Usually, people don't seem to indulge in such moral skepticism, so your thought experiment is moot for them. A philosopher cannot just ignore such things about people. It seems that most people are intuitively and absolutely sure about their sense of right and wrong, and this surety being intuitive and absolute is essential to their sense of morality. — baker
Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to not give a damn about what's right or wrong and continue as you were?
If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned. — Michael
Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno
course for her the choice is more difficult because she believes that she will be punished for doing wrong, but for the non-religious ethical non-naturalist, there's no such punishment. And so my question stands; what is the motivation to be moral? — Michael
I have been faced with similar situations when I approached some religions/spiritualities. But I wasn't actually sure that something I enjoyed was wrong, and I wasn't sure that something I'm disgusted by was right -- instead, I felt enormously pressured to have such surety, and my continual involvement was predicated on at least aiming for such surety. I couldn't stand it for long, though, and eventually broke off my involvement with them. I'm also facing such situations in relation to politics, and as things stand, my current means of coping is cynicism.Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to continue as you were? — Michael
While a person's moral stances can remain the same for long periods of time, things can change. External events might provoke one to think and act in ways that one previously thought unimaginable, not only impossible.If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned.
The problem is the bit about _everyone_. It's usually not the case that everyone thinks the same way. This is why the issues of whether moral facts exist or not and whether a belief is true or not come into play. As soon as someone is "different" than the majority, this will have some practical consequences for the person (often adverse ones), and the person will try to make sense of this being different and of how other people treat them because of it.1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
What is the practical difference between these worlds?
It seems to me that only moral beliefs matter. Whether or not the beliefs are true has no practical relevance. — Michael
Because you haven't internalized the metaphysical framework needed for said obligation to make sense.Perhaps I should have said that it isn't necessarily a sufficient reason. If I were to somehow know that I have an obligation to kill children, I would need a more convincing reason to carry it out. That I am obligated isn't reason enough for me. — Michael
For most people who (claim to) obey God's law, that motivation appears to be pre-cognitive; ie. they have internalized it before they were even old enough to think about it.So what is the motivation to obey God's moral laws? — Michael
Moral obligation only makes sense in a religious framework to begin with.I, for one, am not motivated simply by the belief (or knowledge) of what I ought to do. — Michael
As is inevitably the case for someone who is not religious or whose sense of morality is not shaped after religions.I can't make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable. That's really what I'm trying to show here. — Michael
Because moral obligations only make sense in the framework of religion. Only religion has the metaphysical underpinnings needed for making moral obligations intelligible (and the practical means for raising prospective believers).If it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to harm and if it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to not harm, and if there's no practical difference between being morally obligated to harm and being morally obligated to not harm, then moral obligations are a vacuous concept.
only it would be clear what "moral" means, in any particular instance. Hating your enemies (the persons), like the Jews do? Stoning infidels, like some Muslims do? — baker
So why don’t we dump moral realism and moral subjectivism and all other moldy conformist dictums stuck in the 18th century, which blithely ignore all the exciting ideas coming from current research in evolutionary biology, anthropology , psychology and language studies? — Joshs
Actually, I heard about the need for hatred from you for the first time. I was quite taken aback.Tread more carefully in your attempts to describe Jewish theology so as not to appear anti-Jewish. I don't trust that your description of the way Jewish theology describes evil is entirely a misunderstanding, but I am more convinced it's a desire to cast the religion in a bad light. — Hanover
Is it even possible to say something about Judaism without the Jews feeling offended?Instead, I'll just tell you to end your Judaism bashing.
Well to be accurate, homosexuality is wrong by her (Muslim) community ethical standard, not her personal moral code (based on her actions). This is very common for folks' morals to clash with their community ethical standards. But she is, in fact, following her moral code. — LuckyR
Is your main point here just that you think non-naturalism doesn't work and you're therefore a naturalist consequentialist when it comes to ethics? — Hanover
I'm asking why there is a motivation to be moral if moral facts have no practical implications. — Michael
How is this not a slide from obligation to motivation? Sure, there are issues of weakness of the will. But they presume an obligation avoided, and hence an obligation.
What you are doing here is indeed incomprehensible. — Banno
That's the question asked by the OP. — Michael
I don't understand this phrase. If one is under an obligation to act in a certain way, then one ought act in that way - that's what an obligation is. That is the "practical import" of the obligation....obligations have no practical import... — Michael
Yes, a very odd post, in which you claim that there are no "practical implications" for vegetarianism while pointing out that the vegetarian will probably not eat meat.
What more practical an implication could you find? — Banno
Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.
I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications.
Sure, if we believe that we ought not do X then we might not do X, but then it wouldn't really matter if our beliefs were true; only that we have them.
Actually, I heard about the need for hatred from you for the first time. I was quite taken aback.
But some things started to make sense. — baker
Is even possible to say something about Judaism without the Jews feeling offended? — baker
Yes, I read that. Very odd. As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true.
If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno
As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true. — Banno
If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno
To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:
1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies.
It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Michael
If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno
If I eat meat then it doesn't matter if I ought not eat meat. Nothing bad will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing good will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation? — Michael
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