their priority, or how to achieve them, etc.). — Leontiskos

I don't disagree with anything here, but I'm still wondering where you want to go with this.

Well above you spoke about points on which there is "no room for disagreement," or that "all humans are bound to agree about." Surely not all intersubjective agreement is like this, and therefore there are at least two different kinds of intersubjective agreement. — Leontiskos

As I've said I see it as a spectrum or continuum, so there are (in prinicple at least) degrees of intersubjective agreement from zero to one hundred percent.

Well, look at it this way. You speak about what you are justified in claiming. I am wondering what you are justified in believing. Are you allowed to believe things that you are not justified in claiming? (Apparently you believe things that you cannot demonstrate. What is the status of these things? And do you believe them rationally?) — Leontiskos

What I believe and what I choose to claim are two different things. For example, I don't believe there is a God, but I don't choose to claim that there is no God because I think the truth or falsity of that statement cannot be demonstrated or even really coherently argued for or against. Another example is that I believe there are real aesthetic differences of quality in the arts, but I cannot mount a rational argument for that, so I acknowledge it is a matter of faith.

The main point for me in this is that what I might personally feel intuitively convinced of does not, on account of that conviction, constitute a reason for anyone else to be convinced of its truth. You ask whether I believe such things rationally. The conviction, if not based on empirical evidence or strict logic might not be counted as rational, but then it might be pragmatically rational for me to believe those things I find intuitively to be true, even if I cannot give empirical or logical reasons for that intuition.

I think Kant makes a similar distinction between pure and practical reason when he says that there is no purely rational justification for believing in God, freedom and immortality, but that there are (or, as I would rather say, "may be") practical reasons for believing in those things. In other words, if Kant means to say that there are universal practical reasons for believing in those things then I would part company with him.

So maybe we agree that arguing about ends is inevitable. Let me say that I think it is also good. It is good that a school argues about its curriculum, or a nation about its ideals and laws. — Leontiskos

I would agree that it is good that such things be discussed, and that people seek to understand the views of others and realize that there can be no arrival at definitive answers to the questions motivating such discussions or the truth or falsity of competing claims.

I think polemical argument— "you're wrong and I'm right"— is never a good thing and is based on the failure to understand that in regard to metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic matters, if not empirical and logical matters, there will inevitable be a diversity of subjective opinion. Everyone does not have to agree about everything, and the very idea of a society wherein everyone did agree about everything makes me shudder.

Although he spoke of nature gods, they were more like Spinoza's deus sive natura than the anthro-morphic gods of Greece*2. That's why I interpret Metaphysics in terms of abstract philosophical concepts*3 instead of socio-cultural religious precepts* — Gnomon
I don't agree with your first sentence; I don't see Spinoza as an animist or a pantheist. And I don't know what your second sentence is attempting to say; surely metaphysics is to be found both in philosophy and in religion, no? Are you just saying that you personally prefer to focus on the philosophical context of metaphysical ideas rather than the religious context? — Janus

If not Pantheism, how would you describe Spinoza's concept of "deus sive natura"*1, which equates Nature with god-like creative powers? I agree that Spinoza's notion of an animating power in nature is far more sophisticated than primitive "attribution of a soul to plants, inanimate objects, and natural phenomena". But my reference to Aristotle & Spinoza was intended to make a distinction between philosophical Meta-physics and dogmatic Religion*2. Meta-Physics, with a hyphen, is about Mind, while Catholic metaphysics is about Soul.

That religious association came almost a millenium later, when Catholic theologians looked to Aristotle as an authority on both Natural science and the Cultural science we now know as Philosophy. Because their Bible had little to say about those abstract topics. As I interpret his works, Aristotle's Metaphysics was philosophical, not religious*3.

But several posters on this forum seem to prejudicially equate them, and denigrate speculative Philosophy of Mind in deference to empirical Science of Matter. Hence, I use Meta-Physics in reference to immaterial abstract subjective philosophical topics --- such as this thread --- by contrast to the material concrete objects of scientific study. So, my "personal preference" is to dissociate Catholic Metaphysics from Aristotle's Meta-Physics*4. :smile:


*1. Deus sive natura :
The slogan of Spinoza's pantheism : the view that god and nature are interchangeable, or that there is no distinction between the creator and the creation.
https://www.oxfordreference.com › display › authorit...

*2. Deus Sive Natura :
The first point is that in the Aristotelian conception, nature is in no way a transcendent notion . . .
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3751565

*3. Philosophy vs Religion :
Philosophy is the most critical and comprehensive thought process developed by human beings. It is quite different from religion in that where Philosophy is both critical and comprehensive, Religion is comprehensive but not necessarily critical.
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/phil_of_religion_text/CHAPTER_1_OVERVIEW/Philosophy_of_Religion.htm

*4. Meta-physics :
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
5. I use a hyphen in the spelling to indicate that I am not talking about Ghosts and Magic, but about Ontology (science of being).
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

I don't think it is necessarily different. There is universal intersubjective agreement that 2+2=4, and no room for disagreement (excluding insanity or perversity), for example. In fact, I would say "no room for disagreement" is equivalent to saying, "necessary intersubjective agreement". — Janus

But "necessary intersubjective agreement" is also different from "intersubjective agreement," so the difference persists. Some intersubjective agreements contain room for disagreement.

I'd agree that in one sense purely subjective and completely intersubjective would count as contraries, but in a different sense all intersubjective agreement consists in agreement between subjectively held opinions. Or in other words the intersubjective is comprised of the subjective. — Janus

Well first you claimed that ends are subjective, and not intersubjective. I pointed out that some are intersubjective, and you responded by saying that that doesn't make them non-subjective. Again, if nothing is non-subjective then "subjective" has no meaning.

Perhaps not all people seek pleasure, some may prefer pain or enjoy being depressed. You might object that then those are sources of pleasure, but if everything people do, whether painful, depressing or whatever is stipulated as being pleasure-seeking, then it will be tautologously true, but uninformative that all human activity is pleasure seeking. — Janus

The hedonist's claim is synthetic, based on experience and data.

So, it depends on how broadly you define 'pleasure'. Anyway, to be honest, I'm not getting much sense of where you want to go with this discussion; what conclusions are we supposed to draw from the idea that all human activities are pleasure-seeking in some sense of other? — Janus

You made an implicit argument with a crucial premise that ends are subjective and not intersubjective. You haven't spelled out what that argument actually is, but given that some ends are intersubjective, the argument must have failed.

The other question that comes to mind is whether you think there are other ends which are not subjective. — Janus

Sure, but we are discussing your argument for why we can't argue about ends. Your argument was something like, "Ends are like tastes. They are subjective, not intersubjective. Therefore they cannot be argued about."

Shortness of time is making me want to find a stopping point, but at this point you're not even standing behind your arguments. You made an argument that depends on the contrariety of 'subjective' and 'intersubjective', and then you met an objection by claiming that there is no contrariety to be had. If there is no contrariety to be had, then your argument has failed. But you are trying to get off scot-free, as if it makes sense to give such an argument while simultaneously holding that the contrariety does not exist.

You ask whether I believe such things rationally. The conviction, if not based on empirical evidence or strict logic might not be counted as rational, but then it might be pragmatically rational for me to believe those things I find intuitively to be true, even if I cannot give empirical or logical reasons for that intuition. — Janus

It seems like you're not quite sure whether your beliefs are rational. To be blunt and pithy, I would say that if your beliefs are rational then they can be argued about. If they are not rational then you should not believe them.

If not Pantheism, how would you describe Spinoza's concept of "deus sive natura"*1, which equates Nature with god-like creative powers? — Gnomon

More panentheist than pantheist; I think Spinoza understood God to be both immanent to and transcendent of nature, and by that, I mean transcendent of nature as we know it; knowing which is exclusively under the attributes of extensa and cogitans. Spinoza believed those are just the two of God's infinite attributes that we humans can know. Have you read Spinoza's Ethics?

Well first you claimed that ends are subjective, and not intersubjective. I pointed out that some are intersubjective, and you responded by saying that that doesn't make them non-subjective. Again, if nothing is non-subjective then "subjective" has no meaning. — Leontiskos

You made an implicit argument with a crucial premise that ends are subjective and not intersubjective. You haven't spelled out what that argument actually is, but given that some ends are intersubjective, the argument must have failed. — Leontiskos

Individual ends are subjective, I haven't denied that there are collective ends. But even collective ends, insofar as they are desired by the individuals who form the collective, are also individual and thus subjective. I don't think it's hard to understand: intersubjective agreement relies on the agreement of individual subjects. There are things we can all agree about, things we all must agree about (absent perversity or gross stupidity) and things where there will inevitably be disagreement.

Sure, but we are discussing your argument for why we can't argue about ends. Your argument was something like, "Ends are like tastes. They are subjective, not intersubjective. Therefore they cannot be argued about." — Leontiskos

I have acknowledged that the consequences of holding particular ends can and should be discussed, and I would add with the majority ruling in a democracy. Nonetheless individuals may disagree about the ends that become mandated, as some significant proportion of the populace often, even usually, does. People are not often convinced by rational argument to change their opinions in my experience.

It seems like you're not quite sure whether your beliefs are rational. To be blunt and pithy, I would say that if your beliefs are rational then they can be argued about. If they are not rational then you should not believe them. — Leontiskos

I think we all believe many things which are not arrived at by rational argument. The foundational presuppositions and also just general beliefs about economics, politics, other people, religion, race, culture and so on that people commonly hold are very often rationally undecidable.

Rationality consists in consistency and coherency; the principle of valid argument that the conclusions should follow from the premises. It seems you continue to misunderstand what I am saying, the consequence being that I haven't found your objections and counterpoints to be relevant.

So, the "appearance" of subatomic (i.e. fundamental) Uncertainty and Unpredictability appears to be a natural fact. :cool: — Gnomon

"Appears to be a natural fact", doesn't get us anywhere. it always appeared to be a natural fact, but that's irrelevant. The fact is that "uncertainty" is a property of the subject, not the object. And, it is always caused by the subject's mode of understanding not being properly suited to the reality of the object which it is attempting to apprehend. It makes no sense to blame the object here, therefore the subject's mode of understanding needs to be scrutinized.

Uncertainty principle :
It states that there is a limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known. — Gnomon

There's obviously a basic problem here. If something is moving it cannot truthfully be said to have a position. And if something has a position it cannot truthfully be said to be moving. Since only moving things can have momentum, a thing which has a position cannot also have momentum.

Therefore it appears very obvious that this type of "uncertainty" is the result of a faulty human ontology which allows the contradictory premise that a moving thing has a position, or the converse, that a thing with a position could be moving. Clearly the uncertainty here is the result of faulty concepts.