Unsurprisingly, I am not in fact twenty years younger than I am, so you don't have to worry about covering your arses. — unenlightened

But you ought be.

...as well as who we think he is and choose him to be. Direction of fit helps here, again, in that we choose what counts as schopenhauer1. It appears problematic mainly because folk are looking for something in the world that is schopenhauer1, whereas to a large extent the direction of fit is the revers of this - we get to choose. — Banno

This is a good point because this started as a discussion of hindsight and counterfactuals - what life would be like if you were born in different circumstances. My point in that discussion was that at some point there could be no changes in circumstances without not existing at all. I discerned that point to be the point of conception. Up until that point, if anything changed, there would be no YOU reflecting back in the first place. After that point, one can make an argument that various things could change and you might end up more-or-less the same. So perhaps it is the point of conception where identity is necessitated with physical components, after which experience and development can shape it and it can be thus defined this way or that, whether if the wind blew northeast versus southwest but everything else was the same that Tuesday morning, whether you would have been a different YOU, let alone major differences in upbringing.

...which is to say what makes that object and not another object in ANY possible world. — schopenhauer1

Counterpart theory?

...what life would be like if you were born in different circumstances. — schopenhauer1

It remains you who has the different circumstances.

It remains you who has the different circumstances. — Banno

BEFORE conception? Like a transposable soul or something? :brow:. After perhaps yeah.

what is it that makes any object or entity an object or entity? Is it an object or entity in its own right or only because we choose to count it as such? — Janus

Your question. What do you think is the answer?

Counterpart theory? — Banno

Only after conception yes. Before no.

You have to choose one approach or the other. They are not the sort of thing you can mix and match to suit your mood.

You have to choose one approach or the other. They are not the sort of thing you can mix and match to suit your mood. — Banno

My quest here is to find an objective thing that differentiates a person from being all possibilities that that person can hold. Clearly the stopping point for that person to be all counterparts of that person would be at conception. How could it be otherwise?

Well, in some possible world you were born premature and disabled- presuming you are not so already. That is a "stopping point" that has nothing to do with conception.

In another possible world. you have pink shows on. Even less to do with conception.

My quest here is to find an objective thing that differentiates a person from being all possibilities that that person can hold. — schopenhauer1

I donl't get this. The possibilities are of the person - It's you who might have had pink shows on. I don't see a question clear enough to have an answer.

I'll leave it at that.

The Schopenhauer1 of 1999 lacked all the experiences of the Schopenhauer1 of 2023. This is why I previously asked: "Are you the same person (same identity) today, than "you" were yesterday (or 20 years ago)?"

[...]

[...]

Are people different? We've noted that monozygotic twins start out with the same genetic makeup, so that set of DNA can't be sufficient. Is it even necessary? No, because our DNA mutates over time, so the DNA you have today is not identical to the DNA "you" had as a zygote or at birth. So you can't even say a specific set of DNA is a necessary condition. — Relativist

Fully agree with everything said here.



I think this post from a related thread is very relevant.

My quest here is to find an objective thing that differentiates a person from being all possibilities that that person can hold. Clearly the stopping point for that person to be all counterparts of that person would be at conception. How could it be otherwise? — schopenhauer1

Consider tetragametic chimeras.

Tetragametic chimerism is a form of congenital chimerism. This condition occurs through the fertilization of two separate ova by two sperm, followed by aggregation of the two at the blastocyst or zygote stages. This results in the development of an organism with intermingled cell lines. Put another way, the chimera is formed from the merging of two nonidentical twins (a similar merging presumably occurs with identical twins, but as their genotypes are not significantly distinct, the resulting individual would not be considered a chimera). As such, they can be male, female, or have mixed intersex characteristics.

In such a case there were two separate conceptions resulting in one person.

I donl't get this. The possibilities are of the person - It's you who might have had pink shows on. I don't see a question clear enough to have an answer. — Banno

What differentiates one individual from the other? The discernible is the persons combination of gametes at an instance. All counterfactual after that can be whatever. Before that, we are not talking about that person as now that person doesn’t exist to even speak of.

In such a case there were two separate conceptions resulting in one person. — wonderer1

That’s cool but even more to my point as it’s so unique. That doesn’t counter my gametes theory, it just elaborates on an interesting variation of it.

That doesn’t counter my gametes theory, it just elaborates on an interesting variation of it. — schopenhauer1

Right.

Perhaps we should augment the principle of the identity of indiscernibles with another principle: the indiscernibility of identities. — Janus

I'll second that.

whereas to a large extent the direction of fit is the revers of this - we get to choose. — Banno

I'm afraid I can't resist elaborating on this. Where inanimate objects are involved we get to choose - or perhaps more accurately we get to choose the criteria. Common sense would say that once the criteria are in place, the objects fit or don't - not up to us. But then, there's Wittgenstein on rules, so in that sense, we do get to choose even then.
Animate beings that aren't people are a half-way house.
People, however, are not passive. They can have opinions and make claims on us. So I would prefer to say there's a negotiation. It's not hard to think of examples.

but to simplify the question: — Janus

I agree that it is very, very hard to deal with all the complexities of any interesting question. The trouble is that the devil is almost always in the detail, so I'm reluctant to ignore complexities, even if it isn't possible to sort them all out. A grand simplification always gets me going, I'm afraid. Perhaps it is better to think in terms of focus rather than simplification and then it is easier to at least acknowledge complexities.

one would need to very carefully differential between modal identity and personal identity, between a=a and what makes schopenhauer1 who he is. — Banno

I have to confess that I don't really understand what modal identity is. A brief explanation or a reference would help me a lot.

the instance of that person still needs to have started somewhere, that person started with the casual-temporal-spatial instance of the combination of gametes of an individual. — schopenhauer1

I don't look at it quite that way. It seems to me that the idea of a causal chain is always an over-simplication. The spark may cause the explosion, but not without the explosive - and how did the two get together? The idea of a causal web is usually a better way to look at things - as many, many accident reports illustrate. When looking for a causal chain for a specific event, it is more helpful to identify a causal web and then select the most helpful causal chain.
The idea that the formation of a new DNA is the starting-point of the individual plays in to common sense. But it can be seriously misleading, as in the interminable and insoluble nature/nurture debates. I think you will find that the more balanced view that the two are inseparable and that we will do best by accepting that we are a combination of both is at last gaining ground.

This is a good point because this started as a discussion of hindsight and counterfactuals - what life would be like if you were born in different circumstances. My point in that discussion was that at some point there could be no changes in circumstances without not existing at all. — schopenhauer1

My quest here is to find an objective thing that differentiates a person from being all possibilities that that person can hold. — schopenhauer1

I don't get this. The possibilities are of the person - It's you who might have had pink shoes on. I don't see a question clear enough to have an answer — Banno

This is indeed where the debate between me and schopenhauer1 started - in the context of what the limits are of imagination. I might have been an accountant or a rock star. (In my opinion, the first is plausible, the second not.) The question is, if I had been an accountant or a rock star, would I have become a different person? For me, it depends what you mean by a different person. A stronger example might be the question whether could I imagine being a bat, which means with a bat's perceptions and desires. I don't think so. A weaker case is the one about wearing pink shoes. I agree, not only that I might have worn pink shoes this morning, but that I can imagine myself wearing pink shoes. This question may well be too unclear to be answerable. But then, that too, would be a result.

But then, that too, would be a result. — Ludwig V

I want to add to the disquisition above.

1) Thinking about the possibility/impossibility of becoming a different person from the one I am, I came up with three (real-life) possibilities. People do sometimes change their name and/or adopt a different identity, often for reasons of convenience, but sometimes not. Where this is does for religious reasons, and, perhaps, some other cases, I believe that it is done precisely in order to signify a major change in life, amounting to becoming a different person. The other is the (contested) phenomenon of multiple personality. And, perhaps, this is part of what is called gender change. However, I don't think these cases could remain uncontested and very much doubt whether any court would accept them as a reason for escaping criminal or civil responsibility. For me, (and this is where I think schopenhauer1 had a point) continuity of the body would be fundamental. Amnesia might, perhaps be an exception.

2) Having said that and considering when I would say that a new person had been created, I am struck by the long development period from conception to birth and adolescence to full maturity. I don't think there is a clear marker here - it is essentially a development process and (apart from conventional markers like age or perhaps some features of physical development) - there is no clear line when we can say that we have a new person.

The idea of a causal web is usually a better way to look at things - as many, many accident reports illustrate. When looking for a causal chain for a specific event, it is more helpful to identify a causal web and then select the most helpful causal chain. — Ludwig V

Sure, it is a shorthand, admittedly when I use "causal-historical chain". Perhaps a "causal web" is better. Indeed, I brought up earlier, Harman's idea of not overmining an object to all causal factors involved with the object. We don't even need to know all the combination of factors that allow the gametes to start forming the embryonic development, we can point to a "web" of causal factors that are involved without picking out all of them. In other words, not knowing each factor, doesn't negate the case. The microscope doesn't need to be that granular when we reference the event.

The question is, if I had been an accountant or a rock star, would I have become a different person? For me, it depends what you mean by a different person. A stronger example might be the question whether could I imagine being a bat, which means with a bat's perceptions and desires. I don't think so. A weaker case is the one about wearing pink shoes. I agree, not only that I might have worn pink shoes this morning, but that I can imagine myself wearing pink shoes. This question may well be too unclear to be answerable. But then, that too, would be a result. — Ludwig V

I mean to be fair, isn't that the general nature of most philosophical debates? Being unanswerable is almost a requirement of a philosophical issue :). But I guess you can mean it, that there is no way in hell that any philosopher would come up with a theory of identity that would ever have any validity or soundness. I mean, why pick this issue out as being interminably impossible to answer versus any other philosophical question? It's all debatable and hence philosophy continues....

So, I think the question you ask is slightly different than where this question of identity has shifted. Indeed, to a point made earlier, personal identity can start looking very personal and "existential" (we define our identity, not given it). My question in this line of thought is more the following:

"At what point would that person no longer have the set of all possibilities that that person could have? In other words, whether that person wore pink shoes or is an accountant or what not, is necessarily/rigidly designated to something. At what point would that something be something else that one is ascribing a personal identity to.

Surely, we can agree that certain physical-spatial-causal events are not transposable. At some point that chair became a chair, and not just pieces of wood, plastic, whatever. At the point at which it is a chair, it becomes a new "possibilities" of what can happen to that chair. We can talk reasonably about that chair qua chair versus other chairs, or other objects.

When hydrogen and oxygen combine in a process to make water, when water forms, it is now that substance and not its antecedents we are discussing. We can pick it out (H20), and it has an instance in causal-space-history (hence why I say it is not just a natural kind, but an instance of a natural kind.. that instance of water.

The microscope doesn't need to be that granular when we reference the event. — schopenhauer1

But the event is the creation of a fertilized egg, which is beginning of a process which will result - years later - in a new person. That process of development involves a web of other factors. Why do you pick that event out? Think of it this way. Some eggs hatch into caterpillars; the caterpillars grow and eventually become pupae; the pupae hatch out and a butterfly emerges. The caterpillar eggs are not caterpillars, pupae or butterflies. The butterflies are not pupae, caterpillars or caterpillar eggs. Why do you say that a human egg (fertilized, like my caterpillar eggs) is a person?

Responding to the rest of your post will have to wait, I'm afraid.

Why do you say that a human egg (fertilized, like my caterpillar eggs) is a person? — Ludwig V

So the question at hand is what counts as being that object versus no longer being that object- either it is a proto-object where it is the components but not the object itself, or it is not that object at all. So, in the case of the caterpillar, indeed even with that case, it was its conception where all possibilities for that individual had its terminus.

I agree that it is very, very hard to deal with all the complexities of any interesting question. The trouble is that the devil is almost always in the detail, so I'm reluctant to ignore complexities, even if it isn't possible to sort them all out. A grand simplification always gets me going, I'm afraid. Perhaps it is better to think in terms of focus rather than simplification and then it is easier to at least acknowledge complexities. — Ludwig V

It doesn't seem that there are the same complexities (although determinacy is another matter) when we think about the identity of everyday objects as there are when we attempt to address human identity. So, it seemed to me a good plan to start with the simple cases and then work towards understanding the complexities of human identity built upon the relative simplicities of object identity.

"At what point would that person no longer have the set of all possibilities that that person could have? In other words, whether that person wore pink shoes or is an accountant or what not, is necessarily/rigidly designated to something. At what point would that something be something else that one is ascribing a personal identity to.

Surely, we can agree that certain physical-spatial-causal events are not transposable. At some point that chair became a chair, and not just pieces of wood, plastic, whatever. At the point at which it is a chair, it becomes a new "possibilities" of what can happen to that chair. We can talk reasonably about that chair qua chair versus other chairs, or other objects.

When hydrogen and oxygen combine in a process to make water, when water forms, it is now that substance and not its antecedents we are discussing. We can pick it out (H20), and it has an instance in causal-space-history (hence why I say it is not just a natural kind, but an instance of a natural kind.. that instance of water. — schopenhauer1

Do each of these examples have to have the same criteria?

The first seems to be asking after the psychological, the second a kind of everyday understanding of medium-sized dry goods, and the third relies upon a notion of science and how that relates to our understanding of objects. At least that's how I'd put it, and so think that the criteria would differ since those three topics would be answered differently if we were to put it in question form.

Do each of these examples have to have the same criteria?

The first seems to be asking after the psychological, the second a kind of everyday understanding of medium-sized dry goods, and the third relies upon a notion of science and how that relates to our understanding of objects. At least that's how I'd put it, and so think that the criteria would differ since those three topics would be answered differently if we were to put it in question form. — Moliere

I think for the chair, there can be distinctions made that are different than the case of people or natural kinds (like water). I was just making a point that the debate is about when an object thus becomes an object. A man-made object like a chair seems more about social notions like "use" and "intention", and indeed seems more subjective. It would need a human determiner for this to be true. And indeed, even for personal identity (which I messed up by naming this thread that but I'll keep it for now for historical purposes of the debate), we can say that there needs to be a human determiner to understand "what" a person is at a given time. However, where there might be overlap is how the man-made and the natural kind can come to be in a causal-historical instance in time. You can say, perhaps, there was a point in time that that chair became the chair. And thus there was a terminus which the history of that chair can then go back to where all things referring to that chair has the range of possibilities that can happen "for that chair", and not just, say, the wood components that comprise that chair. It's a bit harder to define though because a chair is very subjective and because of its social nature, harder to determine its "rigidity" as a thing.

However, the natural kind/human analogy is more equivalent. That is because there is an element of substance to the identity, and in the case of an "instance" of a natural kind (that instance of water, that instance of a human), we have the causal aspect of a place and time when there is a terminus when it goes back to a time when it was that instance of the object, and whereby we talk about "possibilities for that object", we are talking about the range of possibilities for that object and not something else or something prior.

which I messed up by naming this thread that but I'll keep it for now for historical purposes of the debate) — schopenhauer1

I should say I messed up too -- communication is always two-way, so no worries.

However, the natural kind/human analogy is more equivalent. That is because there is an element of substance to the identity, and in the case of an "instance" of a natural kind (that instance of water, that instance of a human), we have the causal aspect of a place and time when there is a terminus when it goes back to a time when it was that instance of the object, and whereby we talk about "possibilities for that object", we are talking about the range of possibilities for that object and not something else or something prior. — schopenhauer1

I agree that water and humans are closer to one another than either are to chairs.

I think I get lost in the talk of causation and natural kinds. I tried to write out a few paragraphs after this and ended up just deleting them because they got too tangential every time.

I think I get lost in the talk of causation and natural kinds. I tried to write out a few paragraphs after this and ended up just deleting them because they got too tangential every time. — Moliere

Yeah, it's tricky determining these kind of things and it harkens back to questions that Aristotle grappled with and the like. Identity, existence, essence, etc.

A man-made object like a chair seems more about social notions like "use" and "intention", and indeed seems more subjective. — schopenhauer1

Even a chair can be tricksy, though, here's a Picasso sculpture of a chair:

That's true.

I'm curious what you think about natural kinds and causation @Ludwig V -- it seems that since continuity of a person is the real underlying topic, though through the lens of the identity of objects (however we wish to construe that), I'm wondering if you believe natural kinds and causation have anything to do with the continuity of a person?

The suggestiong to my mind is if one could establish that human beings are a natural kind, and natural kinds of the sort that human beings are can be said to be different under such-and-such circumstances, then we could say when a person is, which in turn should at least hint whether genetics are necessary for the identity of a person as an object (given such and such beliefs, of course) -- but I'm wondering if this is just too far astray from the case you'd make for the continuity of a person? The example of a religion changing a person's name seems to indicate something more along the lines of how I think of personhood, but that also doesn't necessarily eliminate it from being included as a natural kind (considering that we're naturally social creatures, a case might be made...)

Even a chair can be tricksy, though, here's a Picasso sculpture of a chair: — mcdoodle

Yep, I actually think a combination of use and intention would be a good way to describe most man-made items if we were to explore its "essence" in any way. In the case of Picasso, more intention than use!

I'm wondering if you believe natural kinds and causation have anything to do with the continuity of a person? — Moliere

One way is insofar as all the possibilities of the continuities of that person are had from the terminus of the conception of that person and no further back. Clearly, the gametes at conception are of a "natural kind". They are cells made of compounds, made of atoms, etc.

However, if you mean in terms of the fact that the genes are generally stable, that's harder to answer. I would be inclined to say yes, but with variation. Personalities it has been reported, are very much tied to genetics, even though it is also shaped in large part by environment, for example. It is probable that various capacities and abilities are more likely tied to genes than people might admit, etc.

The suggestiong to my mind is if one could establish that human beings are a natural kind, and natural kinds of the sort that human beings are can be said to be different under such-and-such circumstances, then we could say when a person is, which in turn should at least hint whether genetics are necessary for the identity of a person as an object (given such and such beliefs, of course) -- but I'm wondering if this is just too far astray from the case you'd make for the continuity of a person? The example of a religion changing a person's name seems to indicate something more along the lines of how I think of personhood, but that also doesn't necessarily eliminate it from being included as a natural kind (considering that we're naturally social creatures, a case might be made...) — Moliere

If humans are part of "nature", then even sociality in general is "natural". But usually this becomes word games because we often split things at the physical and socio-cultural level so that it represents some artificial divide. I think it is harder to define someone's "personal identity" because that does seem socially-determined by others or oneself based on a number of contingent social factors (personality, likes, social roles, beliefs, ethnic-identity, family ties, friend groups, hobbies, or anything really). What can be determined perhaps, modally, is that when you look back on your life and ask yourself, "Could I have lived differently", the point at which you could no longer have had the range of possibilities that YOU had, including the one at the present, would have been at conception. Prior to that, it could not be the same person looking back at a counterfactual life as you would be doing in this moment, as that person. Even if it was a different sperm that conceived that night a second earlier, that is not you, so the set of possibilities that encompasses the YOU looking back in hindsight is no longer even a fact.

One way is insofar as all the possibilities of the continuities of that person are had from the terminus of the conception of that person and no further back. Clearly, the gametes at conception are of a "natural kind". They are cells made of compounds, made of atoms, etc. — schopenhauer1

It should be clear that this is not clear to me, at least :D -- it's the "etc." part that looks like it would make a difference.

One of the things that's snagging me that I'm thinking is contributing to our differences in expression is the relationship between the technical words within a scientific discipline and how we are meant to understand those expressions within a philosophical context.

"Natural kinds" is clearly a philosophical notion, whereas "H2O" and "Genetics" and "DNA" aren't really. At the very least you won't find "natural kinds" in a physics or biology textbook in the way that the SEP describes "natural kinds", and philosophically I tend to group science with its activities -- if it's not even being taught to people who signed up for science classes (and certainly not being used by scientists) then can we properly say that these are scientific notions at all?

But stating it like that I hope you can see why I began to worry about going off on a tangent with respect to the original notion that started the questions. My questioning became more about science and its relationship to reality and our notions of the real in either a philosophical or everyday sense and less about the continuity of a person, even though perhaps the general question would settle the more particular question.

The suggestiong to my mind is if one could establish that human beings are a natural kind, and natural kinds of the sort that human beings are can be said to be different under such-and-such circumstances, then we could say when a person is, which in turn should at least hint whether genetics are necessary for the identity of a person as an object... — Moliere

I'm not seeing a need for establishing humans as a natural kind, in order to recognize genetics as playing a necessary causal role in maintaining human identity.

It is enormously scientifically supported, that our genes play an ongoing role in maintaining us in existence as living human beings. What would the notion of a natural kind add?