Not to worry. I already disagree him in other ways.Here’s why the zombie idea is supposed to provide an argument against physicalist explanations of consciousness. If you can imagine a zombie, this means you can conceive of a world that is indistinguishable from our world, but in which no consciousness is happening. And if you can conceive of such a world, then consciousness cannot be a physical phenomenon.
And here’s why it doesn’t work. The zombie argument, like many thought experiments that take aim at physicalism, is a conceivability argument, and conceivability arguments are intrinsically weak. Like many such arguments, it has a plausibility that is inversely related to the amount of knowledge one has.
Can you imagine an A380 flying backward? Of course you can. Just imagine a large plane in the air, moving backward. Is such a scenario really conceivable? Well, the more you know about aerodynamics and aeronautical engineering, the less conceivable it becomes. In this case, even a minimal knowledge of these topics makes it clear that planes cannot fly backward. It just cannot be done.
It’s the same with zombies. In one sense it’s trivial to imagine a philosophical zombie. I just picture a version of myself wandering around without having any conscious experiences. But can I really conceive this? What I’m being asked to do, really, is to consider the capabilities and limitations of a vast network of many billions of neurons and gazillions of synapses (the connections between neurons), not to mention glial cells and neurotransmitter gradients and other neurobiological goodies, all wrapped into a body interacting with a world which includes other brains in other bodies. Can I do this? Can anyone do this? I doubt it. Just as with the A380, the more one knows about the brain and its relation to conscious experiences and behavior, the less conceivable a zombie becomes.
Whether something is conceivable or not is often a psychological observation about the person doing the conceiving, not an insight into the nature of reality. This is the weakness of zombies. We are asked to imagine the unimaginable, and through this act of illusory comprehension, conclusions are drawn about the limits of physicalist explanation. — Seth
is to consider the capabilities and limitations of a vast network of many billions of neurons and gazillions of synapses (the connections between neurons), not to mention glial cells and neurotransmitter gradients and other neurobiological goodies, all wrapped into a body interacting with a world which includes other brains in other bodies. Can I do this? Can anyone do this? I doubt it. — Seth
Unless you can fully understand consciousness in physical terms (I do not believe this is hte case, but even if not, we don't ahve that understanding yet) then p-zombies are coherent until we do (and it excludes that possibility). — AmadeusD
That's the scenario we're given. P-zombies are supposed to act exactly like us. We would have no way of knowing that they have no consciousness. So they talk. And they answer questions the same ways we do.Why are we assuming language? That seems a conscious ability, whereas we're talking about physically identical, yet non-conscious entities. — AmadeusD
That's the scenario we're given. P-zombies are supposed to act exactly like us. We would have no way of knowing that they have no consciousness. So they talk. And they answer questions the same ways we do. — Patterner
That is not how I've ever understood any version of the TE.
p-zombies are physically the same, yet unconscious. No idea why we are assuming they're behaving exactly the same? If i've got that wrong, then I have got that wrong. — AmadeusD
p-zombies are physically the same, yet unconscious. No idea why we are assuming they're behaving exactly the same? If i've got that wrong, then I have got that wrong. — AmadeusD
The difference is that we can program computers to act like us. But there's no reason to think p-zombies would act like us.Replace p-zombie with a computer that perfectly simulates human personality. Does the computer feel sadness when it cries? That is basically the question. — Lionino
The difference is that we can program computers to act like us. But there's no reason to think p-zombies would act like us. — Patterner
I don't really see those elements as relevant (at least certainly not necessary) to the Hard problem — AmadeusD
I am under the impression that this requires biting the "consciousness is not emergent from neural activity" bullet hard, but nothing else - only serves to preclude a fully physicalist account of consciousness, and all the interesting questions are still in the air (what, where from, how, why etc..) about consciousness. — AmadeusD
That's not my argument. That's the premise, which i dispute.The difference is that we can program computers to act like us. But there's no reason to think p-zombies would act like us.
— Patterner
By your own argument, there is. The p-zombie would be biologically wired to act like us. — Lionino
That's not my argument. That's the premise, which i dispute. — Patterner
How would the p-zombies, which do not possess consciousness, come to be programmed to speak and act as though they did? — Patterner
I would think its brain would prompt it to say something like, "What is 'conscious'?" — Patterner
Why would a computer that had no programming or memory related to consciousness think it was conscious, or come up with the idea on its own? — Patterner
Yes. My position is that the premise is not conceivable. Yes, we can write the words "I conceive of a p-zombie with such-and-such characteristics." But that's just writing words. I can write any outlandish thing i want, but that doesn't make it conceivable.The premise of p-zombies is that they would not ask that. They act exactly the same as us. — Lionino
Yes. But if you didn't train it that way, why would it? If you didn't train p-zombies that way, why would they?If you train an AI on comments talking about things such as feelings and so on, the AI would talk as if it is conscious. — Lionino
I would think its brain would prompt it to say something like, "What is 'conscious'?"
— Patterner
The premise of p-zombies is that they would not ask that. They act exactly the same as us. — Lionino
Yes. My position is that the premise is not conceivable. Yes, we can write the words "I conceive of a p-zombie with such-and-such characteristics." But that's just writing words. I can write any outlandish thing i want, but that doesn't make it conceivable.
A square circle that was shaped like a pyramid and made entirely of chocolate flavored whipped cream flew into a black hole, lived there for a year, changed its mind, and flew back out. — Patterner
Yes. But if you didn't train it that way, why would it? If you didn't train p-zombies that way, why would they? — Patterner
it would know it's not conscious — RogueAI
And here I specially stayed to show that, were there such machines exactly resembling
organs and outward form an ape or any other irrational animal, we could have no means of knowing that they were in any respect of a different nature from these animals; but if there were machines bearing the image of our bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as far as it is morally possible, there would still remain two most certain tests whereby to know that they were not therefore really men. Of these the first is that they could never use words or other signs arranged in such a manner as is competent to us in order to declare our thoughts to others : for we may easily conceive a machine to be so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it emits some correspondent to the action upon it of external objects which cause a change in its organs; for example, if touched in a particular place it may demand what we wish to say to it; if in another it may cry out that it is hurt, and such like; but not that it should arrange them variously so as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as men of the lowest grade of intellect can do. The second test is, that although such machines might execute many things with equal or perhaps greater perfection than any of us, they would, without doubt, fail in certain others from which it could be discovered that they did not act from knowledge, but solely from the disposition of their organs: for while reason is an universal instrument that is alike available on every occasion, these organs, on the contrary, need a particular arrangement for each particular action; whence it must be morally impossible that there should exist in any machine a diversity of organs sufficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life, in the way in which our reason enables us to act.
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