You aren't presenting an argument that shows that its wrong to look at things that way. — frank
Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".
I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and avoid causing pain either way. — Michael
But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, — Leontiskos
I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about. — Leontiskos
I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering. — Michael
I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all. — Michael
You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. — Leontiskos
I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too. — Michael
I am only arguing that if moral realism (specifically ethical non-naturalism) is correct then moral facts don't matter. — Michael
What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"? — Leontiskos
Is this premise true?
1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X
According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false. — Michael
If you want to argue that there is no motivation — frank
I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. — Leontiskos
You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism. — Michael
Is this premise true?
1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X
According to moral realists it's not. — Michael
Still, when I say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." — Leontiskos
A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).
What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms. — javra
That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael
We've already acknowledged that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted morally — Count Timothy von Icarus
"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," — Leontiskos
I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things. — Michael
Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time. — Leontiskos
That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth. — Michael
I think this gives short shrift to Mill. Mill's reference to happiness as being the objective of "the good" didn't at all suggest it was a reducible concept, but he was clear that happiness arose from a variety of factors and it was a holistic state that could not be achieved from just finding physical pleasure. I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover
It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. — javra
2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics? — javra
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