Carlo Rovelli's highly expert and deeply thoughtful popularizations are, no doubt, excellent though. — 180 Proof
It may be a missing aspect in Daniel Dennett's materialistic take on this. — Jack Cummins
“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?” — Daniel Dennett
I think you have touched on the antithetical Frames of Reference that divide many of the posters on this forum : Empirical vs Theoretical (metaphysical) Philosophy and Theoretical vs Empirical (physical) Science. Adherents of those disparate worldviews find it difficult to communicate with their opposite number. They speak mutually unintelligible dialects of the same language*1, because they approach "Reality" from different directions (presumptions) as noted by Joshs in the quotes below*2*3.Philosophy and physics come at the issue from separate perspectives. A key point of philosophy, I would assert, is that it is grounded in rational contemplation of the human condition. It ought not to overly rely on science, except perhaps insofar as scientific discoveries impact the human condition. But Wittgenstein himself said that “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.” — Wayfarer
those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense. — Gnomon
Okay, so non-physicist Kastrup disagrees with physicist Rovelli's theoretical prediction from RQG. Big whup. In the article I see that Kastrup cannot refute Rovelli without the crutch of a fallacious appeal to incredulity that amounts to nothing more than an ad hoc "non-physical" stuff-of-the-gaps fiat. :roll:Kastrup on Rovelli — Wayfarer
:up:I am totally ignorant of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy. — Gnomon
@Jack CumminsIt is with sadness that every so often I spend a few hours on the internet, reading or listening to the mountain of stupidities dressed up with the word 'quantum'. Quantum medicine; holistic quantum theories of every kind, mental quantum spiritualism – and so on, and on, in an almost unbelievable parade of quantum nonsense. — Carlo Rovelli, Hegoland, pp. 159-60
:sweat: A "PhD in computer engineering" does not make one remotely as "conversant with physics" as a world-class, theoretical physicist like Carlo Rovelli. The article you provided, Wayf, illustrates Kastrup's deficit.Non-physicist Kastrup’s first job was at CERN. He’s quite conversant with physics. — Wayfarer
Better yet (since, for instance, planck-scale entities are not "empirical"): Hawking-Mlodinow's model-dependent realism. — 180 Proof
Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself. — sime
Thanks. I had never heard of "Constructive Empiricism". CE sounds like a good policy for Practical Scientists : "to refrain from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities". The old "refrain" of "shut-up and calculate" seems like a similar pragmatic attitude toward impractical scientists who dabble in the Meta-Physical aspects of Quantum Physics --- sometimes mis-labeled as "Quantum Mysticism"*1 --- but are actually "abstract" & "unobservable" entities & forces, and open questions about Being & Reality.That’s more characteristic of positivism, really. There is a school of thought called ‘constructive empiricism’. Constructive empiricism is a philosophical perspective on the nature of scientific theories proposed by Bas van Fraassen in his 1980 book "The Scientific Image." It contrasts with scientific realism in important ways. Scientific realism holds that science aims to give us true descriptions of the world, including unobservable phenomena. Constructive empiricists, on the other hand, argue that the goal of science is not to find true theories, but rather to develop theories that are empirically adequate. . . .
it simply refrains from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities. — Wayfarer
I made-up the descriptive term "Empirical Philosophy" to refer to posters on this forum, who do not "refrain from making metaphysical commitments" — Gnomon
So, I am raising the question of the nature of metaphysics and perception and how may the nature of 'reality' be understood in the most helpful way? — Jack Cummins
This may be where the issues of what is metaphysics may come into play, in trying to understand the nature of ' reality'. I struggle with this area of thinking, but am not sure how many is my psychological issue or one of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins
Of course. "Mind-dependent reality" doesn't make sense except to idealists / antirealists (who tend to obey poison warning labels, not carry lightning rods in thunderstorms, purchase auto insurance and eat enough in order not to starve).So did Hawking believe in mind-independent reality or not? — sime
AFAIK, metaphysical statements are not propositions. Also, MDR (which I raised in contrast to @Wayfarer's sketch of "constructive empiricism") is an epistemological criterion. The rest of your post seems besides the point.Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself.
Of course. "Mind-dependent reality" doesn't make sense except to idealists / antirealists (who tend to obey poison warning labels, not carry lightning rods in thunderstorms, purchase auto insurance and eat enough in order not to starve). — 180 Proof
metaphysical statements are not propositions — 180 Proof
Okay, this is where we differ: I think meta-statements are either interpretative or suppositional and only object-statements are propositional. To my mind, "theories" may be epistemic objects.Metaphysical "propositions" are indeed propositions - but they are higher order propositions about theories, as opposed to being first-order propositions that are expressed by those theories. — sime
I've accepted that I'll never read all of Aristotle's metaphysics, but I've come to appreciate some aspects of him through his modern interpreters. — Wayfarer
I wonder about the nature of 'theories' and how they stand in philosophy, especially in relation to propositions, which may be concepts rather than empirically measurable. Within science and, in support of theory, there is an emphasis on evidence based ideas. This is fair enough because ideas and concepts without evidence are questionable. — Jack Cummins
and yet concludes that active 'Practice' is the key to eudaimonia. My tutor a few years ago, a practical man said, What do the gods talk about all day then? Do they exchange quadratic equations?. Aristotle is not a great explorer of the divine but he acknowledges it is there, and that human speculation and meditation are paths towards it. — mcdoodle
But if happiness [εὐδαιμονία] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [θεωρητική]. — 1177a11
What? :chin:It is here that the nature of propositions themselves may be flimsy because they are based on interpretative understandings and hermeneutic assumptions. — Jack Cummins
parently, Wayf, you've never read Dennett, have no intention of ever reading his books, and nonetheless keep on bashing him whenever his name comes up — 180 Proof
Hawking indicated his disinterest in philosophy, which concerns these higher-order propositions, for his interest in physics, where I interpret his "model dependent realism" to refer to his view that the remit of physics is strictly in the analysis and testing of first-order physics propositions, as illustrated by his "world picture" analogy.
So it remains very unclear to me as what his philosophical views are, for his "model dependent realism" clearly wasn't meant to be a philosophical proposition, but only to express that as far as physics is concerned, philosophical questions are besides the point. — sime
I think you misrepresent Hawking's intentions sime. In "The Grand Design" he presents himself as having an adequate understanding of philosophical problems, and proposes model-dependent realism as a superior alternative to other philosophical theories. So he is not suggesting that philosophical problems are beside the point, he is proposing model-dependent realism as a solution to those philosophical problems. — Metaphysician Undercover
MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.
So what exactly does MDR solve? — sime
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