↪013zen You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs. — Sam26
1. Fact can either be the case or not be the case. — 013zen
In the event that it is the case, a certain set of atomic facts obtain. In the event of a possible fact not being the case, a certain set of atomic facts do not obtain.
Now we can be lost together!
— Fooloso4
This is why we do philosophy, after all. — 013zen
(CV 65)When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.
So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here. — 013zen
"The young man is starting college tomorrow." — 013zen
Any young man, any college, any date, etc. — 013zen
(3.1431)The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.
(2.021)Objects make up the substance of the world
Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4
I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.
The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI. — Banno
Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? — Fooloso4
To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college) — Fooloso4
That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno
...whatever elementary propositions may be, they are not simple observation statements
If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.
↪Fooloso4 Ok, but elementary propositions are not atomic objects. — Banno
See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Banno
(28)But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned.
↪Fooloso4 In the post above, (↪Fooloso4 )where you quote my comment about simple objects and then go on to reply to it as if it were about elementary propositions. — Banno
He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. — Fooloso4
If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.
And that there should be simple names and simple objects is equally presented as a demand at 3.23
First off, what you referred to was not about simple objects: — Fooloso4
That sentence appears to me to be about objects.Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4
I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211. — Banno
Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4
What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno
What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. — Banno
The objects form the substance of the world.
But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts. — Banno
Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. — Sam26
Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. — Sam26
Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality). — Sam26
As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game. — Fooloso4
That is to say, it would be a matter of empirical investigation to find out, both what the constituents of a thought are and how they are related to the ‘objects’ occurring in facts, that is to say, to the objects designated by the ‘names’ in language. — Summary, p. 28
That this is fantastically untrue is shewn by any serious investigation into epistemology, such as Wittgenstein made in Philosophical Investigations. But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned. The passage about the ‘elucidation’ of names, where he says that one must be ‘acquainted’ with their objects, gives him the lie. — op cit.
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