What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. — Sam26
(2.06)The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)
“Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real. — Sam26
(2.024)Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
(2.0231)The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties.
The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. — Sam26
The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world. — Fooloso4
The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. — Sam26
The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads: — 013zen
Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. — Fooloso4
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.
An item is only a fact if it is true. — Banno
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