Again, that describes how people talk about truth but it doesn't in and of itself tell you if something is true or truthapt. — Apustimelogist
Nothing - any more than something stops someone from starting with g as 10m/s/s. Either way, they may find it difficult to maintain consistency. What makes it true that "g is 9.8m/s/s" is exactly that g is 9.8m/s/s.So what stops someone from starting from a different assumption about whether one ought to cause suffering? — Apustimelogist
Its very easy, you can talk about it in terms of things like goals, actions, their consequences and reason using them instead. People do it every day concerning the things they want to do and the ends they want to realize to decide what behaviors they want to do. — Apustimelogist
Yes, something along those lines. Any theory that requires differing senses of truth is to my eye dubious. I'd apply Searle's analysis, using status functions - "counts as" sentences. Moving along a diagonal "counts as" a move in chess, and so on. No need to re-think truth in order to play chess, which strikes me as a huge advantage. — Banno
We are apt to speak about the truth of an artifact according to the goal of the artist. So if there is a horse drawing competition, the drawing that most resembles a real horse will be the winner, and will be deemed truest. Or a carpenter's square is true when it achieves an exact 90° angle. — Leontiskos
This is really the whole of your argument, and it is nothing more than an assertion. Moreover, it is an assertion I have already addressed (↪Leontiskos). Feel free to engage that post. — Leontiskos
You are saying that all truth is formal, deriving from axioms, and where axioms are not truth-apt so conclusions are not truth-apt (in the strong sense). — Leontiskos
At the end of the day you just think prescriptions cannot be true or false, no? It is not that R is systematic/doctrinal/axiomatic, but rather that it is prescriptive. If all you are saying is that prescriptions are not truth-apt, then all that talk about systems and axioms led me to misunderstand your position. — Leontiskos
How does one discover and verify such brute facts? — hypericin
Presumably you meant "...why there is something..." — hypericin
The problem is that's doesn't lead to the moral realism as a conclusion if you're a deflationist. — frank
My understanding of moral realism is that it is the theory that some moral propositions are true in such a way that if everyone believes that they are false then everyone is wrong.
Why can't a moral realist believe this and also be a deflationist? — Michael
If you agree that there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and not wanting babies to be tortured, then what is the difference!? How does a taste become justifiably imposable?
You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste."
You claim they are tastes, but you treat them as laws. This is irrationality at its finest.
It is irrational to impose tastes
it is irrational to hold that there are non-objective truths
it is irrational to treat two alike tastes entirely differently
it is irrational to claim that rationality is a subjective matter
When faced with a contradiction in your thinking you try to defend it, and seven more pop up.
Are you saying that moral sentences aren't truth-apt or are you saying that moral sentences being truth-apt does not entail moral realism?
I'm not sure who would argue for the latter. Moral sentences being truth-apt also allows for error theory and moral subjectivism. — Michael
That is the key question that moral realists need to answer. Kant, for example, believed that this could be done using what he called pure practical reason, leading him to the categorical imperative. — Michael
For example, you got out of bed this morning because you believed that the proposition, "I ought to get out of bed," was true. On my reckoning that is a moral judgment, pertaining to your own behavior. — Leontiskos
For example, you got out of bed this morning because you believed that the proposition, "I ought to get out of bed," was true. On my reckoning that is a moral judgment, pertaining to your own behavior. — Leontiskos
Is the reasoning that grounds that moral judgment purely hypothetical, with no reference to, or support from, objective values or 'oughts'? I really, really doubt it. — Leontiskos
When people make decisions they do so on the basis of the belief that some choices are truly better than others, in a way that goes beyond hypothetical imperatives. — Leontiskos
After all, in real life a hypothetical imperative needs to be grounded in a non-hypothetical decision or imperative in order to take flesh — Leontiskos
I agree with that. It could be that error theory of moral subjectivism are correct. — Michael
Or there could be no such true brute facts such as the categorical imperative. Or, such ultimate moral propositions may not be truth-apt, while everyday moral claims, being claims about such ultimate propositions, are perfectly truth apt. — hypericin
Well, it was good enough for Tarski, Davidson and one or two others. — Banno
Nothing - any more than something stops someone from starting with g as 10m/s/s. Either way, they may find it difficult to maintain consistency. What makes it true that "g is 9.8m/s/s" is exactly that g is 9.8m/s/s. — Banno
How do you set out the "ends they want to realize " without an evaluation? — Banno
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