Your account is akin to saying: I'm not watching pixels activate on my television screen, I'm watching Joe Biden's inauguration. — Michael
This "semantic" directness is so far divorced from the phenomenological directness that concerns the epistemological problem of perception and the dispute between naive and indirect realists that it seems entirely misplaced in these discussions. — Michael
That it's "as direct as it can be" isn't that it's direct. The point made by indirect realists is that you can't smell the cake directly. Direct perception of a cake would require naive realism to be true, which it never is. This non-naive sense of "directness" is a misnomer. — Michael
Are the pixels the perception or the cause of the perception? In your previous example you said that the odour molecules were the cause of the smell. Here you appear to imply that the perception and its cause are equivalent. — Luke
I think I am using language in an ordinary way when I say that you can smell the cake directly. — Luke
It's odd, then, that Intentionalism was included in the SEP article you were quoting. — Luke
Thus, like sense-datum theorists and adverbialists, intentionalists reject Direct Realist Presentation, and admit that we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects, not even in veridical experience.
The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.
If Jodie had told you herself, instead of hearing it from Bob, or if you went to the baseball game and saw it live, instead of watching it on TV, then these would be direct perceptions, right? — Luke
Your analogies are all about things that aren't *experience itself*. A TV isn't experience itself. A baseball game isn't experience itself. I think you misunderstood the words you quoted from me. — flannel jesus
I don't know, I'd have to figure out what sort of thing you might mean by that before I can answer.but there is "indirect experience", right? — hypericin
The pixels are the distal cause of the sensation. You can describe this event as "watching Joe Biden's inauguration" if you like, or you can describe it as "watching pixels" if you like. The latter is certainly an unusual way to describe it, but strictly speaking it's factually correct.
The odour molecules are the distal cause of the sensation. You can describe this event as "smelling a cake in the oven" if you like, or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules" if you like. The latter is certainly an unusual way to describe it, but strictly speaking it's factually correct. — Michael
The "ordinary way of speaking" is not an accurate account of the ontology of perception. The "ordinary way of speaking" developed according to our naive, pre-scientific understanding of the world. — Michael
Even the SEP article adds:
Thus, like sense-datum theorists and adverbialists, intentionalists reject Direct Realist Presentation, and admit that we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects, not even in veridical experience.
It's not clear to me what the intentionalist means by "we directly perceive ordinary objects that are not directly presented to us". It seems hopelessly confused. At best they're equivocating and mean two different things by "direct". — Michael
The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent. — Luke
It means that we don't perceive things directly in the naive realist sense of taking physical objects directly into one's mind (somehow). It is just as I am describing: a perception (including representation) is the end result of a causal chain; for example, taking odour molecules into the olfactory system and converting them into brain signals, etc. The output of this causal chain is a perception such as a smell... — Luke
I don't believe so. I directly smell the cake. I do not smell an intermediary. — Luke
You're just reasserting the irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael
The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent. — Luke
I don’t know how you could smell the cake more directly. Would it be without the causes? — Luke
In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael
If the causal chain of odour molecules, olfactory system, etc. is equivalent to the perception of smelling cake, then what’s the intermarry? The causal chain can’t be both the perception and the intermediary. What’s between the perception and the cake? — Luke
Sensations are the intermediary that sit between rational awareness and distal objects. — Michael
The colour red is not a property of some distal object but a visual sensation. I am directly aware of the colour red and indirectly aware of a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of ~700nm. — Michael
Your intentionalism seems to accept that existence of such sensations but nonetheless wants to say that we are directly aware of the distal object, and even though something like odour molecules are the more proximal cause of the sensation. — Michael
The relevant issue is whether perceptions are direct or indirect, not whether awareness is direct or indirect. — Luke
The smell of cake is not a property of the cake either; it’s an interaction between the cake and the perceiver. That doesn’t mean the perception is not of the cake. — Luke
Is the perception of smelling cake equivalent to the cause of the perception? — Luke
If we are directly aware of sensations and not directly aware of distal objects then we do not directly perceive distal objects. — Michael
The odour molecules in the air are the more proximal cause. So why is it that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael
The cause of the sensation is odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose. The perception is (the rational awareness of) the sensation. — Michael
What's the connection between either of these things and the cake in the oven? — Michael
You provide an accurate account of the mechanics of perception (odour molecules stimulating the sense receptors in my nose, leading to a sensation) but then just throw in the non sequitur "therefore it's the direct perception of a cake in the oven" at the end with no explanation — Michael
The relevant issue is whether perceptions of objects is direct or indirect, not whether awareness of perceptions/sensations is direct or indirect. — Luke
The cake emits the odour molecules, presumably. — Luke
Earlier you seemed to be saying that smelling a cake and "smelling" odour molecules were equivalent, just like watching pixels/light and watching Joe Biden on television. — Luke
Secondly, if perceptions are not equivalent to their causes, then we can ignore the causes, which are irrelevant to the question of whether or not our perceptions are directly of objects or not. — Luke
If awareness of sensations is direct and awareness of objects is indirect then perception of objects is indirect. — Michael
So? Why is the object of perception not the specific thing that stimulates the sense receptors? Why do you get to go back a step in the causal chain and say that it's the cake? — Michael
Yes, you can describe what happens as "smelling cake" or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules", much like you can describe it as "seeing fireworks" or you can describe it as "seeing lights in the sky". — Michael
That's not the same as saying that "perceptions are equal to their causes", so you prior question is misguided. — Michael
What does it mean to say that some sensation is the "direct" perception of some distal object? What conditions must be satisfied for some distal object X to be the "direct" object of perception? — Michael
What if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs? Odour molecules in the air? — Michael
The relevant issue is about perceptions of objects, not awareness of sensations. The directness or indirectness of awareness is irrelevant. — Luke
The view that perception is direct holds that a perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogates thereof.
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The position that perception is direct begins with the common sense intuition that everyday perceiving involves an awareness of ordinary environmental situations.
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The indirect position, in contrast, argues that the common sense intuition of perception as the direct awareness of environmental objects is naïve. Upon closer examination, a perceiver is actually only in direct contact with the proximal stimulation that reaches the receptors, or with sense-data, or with the sensations or internal images they elicit - but not with the distal object itself.
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The perceiver is directly aware only of some mind-dependent proxy— the sense-data, internal image, or representation - and only indirectly aware of the mind-independent world.
How do the causes of a perception act as an intermediary between the perception and its object? — Luke
Would be nice if everyone wrote down what they thought a a perceptual intermediary was and why it matters!
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