Since most of his senses point outward one would assume he mostly perceives in an outward direction — NOS4A2

What does this mean?

But indirect realism undermines this relationship. It claims that even though the senses point outward, and interact directly with the rest of the world, his perception remains inward. — NOS4A2

The indirect realist recognises that in most cases the causal chain of perception is:

distal object → proximal stimulus → sense receptor → sensation → rational awareness

The indirect realist also recognises that the qualities of the sensation are not properties of the distal object (although in some accounts the so-called "primary qualities" of the sensation, such as visual geometry, "resemble" the relevant properties of the distal object).

So in what sense is the relationship between rational awareness (or even sensation) and the distal object direct?

And given that I see things when I dream and hallucinate, sometimes the casual chain is just:

sensation → rational awareness

What is the direct object of perception in these cases? Why would the involvement of some distal object, proximal stimulus, and sense receptor prior to the sensation change this?

I've been arguing that the perception is the smell, not its causes. — Luke

I have felt that was the case - but then, I don't quite understand the resistance to settling the question on one side or the other. It seems clear that you would hold a view, given you consider perception "the smell" which is an experience - and not, from what I gather, how most people consider those two things in tandem (i.e, in causal relation rather than identical relation).

What does this mean?

The senses point outward and interact with the mediums found in the rest of the world. Since they point outward, you cannot see into your own skull, for instance. One cannot sense what is actually going on in there. It’s one of the main reasons why a bodily state of feelings cannot be reconciled with a bodily state of affairs, and the first-person perspective of oneself is always one of grasping and guesswork.

The indirect realist recognises that in most cases the causal chain of perception is:

distal object → proximal stimulus → sense receptor → sensation → rational awareness

The indirect realist also recognises that the qualities of the sensation are not properties of the distal object (although in some accounts the so-called "primary qualities" of the sensation, such as visual geometry, "resemble" the relevant properties of the distal object).

So in what sense is the relationship between rational awareness (or even sensation) and the distal object direct?

And given that I see things when I dream and hallucinate, sometimes the casual chain is just:

sensation → rational awareness

What is the direct object of perception in these cases? Why would the involvement of some distal object, proximal stimulus, and sense receptor prior to the sensation change this?

The direct object of perception is the environment. It can never be just one object, so I take issue that. It’s myriad objects, mediums, interacting with myriad senses. I’m not only aware of the object, but what it sits on, is beside it, in front of it, the relative distance between us, of the light, the oxygen, the ground, and so on. If I doubt any of this I can get closer and examine it, pick it up, and can confirm with others the accuracy of what I’m perceiving.

It’s direct because at no point in your chain is there any intermediary. I would distill it as such:

Perceived → Perceiver.

There isn’t anything in between me and what I’m aware of. I’m just given a bunch of nouns-without-a-referent. No perceiver I’ve met is a “rational awareness”, as far as I can tell. Or when I point to a sensation I point to my body. This is largely why I take issue with the indirect realist account.

Since they point outward, you cannot see into your own skull, for instance. — NOS4A2

The indirect realist doesn’t claim that we see into own own skull. You’re misrepresenting what is meant by seeing something or feeling something. I feel pain, I see mountains in my dream. Nothing about this entails anything like the sense organs “pointing” inwards or anything like that.

In most cases the sense organs play a causal role in seeing and feeling and smelling, but “I see X” doesn’t simply mean “the sense receptors in my eye have been stimulated by some object in the environment.”

It’s direct because at no point in your chain is there any intermediary. I would distill it as such: — NOS4A2

There literally are intermediaries. Light is an intermediary between the table and my eye. My eye is an intermediary between the light and my brain, etc.

Or when I point to a sensation I point to my body. — NOS4A2

That doesn’t make it right to. We know that people with certain brain disorders are blind even though they have functioning eyes, and we know that people can be made to see things by bypassing the eyes and directly stimulating the brain, so clearly whatever vision is it sits somewhere behind the eyes, either in the visual cortex or in some supervenient mental phenomenon.

The indirect realist doesn’t claim that we see into own own skull. You’re misrepresenting what is meant by seeing something or feeling something. I feel pain, I see mountains in my dream. Nothing about this entails anything like the sense organs “pointing” inwards or anything like that.

I'm not claiming anyone claims such a thing. I'm claiming our senses point outward, not that indirect realists claim they point inward. The point is: if seeing involves the eyes, and eyes point outward, and we know a mountain cannot exist in someone's body, it just isn't the case that you see mountains in your dreams. It would be more accurate to say that you dream of mountains, in my opinion.

In most cases the sense organs play a causal role in seeing and feeling and smelling, but “I see X” doesn’t simply mean “the sense receptors in my eye have been stimulated by some object in the environment.”

But that's what seeing entails, and the eyes are fundamental to the process and biology of sight.

There literally are intermediaries. Light is an intermediary between the table and my eye. My eye is an intermediary between the light and my brain, etc.

Light is of the world. The eye is of the perceiver. It just doesn't make sense to me that the perceiver can be the intermediary for himself. The contact is direct, so much so that light is absorbed by the eye, and utilized in such an intimate fashion that there is no way such a process could be in any way indirect, simply because nothing stands between one and the other.

That doesn’t make it right to. We know that people with certain brain disorders are blind even though they have functioning eyes, so clearly whatever vision is it sits somewhere behind the eyes, either in the visual cortex or in some supervenient mental phenomenon.

Yes, more than just eyes are involved in vision. I would argue it requires the whole body, give or take. A functional internal carotid artery, for instance, which supplies blood to the head, is required for sight, as are the orbital bones and the muscles of the face. Sight requires a spine, metabolism, digestion, water, and so on. Because of this, I believe, the entity "perceiver" must extend to the entirety of the body. In any case, I cannot say it can be reduced to some point behind the eyes.

The contact is direct, so much so that light is absorbed by the eye, and utilized in such an intimate fashion that there is no way such a process could be in any way indirect…. — NOS4A2

Agreed, but restricted to the eye. Nothing internally and outside the eye uses light.

A functional internal carotid artery, for instance, which supplies blood to the head, is required for sight — NOS4A2

The carotid artery and assorted peripherals may be necessary, but are not sufficient for vision or any sensation predicated on a particular physiology; they aren’t involved in nor benefit from the various processes themselves.

For whatever each perceptual apparatus provides, there is that which is both sufficient and necessary for the process to continue, which reduces to a specificity congruent with the mode of sensation.

It just doesn't make sense to me that the perceiver can be the intermediary for himself. — NOS4A2

Depends on what one thinks is contained in a sensation. If he thinks mere sensation is not enough for knowledge, then it is reasonable to suppose the remainder is provided by the perceiver himself, in which case he is his own intermediary, even if only between the thing he directly senses, and that with which he complements the sensation indirectly, in order to represent its object to himself.

it just isn't the case that you see mountains in your dreams. It would be more accurate to say that you dream of mountains, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

Dreams, and hallucinations, have various perceptual modes. I see things and hear things and smell things. The things I see and hear and smell when I dream, and hallucinate, are not distal objects.

Light is of the world. The eye is of the perceiver. It just doesn't make sense to me that the perceiver can be the intermediary for himself. The contact is direct, so much so that light is absorbed by the eye, and utilized in such an intimate fashion that there is no way such a process could be in any way indirect, simply because nothing stands between one and the other.

...

Yes, more than just eyes are involved in vision. I would argue it requires the whole body, give or take. A functional internal carotid artery, for instance, which supplies blood to the head, is required for sight, as are the orbital bones and the muscles of the face. Sight requires a spine, metabolism, digestion, water, and so on. Because of this, I believe, the entity "perceiver" must extend to the entirety of the body. In any case, I cannot say it can be reduced to some point behind the eyes. — NOS4A2

There is such a thing as visual percepts. It's what the blind (even with functioning eyes) lack. It's what occurs when we dream and hallucinate, as well as when awake and not hallucinating. They come into existence when the relevant areas of the visual cortex are active. The features of these percepts are not the distal objects (or their properties) that are ordinarily the cause of them. The features of these percepts is the only non-inferential information given to rational thought; that inform our understanding. The relationship between these percepts and distal objects is in a very literal physical sense indirect; there are a number of physical entities and processes that sit between the distal object and the visual percept in the causal chain.

This is what indirect realism is arguing. It's not arguing anything like "the human body indirectly responds to sensory stimulation by its environment" or "the rods and cones in the eye react to something inside the head" which seems to be your (mis)interpretation of the position.

There literally are intermediaries. — Michael

Physical, inarguable ones. It's quite fun watching them dance around this.
Luke is making some inroads, though, positing that 'direct' relates to perceptions (representations) and then refering to Austin's preposterous attempt at denying the physical, empirical, measurable reality of sense-data.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?..............I'd like to read your answer to the question above
— creativesoul

I agree that the proposition in language "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are in the world Cypress trees lining the banks.

However, the question is, where exactly is this world. Does this world exist in the mind or outside the mind. — RussellA

:yikes:

Evidence/remnants/consequences of linguistic bewitchment(radical skepticism/idealism).


We spoke earlier about this. The trees are in the Mississippi delta backwaters. We could increase specificity. Hone our aim, as it were. There's a small bayou named "Manchac". I could show you a map. I could take you there and show you in person. Coming off of the bayou Manchac and then reconnecting to it are canals. All along the banks of some of those canals are docks, decks, houseboats, houses, and living areas. There are sometimes adjacent swampy areas close by. Bald Cypress grow there.

None of those things and none of those places are in my mind.

Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right.
— creativesoul

I could say "I perceive the colour green" or "I am conscious of the colour green". These mean the same thing, on the assumption that perceiving requires consciousness, in that I can only perceive something when conscious. — RussellA

What I'm saying is that it is possible for a capable creature to directly perceive green cups but because they do so by means of ways that they are completely unaware of, they're not conscious of perceiving. They're just doing it.

House cats can see green cups in cupboards and have no idea that they're called "green cups".

Because they are unaware of the fact that they are perceiving green cups, they do not have conscious awareness of the fact that they are perceiving a green cup while they're watching another creature hide by moving around to the other side.

The cat is now paying very close attention to the green cup. S/he's watching the edges. S/he's anticipating seeing the mouse. The cup may not appear the same to her/him as it does to us, at least regarding the color.

It seems that some here think that having biological machinery somehow discounts any and/or all capable creatures from directly perceiving things. As if having eyes somehow disqualifies one from even being able to directly perceive the green cup in the cupboard. "The green cup" is a rigid designator.

When looking at the same object, I may perceive the colour green and the other person may perceive the colour blue. I can never know what colour they are perceiving, not being telepathic. However, if the other person is perceiving the colour blue, then one of us is not seeing the object as it really is. — RussellA

If the object has no inherently existing mind-independent property of color to speak of, then it makes no sense to accuse either one of you of not seeing the object 'as it really is'(whatever that's supposed to mean). It's appearing green to you and blue to them makes no difference - if the object has no inherently mind independent property of color.

Someone recently accused indirect realists of working from the same mistakes as naive realists.

If the object appears green to you and blue to them, it is because the object both of you are directly perceiving has different effects/affects on different individuals. It does not follow from that that we do not or cannot(which is what some seem to suggest) directly perceive the object under consideration.

The cat can too.

We do not perceive mental concepts.
— creativesoul

We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept. — RussellA

Trees are in the yard. Concepts are in the language talking about the yard. Both are in the world. Concepts are in worldviews. Cypress trees are in the backwaters of the Louisiana delta.

Absurd to deny, I should think, and thereby easily dismissed.

Now, whatever shall we do with realism? — Mww

That which is real has affects/effects.

Let's take Direct Perception: The View from Here as a starting point: — Michael

Did you read all of this article? It argues in favour of direct realism. For example, the first sentence of the Reprise states:

I have argued that Gibson's ecological theory provides the elements of a plausible account of direct perception and offers means to fend off the standard arguments against it.

The article also presents strong arguments against indirect realism, which are similar to those I have been making (especially the category mistake mentioned at its third point):

How does Gibson's approach to perception compare with the representationalist one? On the standard representationalist view, perception is conceived as a process of getting an image, description, or symbol—some representation—of the environmental object into the head or mind of the perceiver. The representation stands for something in the world and constitutes the object of awareness; the observer does not immediately perceive or experience the environment, but only her mental representation thereof.

However, getting a representation of the world into the head does not really solve the problem. First, it sets up a logical regress analogous to the classic homunculus problem of picture-in-the-head theories: if the object of awareness is an internal image or representation, who perceives the image or interprets the representation? Second, this returns us to Hume's problem, for interpreting a representation presumes prior knowledge of the environmental entities for which the representations stand, and how they correspond. Third, it commits the representationalist fallacy of confusing the object of awareness with the vehicle of awareness (Huemer 2001). One may perceive the environment (the object of awareness) by means of an internal state (the vehicle of awareness), but to say that one perceives the vehicle of awareness itself is a category mistake that leads to the regress. The representationalist ends up claiming that we only perceive our internal states, which involves creating an internal representation of an internal representation (etc.), thereby ringing down the veil of perception.

Alternatively, perception may be conceptualized as a relation between the perceiver and the environment, in which the perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary environmental objects. Gibson's view of direct perception is of this stripe. But the question persists: what goes on in the perceiver when she becomes aware of an environmental object, if not getting a description of it into her head? For Gibson, the observer's perceptual system, which is attuned to specific information, resonates to that information. There are thus coordinated changes of state in the environment and the perceiver. The perceptual system's activity covaries with distal environmental features and properties, enabling actions to be oriented to them. The object of awareness is the environmental object, and the vehicle of awareness is the resonating perceptual system.

The relationship between these percepts and distal objects is in a very literal physical sense indirect; there are a number of physical entities and processes that sit between the distal object and the visual percept in the causal chain. — Michael

The causal chain is prior to the visual percept. If, by "visual percept", you mean a "perception" of a distal object, then it cannot be a perception of the causal chain, since the causal chain is prior to, and is the cause of, that perception.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived.

You do not perceive the causal chain that produces your visual percepts.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived. — Luke

That is, in fact, the hump the indirect realist cannot understand a Direct Realism not getting over.

If the Realist argument boiled down to "I directly perceive images, formed by my brain, which are indirect representations of distal objects caused by intermediaries between the objects and my sense organs and further, my photo receptors, and further my nerves, and further my visual cortex, and even further my experience of such.." I don't think there would be a conflict.

If the Realist argument boiled down to "I directly perceive images, formed by my brain, — AmadeusD

You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions.

...which are indirect representations of distal objects... — AmadeusD

What makes them "indirect representations of distal objects"?

...caused by intermediaries between the objects and my sense organs" — AmadeusD

The relevant intermediary is between the objects and your perceptions, not the objects and your sense organs.

You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions — Luke

That is, in fact, what that sentence means. I do not see the distinction you're trying to make here. My brain conjures up images of objects - which aren't the objects. And my experience is of that. The idea that the images conjured by my brain are distinct from my perceptions may be misguided, but it's not relevant to the position. I can only experience those images. I cannot experience anything but (in the realm of vision). That's what matters.

What makes them "indirect representations of distal objects"? — Luke

A representation is indirect. It is something re-presented. Unless you're positing that looking at an apple causes an apple to appear physically in my, physical mind.. I'm unsure how this question is sensible. Also:

between the objects and my sense organs and further, my photo receptors, and further my nerves, and further my visual cortex, and even further my experience of such.. — AmadeusD

Answering the question "How could this be direct, given there are several way-points - one of whcih we don't even understand, and at least one of which changes the actual form of the 'message'.

The relevant intermediary is between the objects and your perceptions, not the objects and your sense organs. — Luke

They are all relevant. It is literally enough to say that my sight is caused by light bouncing off an object an entering my body to reject Direct Realism. It is very strange that no one has even attempted to deal with this, but still maintains their positions.

On a direct realist account, its not even an open move to claim direct perception - because you take it that empirical knowledge is direct. Therefore, If you 'actually know' that sight is indirect (if you're a direct realist, it is because you wholesale accept the empirical evidence as infallibly direct) then it defeats your position. Which is an interesting conundrum.

The point is, you have to have another system of sight to get around the known system of sight, to claim direct perception. But again,. it seems to me fairly clear that you are arguing a position you couldn't hold.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allowsonly a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived. — Luke

If the above isn't actually your position, and i'm missing context, I am sorry.

But heck, even if you were to read this and go "Ah fuck, I was wrong. Direct Realism is obvious nonsense"...Indirect Realists get ding-en-sich, though. So. Fuck.

I directly perceive images, formed by my brain
— AmadeusD

You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions
— Luke

That is, in fact, what that sentence means. I do not see the distinction you're trying to make here. — AmadeusD

If those images are your perceptions, then your sentence means "I perceive perceptions". If those images are your perceptions, then those images aren't the objects of your perceptions; they aren't the things you perceive. What you perceive is the world, not the images.

A representation is indirect. It is something re-presented. Unless you're positing that looking at an apple causes an apple to appear physically in my, physical mind.. I'm unsure how this question is sensible. — AmadeusD

I think you're asking too much of a perception if you expect it to present objects, instead of to represent objects.

It is literally enough to say that my sight is caused by light bouncing off an object an entering my body to reject Direct Realism. — AmadeusD

Maybe that's enough to reject naive realism, but naive realism isn't hard to reject.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived. — Luke

If the above isn't actually your position, and i'm missing context, I am sorry. — AmadeusD

I'm not arguing for an intermediary; indirect realists are. My point here was about where the intermediary lies: between the perception and its perceived distal object, and not between the perception and its prior, imperceptible causes.

↪hypericin These words are too abstract for me, an example might help. — flannel jesus

Consider the experience of watching a YouTube video of a man telling a story. Your mind is transported to the world of the story, it is what occupies your attention. But your experience of the story is indirect. More direct is your experience of the man and his voice, as you experience the story via his voice and gestures. But this experience is still indirect, what is even more direct is your experience of your computer making sounds and images, as you experience the man's voice and gestures via your computers monitor and speakers.

Within this framework, the indirect realist says that this is still indirect, that there is a fundamental, bedrock, direct layer of experience. Of course, this is subjective sensory experience, because you experience every aspect of the world only via sensory experience. — hypericin

Did you read all of this article? It argues in favour of direct realism. — Luke

Yes, I wasn't offering it as a defence of indirect realism. I was offering it as an explanation that the problem of perception concerns whether or not we are directly aware of distal objects and their properties.

The causal chain is prior to the visual percept. If, by "visual percept", you mean a "perception" of a distal object, then it cannot be a perception of the causal chain, since the causal chain is prior to, and is the cause of, that perception.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived.

You do not perceive the causal chain that produces your visual percepts. — Luke

I'm not saying that we perceive the causal chain. I'm simply trying to explain the inconsistency in your position. You say that there are no intermediaries between visual percepts and some distal object, and yet there are; the odour molecules in the air are an intermediary between the visual percept and the cake in the oven.

I'm also trying to understand why you say that the perception is of the cake in the oven, and not of the odour molecules, given that it is the odour molecules that stimulate the sense receptors in the nose. Clearly the causal chain has something to do with the object of perception under your account given that, presumably, the object of perception is never some distal object that has no role in the causal chain (e.g. you never see something happening on Mars). So how do you determine which object that is a part of the causal chain is the direct object of perception? You just say it's the cake without explaining why it's the cake.

At least if you were to say that the object of perception is the odour molecules you could defend it by saying that the odour molecules are the proximal stimulus. There is at least some sense in such a claim.

You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions. — Luke

This is where people are getting lost in the grammar.

I see colours. Colours are a visual sensation.

If you don't like the phrasing of the conclusion "therefore I see a visual sensation" then just don't use it. It is still the case that I see colours and that these colours are a visual sensation, not properties of distal objects. The same for every other feature of visual and auditory and olfactory experience. That's the substance of indirect realism.

Perhaps adopt something like adverbialism. Rather than "I see colours" being a verb and a noun it's a verb and an adverb. Maybe that's the best way to understand "the schizophrenic hears voices" or "I saw a mountain in my dream." In each case, whatever is the direct object of perception it isn't some distal object. Waking, non-hallucinatory experiences are of the same kind, and only differ in that there is some appropriate distal cause.

I think calling it "sensory experience" is too presumptive, as it assumes you're sensing something. Maybe I'm misinterpreting it, but like... imagine the phenomenal experience of seeing a yellow square, and then imagine the phenomenal experience of hallucinating a yellow square. Phenomenally, they're the same experience - but would you call the second one a "sensory experience"? Maybe you would, I don't know. Maybe I should, I don't know. I feel uncertain about using that word though.

I'm not saying that we perceive the causal chain. I'm simply trying to explain the inconsistency in your position. You say that there are no intermediaries between perception and some distal object, and yet there are; the odour molecules in the air are an intermediary between perception and the cake in the oven. — Michael

You say you don’t perceive the causal chain. The odour molecules are a part of that unperceived causal chain. According to indirect realism, the intermediary is something that is perceived. The perception one has is not of a causal chain but of a distal object. Otherwise, the perception is of an intermediary/representation of the distal object. Odour molecules are neither the distal object nor a representation of it. Odour molecules are part of the causal chain that you say you don't perceive. The perception you have is of the cake in the oven.

I'm also trying to understand why you say that the perception is of the cake in the oven, and not of the odour molecules, given that it is the odour molecules that stimulate the sense receptors in the nose. — Michael

The perception you have is the smell of cake in the oven. You don't smell the odour molecules, even if they stimulate the sense receptors. The odour molecules are part of a causal explanation for why you have the perception of smelling the cake. You don't smell the causal explanation; you smell the cake.

As I quoted from the article you referenced, the problem with your idea of smelling the odour molecules is that:

...it commits the representationalist fallacy of confusing the object of awareness with the vehicle of awareness (Huemer 2001). One may perceive the environment (the object of awareness [i.e. the cake]) by means of an internal state (the vehicle of awareness [i.e. the odour molecules being converted into brain signals to produce the perception]), but to say that one perceives the vehicle of awareness itself is a category mistake that leads to the regress. The representationalist ends up claiming that we only perceive our internal states, which involves creating an internal representation of an internal representation (etc.), thereby ringing down the veil of perception. — Direct Perception: The View from Here

So how do you determine which object that is a part of the causal chain is the direct object of perception? — Michael

The direct object of perception is, normally, whatever your phenomenal perception is of; whether it's a cake, Joe Biden, a coloured object, or something else.

You just say it's the cake without explaining why it's the cake. — Michael

You originally asked:

In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael

So you originally told us that the perception is of a cake in the oven. What makes it direct is that it is not, instead, a perception of an intermediary or representation of a cake in the oven.

@Michael

I'm not saying that we perceive the causal chain. I'm simply trying to explain the inconsistency in your position. You say that there are no intermediaries between visual percepts and some distal object, and yet there are; the odour molecules in the air are an intermediary between the visual percept and the cake in the oven. — Michael

There will probably be a distinction between there being a perceptual processing step which interfaces the body with the distal object of a perception [which could be construed as a mediating object] and if the resultant perception associated with that distal object is of the perceptual processing step. You seem you construe the perception as of an intermediary sensation which lays "between" the distal object and the perception, and thus perception is not of the distal object and thus is indirect.

Let's just grant that your construal of a perceptual chain is correct for now Michael. Whereas @Luke

You say you don’t perceive the causal chain. The odour molecules are a part of that unperceived causal chain. According to indirect realism, the intermediary is something that is perceived. The perception one has is not of a causal chain but of a distal object. Otherwise, the perception is of an intermediary/representation of the distal object. Odour molecules are neither the distal object nor a representation of it. Odour molecules are part of the causal chain that you say you don't perceive. The perception you have is of the cake in the oven. — Luke

construes perception as direct because it's more appropriate to parse perception itself as the chain

→ proximal stimulus → sense receptor → sensation → rational awareness

which would make it "of" the object, but as a mapping of object behaviours to "rational awareness".

In that regard you also both disagree about what the perceptual object is. If the link between sensation and rational awareness is perception, then the perceptual object is a sensation. If the chain between distal object and rational awareness is perception, then the perceptual object is the distal object.

Futher to my previous post, if I want to use the word 'experience' to only refer to those raw things we have immediate access to, the qualia, then I would say we don't "experience" a baseball game at all.

We experience the visual qualia, and we experience the series of thoughts which include the thought "I'm watching a baseball game" and "this game is fun / this game sucks" and etc.

Thoughts are raw experience, qualia is raw experience, "baseball games" are not raw experience.

And I guess that's why you want to call it an "indirect experience", while I'm kind of inclined to just not use the word "experience" for it - I mean, I would if we were speaking colloquially of course, conversationally, but in this conversation I feel pulled to not use the word 'experience' for things other than those raw things we experience.

And I guess that's why you want to call it an "indirect experience", while I'm kind of inclined to just not use the word "experience" for it - I mean, I would if we were speaking colloquially of course, conversationally, but in this conversation I feel pulled to not use the word 'experience' for things other than those raw things we experience. — flannel jesus

Everyone knows P. In that sentence "Everyone" has no existential instance even in logic. It is a universal quantifier pronoun for further inducing any existential instances if needed. All along you have been barking at the wrong tree claiming it is wrong. It is not a correct way of seeking truth.

Anyway, you still have not answered the question where does mind come from, if it is not from brain.

I think you're in the wrong thread

The trees are in the Mississippi delta backwaters.................I could take you there and show you in person..................None of those things and none of those places are in my mind. — creativesoul

Suppose we are both in Mississippi.

I agree that in a mind-independent world are real things, in that they can physically affect me. They can cause in my sensations sharp pains, acrid smells, sweet tastes, loud noises and colours.

You say that the place Mississippi does not exist in the mind, and yet the original Mississippi Territory was only created by the U.S. Congress in 1798.

Are you saying that the place Mississippi existed before the US Congress named it in 1798?

How did the US Congress know the extent of the territory of Mississippi before the extent had even been written down?
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What I'm saying is that it is possible for a capable creature to directly perceive green cups but because they do so by means of ways that they are completely unaware of, they're not conscious of perceiving. They're just doing it. — creativesoul

I think that the expressions "I see a green cup", "I perceive a green cup". "I am aware of a green cup" and "I am conscious of a green cup" are synonymous.

As an Indirect Realist, I agree that in the first instance I directly perceive a green cup. I don't perceive myself perceiving a green cup, I am not perceiving an image of a green cup and I am not perceiving a representation of a green cup.

Subsequently, however, I can begin to apply reason about what I have perceived, and ask myself what exactly was it that I had perceived. Had I perceived a green cup as it was in the world, had I perceived an image of a green cup, had I perceived a representation of a green cup or had I perceived a cup greenly. However, I agree that all these all philosophical questions don't detract from the point that in the first instance I directly perceive a green cup.
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House cats can see green cups in cupboards and have no idea that they're called "green cups". — creativesoul

How do you know what is in the cat's mind, that the cat sees the cup as green, rather than red or blue?
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If the object has no inherently existing mind-independent property of color to speak of, then it makes no sense to accuse either one of you of not seeing the object 'as it really is'(whatever that's supposed to mean). It's appearing green to you and blue to them makes no difference - if the object has no inherently mind independent property of color. — creativesoul

As an Indirect Realist, I agree that objects in the world don't have the mind-independent property of colour, but the object must have some property otherwise no-one could see it. It could well be the property of being able to reflect a particular wavelength of light, such a red rose has the property of being able to reflect the wavelength of 700nm when illuminated by white light.

I agree that the wavelength of 700nm may have different effects on different people, in that, for example, I may perceive the colour green whilst another person may perceive the colour blue. But no-one will ever know, as it is not possible to look into another person's mind.

The question is, if I perceive the object as having the property green, but in fact the object has the property of being able to reflect a wavelength of 700nm, in what sense am I directly perceiving the object?
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Trees are in the yard. Concepts are in the language talking about the yard. Both are in the world. Concepts are in worldviews. Cypress trees are in the backwaters of the Louisiana delta. — creativesoul

If Cypress trees exist in the world independently of any human mind, then it should be obvious to someone who doesn't know the concept of a Cypress tree, that A and B are the same thing and A and B are different to C

Yet that is obviously not the case.

You seem you construe the perception as of an intermediary sensation which lays "between" the distal object and the perception, and thus perception is not of the distal object and thus is indirect. — fdrake

As referenced in the aforementioned article Direct Perception: The View from Here, "the view that perception is direct holds that a perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogates thereof."

So, to say that my perception is directly of a distal object is to say that I am directly aware of a distal object.

I do not believe that I am directly aware of a distal object. I believe that I am directly aware only of my sensations. Therefore, my perception is not of a distal object and so therefore perception is not direct.

@Luke's position seems to be that perception is direct if sensations are (direct?) representations of distal objects.

The first issue with this is that it doesn't explain what it means for a sensation to be a representation of a distal object.

The second issue with this is that it doesn't explain what determines that the sensation is a representation of that distal object rather than of some other distal object, or even of the proximal stimulus (e.g. why is the sensation a representation of the cake in the oven rather than a representation of the odour molecules in the air).

The third issue with this is that it is prima facie consistent with the indirect realist's claim that we are not directly aware of distal objects, as it may be both that a) we are directly aware only of sensations and that b) sensations are (direct?) representations of distal objects.

The fourth issue with this is that (as mentioned in the SEP article) his position (and any other non-naive so-called "direct" realism) argues that "we directly perceive ordinary objects" and that "we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects." Either his position equivocates on the meaning of "direct" or it contradicts itself.

The odour molecules are a part of that unperceived causal chain. — Luke

The odour molecules are perceived. I smell them.

which would make it "of" the object, but as a mapping of object behaviours to "rational awareness". — fdrake

The concept of perception has a logical feature that rules out one-to-one mapping, molding, or mirroring. As the parade of sights and sounds changes through time, it's supposed to be the same perceiver through all of it. Without that distinction between change and the unchanging, there will be no perception of time because world and perceiver would constantly track. There would only be the now, in which case none of the content of perception would have any meaning and there would be no memory of it.

If it's just that one is allergic to the historical, spiritual baggage surrounding the concept of the enduring perceiver, it can be visualized as a pattern produced by the brain. But if that is also deemed distasteful, the price for discarding the perceiver altogether is that there is neither direct nor indirect perception. I guess perception would become some sort of myth.

The representationalist ends up claiming that we only perceive our internal states…..

Mmm, no; no, he doesn’t. Or, rather, he shouldn’t.

the observer does not immediately perceive or experience the environment, but only her mental representation thereof.

The representationalist observer immediately perceives the environment, but only experiences representations of it.

getting a representation of the world into the head (…) sets up a logical regress analogous to the classic homunculus problem of picture-in-the-head theories

(Sigh) The representationalist sneers at this funny talk. Second-order talk about what goes on in the head creates the folly; the head, in going about its first-order business, on its own sine qua non cognitive methodology, is destroyed by logical regress, which makes it patently obvious that isn’t what happens. It is, then, if this foolishness does seem to go on, the talk about it is catastrophically wrong.

this returns us to Hume's problem, for interpreting a representation presumes prior knowledge of the environmental entities for which the representations stand

Hume’s problem was solved, so it’s a mistake to return to it. Interpreting a representation is a logical function manifest in conceptual relational consistency, re: judgement, which is not a presumption of knowledge.

One may perceive the environment (the object of awareness) by means of an internal state (the vehicle of awareness)

One doesn’t perceive by means of internal states, he understands his perceptions by internal states. He perceives by the sensory apparatuses. The vehicle(S) of awareness then, are the senses. The internal state is the representation of what the awareness is about, which presupposes it. The vehicle of comprehension, the internal state, is not the vehicle of awareness, the senses.

But the question persists: what goes on in the perceiver when she becomes aware of an environmental object, if not getting a description of it into her head?

Getting it into his head? This implies the description has already been determined and comes from someplace else, another example of funny talk. If the system determines the description, it isn’t gotten into the head so much as being born there.

What goes on is an internal construction relating the real object he perceives to what he shall know it as. Bye bye homunculus dude and his reservations in the Cartesian theater.

perception may be conceptualized as a relation between the perceiver and the environment, in which the perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary environmental objects.

Whoa. Finally. Something uncontentious. Sorta. Perception MUST be conceptualized as that relation, in order to prevent all that follows from stumbling all over itself, insofar as to be aware of and to be in contact with, is not to experience.