. Why would a kind be different than an individual in terms of substance that it is identified with? — schopenhauer1

I wasn't going to get involved in this thread, because of the many ways modality is misconstrued.

The difference between a kind and an individual is logical, or if you prefer grammatical, and not to do with substance.

One of the logicians will probably correct this, and doubtless it is formally wrong, but speaking roughly an individual is referred to by an individual constant, {a,b,c...}. A type is a grouping of individuals. The difference between types and sets is that types are hierarchic in such a way that a type cannot be a member of itself, avoiding Russell's paradox.

So the stuff in this glass - note the demonstrative, picking out an individual - is water - a type. So that individual belongs to the type "water".

An individual is not defined by being "a combination of substances".

Basically there are better ways to think about this issue. It's notable that there has been precious little use of modal logic in an thread about modality.

One of the logicians will probably correct this, and doubtless it is formally wrong, but speaking roughly an individual is referred to by an individual constant, {a,b,c...}. A type is a grouping of individuals. The difference between types and sets is that types are hierarchic in such a way that a type cannot be a member of itself, avoiding Russell's paradox. — Banno

So the stuff in this glass - note the demonstrative, picking out an individual - is water - a type. So that individual belongs to the type "water" — Banno

An individual is not defined by being "a combination of substances". — Banno

Why can a substance not be this "individual constant"? If not that, "what" is the individual constant? Just any old thing that is designated so at a point in time? There are no characteristic essences of the thing being designated (demonstrably, let's say by denoting that), that would pick it out versus another thing?

Just any old thing that is designated so... — schopenhauer1

Stop there and you are pretty much right.

Being rid of essence is somewhat to the point. That's what rigid designation does, avoids the "picking out".

You seem to be working with some form of counterpart theory, which has it's own set of problems.

The upshot in Identity and Necessity seems to be that while this person could not have had a different genetics, schopenhauer1 might have. — Banno

I meant to point out that, apart from the complexity of self-awareness and the capacity for self-reference, there is an additional complexity that a person is (normally) a human being (a living, sentient creature) and is/has a body. So there are criteria of identity in play at each level. But objects can also be identified under different (levels of) description. I know that's not supposed to affect names, but it can certainly affect objects. I mean, Kripke's lectern is (also) a piece of wood and an item of furniture and a philosophical example.

Well, yes, there is an ambiguity in this thread between modal identity, which occupies most of the conversation, and personal identity, a very different issue that appears in the title. Much of the puzzlement here might be a confusion between the two.

Stop there and you are pretty much right. — Banno

Being rid of essence is somewhat to the point. That's what rigid designation does, avoids the "picking out". — Banno

Now you have thoroughly confused me. In Naming and Necessity, it's basically about just that. You name an individual thing (a proper name/ demonstrative that), that becomes rigidly designated through causal act of dubbing. That causal dubbing IS the "essence".

And so yeah...

You seem to be working with some form of counterpart theory, which has it's own set of problems. — Banno

My point is that, similar to the notion of natural types, even individuals have an essential "property" (substance I said) about them. Both need to be there. It's not that the "causality alone" (Kripke) is wrong, it's just that it seems that it is incomplete. That, there is also the matter of "what" is being dubbed. I don't see it as, "Causality thusly negates substance theories of essence". Why should that be so? Because the question is thorny, and thus anything that shortcuts the thorny issue is where we should stop our inquiry into what makes an object an object?

That causal dubbing IS the "essence". — schopenhauer1

That's pretty loose. No, it's not an essence. The causal theory was more a throw-away alternative explanation, never fully worked out by Kripke.

...even individuals have an essential "property" — schopenhauer1

No, they don't. That's rather the point. Pick any property you like, you can designate a possible world in which that very individual does not have that property.

That's pretty loose. No, it's not an essence. The causal theory was more a throw-away alternative explanation, never fully worked out by Kripke. — Banno

The causal dubbing by way of causality is "throw-away" and not a part of his theory? Interesting. I thought that was one of his main theories that came out of it. It seems to be the one that people offer when discussing how the whole "rigid designation" of a proper name works.

No, they don't. That's rather the point. Pick any property you like, you can designate a possible world in which that very individual does not have that property. — Banno

But that's my point about the gametes. That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. Then it is back to being open to simply "a possibility of some individual".

I can agree with even this, yet still insist that a well-known necessary aspect of what makes a person THIS person (and not something else) is the causal-temporal point at which the two gamete components combined. — schopenhauer1

I think that @Banno managed to split the difference here between us:

The upshot in Identity and Necessity seems to be that while this person could not have had a different genetics, schopenhauer1 might have. — Banno

Here is the individual, this individual has the name Moliere, and this individual with the name Moliere at the time of conception had this set of base pairs, and this set of base pairs was necessary for this individual as stipulated by the use of rigid designation. This person necessarily had such-and-such a base sequence at a particular time -- I can grant that, and don't think our imagined scenarios define what actually happened in the past.

But I'm wondering if it's side-stepping some real point of contention :D -- like causality and genes and personality, and how those combine, or some such. Perhaps we just have different notions of what's plausible here, for instance?

But that's my point about the gametes. That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. Then it is back to being open to simply "a possibility of some individual". — schopenhauer1

Well in the the gamete example, it is about a world where that person was not born as opposed to a world where some property of the person has been changed.

...not a part of his theory? — schopenhauer1

No, his main target was the descriptive theory of proper names and reference generally. The causal theory of reference was only mentioned briefly towards the end of the book as an alternative, pretty much just to show that there were other possibilities besides descriptions. There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works.

But that's my point about the gametes. That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. Then it is back to being open to simply "a possibility of some individual". — schopenhauer1

I don't know how to follow that. We can say that schopenhauer might have had different genetics to that which he actually has, and that is a truth about schopenhauer. We might not so clearly say that this person might have had different genetics, depending on considerations of de dicto and de re interpretations. Notice that it is specified here that in some possible world, schopenhauer, that very individual, has different genetics. There is no chance here of schopenhauer being someone else.

Yes. But you inadvertently run into the oddity about the Identity of Indiscernibles. If you know you have two objects in front of you, you know they are not identical in all respects. The only way this problem could arise would be if you knew about two different appearances of the same object, which may not be both in front of you at the same time. We know how to cope with that in practice, but I'm not sure that logic does. — Ludwig V

I think I get what you're saying—we could not have two identical objects in front of us because they would have to be occupying the same space which would seem to be impossible. My example of two leaves was more modest—if we had two leaves that looked absolutely identical to each other and no amount of measuring or examination including microscopic visual examination, spectroscopic analysis or whatever could reveal any differences, then there would be two possibilities: either our measurements and examinations are not fine-grained enough or the two leaves are identical in all respects except in regard to occupying the same space.

I would be prepared to wager that there never have been any cases of two such identical leaves or any other kind of object—although of course I could be mistaken. In any case, the two possibilities outlined above entail that absolute identicality could never, even in principle, be established, because finer measurement and examination which at any given time were beyond our capabilities could always reveal discrepancies between the two once they become workable.

Also, it is uncontroversial that no object would remain unchanged across time—but we do speak of "the same object" and at the same time acknowledge that any object changes to greater or lesser degrees over time, changes which may or may not be discernible to the "naked senses".

No, his main target was the descriptive theory of proper names and reference generally. — Banno

Yes.

The causal theory of reference was only mentioned briefly towards the end of the book as an alternative, pretty much just to show that there were other possibilities besides descriptions. There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works. — Banno

Okay, makes sense. And goes along with my impulse to expand it...

I don't know how to follow that. We can say that schopenhauer might have had different genetics to that which he actually has, and that is a truth about schopenhauer. We might not so clearly say that this person might have had different genetics, depending on considerations of de dicto and de re interpretations. Notice that it is specified here that in some possible world, schopenhauer, that very individual, has different genetics. There is no chance here of schopenhauer being someone else. — Banno

You seem to be agreeing? Yes, there is no world in which schopenhauer, the object/person could have been someone else at the point of the combination of gametes.

There is a point of differentiation of the object as separated from other objects, that is the point of differentiation.

Here is the individual, this individual has the name Moliere, and this individual with the name Moliere at the time of conception had this set of base pairs, and this set of base pairs was necessary for this individual as stipulated by the use of rigid designation. This person necessarily had such-and-such a base sequence at a particular time -- I can grant that, and don't think our imagined scenarios define what actually happened in the past.

But I'm wondering if it's side-stepping some real point of contention :D -- like causality and genes and personality, and how those combine, or some such. Perhaps we just have different notions of what's plausible here, for instance? — Moliere

I think it's simply the notion of accepting that the gametes are necessary at a certain causal-historical point in time for that person to be that person, but not sufficient. Prior to that event, if you referred to "George", George could be any set of possibilities. After that event, George was that set of gametes and no other.

You seem to be agreeing? — schopenhauer1

I couldn't be sure - It's not clear to me.

Well in the the gamete example, it is about a world where that person was not born as opposed to a world where some property of the person has been changed. — Apustimelogist

Yes. I don't think that's refuting my point. It is getting at where it is that is necessary for that object to have been the person now reflecting back on his life. Prior to that, there wouldn't even be a person reflecting back to even talk about. Hence Ryle uses the term as "indeterminate", as opposed to in hindsight after the event has taken place. When you bring two compounds together that can combine and form a new compound, it is not until the compound is actually combined that we can now start talking about the new compound as an actualized thing and not just a possibility.

In fact, we don't even know that there needs to be the possibility for the possibility to exist. If Jane and Joe have sex 2 minutes earlier, they end up with George 1, if they had sex 2 minutes later, they end up with George 2. Prior to this, George may have never existed at all. George 1 and George 2 are not transposable. One would not be the other. Hence when reflecting back one his life, George 1 can fathom what it would be like to be George 2, but in no way would George 1 ever actually be George 2, let alone under ANY other circumstance that would have changed that particular set of gametes.

What about a possible world where the only thing that was different was that George 1 came from gamete 2 instead of gamete 1, which just happen to be "twin" gametes. Everything else in that world is identical.

the two leaves are identical in all respects except in regard to occupying the same space. — Janus

Well, I don't see why we need to rule that out as impossible. It may be very unlikely, but unlikely things do happen. And we'll never check enough leaves to establish an empirical possibility.

I would be prepared to wager that there never have been any cases — Janus

I wouldn't bet against you. But that's not the point.

Here is the individual, this individual has the name Moliere, — Moliere

It would be one thing to establish this identity at some specific moment in the life of an individual. In one way, I don't mind what you pick, although I think you'll have difficulty identifying a plausible threshold in the long process of growing up and maturing; birth is not a bad alternative.

But let me point out again that the expected individual does not exist at the moment of conception; all that exists is a fertilized egg, which is an individual egg, if you like, but is not yet an individual person. (Unless you are following the unusual idea that is sometimes propounded in the context of the abortion argument. I don't think it has any currency or point outside that argument.)

There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works. — Banno

It is a relief to hear that the causal theory was an afterthought. That first sentence suggests that it hasn't worked, which fits with my prejudice. Now you mention it, I don't see any reason to object to the idea that there may be different kinds (categories) of reference.

But let me point out again that the expected individual does not exist at the moment of conception; all that exists is a fertilized egg, which is an individual egg, if you like, but is not yet an individual person. (Unless you are following the unusual idea that is sometimes propounded in the context of the abortion argument. I don't think it has any currency or point outside that argument.) — Ludwig V

I agree with you. I don't believe that conception is a good time-point to choose for personhood.

I'd draw a distinction between personhood, personal identity, and the identity of an object. But I imagine at this point that all we're really talking about is the identity of an object rather than the other two things -- insofar that we're just describing the body at a certain point in time I can grant a posteriori necessity: this body at this or that point has some true sentences which can be said of it, and the negation of those sentences is also false, and what makes it so is the particular body under discussion.

But in contradistinction to this notion I like to use my internet handle because it demonstrates how much the name has little to do with the body -- Moliere didn't exist until I made an account on The Philosophy Forum, which was far after all of these events. There's even a distinct time-point we can point to that's still in the record but surely the name and who I am isn't exactly the same. The only thing that happened to give me this name is dubbing myself as Moliere on The Philosophy Forum rather than the physical facts of my body.

What about a possible world where the only thing that was different was that George 1 came from gamete 2 instead of gamete 1, which just happen to be "twin" gametes. Everything else in that world is identical. — Apustimelogist

Then the casual-spatial aspect still remains, just like the regular twin scenario.

Think of it this way:

For "natural kinds", the necessary component can just be the substance.

For individuals, the necessary component is the substance AND the causal-historical-spatial aspect of that individual.

Moliere didn't exist until I made an account on The Philosophy Forum, which was far after all of these events. ...... The only thing that happened to give me this name is dubbing myself as Moliere on The Philosophy Forum rather than the physical facts of my body. — Moliere

As to the first sentence, I notice that it was possible that you might not have made the account, though I get the point that it is no longer possible.

As to the second, for me, what is important is not so much the dubbing ceremony as the consequences, which are that other people use the name and you respond to it. That's at least part of what your identity qua person consists in. That obviously isn't true of names for objects.

I notice that it was possible that you might not have made the account, though I get the point that it is no longer possible. — Ludwig V

True.

As to the second, for me, what is important is not so much the dubbing ceremony as the consequences, which are that other people use the name and you respond to it. That's at least part of what your identity qua person consists in. That obviously isn't true of names for objects. — Ludwig V

That makes sense to me. Without the conventions of the internet then the dubbing wouldn't matter -- it's the communal enactment of personhood which makes at least a pretty clear difference between how we treat persons and how we treat objects, just as the pronouncement of Man and Wife isn't really a cause as much as the cap to a ceremony which is enacted by a community.

That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. — schopenhauer1

Modally, that very individual is still that very individual.

But physically and presumably psychologically they might be different.

And here the conjecture falls off the rails, because of course modally we can specify a possible world in which your genetics is different, and yet you are physically and psychologically the same.

To be clear as to the issue here, one would need to very carefully differential between modal identity and personal identity, between a=a and what makes schopenhauer1 who he is.

And that last is arbitrary.

Well, I don't see why we need to rule that out as impossible. It may be very unlikely, but unlikely things do happen. And we'll never check enough leaves to establish an empirical possibility. — Ludwig V

I haven't ruled out its being possible, nor do I rule out its being impossible: we just don't know, which is what I've being trying to get across.

The difference between a kind and an individual is logical, or if you prefer grammatical, and not to do with substance. — Banno

There are individual or particular kinds just as there are individual entities of particular kinds; so, I'm assuming you're referring to the obvious logical difference between type and token or general and particular, and the fact that individual entities may be objects of perception, whereas individual kinds are objects of judgement.

—

between a=a and what makes schopenhauer1 who he is. — Banno

I would want to say that what makes schopenhauer1 who he is is partly determined by who he thinks he is and even who he chooses to be - I'm not saying it's entirely up to him, just that he is a participant.

A question that bothers me. I don't know whether it matters, but what is the difference, if any, between "what he is" and "who he is". The what question is asked of inanimate objects as well as people. The who question can only be asked of people. But how significant is that? Do we need two sets of criteria for people - one for their identity as physical object and living creature and the other for their identity as people? But that sounds like a kind of dualism, which makes me hesitate.

I haven't ruled out its being possible, nor do I rule out its being impossible: we just don't know, which is what I've being trying to get across. — Janus

Well, what matters most to me is that, so far as I can see, there's nothing to rule out the possibility and no positive evidence to establish impossibility. There is a common belief, dear to all of us, that each individual person is unique and irreplaceable - and the discovery of DNA seemed to give a physical basis for that belief. But that it seems to me to be an article of faith, though there is the identity of indiscernibles to fall back on.

Well, what matters most to me is that, so far as I can see, there's nothing to rule out the possibility and no positive evidence to establish impossibility. There is a common belief, dear to all of us, that each individual person is unique and irreplaceable - and the discovery of DNA seemed to give a physical basis for that belief. But that it seems to me to be an article of faith, though there is the identity of indiscernibles to fall back on. — Ludwig V

I could respond that, so far as I can see, there is nothing to rule out the impossibility and no positive evidence to establish possibility. I would add, as far as I am aware, there are no documented examples of any two objects being indistinguishably identical (even leaving aside the issue of occupation of different spaces).I think it is articles of faith all the way down, so you'll get no disagreement from me on that point. Perhaps we should augment the principle of the identity of indiscernibles with another principle: the indiscernibility of identities.

I would want to say that what makes schopenhauer1 who he is is partly determined by who he thinks he is and even who he chooses to be — Ludwig V

...as well as who we think he is and choose him to be. Direction of fit helps here, again, in that we choose what counts as schopenhauer1. It appears problematic mainly because folk are looking for something in the world that is schopenhauer1, whereas to a large extent the direction of fit is the revers of this - we get to choose.

Yes, all that...human identity is complex...but to simplify the question: what is it that makes any object or entity an object or entity? Is it an object or entity in its own right or only because we choose to count it as such?

To be clear as to the issue here, one would need to very carefully differential between modal identity and personal identity, between a=a and what makes schopenhauer1 who he is. — Banno

Yes, the word "personal" really screwed up the discussion because I am really discussing modal identity.

My theory of substance and causal-historical-spatial instance is one of a modal identity which is to say what makes that object and not another object in ANY possible world.

And here the conjecture falls off the rails, because of course modally we can specify a possible world in which your genetics is different, and yet you are physically and psychologically the same. — Banno

In this we must be careful what we mean by "genetics", because as the Ship of Theseus problem is indeed something to consider (what if all genetics were slowly replaced over time), the instance of that person still needs to have started somewhere, that person started with the casual-temporal-spatial instance of the combination of gametes of an individual.

If we just said it was the causal aspect, we are not designating the substance that it is the instance of.. It's not a piece of wood, or speck of dust but this person. This person would not be anything one way or the other without the initial meeting of their particular gametes, even in the possible world scenario where their genetics were switched out.

Edit: But I also realize people will come up with some possible world where people exist without gametes, or something where people were created differently than now. Then we can discuss at what point is that person then even a person and not something else (artificial person, robot, engineered person, whatever). It would be a new "kind" and possibly not fall into the logic of the possible worlds in the same way. What if water was H30 for example, is not a move one can make in many modal logic hypotheticals.

Edit 2: And thus, personal identity can be contingent on any number of existential and physical factors, where the gamete/causal aspect is modally invariant for that person to be that person and not someone else.