I have directly answered it three times now and quoted. So, yeah. Far be it from me...

Does this help:

What you say seems to imply that you think that seeing a particular colour and that particular colour are the same thing. — Janus

Seeing a particular colour is a sensation, right? Let's call "visual sensation of Blue".

My response:

colours are obviously visual sensations.(of Blue, let's say) 'seeing a colour' is that sensation — AmadeusD

If a colour is a visual sensation (i maintain it is) and that, as noted clearly above "seeing a colour" consists in that sensation, I can't see the difficulty in understanding that then 'a' colour = seeing 'a' colour. . This is necessary, given what I've said. The visual sensation of Blue is what Blue, the colour, consists in.

This was in the quoted passages. That it was missed is... odd. The answer is obviously 'Yes, but your grammar is wanting..


Therefore, if "seeing a colour" is, to Janus, an experience of that colour - that is what the given colour consists in. It is a three-pronged (possible)fact.
1. Seeing a colour is a sensation.
2.That sensation is the particular colour being 'seen' (i dislike that term, in this context but there we go).
3. If 'seeing a colour' is Janus' preferred term for 'the visual sensation of XXX', that's great. The fact I didn't use his terminology and his grammar doesn't make my response any less direct.

So i've now had to be far less direct than my answer initially was, to elucidate what seems a necessary inference. I can't grasp what was lost...

You asked the question, for people like me to answer, and someone like me answered. Do you have anything more enlightening for me than "nah"?

For a "perception to be directly of worldly objects " makes sense to me by contrast with the case when the perception is mediated by other objects, i.e. a photo of an apple vs an apple. — hypericin

I agree. However, the typical contrast for the indirect realist seems to be that a perception is, instead, directly of a representation. You seem to be taking a similar line with your awareness of a perceptual experience.

A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings — hypericin

It's unclear to me how you are distinguishing direct from indirect here.

the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

I don't see why you need to introduce an awareness of the perceptual experience and why you seem to consider the perceptual experience itself to be insufficient. How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience? That is, how can you have a perceptual experience (e.g. the experience of a smell, a sound, a taste, etc.) and not be aware of it?

all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

Can we agree from this, that experience is a stand-alone entity?

Our differences may be a matter of taxonomy….. — creativesoul

Taxonomy. Hierarchal organization. Of correlations drawn between different things? In the interest of clarity, might this require a predetermination of domain of discourse? If a dialectic should follow here, seems imperative to be on the same page. You brought it up, so you should set the pace.

……Maybe not if you're a mind/body dualist or physical/mental dualist. — creativesoul

I gather from this our differences wouldn’t be merely a matter of taxonomy if I were one of those dualists. It has always been my position that simply the nature of our human intellect makes non-dualism impossible. Might be different with a greater knowledge base, but we don’t have it yet, so…..
—————

some language less creatures can see red cups in very much the same way we do, given similar enough biological machinery. However, that same creature cannot know that they're seeing a green cup — creativesoul

….cannot know they’re NOT seeing a green cup?
———-

If you refer to a dualism of aspects as opposed to a dualism of substances then I agree. — Janus

Cool. In this instance, I was.

You seem to count as real only that which the senses apprehend. — Janus

Depending on our agreement on “apprehend”, yes. Given as opinion based on parsimony based on theory, but, yes.

My point earler was that on that criterion causation is not real. — Janus

Is this to say you don’t agree? Your point would be that causation is real?

I’d use causality rather than causation, but in either case, these always represent a relation, or that under which the chronology of the concepts in a relation, is subsumed. As such, causality/causation is no more than a metaphysical explanatory device representing either the progression or regression of real things in relation to each other.

Yea? Nay?

A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings
— hypericin

It's unclear to me how you are distinguishing direct from indirect here. — Luke

Object perception in smell, sight, hearing are indirectly mediated by molecules, light, and sound waves respectively. But to be clear, this is not the indirection we are discussing.

I agree. However, the typical contrast for the indirect realist seems to be that a perception is, instead, directly of a representation. — Luke

Who is the typical indirect realist here?

How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience? — Luke

There is no difference.

I'm not sure why you are getting hung up over "awareness of perceptual experience". We already agreed that the self is aware of perceptual experience. When I say, "the self is only directly aware of perceptual experience", to point out that the self is *not* directly aware of what the perception is *of*, nor any of the other components of perception, would you have me say, "the self is only directly perceptual experience"? The "aware of" is necessitated by English.

why you seem to consider the perceptual experience itself to be insufficient. — Luke

As I pointed out in my last post perceptual experience is only one part of perception:

A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings, which transmit information to the brain, which (somehow) produces the perceptual experience. — hypericin

Perceptual experience is a necessary but insufficient condition for perception. If the perceptual experience is there but other parts are missing, we have things like dreams, hallucinations, and nerve misfirings.

As such, causality/causation is no more than a metaphysical explanatory device representing either the progression or regression of real things in relation to each other.

Yea? Nay? — Mww

I think causation is understood in terms of energy exchange. I would say it is real, although it cannot be directly observed. Perhaps energy differentials can be measured, and the exchange of energy and causal processes inferred from that.

I wouldn't call it a metaphysical explanatory device. If it is real, it is a physical process.

I would say it is real, although it cannot be directly observed. — Janus

I guess that’s the root of my discomfort: we have real things we can observe and we have real things we cannot even possibly observe. Seems to take something important away from being real. It isn’t that big a deal, though, until or unless one gets deep into the weeds, whereupon inconsistencies become apparent.

Right, we have things we know are real, by definition, like the everyday objects and entities we all deal with every day, and then we have those things like time and space and causation, which may or may not be human experience-independently real. I don't have a problem with the idea that there may be real things which we cannot deomstrate to be real.

I don't have a problem with the idea that there may be real things which we cannot deomstrate to be real. — Janus

I’m with you on that; there could be all sorts of real stuff just outside the limits of our intelligence. Still, for those things we cannot demonstrate to be real, we lose the warrant for calling them real. Possibly real is all we can say, and that’s pretty weak.

I probably go further than you in thinking that even though it cannot be demonstrated, it is plausible to think that space, time. energy. entropy and causation are human-independently real given what a remarkably coherent synthesis the sciences present. But I also acknowledge there is no definitive measure of plausibility, so...

Object perception in smell, sight, hearing are indirectly mediated by molecules, light, and sound waves respectively. — hypericin

Aren't these in direct contact with our senses and nervous systems as equally as the objects that we touch or taste? I don't know whether it is possible to perceive objects via smell, sight and hearing any other way.

But to be clear, this is not the indirection we are discussing. — hypericin

Agreed.

Who is the typical indirect realist here? — hypericin

I would have thought you are the typical indirect realist here, since you are arguing that we cannot have direct perception of objects, but instead that we can only have indirect perception of objects or, in other words, that we can only ever have direct perception of representations of objects.

How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience?
— Luke

There is no difference.

I'm not sure why you are getting hung up over "awareness of perceptual experience". We already agreed that the self is aware of perceptual experience. — hypericin

While I agree that the self is aware of perceptual experience, the dispute remains between us that I label perceptual experience as a perception, whereas you label awareness of perceptual experience as a perception.

What distinguishes direct realism from indirect realism is whether we can perceive (real) objects, or whether we can only ever perceive representations of (real) objects.

When I say, "the self is only directly aware of perceptual experience", to point out that the self is *not* directly aware of what the perception is *of*, nor any of the other components of perception, would you have me say, "the self is only directly perceptual experience"? The "aware of" is necessitated by English. — hypericin

I don't believe we need to say that "the self is only directly perceptual experience" in order to express that we can directly perceive real objects. But then, I disagree with you that a perceptual experience is not a perception, and that one needs an awareness of a perceptual experience in order to qualify as a perception. My argument is to question what it means to have a perceptual experience without an awareness of it; whether such a thing can be called a perceptual experience at all. If there is no such thing as a perceptual experience without an awareness of it, then a perceptual experience and a perceptual experience with an awareness of it are the same thing. Therefore, you cannot say that a perceptual experience is not a perception, and that only awareness of a perceptual experience is a perception.

Perceptual experience is a necessary but insufficient condition for perception. If the perceptual experience is there but other parts are missing, we have things like dreams, hallucinations, and nerve misfirings. — hypericin

What "parts" could be missing?

I probably go further than you in thinking that even though it cannot be demonstrated, it is plausible to think that space, time. energy. entropy and causation are human-independently real given what a remarkably coherent synthesis the sciences present. But I also acknowledge there is no definitive measure of plausibility, so... — Janus

Fwiw, even on my slightly adjusted Indirect Realist account, this is still the case.

…..it is plausible to think….. — Janus

Yep, even Himself says we can think whatever we please. But honestly….what advantage is gained by affirming something as real without the possibility of demonstrating it? If it’s as simple as the real encompasses at minimum holding something in your hand, sheer parsimony on the one hand, and pure logic on the other, says if you can’t hold it in your hand, it ain’t real.

It’s all good.

what advantage is gained by affirming something as real without the possibility of demonstrating it? — Mww

:up: I don't see it as a matter of advantage, but rather simply as affirming what seems most likely to be true. But to be sure what seems most likely to one may not seem so to another.

OK.

The conversation is not progressing. I will try a different approach.

Here is a diagram of my conception of perception. Which parts do you disagree with?

Here is a diagram of my conception of perception. Which parts do you disagree with? — hypericin

I believe that a perception is equivalent to a perceptual experience. My brain and nerves are not what I have perceptual experiences of, so I would not include these as being part of a perception. (Your diagram indicates that the brain generates the perception, and that the nerves transmit the perception, so maybe you agree.)

I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.

But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects. You seem to believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct awareness of our perceptions/perceptual experiences, instead of direct perceptions of real world objects. In fact, you appear to agree that we have direct perceptions of real world objects.

I couldn’t remember where I found this, seems like ages ago, and your “dualism of substances” made me think of it again. So I dug it up, just to give maybe the first exposition of what the intent was behind it. Not meant to elicit a comment…just thought you might be interested, if you didn’t already know.

Hobbes’ objection:
“…. Hence it may be that the thing that thinks - the subject that has mind, reason or intellect - is something corporeal. Descartes assumes that it isn’t, but he doesn’t prove this. Yet the conclusion that he seems to want to establish is based on this inference….”

Descartes’ reply:
“…. I’ll explain the point briefly. It is certain that a thought can’t exist without a thing that is thinking; and quite generally no act or property can exist without a substance for it to belong to. But we don’t ·ever· come to know a substance immediately, knowing it in itself, but only through its being the subject of certain acts. This makes it perfectly reasonable and normal for us to use different names for substances that we recognize as being the subjects of radically different acts or properties, and then later on to consider whether these different names signify different things or one and the same thing. Now there are certain acts and properties that we call ‘corporeal’, such as size, shape, motion and all others that can be thought only in terms of spatial extension; and we label as ‘body’ the substance that they are in, i.e. the thing that performs the acts and has the properties. We can’t intelligibly suppose that one substance has shape, and another substance moves, and so on, because all these acts fall under the common concept of extension. There are other acts that we call ‘acts of thought’, such as understanding, willing, imagining, having sensory perceptions, and so on; these all fall under the common concept of thought or perception or consciousness, and we call the substance that has them a ‘thinking thing’ or a ‘mind’ or any name you like as long as you don’t confuse this substance with corporeal substance. That confusion would be very bad, because acts of thought have nothing in common with corporeal acts, and thought (the common concept of the former) is radically different from extension (the common concept of the latter). Once we have formed two distinct concepts of these two substances, it is easy, on the basis of what I have said in the sixth Meditation, to establish whether they are one and the same or different….”
(Descartes, Objections and Replies, Third Objections (Hobbes), Second Meditation: ‘The nature of the human mind’, 1642, in Bennett, 2017)

But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects — Luke

I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them. — Luke

It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. I have a feeling even Banno would be shown to be prevaricating on this account of the terms.

The reason for this is that, on my reading of the entire 35 pages, no one has been capable or even willing to deny the underlined above - but a swathe are still clinging to Direct Realism as if committing to the above account wasn't a fatal blow to DR. On the other hand, if the second conception:

whether or not we have direct awareness of our perceptions/perceptual experiences — Luke

Were the true dispute, viz. If DR amounted merely to a claim of 'direct perception of representations' it would be a useless term - a fig leaf.

Interesting, thanks. Descartes simply assumes that extended substances cannot think and that thinking substances are not extended. I think Spinoza's solution, that there is only one substance with both attributes, works. Descartes allowed two substances, Spinoza only one, but Aristotles' conception was of many substances, all extended and some thinking and some not.

I think Spinoza's solution, that there is only one substance with both attributes, works. — Janus

Of all those choices, this is provably closest to the case, but you know….that leaves us with phosphate and calcium ions, nanovolts and picometers that think. Or, a brain full of nothing but extended substances that don’t think.

We are well and truly screwed, ain’t we? (Grin)

Of all those choices, this is provably closest to the case, but you know….that leaves us with phosphate and calcium ions, nanovolts and picometers that think. Or, a brain full of nothing but extended substances that don’t think.

We are well and truly screwed, ain’t we? (Grin) — Mww

We are screwed in the sense that we don't know much. We have a conception (rightly or wrongly) of brute, dead, insentient matter, and we have a conception (rightly or wrongly) of godly, living, sentient mind. And we wonder how the former could produce the latter, we just can't imagine how it could be.

I tend to favour the idea that mater is not as brute, dead and insentient as we might think (although I certainly don't mean to suggest pantheism), and that in favorable energetic configurations it can become living and sentient (I'll leave the "godly" for the botherers). :grin:

Note: the 'mater' was a typo, but I left it in as it and matter ("material") apparently share a common root, along with 'matrix'. It's the mother of all ideas, or a "mother" of an idea. :wink:

I believe that a perception is equivalent to a perceptual experience. My brain and nerves are not what I have perceptual experiences of, so I would not include these as being part of a perception. (Your diagram indicates that the brain generates the perception, and that the nerves transmit the perception, so maybe you agree.) — Luke

You are conflating perception and perceptual experience. A "perceptual experience" is not a perception when you are hallucinating, dreaming, etc. There is nothing you are perceiving, you are only experiencing. I call a "perception" the overall process that connects real world objects with the perceiving self, and "perceptual experience" what the self actually subjectively experiences.

Is this a disagreement on terminology, or substance? If terminology, what other word could fill the role I am giving "perception"?

You seem to believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct awareness of our perceptions/perceptual experiences, instead of direct perceptions of real world objects. In fact, you appear to agree that we have direct perceptions of real world objects. — Luke

No!

The dispute is over whether perceptions allow direct or indirect awareness of real world objects. Perceptions can be directly of real world objects, by contrast with cases like photographs. But as I made very clear, in my conception of perception, we are not directly aware of everything that makes up a perception. We are only directly aware of perceptual experience.

But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects
— Luke

I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.
— Luke

It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. — AmadeusD

It is almost as if @Luke has become a radical indirect realist!

Ironically, I disagree. Objects *are* part perception. But perception is a process, what we are actually, directly aware of, the perceptual experience, merely represents the object.

But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects
— Luke

I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.
— Luke

It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. I have a feeling even Banno would be shown to be prevaricating on this account of the terms. — AmadeusD

I invite you to go back and read all of my posts. I have maintained from very early on, if not since my first post, that our perceptions include representations, but that our perceptions are not of representations.

The dispute is over what our perceptual experiences are of, and whether they are of real world objects or are of representations of real world objects. Direct realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of real world objects. Indirect realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of representations of real world objects.

It might be the naive realists' view that physical objects are in our minds, but I'm not defending naive realism.

To describe what is part or is not part of the content of a perceptual experience--what is included in the experience--says nothing about whether that perceptual experience is of a real world object or is of a representation of a real world object.

I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, those perceptual experiences are of real world objects. I consider indirect realists to be mistaken in thinking that because the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, then those perceptual experiences must also be of representations. This implies that what gets represented is another representation.

If DR amounted merely to a claim of 'direct perception of representations' it would be a useless term - a fig leaf. — AmadeusD

This is the claim made by indirect realists, not by direct realists.

You are conflating perception and perceptual experience. A "perceptual experience" is not a perception when you are hallucinating, dreaming, etc. There is nothing you are perceiving, you are only experiencing. I call a "perception" the overall process that connects real world objects with the perceiving self, and "perceptual experience" what the self actually subjectively experiences. — hypericin

I have been using the terms "perception" and "perceptual experience" interchangeably because in deciding whether we perceive real objects or only representations, the perception side of that equation concerns the content of the perception, i.e. the perceptual experience. The two sides of the dispute argue over what that content is of, or what that content represents; whether it represents a real world object or whether it represents another representation.

Is this a disagreement on terminology, or substance? If terminology, what other word could fill the role I am giving "perception"? — hypericin

If it helps, I could avoid using the word "perception" and will use only the phrases "perceptual experience" or "the content of perception" instead, and then we could both use "perception" in the manner you prefer. Otherwise, you could use phrases such as "the process of perception" or "the mechanics of perception" to make it clear that you aren't referring only to the perceptual experience. It may be easiest if I avoid using the word "perception". I will henceforth use only "perceptual experience".

The brain, the nerves and real world objects are not part of our subjective, perceptual experience; they are not contained in the content of perception. When you see a real world object, that real object is neither physically inside your head nor even physically inside your mind.

My position is that our perceptual experience typically represents real world objects. That is, our perceptual experience is typically of real world objects; we typically perceive real world objects. The perceptual experience is the representation. We don't have another--a second--perceptual experience of that perceptual experience.

The dispute is over whether perceptions allow direct or indirect awareness of real world objects. — hypericin

None of these references indicate that the dispute concerns awareness, only that it concerns perceptual experience:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism
https://iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/

The dispute is over what our perceptual experiences are of, and whether they are of real world objects or are of representations of real world objects. Direct realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of real world objects. Indirect realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of representations of real world objects. — Luke

It’s possible my reply to you didn’t land because this was directly addressed, in relation to at least one other commenter. I invite you to reread what I’ve said there :)

It might be the naive realists' view that physical objects are in our minds, but I'm not defending naive realism — Luke

My response doesn’t suggest this of you :)

To describe what is part or is not part of the content of a perceptual experience--what is included in the experience--says nothing about whether that perceptual experience is of a real world object or is of a representation of a real world object. — Luke

Oh, but it does. And we’ve been doing so over these pages. One of the deeeper (and imo dumber) disputes has been whether the new inclusion of real world objects at the initiation of the process of perception constitutes a “directness” requires for DR to make any sense. But it doesn’t.

I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, those perceptual experiences are of real world objects. — Luke

Then I couldn’t know what to say. This directly contradicts your earlier assertion that our perceptions are if representations. You are now doing exactly what my reply insinuated we could have avoided across the thread.

This is the claim made by indirect realists, not by direct realists. — Luke

It is not. My comment stands.

Naive realism is not the only sensible notion of direct perception.

all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Can we agree from this, that experience is a stand-alone entity? — Mww

I doubt it. Maybe.

I don't see how that qualifies as a stand-alone entity. Apart from what, exactly?

How do you get from what I wrote to what you suggest for agreement?

It has always been my position that simply the nature of our human intellect makes non-dualism impossible — Mww

I'd like to see the support for this.

some language less creatures can see red cups in very much the same way we do, given similar enough biological machinery. However, that same creature cannot know that they're seeing a green cup
— creativesoul

….cannot know they’re NOT seeing a green cup? — Mww

That as well...