What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. — Sam26

"The Earth has six moons" is a state of affairs. It tells us what is the case, but only if it is true.

The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

(2.06)

“Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real. — Sam26

If what is real is what is the case then substance is not real:

Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.

(2.024)

The substance of the world is not a state of affairs. The substance of the world is not a fact. Substance is what stands under and makes possible what is real.

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties.

(2.0231)

This is an a priori claim about the form of the world, its logical structure.

The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. — Sam26

It is because they have the same logical form that the picture makes sense. If the proposition did not have logical form, the form of both a proposition and of reality, it would not make sense. They are not independent of each other.

The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world. — Fooloso4

I believe that you're right, that this is what Witt was struggling with in the notebooks, at times. You point that out, rightly - it's a main component of the Tract. But, I think he tries to show that he has come down on one side of the issue, namely that there are physical elements that correspond to logical simples. His analysis tells him that there must be logical simples, otherwise propositions having sense would rely on another proposition was true. Why does he say this?

Well, consider:

"The young man is starting college tomorrow."

I know what that means regardless of any content. I don't need to know who the young man is, what college he's going to, what todays date is, or anything one might otherwise suspect I'd need to know in order to make sense of the expression. I don't need to know if anything else is true in order to understand its sense. So, there must be logically simple entities which can be applied to any number of particulars. Any young man, any college, any date, etc.

But, Witt does try and give any idea regarding what these forms might mirror in the real world when he says:

"Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
It is form and content. Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.024 -2.0251).

Wittgenstein suspects that particular arrangements or forms in things like space, time, and colour that persist over and over again must exist, for how else could a flower 200,000 years ago be red, and so can the coke can sitting on my desk today? Like the necessity for some general logical form which allows many particulars to fall under it by only containing a logical form allowing relevant aspects of the particular in question, so too must there be a general physical form which allows particulars to insatiate a quality.

Post 9

Just a couple of points of clarification before I continue.

When a proposition is true it mirrors a positive fact. False statements are possible states of affairs not actual states of affairs, in other words, they don’t obtain, but they still have sense because they picture a possible fact. Again, there is nothing in a false statement that connects with reality, i.e., it’s a picture that isn’t representative of a positive fact. The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. “Logical form is mirrored in propositions. Propositions show the form of reality (T. 4.121).” In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (Nb p. 7). A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01).”

The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. — Sam26

Just a bit of nit-picking for consistency's sake.

The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads:

"An illustration to explain the concept of truth. A black spot on white paper; the form of the spot can be described by saying of each point of the plane whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact".

So, here we can kind of see what Witt has in mind.

A black spot is like a positive fact that obtains. There IS a cat over there.
A white spot is the absence of any fact (since the paper itself is white). There is NO thing over there.

But, importantly, we already know to what a negative fact corresponds in order to be able to say it is false. We understand the sense of "The spot is white".

I think Witt touches on this when he says:

"Why should one not be able to express the negative proposition by means of a negative fact? (Like: if "a" does not stand in a certain relation to "b", it could express that aRb is not the case.) But here also the negative proposition is indirectly constructed with the positive. The positive proposition must presuppose the existence of the negative proposition and conversely" (5.5151).

A negative fact can still furnish a proposition with a sense because the negative contains the positive as prototype. To know what it means to say:

"The spot is black" we must know what it means for it to be white, and visa versa.

The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads: — 013zen

I would probably clarify it this way: The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a positive fact. Some of the confusion has been that when I've been talking about states of affairs or facts I've been talking about positive facts/states of affairs.

Just going over this page.

As you (@Sam26) point out, a fact can either be true or false. — 013zen

The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a positive fact. — Sam26

There can be no false facts.

I gather, Sam, you have been misunderstood by 013zen?

For my own purposes, a link to just Sam's posts here.

@Banno

It's easy to be misunderstood because of Wittgenstein's use of these concepts. Hell, even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he meant by certain statements. Years after he wrote the Tractatus he was asked about what he meant by this or that statement and he couldn't say. So, I'm not going to claim that my interpretations are always correct. We're all going to be off to one degree or another, and we're certainly not all going to agree.

There can be no false facts — Banno

What do you mean by "false fact"? When I say:

As you (@Sam26) point out, a fact can either be true or false. — 013zen

I mean to say, a fact can either be the case, or not the case.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. — Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.

The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI.

I mean to say, a fact can either be the case, or not the case. — 013zen

No, it can't. If it is a fact, then it is the case.

No, it can't. If it is a fact, then it is the case. — Banno

"[Any fact] can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21.)

Yes, I agree. I think maybe Wittgenstein's negative facts cause some problems, but I'll let @013zen explain what he means.

Here's a PDF of Anscombe:

https://archive.org/details/g.-e.-m.-anscombe-an-introduction-to-wittgenstein-s-tractatus/page/n9/mode/2up

I recommend reading a few pages from about p. 28.

And the pages before that, if you are under the illusion that elementary propositions are somehow observed. If you disagree, I have a poker handy.

That's a misquote.

1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same. 

An item is only a fact if it is true.

All propositions picture possible facts, a true proposition is one where the fact obtains.

Ok. I'm not that interested, since it seems so obviously misguided.

What? I don't follow.

1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same. 

An item is only a fact if it is true. — Banno

It's not a misquote. The quote is:

"Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21).

Any one here is in reference to the previous two points:

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.

Any one is referencing facts.

You are misreading it. There are no untrue facts.

↪013zen You are misreading it. There are no untrue facts. — Banno

I believe that you are, my friend.
Please tell me to what the expression "Any one" in 1.21 is referencing? Any what?

The trouble with talking to two folk at once in a forum.

↪Banno All propositions picture possible facts, a true proposition is one where the fact obtains. — Sam26

Yep.

In more modern parlance, of all the possible worlds, only one is the actual world.

You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs.

Please tell me to what the expression "Any one" in 1.21 is referencing? — 013zen

What it does not say is "any fact can be true or not true". Facts are all of them true. Some possible facts are not true.

I agree with that.

You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? — Sam26

That is what they have said. :roll:

I haven't read everything. :gasp: I only read every other word.

Then I think we are on the same page.

Have you read Anscombe's book? She had this stuff at first hand, of course, so is I think authoritative; the only problem is that she is not that much more comprehensible than the original...

:smile:

We are writing over each other.

An excellent few pages. Well done. Still think you should put it into WIki...

I may have read it years ago. I should re-read it. I don't think I'm at odds with her, am I?