Quite so. Not wanting to be picky, but what makes these abstractions arbitrary? Isn't it rather that the idea of natural kinds proposes a certain kind of model, but the facts (nature) undermine it. Where's the necessity?Nothing we categorize in the world avoids arbitrary abstractions. — Apustimelogist
That's right. The web, not just one element in it. Given your extraordinarily rigid version of determinism, we can also say that as the causal web constantly changes and develops, any other point in time is also a point when the actualized person that it the you right now could have come to be. There is no reason to pick out any one moment in my life (or before it, or after it) as more or less important than any other.Because it was that web of circumstances (conception) that is the point of time when the actualized person that is the you right now could have come to be in the first place — schopenhauer1
Well, if Kripke is right, it becomes a posteriori necessary. But that's a big "if", so I prefer to wait and see. It doesn't seem to matter, one way or the other.But the point is that it becomes a posteriori necessary, which is Kripke's controversial theory. — schopenhauer1
No, patently not. But while we are speaking precisely, we need to bear in mind that we exist at three levels (at least). a) the physical object (the body), the animal (homo sapiens - a misnomer if ever there was one - and the person (which is an essentially social concept).that doesn't mean humans are their genome. — Moliere
though very little in comparison. — Moliere
It just means that H2O represents more than just "H2O" perhaps. — schopenhauer1
But the point is that it becomes a posteriori necessary, which is Kripke's controversial theory. The evidence provides the necessity of identity's content, which can be changed with more evidence. So the content can change, but the link of necessity does not, with whatever it is that that content provides. — schopenhauer1
Quite so. Not wanting to be picky, but what makes these abstractions arbitrary? Isn't it rather that the idea of natural kinds proposes a certain kind of model, but the facts (nature) undermine it. Where's the necessity? — Ludwig V
That's right. The web, not just one element in it. Given your extraordinarily rigid version of determinism, we can also say that as the causal web constantly changes and develops, any other point in time is also a point when the actualized person that it the you right now could have come to be. There is no reason to pick out any one moment in my life (or before it, or after it) as more or less important than any other.
Why do you speak of the actualized person that is the you?.... Surely the same applies to everybody else, so you would do better to say the actualized person that is <insert anyone's name> ......
By speaking of "you", you posit the person you address as a participant in the language game (or whatever other kind of practice we are engaging in). Genomes are incapable of participating in these practices. People do, and their identity as people amongst people is revealed (or perhaps created) in their participation. This is an unusual take on personal identity, but given our starting-point, it seems inevitable. — Ludwig V
Yes, I see this but it seems that was is posteriori necessary trivially depends on what I happen to decide I should call something so to me it doesn't seem that interesting or have deep consequences. Can you even call that necessary?
Then it comes to the issue of deciding what is water in all possible worlds. Does that trivially mean that water in all possible worlds is identical to water in this world? Or might there be other possible worlds with water that is different in some way but still similar? It seems this is down to my decision in some ways about what I want to deem as water or not depending on what I want to ignore in possible worlds. — Apustimelogist
I'm not so certain that the account of a posteriori necessity works very well for water, though. Even the water in my cup right now. This is because I tend to agree with Hume on causation -- that it is a habit of ours as creatures who look for patterns, and that tomorrow water could turn out to be something aside from what we thought it was by exploring those patterns. This is a feature of most scientific knowledge: the knowledge is always provisional, and built around technical problems of a particular group of knowledge-producers. If water is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O -- of course! But is it actually H2O? — Moliere
This is the point made earlier, that if schopenhauer1 decides that schopenhauer1 has by fiat some specific genetic code, then in any possible world in which someone has that genetic code, that someone is schopenhauer1; and further, if in some possible world there is a person with all the attributes of schopenhauer1, but with a different genetic code, then that is not schopenhauer1 . — Banno
Yes but they are still necessary for the properties of water like electrical conductivity, even if little in comparison - if they were not present, it would imply there was no water there or at least that the water didn't possess its characteristic properties. Hence why different concentrations lead to different properties. The isotope example is also interesting because its not trivial at all the changes it makes. D2O can kill things because of how different it is to water.
I think the concept of idealization always strengthens this kind of direction you are going in since at the very least it questions or complicates the idea that people are actually referring to what they say they are referring to when they use particular terms or phrases. — Apustimelogist
So why I say YOU, is I am discussing the person that has actualized all the events leading to the very present. THIS person (the present you, not a counterfactual you that could have actualized differently), could not have been THIS person without certain factors. As far as the main factor that differentiates the range of possibilities that led to THIS present you from a range of possibilities that would NEVER include the YOU that is present right now, that would be the set of gametes that developed into the current YOU. That is to say, it's as far back as we can go whereby if the circumstances were different (there was a different set of gametes), there was no possible world that the current actualized YOU would have existed as YOU are right now looking back on your life. — schopenhauer1
But while we are speaking precisely, we need to bear in mind that we exist at three levels (at least). a) the physical object (the body), the animal (homo sapiens - a misnomer if ever there was one - and the person (which is an essentially social concept). — Ludwig V
What is happening here is a bit more than just an observation. No number of observations could show that in every case, what we would call water is what we would call H₂O. The problem of induction intervenes. What happens is more akin to an act of fiat, a decision on our part to only call stuff mad of "H₂O" water. So we look around and see that every sample of water we check is made of H₂O, and so decide that thenceforth if some sample of what we thought was water turns out not to be H₂O, we were mistaken, and it's not water.
Logically, as it points out in the article ↪schopenhauer1 cites, "What is not being claimed is that water is necessarily H2O, but conditionally, if water is H2O then water is necessarily H2O." The antecedent is not proven on empirical grounds so much as taken as a definition of water - it;'s decided by fiat that we will only use the word "water" for stuff that is made of H₂O.
This is the point made earlier, that if schopenhauer1 decides that schopenhauer1 has by fiat some specific genetic code, then in any possible world in which someone has that genetic code, that someone is schopenhauer1; and further, if in some possible world there is a person with all the attributes of schopenhauer1, but with a different genetic code, then that is not schopenhauer1 .
What it is important to note here is that this is a choice about how we use the names "water" and "schopenhauer1"; not solely an issue of empirical observation. — Banno
Why folk insist on trying to make use of the anachronistic notion of substance is beyond me. — Banno
I am working at getting a grounding on the metaphysics of an individual by way of thinking about it causally. — schopenhauer1
And I'm pointing out that what counts as an individual is nothing to do with substance, but with how we choose to use names.
You are using a screw driver as a hammer. — Banno
That's ok so far as it goes. But there are complexities in that "we". It isn't a choice that we make by getting together, debating and voting. It's many choices made by individuals in the context of their pragmatic and social context.What it is important to note here is that this is a choice about how we use the names "water" and "schopenhauer1"; not solely an issue of empirical observation. — Banno
Thus, it is at the point of conception that at least the opportunity for the actual you that is now reflecting, would be able to exist. — schopenhauer1
The lone H₂O molecule floating through space is not wet, and so there are some predicates which apply to water but which do not apply to H₂O, and so we can say that these are two different things. — Moliere
And I'm pointing out that what counts as an individual is nothing to do with substance, but with how we choose to use names.
You are using a screw driver as a hammer. — Banno
I searched and could find no clear answer to this question. They are obviously not bonded as they are in either liquid water or in ice. In any case, when water evaporates, it is referred to as water vapour. — Janus
Quite so. Not wanting to be picky, but what makes these abstractions arbitrary? Isn't it rather that the idea of natural kinds proposes a certain kind of model, but the facts (nature) undermine it. — Ludwig V
I best be careful then. If my account means that people cannot refer then it's in trouble since we do successfully refer! — Moliere
I think there's been some wires crossed as I don't understand whats being implied here. — Apustimelogist
I think the concept of idealization always strengthens this kind of direction you are going in since at the very least it questions or complicates the idea that people are actually referring to what they say they are referring to when they use particular terms or phrases. — Apustimelogist
Yes, but a great deal has to happen before I exist. Why isn't the development of the heart or the brain also a point like the moment of conception? Why isn't the moment when my parents meet or marry, just as important? What about the moments when my mother and father were conceived? Aren't they also critical? It's a web.
I'm sorry if this seems outdated by what has appeared since I started writing it. — Ludwig V
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