You aren't presenting an argument that shows that its wrong to look at things that way. — frank

I'm not trying to. I'm not arguing in favour of moral realism and ethical non-naturalism over moral subjectivism or error theory or divine command theory or cultural relativism or non-cognitivism. I am only arguing that if moral realism (specifically ethical non-naturalism) is correct then moral facts don't matter.

For what it's worth, I understand exactly the point you're making.

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and avoid causing pain either way. — Michael

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about.

And if you say that there are moral 'oughts' and non-moral 'oughts', then your definition must be faulty.

But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, — Leontiskos

I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering.

If it is impermissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering then the consequences are the same as if it is permissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering.

The permissibility of causing suffering does not affect the outcome of my decision to cause (or not cause) suffering.

Whereas the viability of antibiotics can very much affect the outcome of my decision to take antibiotics. If they're viable then my sickness is cured, if they're not then I will probably die.

The viability of antibiotics matters. The permissibility of causing suffering doesn't. Suffering is just suffering whether permissible or not.

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about. — Leontiskos

I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all.

I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering. — Michael

I think you're saying, "It doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering, and I am going to do my best to prevent suffering."

Morality in the fundamental sense is about how we should act (and, derivatively, why we do act). You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. Of course, you usually refuse to define it whatsoever, falling in with Moore's non-committal approach.

But I would say that if you think we should pursue happiness and avoid suffering, then you are likely some sort of hedonist. You just won't fully commit because you can't answer Moore's Open Question.

I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all. — Michael

Why is empathy non-moral?

You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. — Leontiskos

I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too.

I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too. — Michael

What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"?

I am only arguing that if moral realism (specifically ethical non-naturalism) is correct then moral facts don't matter. — Michael

Right. And I agree with that. But when you went down the trail of motivation, you overlooked the fact that motivation is rooted in ideology. If you want to argue that there is no motivation, then you're immediately pitting yourself against ideologies that define moral in such a way that the motivation is built in, such as Stoicism, where goodness and health are the same pursuit, or Calvinism where the reason you were born is to glorify God, so it's your life's mission.

What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"? — Leontiskos

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false.

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false. — Michael

I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. Why do you think it is false?

Or, let me be more clear. You used it in the sense, "I'd like it if you pursued happiness and tried to avoid causing suffering." It could also be used in the sense, "I'd like it if you wore my favorite color on my birthday." You can imagine a parent saying both of these things to their child. But the curious thing is that "should" captures the valence of both. Still, when we are talking about morality we are talking about something like the former sense.

(Again, I am swimming against the stream of your Kantian inheritance.)

If you want to argue that there is no motivation — frank

I'm not arguing that there is no motivation. I'm explaining that I have no motivation to be moral and am asking others why they have it given that there are no practical benefits to being moral. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. — Leontiskos

That strikes me as a contradiction. You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism.

And if the "I" refers specifically to me then why am I the authority on what you should or shouldn't do?

- I don't think you read beyond the first sentence of that reply.

You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism. — Michael

You're swapping a biconditional for a definition while simultaneously reifying an opinion into a law. Moral reasoning is perhaps the most subtle form of reasoning accessible to natural reason. You continue to run roughshod over the subtleties.

Should-as-opinion differs from should-as-fact. In morality we have and share opinions about what is true, just as we do in other fields. Just as in other fields, opinions do not establish truths. Still, when you say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." You are sharing an opinion about what is (morally) true. You are advising, and the advice is moral because the precept is coextensive with all of human action. The precept bears on all of a person's actions, and not just some. It is something you believe they should take into consideration always, and not just sometimes.

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. — Michael

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms.

Still, when I say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this.

To make this clearer, do you accept that non-cognitivists, error theorists, and moral subjectivists exist? Do you accept that they do not believe in objectively binding moral obligations? Do you also accept that they express their personal preferences? Then you must accept that when they express their personal preferences they are not simultaneously asserting the existence of objectively binding moral obligations.

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms. — javra

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth.

See here where it's explained that the meaning of the word "should" is not exclusively moral.

We seem to be going in a circle. We've already acknowledged that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted morally, or that there can be plenty of consequences due to acting immorally.

You are asking for what "real difference," it makes if acts are moral. When we discuss the various negative consequences of immoral actions, you say "well that isn't non-natural," so it doesn't count. When we discuss the non-natural, irreducible difference of an act's either being moral or not moral, you say that isn't a "real" difference. I'm not sure what you want here, a difference that is not "natural" yet somehow is "meaningful," where meaningful seems to be defined as "makes a difference in the natural world?"

It seems to me that saying that an act's being moral or immoral is, of itself, not a "real difference" is simply to reject the core premise that there are, in fact, discoverable, irreducible, non-natural moral facts in the first place.

Personally, I might be able to get behind that, because the premises seem like the weak part. Perhaps morality is not reducible, but it seems to deeply bound up in other "natural" phenomena to keep separate.

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," is the same statement, qualitatively speaking. Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time.

We've already acknowledged that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted morally — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't acknowledged this. I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference.

"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," — Leontiskos

I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things.

I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things. — Michael

Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time. — Leontiskos

That quote of yours does not address mine.

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth. — Michael

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. That aside:

1) Does your reply then make the statement untrue? If so, how?

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics?

- It does.

You're skimming posts madly and trying to respond in 0.4 seconds. Again, this isn't philosophy. The only time you write a substantive post is when your interlocutor goes offline for a long period of time.

I think all of these questions are adequately resolved in Aquinas, and that the paradigm shift can be achieved through Peter L. P. Simpson.

But paradigm shifts aside, I think Hanover's starting point is as good as any:

I think this gives short shrift to Mill. Mill's reference to happiness as being the objective of "the good" didn't at all suggest it was a reducible concept, but he was clear that happiness arose from a variety of factors and it was a holistic state that could not be achieved from just finding physical pleasure. I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover

(This may be my last post in this thread. Either way I will be phasing out in the next 48 hours.)

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. — javra

Is it a moral fact? We're discussing moral obligations, not non-moral obligations.

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics? — javra

I'm not. I'm explaining that if ethical non-naturalism is true then being moral has no practical benefit. If ethical non-naturalism is true then the consequences of eating meat are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not. If ethical non-naturalism is true then the consequences of drinking alcohol are the same whether alcoholism is immoral or not.

I'm not arguing that ethical non-naturalism is true.

I'm not arguing that there is no motivation. I'm explaining that I have no motivation to be moral and am asking others why they have it given that there are no practical benefits to being moral. Is it entirely a matter of principle? — Michael

Yes, it's a matter of starting assumptions.

I'm not sure what you want from me. You're putting words into my mouth and I'm simply explaining that I'm not saying what you accuse me of saying.

I'd like you to pass the salt. I'd like you to meet my parents. I'd like you to donate to cancer research. I'd like you to join the protest. None of this implies that I believe in some objectively binding moral obligation.

When I say that I'd like you to be kind to others and make them happy, that's all I'm saying. I am neither explicitly nor implicitly endorsing moral realism.