The question is whether or not - during the all times when we are looking at Cypress trees lining the banks - if we are directly perceiving the world as it is — creativesoul

You can only know that you are looking a a mkondo in the world if you already know the meaning of "mkondo". It is true that humans may impose their concept of a "mkondo" onto the elementary particles and elementary forces that they observe in space-time, but this mkondo wouldn't exist without a human concept being imposed upon the elementary particles and elementary forces that do exist in space-time.

So what are we perceiving?

On the one hand we are perceiving a set of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, meaning that we are directly perceiving the world as it is, and on the other hand we are also perceiving a mental concept, meaning that we are also indirectly perceiving the world as we think it is.

Perception needs both aspects, something in the world and something in the mind.
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You figure the tree stops being a directly perceptible entity that has existed long before you ever came across it simply because you've never seen one? — creativesoul

As a "tree" is a human concept, and as human concepts didn't exist prior to humans, then "trees" couldn't have existed priori to humans. It is true that humans may impose their concept of a "tree" onto the elementary particles and elementary forces that they observe in space-time, but this tree wouldn't exist without a human concept being imposed upon it.
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You cannot believe that the Cypress trees along the banks of Mississippi delta backwaters only exist within your mind. — creativesoul

Speaking from a position of Realism, I agree that something exists in the world independent of any human observer, such as elementary forces and elementary particles in space-time. However, as "cypress trees along the banks of Mississippi delta backwaters" only exist as human concepts, they can only exist in the human mind. It is true that I may impose my concept of a "tree" onto what I observe in the world, but the tree as a single entity still only exists in my mind and not the world.

Some relevant science:
...
..Kohler wear a pair of hand-engineered goggles. Inside those goggles, specially arranged mirrors flipped the light that would reach Kohler's eyes, top becoming bottom, and bottom top. — wonderer1

Why, though, when the original projection on the retina is already flipped upside down by the eye's lens, and then flipped back in conscious awareness.

To flip or otherwise distort the projection on the eye's retina does however show that it takes a few hours or days for conscious awareness to adjust itself to new conditions of observation.

(B) solves (or appears to solve) a number of philosophical problems, which is why it shows up perennially. — frank

And introduces new (bigger?) problems, like why did the conveyor belt come back with six dots rather than three? And why/how do things cease to exist when we turn around and come back into existence when we turn back?

And introduces new (bigger?) problems, like why did the conveyor belt come back with six dots rather than three? And why/how do things cease to exist when we turn around and come back into existence when we turn back? — Michael

The basic idea is that explanations are post hoc. You place the event in a historical context as in dreams. Explaining the six dots is not a challenge to this kind of idealism. The challenge is solipsism.

You cannot believe that the Cypress trees along the banks of Mississippi delta backwaters only exist within your mind. — creativesoul

In a world independent of humans are elementary particles, elementary forces in space-time. When we look at such a world, we directly see the world as it is.



The human has various concepts, including the letter "X", and can impose their concept of "X" onto what they see in the world, thereby enabling them to see an X in the world. Because we can see the letter X in the diagram above, does that mean the letter X exists in the diagram above.

I agree that the parts making up what we call X can exist independently of humans.

The question is, can what we call X exist as a whole exist independently of humans.

My belief is that whilst the parts making up what we call X can exist independently of humans, what we call X as a whole can only exist in the presence of humans.

The human can look at the world and see a tree. I would agree that the parts making of what we call a tree can exist independently of humans, but wouldn't agree that what we call a tree can exist as a whole independently of humans.

Carrying on from this, the argument is something like:

If ordinary macroscopic objects are fully mind-independent then ontological reductionism is correct.
Ontological reductionism is incorrect.
Therefore, ordinary macroscopic objects are not fully mind-independent.

As an example, "I drive a car" is true but "a collection of atoms drives a collection of atoms" is false. Therefore, I am and/or the car is not reducible to just being a collection of atoms. But there's no way to draw a mind-independent distinction between cars and collections of atoms. That distinction is only meaningful in the context of the world as-seen and as-understood and as-talked-about by organisms like us.

Collections of atoms exist independently of us, but that this collection of atoms is a car is not independent of us.

Collections of atoms exist independently of us, but that this collections of atoms is a car is not independent of us. — Michael

There's more than swarms atoms in fundamental physics, such as the forces that bind atoms together so that they necessarily form what we in our scale see as cars etc.. Seeing a car has this hierarchical structure that includes the atoms and the forces that bind them together, reflect their visual properties and so on.

There's more than swarms atoms in fundamental physics, such as the forces that bind atoms together so that they necessarily form what we in our scale see as cars etc — jkop

Yes, but that "what we in our scale see as cars" depends on us (and our sense organs) and is an essential component. The notion that a car is reducible to atoms and the forces that bind them together is a false one, but is unavoidable if you try to remove humans from the equation.

I think the article I referenced here addressed something like this, although I don't have access to it at the moment to confirm.

However, for the Indirect Realist, what is indirect is the relation between the object that exists in the world and the observer's perception of it.

As I see it, the Direct Realist is proposing that we know the world as it really is, in that if we perceive an object to be green then we know that the object is green.

I don't think that this is a case of semantics for the Direct Realist, in that if we perceive an object to be green then by definition the object is green. I think that the Direct Realist is saying that the object "is" ontologically in fact green.

The Indirect Realist is proposing that we don't know the world as it really is, but only know a representation of it, in that our perception of the colour green is only a representation of the object..

The question for the Direct Realist is, how can they know that the object is really green if their only knowledge of the object has come second-hand through the process of a chain of events, albeit a direct chain of events.

Yes, the term “green” describes the object. We know the object is green because that’s what it looks like. I can point to green objects as opposed to red objects. I can also touch, smell, or taste green objects. I can destroy them if I wanted to, and see what lies behind the surface. I can even find out what makes them green. I can name each one of them, categorize them, and apply a label to them. And I can confer with others who possess similar abilities and compare our findings.

These acts allows us to discern information about that particular object and make inferences about similar objects. This is first-hand, not second hand knowledge.

One cannot perform any similar acts with a representation. One cannot see, touch, smell, or taste them. This is because the term “Representation” lacks any real-world referent. There is neither type nor token. He cannot find one. He cannot point one out. The indirect realist does in fact not know anything about representations.

The question for the indirect realist is, how can he know the object is not really green given that his knowledge is limited to and familiar with representations, and not green objects?

We know the object is green because we because that’s what it looks like. — NOS4A2

Do these mean different things?

1. The object is green
2. The object looks green

I don’t think so.

I don’t think so. — NOS4A2

Then "this object is green but looks green" isn't a contradiction, and so "this objects looks green therefore it is green" is a non sequitur, and so "we know that the object is green because it looks green" is false.

Sorry, misread my own question.

If "this object is green" and "this object looks green" mean the same thing then "we know that the object is green because it looks green" means the same thing as "we know that the object looks green because it looks green" which says nothing to address the arguments made by either direct or indirect realism.

Well sure, one implies a little more certainty than the other. A little more examination ought to suffice and relieve any doubts. What is it about the object that says otherwise?

Collections of atoms exist independently of us, but that this collection of atoms is a car is not independent of us. — Michael

Agree. There is also the problem of relations. If a set of parts makes a whole, and a collection of atoms makes a car, then there must be some kind of ontological relation between the parts and the whole and there must be some kind of ontological relation between the collection of atoms and the car. Ontological relations are problematic. (As an aside, relations between objects has a different meaning to forces between objects.)

But as the SEP article on Relations writes:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

As the SEP article on Bradley's Regress writes

“Bradley’s Regress” is an umbrella term for a family of arguments that lie at the heart of the ontological debate concerning properties and relations. The original arguments were articulated by the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley, who, in his work Appearance and Reality (1893), outlined three distinct regress arguments against the relational unity of properties. Bradley argued that a particular thing (a lump of sugar) is nothing more than a bundle of qualities (whiteness, sweetness, and hardness) unified into a cohesive whole via a relation of some sort. But relations, for Bradley, were deeply problematic. Conceived as “independent” from their relata, they would themselves need further relations to relate them to the original relata, and so on ad infinitum. Conceived as “internal” to their relata, they would not relate qualities at all, and would also need further relations to relate them to qualities. From this, Bradley concluded that a relational unity of qualities is unattainable and, more generally, that relations are incoherent and should not be thought of as real.

If relations have no ontological existence in the world, then in a mind-independent world there can only ever be a collection of parts and never any whole. There can be elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, but there can never be trees.

Well sure, one implies a little more certainty than the other. A little more examination ought to suffice and relieve any doubts. What is it about the object that says otherwise? — NOS4A2

Sorry, I'm a bit confused now as my comment originally misunderstood your answer but your response now suggests that I understood it correctly? Were you saying that they mean the same thing or that they mean different things?

Now I’m not too sure. I’ll defer to your judgement. At any rate, rather than litigate sentences how about we examine the evidence regarding green objects. Would you say an object that appears green is not green?

We know the object is green because that’s what it looks like. — NOS4A2

Sunlight hits an object in the world, some light is absorbed by the object and what light isn't absorbed is reflected off the object, this light travels through space to the eye, enters the eye and travels up the optic nerve as an electrical signal to the brain where it is somehow processed by the brain enabling the mind to perceive a green colour.

When you look into a mirror and see the reflection of a person, you wouldn't say that the mirror is a person.

So why, when you look at an object that has reflected a wavelength of 500nm, do you say that the object is green?

What do you mean by the word "is", as in "the object is green"?

So why, when you look at an object that has reflected a wavelength of 500nm, do you say that the object is green?

I would. You can contrast the object with other objects of similar or dissimilar colors. So it’s clear to me that something of that object makes it green. What makes it not green, in your view?

You can contrast the object with other objects of similar or dissimilar colors. So it’s clear to me that something of that object makes it green. What makes it not green, in your view? — NOS4A2

I would say that I perceive an object as being green.
If I perceive an object as being green, then only as a figure of speech I would say that the object is green.
I might say that the object has reflected light of a wavelength of 500nm which I perceive as being green.
I would never say that the object is green in an ontological sense.

The object is not green in the same way that the mirror is not a person.

Yeah, any statement would be just fine in my view.

Would you say something of the object makes it appear green, or makes you perceive it as being green, or makes it reflect that wavelength, for instance chlorophyll?

Would you say an object that appears green is not green? — NOS4A2

That depends on whether or not "is green" and "appears green" mean the same thing.

If they mean the same thing then it's a truism that an object that appears green is green, but then to say that an object is green is just to say that an object appears green, and so says nothing that conflicts with indirect realism.

If they mean different things then it depends on what "green" means. An object is a collection of atoms with a surface of electrons that absorb and emit photons of various wavelengths. Does the word "green" refer to something here? If it doesn't then an object isn't green.

If it does refer to something here, then what does it refer to? Perhaps "green" means "emits photons with a wavelength between 500 and 600nm". But then what do we mean when we say that an object is green but appears blue? Does it mean that the object emits photons with a wavelength between 500 and 600nm but appears to emit photons with a wavelength between 450 and 495nm? I don't think so.

I think colour terms like "green" and "blue" and "red" ordinarily refer to something else when we are talking about how a thing appears. The "green" in "is green" means something different to the "green" in "appears green". They share the same word because of the consistency with which the former is causally responsible for the latter. This has unfortunately led some to equivocate.

This is why I prefer to talk about things other than sight, because there's less room to equivocate because there's more variety in how we respond to the same stimulation. For example, there's phenylthiocarbamide, a chemical that tastes bitter to 70% of people but is tasteless to everyone else.

We might say that food tastes bitter because it contains phenylthiocarbamide, and so "this is bitter" means "this contains phenylthiocarbamide", but then the 30% of people who find phenylthiocarbamide tasteless will agree that it contains phenylthiocarbamide but disagree that it's bitter.

So is food that contains phenylthiocarbamide bitter?

What does "is bitter" mean? What does "tastes bitter" mean? What does "bitter" mean?

So is phenylthiocarbamide bitter?

70% of the time, sure. 30% of the time, not so much.

Do bitter representations or sense-data have phenylthiocarbamide in them?

70% of the time, sure. 30% of the time, not so much. — NOS4A2

But notice that nothing about phenylthiocarbamide has changed. Its existence and its properties are 'fixed'. So how can it be that a chemical with a fixed existence and fixed properties is sometimes bitter and sometimes not?

It must be that "is bitter" doesn't refer to phenylthiocarbamide at all. It's a pragmatic fiction; a naive projection of our sensations. It is just the case that when phenylthiocarbamide stimulates the sense receptors in some people's tongues, a bitter experience is elicited.

Do bitter representations or sense-data have phenylthiocarbamide in them? — NOS4A2

No, precisely because "this is bitter" doesn't (always) mean "this contains phenylthiocarbamide", much like "this is green" doesn't (always) mean "this emits photons with a wavelength of 500nm".

There is a meaningful sense in which terms like "bitter" and "green" don't refer to any property of some external stimulus. I would say that first and foremost they refer to the quality of the conscious experience, and that we might then also use them to refer to the ordinary cause of that quality of experience.

Would you say something of the object makes it appear green, or makes you perceive it as being green, or makes it reflect that wavelength, for instance chlorophyll? — NOS4A2

Yes, there is something distinctive about the object that means it absorbs some wavelengths of light and reflects the rest, making the object appear green to an observer.

In a similar way, the fact that a mirror appears to be a person does not mean that the mirror is a person.

But notice that nothing about phenylthiocarbamide has changed. Its existence and its properties are 'fixed'. So how can it be that a chemical with a fixed existence and fixed properties is sometimes bitter and sometimes not?

It must be that "is bitter" doesn't refer to phenylthiocarbamide at all. It's a pragmatic fiction; a naive projection of sensory experience.

Right, the variation probably has something to do with the senses of the perceiver, perhaps his tongue. But the 70% of people with those tongues know that when they touch it to that chemical, it is, or tastes bitter. Therefor something about that chemical induces their body to make that judgement.

But what is “sensory experience”? As a noun, It is without a referent. It doesn’t refer to anything. It doesn’t refer to either perceiver (a person), or perceived (the chemical), nor to the relationship or interactions between both. It is a fiction. Likewise there is no such projection.

No, precisely because "this is bitter" doesn't mean "this contains phenylthiocarbamide", much like "this is green" doesn't mean "this emits photons with a wavelength of 500nm.

Perhaps not in a strict, analytic sense. But it can and does to those who need not sift through their sentence for veracity.

But what is “sensory experience”? — NOS4A2

That is still an open question. Perhaps property dualism is correct and sensory experience, and consciousness in general, is a non-physical phenomenon that supervenes on brain activity.

At the very least we have to accept that sensory terms like colour and taste do not refer exclusively to the surface properties of things like apples, and to take care not to conflate these uses.

That is still an open question. Perhaps property dualism is correct and sensory experience, like consciousness in general, is a non-physical phenomenon that supervenes on brain activity.

We’ve looked in all the objects involved and have found no thing nor substance worthy of the noun-phrase. So perhaps it’s all a fiction after all.

In any case, it cannot be shown that there is any such intermediary standing between the perceiver and the perceived, there simply is no evidence to support any dualism of any kind.

We’ve looked in all the objects involved and have found no thing nor substance worthy of the noun-phrase. So perhaps it’s all a fiction after all.

In any case, it cannot be shown that there is any such intermediary standing between the perceiver and the perceived, there simply is no evidence to support any dualism of any kind. — NOS4A2

Consciousness doesn’t extend beyond the body, so objects outside the body are not present in my consciousness, and those objects’ properties are not present in appearances.

That suffices as indirect realism for me.

The human can look at the world and see a tree. I would agree that the parts making of what we call a tree can exist independently of humans, but wouldn't agree that what we call a tree can exist as a whole independently of humans.

This is an interesting line, and I think it gets something crucial correct. However, I find that mereological nihilism (i.e. the denial that wholes like trees and cats really exist) tends to have two problems.

The first has to do with the insistence on discrete particles as the basis of reality. So, to your point:

In a world independent of humans are elementary particles, elementary forces in space-time. When we look at such a world, we directly see the world as it is.

are there just "elementary particles" or are there just "elementary forces?" There is plenty of work in the philosophy of physics and physics proper that claims to demonstrate that "particles" are just another of those things that don't really exist "independently of humans." They are a contrivance to help us think of things in the terms we are used to. I've seen particles likened to the "shadows on the walls of Plato's cave," whereas fields or informational process are said to be "the real deal," or at the very least, demonstrably closer to it.

Likewise, mathematized conceptions of the universe, ontic structural realism, tends to propose that the universe as a whole is a single sort of mathematical object, not that the universe is made up of such objects, although I will grant that authors like Tegmark tend to get a little sloppy here in their descriptions. This is the difference between "the world works the way it does because of what things are," and "the world works the way it does because of what it is."

If any part of the old medieval Doctrine of Transcendentals holds up to modern scrutiny, it would be the idea that "unity" appears to be a universal property of being. Everything seems to interact with everything else, and so we don't end up with any divisions independent of minds.

What I find interesting is that this turns out to be the same problem of "the Many and the One" that shows up way back with Parmenides and Shankara. How do we resolve the apparent multiplicity of being with its equally apparent unity? Must one side of the equation be reduced to illusion (e.g., Parmenides, Shankara, modern eliminitivism, etc.)?

The second problem shows up in trying to explain how we end experiencing trees, cats, storms, etc.

When you say:

I would agree that the parts making of what we call a tree can exist independently of humans, but wouldn't agree that what we call a tree can exist as a whole independently of humans.

Where exactly do you see the trees, cats, and thunderstorms as coming from?

For me, they have to come from the same unity from which experience arises. But this presents a puzzle for me. If the experience of trees is caused by this unity, then it would seem like the tree has to, in some way, prexist the experience. Where does it prexist the experience? I would suppose it is in the whole history of the existence of the tree and in the evolution of my sensory system, and its particular development, including my past experiences.

I've found no good solutions here. The most promising might be Hegel's Science of Logic, but it's a very slippery work. But my takeaways from it would be:

1. It doesn't really make sense to declare that "human independent" being is more or less real. The reality/appearance distinction makes sense within consciousness, not applied to being qua being.

2. Notions like tree, cat, tornado, etc. would seem to unfold throughout the history of being and life, having an etiology that transcends to mind/world boundary (a boundary that doesn't exist "human-independently" itself). Our notion of tree has a history on either side of the mind/world distinction, and it's a very long history that involves human social projects, such as science, our evolutionary history, and our personal past.

3. Self-conscious reflection on notions, knowing how a notion is known, and how it has developed, would be the full elucidation of that notion, rather than a view where the notion is somehow located solely in a "mind-independent" realm, which as you note, has serious plausibility problems. A sort of "eye that sees itself and its own vision, and its own seeing of that vision" view, if you will.

Yes, but that "what we in our scale see as cars" depends on us (and our sense organs) and is an essential component. — Michael

It's trivially true that seeing a car is dependent on sense organs, eyes. No-one expects to see a car without a possibility to see it. But does seeing a car depend on us? Again, it's trivially true that observations depend on observers, but many animals see cars as well as trees, rocks, water etc.

While seeing a car is dependent on sense organs and observers, almost any animal can see the car. Unlike our use of the word 'car' seeing the car is a biological phenomenon, so seeing the car is not necessarily dependent on us humans.

The notion that a car is reducible to atoms and the forces that bind them together is a false one, but is unavoidable if you try to remove humans from the equation. — Michael

Surely we can reduce a car to its constituent materials and atoms. The quality of its metal, welding, electricity etc. depend on material properties at the level of atoms. Reduction of the car, however, has little to do with the hierarchical structure of seeing the car. When we (and other animals) see the car, we also see its atoms as they manifest at our level, as materials whose surfaces reflect light in certain ways and set the conditions for how they appear for animals that have the ability to see things.