It’s possible my reply to you didn’t land because this was directly addressed, in relation to at least one other commenter. I invite you to reread what I’ve said there :) — AmadeusD

Said where?

One of the deeeper (and imo dumber) disputes has been whether the new inclusion of real world objects at the initiation of the process of perception constitutes a “directness” requires for DR to make any sense. But it doesn’t. — AmadeusD

Could you elaborate or clarify this? I can't make much sense of it.

Then I couldn’t know what to say. This directly contradicts your earlier assertion that our perceptions are if representations. — AmadeusD

Where did I say that our perceptions are of representations?

Can we agree from this, that experience is a stand-alone entity?
— Mww

How do you get from what I wrote to what you suggest for agreement? — creativesoul

You said “meaningful” experience. I’m saying, first of all, every experience is meaningful, and second, if it is granted experience is an end, the culmination of a methodological process, it needs no adjective attached to it. Case in point: perceptual experience. If every experience begins with perception, then perceptual experience is redundant insofar as it says nothing more than experience alone. Besides, separating perception from experience, and if experience is the end, then perception becomes the means without contradiction or confusion.

I’m aware of what the current reference texts everyone’s so fond of, say. Just wondering what a guy who thinks for himself has to say.
————

the nature of our human intellect makes non-dualism impossible
— Mww

I'd like to see the support for this. — creativesoul

Yes/no, up/down, left/right, wrong/right. For every possible conception, its negation is given immediately, without exception. It is impossible for the human intellect to function at all without this fundamental principle of complementarity, and from it follows the ground of intrinsically dualistic logical systems.

The two sides of the dispute argue over what that content is of, or what that content represents; whether it represents a real world object or whether it represents another representation. — Luke

Who here or anywhere is claiming that it represents another representation? It sounds like you are a indirect realist yourself, while believing indirect realism is the homunculus theory strawmanned by direct realists.

The brain, the nerves and real world objects are not part of our subjective, perceptual experience; they are not contained in the content of perception. When you see a real world object, that real object is neither physically inside your head nor even physically inside your mind.

My position is that our perceptual experience typically represents real world objects. That is, our perceptual experience is typically of real world objects; we typically perceive real world objects. The perceptual experience is the representation. We don't have another--a second--perceptual experience of that perceptual experience. — Luke

This sounds like typical indirect realism to me.

None of these references indicate that the dispute concerns awareness, only that it concerns perceptual experience: — Luke

Perceptual experience is awareness. "What is the awareness of?", is the question. A representation, or the world? None of these links mention the possibility, "a representation of a representation".

Perceptual experience is awareness. "What is the awareness of?", is the question. A representation, or the world? None of these links mention the possibility, "a representation of a representation". — hypericin

If "perceptual experience is awareness", and if there is no possibility that the awareness is of a representation (since none of the links mention this possibility), then perceptual experience/awareness can only be of the world, given that:

"What is the awareness of?", is the question. A representation, or the world? — hypericin

Earlier you said:

the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

Your position up until now has been that we are directly aware of perceptual experience and only indirectly aware of real world objects. However, you are now saying that "perceptual experience is awareness". In that case, we are not directly aware of perceptual experience, because awareness and perceptual experience are the same thing.

Additionally, you claim that the point of disagreement in the dispute is "whether perceptions allow direct or indirect awareness of real world objects." If "perceptual experience is awareness", as you now say, then what prevents direct awareness of real world objects?

But perception is a process, what we are actually, directly aware of, the perceptual experience, merely represents the object. — hypericin

What do you mean by "merely represents the object"? How might perception or perceptual experience be improved upon so that it does not "merely represent the object"? What better possibility are you alluding to?

and if there is no possibility that the awareness is of a representation (since none of the links mention this possibility), — Luke

No, none of the links mention the possibility, "representation of a representation". Awareness of a perceptual experience does not imply awareness of a representation of perceptual experience. I think this is where you are hung up. To be aware of an object does imply awareness of a representation of an object. That is indirect realism. But to be aware of the representation itself does not imply an awareness of a representation of the representation. The conscious brain is constituted so as to be able to be directly aware of representations, "given" to it by other parts of the brain. Everything else it might be aware of, objects for instance, must be via these representations. Again, this is just indirect realism.

However, you are now saying that "perceptual experience is awareness". In that case, we are not directly aware of perceptual experience, because awareness and perceptual experience are the same thing. — Luke

It is incoherent to have a perceptual representation without an awareness of the perceptual representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is representation coupled with an awareness of the representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is (in part) awareness of the representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is (in part) awareness.

What do you mean by "merely represents the object"? How might perception or perceptual experience be improved upon so that it does not "merely represent the object"? What better possibility are you alluding to? — Luke

"Merely" is not a value judgement. It is a contrast with the perceptual process, which itself may be directly of an object.

While,

"what we are actually, directly aware of, the perceptual experience, merely represents the object."
— hypericin

Replacing "merely" with "only" does not change the meaning I intended.

...all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Can we agree from this, that experience is a stand-alone entity? — Mww

I don't think so. I believe experience consists of simpler things. I would not call it a composite, for not all the elements can be said to exist in their entirety prior to becoming part of an experience. Meaning, for example, emerges as a result of correlations being drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Meaning is necessary for experience. It's the difference between detection and perception, or between sensitivity and sentience.

I’m saying, first of all, every experience is meaningful, and second, if it is granted experience is an end, the culmination of a methodological process, it needs no adjective attached to it. Case in point: perceptual experience. If every experience begins with perception, then perceptual experience is redundant insofar as it says nothing more than experience alone. — Mww

Last I checked "perceptual experience" wasn't something I invoked.

I agree that all experience is meaningful but would add that it is meaningful to the creature having the experience. This delineates the discourse. Are you okay with that?

the nature of our human intellect makes non-dualism impossible
— Mww

I'd like to see the support for this.
— creativesoul

Yes/no, up/down, left/right, wrong/right. For every possible conception, its negation is given immediately, without exception. It is impossible for the human intellect to function at all without this fundamental principle of complementarity, and from it follows the ground of intrinsically dualistic logical systems. — Mww

You're focusing upon language use. I agree with that much.

My concerns were of the physical/mental, physical/non physical, mind/body varieties as it may pertain to what counts as direct perception.

Not a good offer... deleted.

:blush:

It is incoherent to have a perceptual representation without an awareness of the perceptual representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is representation coupled with an awareness of the representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is (in part) awareness of the representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is (in part) awareness. — hypericin

We appear to agree that a perceptual experience is a representation. We also seem to agree that we have perceptual experiences of; representations of; perceptions of; real objects.

Your position boils down to this:

Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience.
Indirect experience: Perceptual experience of a real object.

However, you recently said that:

Perceptual experience is awareness. — hypericin

And you now say that:

perceptual experience is (in part) awareness. — hypericin

You appear to be vacillating over whether awareness is perceptual experience or not. Nevertheless, if awareness is perceptual experience then the distinction underpinning your argument between direct and indirect experience (as described above) collapses. If awareness is perceptual experience, and if perceptual experience is a representation, then our awareness, perceptual experience, or representation, is of real objects. That's not indirect, it's direct.

Otherwise, you should acknowledge that your position—that of the indirect realist—is that we have perceptual experiences of; representations of; perceptions of; representations.

You merely attempt to distance yourself from this regress by substituting "perceptual experiences of representations" with "awareness of perceptual experiences".

No, none of the links mention the possibility, "representation of a representation". — hypericin

None of the links mention "awareness of a perceptual experience", either.

The IEP article defines indirect realism as involving a "perceptual intermediary" and offers examples of intermediaries such as “sense datum, ” “sensum,” “idea,” “sensibilium,” “percept” and “appearance.” Your intermediary, however, is awareness.

Instead of the usual indirect realist position, where it is supposed that we have perceptual experiences of a perceptual intermediary, your position is instead that we have a direct awareness of perceptual experiences, whereas our perceptual experiences of real objects are relatively indirect in comparison to this direct awareness. You still have a perceptual intermediary, which is either the perceptual experience itself or the awareness of the perceptual experience, but it's difficult to say which it is. Is it the awareness doing the perceiving or is it the perceptual experience doing the perceiving? Maybe this is why you are vacillating over whether awareness is perceptual experience or not.

If the awareness is doing the perceiving, then you are perceiving the perceptual experience. Since we seem to agree that a perceptual experience is a representation, it follows that if the awareness is doing the perceiving, then you are perceiving a representation. Having a perceptual experience of a representation is having a representation of a representation. Otherwise, if the perceptual experience is doing the perceiving, then you are perceiving real objects, and that's direct realism.

"Merely" is not a value judgement. It is a contrast with the perceptual process, which itself may be directly of an object. — hypericin

Where is the distinction between direct and indirect in the perceptual process? From what you've said, I take it that the perceptual experience is direct and the rest of the process is indirect, because you are aware of the perceptual experience. That is, you appear to define "direct" and "indirect" in terms of your conscious awareness. However, when you say here that "the perceptual process...may be directly of an object", you seem to be using "direct" in a different sense. It does not seem that "direct" is defined in terms of conscious awareness here, because you are not consciously aware of the whole perceptual process. So what does "direct" mean when you say "the perceptual process...may be directly of an object"? What would it mean for the perceptual process to be indirectly of an object?

Your position boils down to this:

Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience.
Indirect experience: Perceptual experience of a real object. — Luke

I would phrase it:

Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience.
Indirect experience: Awareness of an object (via perceptual experience)[/quote]

You appear to be vacillating over whether awareness is perceptual experience or not. — Luke

By "perceptual experience is awareness", I mean, "to have a perceptual experience is to be aware of perceptual experience (and so, you cannot talk about perception without talking about awareness)". I do not mean, "perceptual experience and awareness are two words that actually mean the same thing".

Otherwise, you should acknowledge that your position—that of the indirect realist—is that we have perceptual experiences of; representations of; perceptions of; representations. — Luke

No, I do not agree that to be aware of a perceptual experience is to have a perceptual experience of a perceptual experience. Perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience. For you to have a perceptual experience means you must be aware of that perceptual experience. Otherwise, it is not a perceptual experience at all. This is the sense that "perceptual experience is awareness".

You merely attempt to distance yourself from this regress by substituting "perceptual experiences of representations" with "awareness of perceptual experiences". — Luke

Yes, I am distancing myself from this invalid formulation. For us to perceive an object necessitates we construct a perceptual experience of it. That is how we are built, and it is hard to imagine how it could be otherwise. But there is no such requirement to be aware of the perceptual experience itself. Neither logically, nor in actuality. To be aware of perceptual experience is not a "perceptual experience of representations".

We once agreed that we are aware of perceptual experience. Did you backtrack?

The IEP article defines indirect realism as involving a "perceptual intermediary" and offers examples of intermediaries such as “sense datum, ” “sensum,” “idea,” “sensibilium,” “percept” and “appearance.” Your intermediary, however, is awareness. — Luke

Awareness is not my intermediary, "sense data", "qualia", etc. are. "Awareness" is my replacement for "see" or "perceive". We don't "see perceptual experience", we don't "perceive perceptual experience", we are "aware of perceptual experience", because to be aware of perceptual experience is not itself a perceptual act. Moreover, awareness is my measure of directness or indirectness: Am I aware of something directly, or only via a more direct awareness of something else?

We appear to agree that a perceptual experience is a representation. We also seem to agree that we have perceptual experiences of; representations of; perceptions of; real objects. — Luke

We had also agreed that we are aware of perceptual experience. Do you now maintain that we are unaware of perceptual experience?

@Luke

P1: We are aware of perceptual experiences.
P2: Perceptual experiences are representations of mind-independent reality.
P3: We are aware of representations of mind independent reality. (From P1, P2)
P4: If one is aware of a representation, one has indirect awareness what it represents.
C: We are indirectly aware of mind-independent reality. (From P3, P4).


We agree on P2. So do you challenge P1, P4, or both?

I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, those perceptual experiences are of real world objects. — Luke

"I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of the photograph consists of representations, the photograph is of real world objects."

No one here is doubting that the photograph is of real world objects. But does that mean the photograph gives you direct experience of the real world objects?

The reply we are both referring to in turn here, is the one you have quoted. The passage is here:

It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. I have a feeling even Banno would be shown to be prevaricating on this account of the terms. — AmadeusD

Said where? — Luke

The point being, this wasn't to impugn anything particular you've said. I meant precisely what was said there - that an agreement on one or other of the (precedingly-quoted) conceptions you used could have prevented a huge amount of waffling in the thread. Banno particularly would probably need to adjust his veracious responses if one or other was nailed to the wall at the outset. It wasn't at you, Just an observation in geenral - and you're still here :P

Could you elaborate or clarify this? I can't make much sense of it. — Luke

Sure - Likely, the use of the word 'new' there could throw one. It was entirely erroneous.
The dispute i'm here calling 'dumb', can probably be understood by my cleaning up what I said:

(the dispute consists in) whether the inclusion fact that real world objects at the initiation initiate the process of of the process of perception constitutes a “directness” requires required for DR to make any sense. But it doesn’t viz. the fact that 'perception' the process, is initiated by an external, real-world object does not negate the several way-points that prevent our 'perceptions' i.e perceptual experiences being of the real-world object. It seems to me, that negation is required for DR to make any sense. There is no way to pretend that the perceptual experience is 'direct' in any sense other that it is an immediate apprehension of representations. If that's what a DR means, I think that would undercut the entire debate and reduce it to literally a problem of stubborn people (may be) misusing words.

Where did I say that our perceptions are of representations? — Luke

My position is that our perceptual experience typically represents real world objects. That is, our perceptual experience is typically of real world objects; we typically perceive real world objects. The perceptual experience is the representation. — Luke

^^ this seems to indicate, if one cuts through the grammar, to indicate from the bolded that position.. Unless there's some smuggling of the object into the mind going on in the intervening lines?

I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, those perceptual experiences are of real world objects. — Luke

While I outright reject that there's no inconsistency between the two notions, this also seems to indicate the same. If the experience consists in a representation, it can't be a direct experience of an object. That much seems modally true. This, as noted, presents the exact problem my lament referred to.

If the above position is truly your position, this is, as best I can tell, an indirect realist position, with the line "Well, it a direct experience via representation" tacked to the end. I wasn't asking at the time, but it would be interesting to here how this can be made sense of. If i may quote myself:

If that's what a DR means, I think that would undercut the entire debate and reduce it to literally a problem of stubborn people (may be) misusing words. — AmadeusD

Both positions mean our perceptual experiences aren't of objects, but representations, no matter which tid bit is appended to that.

Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience.
Indirect experience: Awareness of an object (via perceptual experience) — hypericin

Perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience. — hypericin

If perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience, then awareness of an object (via perceptual experience) must equally entail awareness of the perceptual experience and, by extension, awareness of the object. Therefore, it seems to me that you are still unable to coherently maintain a distinction between direct and indirect experience.

On your view, if I smell smoke then I am directly aware of the smell of smoke but indirectly aware of the smoke. So I can never know if I am smelling smoke or smelling something else? In that case, how can I be directly aware of the smell of smoke?

Unless our perceptual experiences were sometimes veridical, then it would never be possible to identify those perceptual experiences.

"Awareness" is my replacement for "see" or "perceive". We don't "see perceptual experience", we don't "perceive perceptual experience", we are "aware of perceptual experience", — hypericin

If you use "awareness" as a replacement for "perceive", and if you have direct awareness of your perceptual experience (as you claim), then surely you must "perceive [your] perceptual experience".

Perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience. — hypericin

...there is no such requirement to be aware of the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

These statements seem to contradict each other?

P1: We are aware of perceptual experiences.
P2: Perceptual experiences are representations of mind-independent reality.
P3: We are aware of representations of mind independent reality. (From P1, P2)
P4: If one is aware of a representation, one has indirect awareness what it represents.
C: We are indirectly aware of mind-independent reality. (From P3, P4).

We agree on P2. So do you challenge P1, P4, or both? — hypericin

I challenge P4.

I do not deny that we are aware of perceptual experiences (P1). I also agree with you that perceptual experence entails awareness of the perceptual experience. This is why I argued earlier that it makes no sense to be unaware of a perceptual experience.

However, if perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience, then you have the same awareness of both the perceptual experience and the perceived object. Your awareness of the object is limited to your awareness of the perceptual experience, so it's the same awareness in both cases. Your awareness of the object is not a step removed (indirect) as compared to your awareness of the experience (direct). Your awareness of the object is part of the experience. You cannot compare your awareness of the experience to your awareness of the object, because these are the same.

No one here is doubting that the photograph is of real world objects. But does that mean the photograph gives you direct experience of the real world objects? — hypericin

A photograph is a coherent example of an indirect perceptual experience. This is a perceptual experience of an external object that represents another external object.

However, the indirect realists' example of an indirect perceptual experience is incoherent. This is a perceptual experience (or awareness) of an internal object that represents an external object..You do not perceive an internal object that represents an external object; you perceive an external object. Indirect realists misuse the word "perceive".

(the dispute consists in) whether the fact that real world objects [that] initiate the process of perception constitutes a “directness” required for DR to make any sense. But it doesn’t viz. the fact that 'perception' the process, is initiated by an external, real-world object does not negate the several way-points that prevent our 'perceptions' i.e perceptual experiences being of the real-world object. — AmadeusD

I don't follow how the "several way-points" of the process of perception prevent our perceptual experiences from "being [directly] of the real-world object."

What process of perception do you envisage that would provide a (more) direct perceptual experience?

There is no way to pretend that the perceptual experience is 'direct' in any sense other that it is an immediate apprehension of representations. — AmadeusD

What does "apprehension" mean here other than "perception" or "perceptual experience"?

If that's what a DR means, I think that would undercut the entire debate and reduce it to literally a problem of stubborn people (may be) misusing words. — AmadeusD

The direct realist argues against the idea that we have perceptual experiences of representations, and argues for the idea that we have perceptual experiences of real objects.

Where did I say that our perceptions are of representations?
— Luke

My position is that our perceptual experience typically represents real world objects. That is, our perceptual experience is typically of real world objects; we typically perceive real world objects. The perceptual experience is the representation.
— Luke

^^ this seems to indicate, if one cuts through the grammar, to indicate from the bolded that position.. Unless there's some smuggling of the object into the mind going on in the intervening lines? — AmadeusD

There is a difference between saying that a perceptual experience is a representation and saying that a perceptual experience is of a representation. Our perceptual experience is a representation, but it is not of a representation (unless we are looking at a photograph or some other external representation of a real object).

In the quote above I say only that our perceptual experience is a representation. Contrary to your accusation, I have never said in this discussion that our perceptual experience is of a (internal) representation.

I believe that where the indirect realist errs is in thinking that we have perceptual experiences of the "way-points" of the process of perception. In my experience, that is rarely, if ever, the case.

Saving this comment space for a full reply as it’s dinner time.

But, so that I can leave it off later - I’m not going to give an account of direct perception. That’s not relevant. If there is no direct perception for humans, then that’s the case. We need not a comparator.

If there is no direct perception for humans, then that’s the case. We need not a comparator. — AmadeusD

There is direct perception for humans. We have it already. The kind of direct perception you seem to envisage involving no representation or process of perception is a fantasy; it's not possible.

. The kind of direct perception you seem to envisage involving no representation or process of perception is a fantasy; it's not possible. — Luke

Then I need not say more on the previous. You accept that our perception is necessarily indirect by understanding that our visual system doesn’t give us a visual of any actual objects, but representations of them.

By then for some reason claiming that this is direct, appealing to some fantasy about some nonexistent perception which is more direct you make a move I don’t think is open to you,

And I think you have, here, tacitly illustrated my assertion earlier / the direct realist claim is a bit of a fig leaf over that. This is the grammatical weirdness - yet again - rhar I was positing we could’ve avoided :sweat:

You accept that our perception is necessarily indirect — AmadeusD

Nope.

by understanding that our visual system doesn’t give us a visual of any actual objects, but representations of them. — AmadeusD

Direct realism is the view that we perceive real objects. We do have "a visual" or a perceptual experience of real objects.

Representations are required in order to have perceptual experiences, but this need not imply that we have perceptual experiences of representations.

To put it another way, a perceptual experience is a representation. For example, a perceptual experience such as a "visual", a sound or a smell might represent some distal object, but it does not represent a representation (unless the distal object itself represents something else).

Can we agree from this, that experience is a stand-alone entity?
— Mww

I don't think so. I believe experience consists of simpler things. — creativesoul

OK.

Meaning, for example, emerges as a result of correlations being drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Meaning is necessary for experience. — creativesoul

I agree meaning is a result of correlations, but I prefer to allot the correlations to understanding, and the meaning thereof emerging from the correlations, to judgement, but for me both of these are procedurally far in advance of experience. For you, then, is meaning one of the simpler things experience consists of, hence necessary for it?

It's the difference between detection and perception, or between sensitivity and sentience. — creativesoul

Meaning is that difference? Sorry, you’ve lost me now. What you mean by those terms helps me locate them in the discussion.
———-

Case in point: perceptual experience. If every experience begins with perception, then perceptual experience is redundant insofar as it says nothing more than experience alone.
— Mww

Last I checked "perceptual experience" wasn't something I invoked. — creativesoul

I know, and didn’t mean to imply you did. I was kinda hoping you wouldn’t because you’d already recognized the lack of justification for doing so.
———-

I agree that all experience is meaningful but would add that it is meaningful to the creature having the experience. This delineates the discourse. Are you okay with that? — creativesoul

Absolutely, insofar as meaningful to the creature, if you meant only to the creature, is a purely subjective predication. What goes on between the ears stays between the ears, kinda thing. For me, this is a strictly metaphysical paradigm, and through the years here, I got the impression you didn’t wish to be so limited.
————

You're focusing upon language use. I agree with that much. — creativesoul

I am forced into language use by the discussion. I reject language use for that which the discussion is about, for the first-hand, immediate occurrence of it, by the creature having the experience, which must include all that by which the experience he has, is possible, whatever that may be.

Nope. — Luke

You have agreed with the description given by myself and others of the process of human perception. That description is indirect. So, I'm just going to leave that as I have seen you say this multiple times.

Direct realism is the view that we perceive real objects. We do have "a visual" or a perceptual experience of real objects. — Luke

I know. And we don't. So, same as above..I'll leave that there. This is a circle now.

Representations are required in order to have perceptual experiences — Luke

Yep. Which is why we have 'indirect' perception. The weird notion that I have to provide some actual perceptual system that is 'more direct' is a fig leaf to this. IN any case, telepathy would do the job.

To put it another way, a perceptual experience is a representation. For example, a perceptual experience such as a "visual", a sound or a smell might represent some distal object, but it does not represent a representation (unless the distal object itself represents something else). — Luke

I am unsure why you're pointing this out. It is implicit in aall the other agreed points of fact we've been over *yet you've denied above.

This is now a circle.

We all accept that vision is, literally, an indirect process from object to experience. That there is more to say for the Direct Realist is baffling and indicates fig leaves, at best, and dishonesty at worst. And, as I have multiple times said, and you've absolutely run-roughshod over in service of circling around an empty hole:

Had we agreed, at the out set, that your conception literally is indirect realism, and that a 'more direct' form of perception would be required for DR to make sense, we wouldn't have this problem (or, the reverse agreement, I'm just on 'this' side of it - but either way we would have had terms that didn't have you saying one thing and claiming another).

As noted, this is now all circles. I don't find them much fun.

The weird notion that I have to provide some actual perceptual system that is 'more direct' — AmadeusD

The issue is not whether our “perceptual system” is direct, as you seem to assume. The issue is whether our perceptual experiences are direct. Perceptual experience is the final product of the perceptual system and we directly experience the world regardless of the number of “way-points” of the perceptual system.

My position is not “”literally indirect realism” because I argue for the idea that our perceptual experiences are of real objects and I argue against the idea that our perceptual experiences are of any perceptual intermediary.

You simply ignore the definitions of direct and indirect realism, instead you see only that our perceptual system involves representation and so you jump to the conclusion that our perceptual experience must therefore be indirect. And all without any argument.

that our perceptual experiences are of real objects — Luke

But they couldn't possibly be this. It isn't a move open to you, and you have rejected the two possible versions where it's true: physical objects in your mind, or non-mediated vision.

The issue is not whether our “perceptual system” is direct, as you seem to assume. The issue is whether our perceptual experiences are direct. — Luke

The circle grows ever-smaller.

We all accept that vision is, literally, an indirect process from object to experience.

Not me. I think the use of the term "experience" is the limited and ignorant explanation of a being who cannot even observe his own ears, let alone the totality of what occurs inside his own body. From this highly-limited viewpoint, which is one of grasping, the result is a product of the fallacy of reification, the use of nouns without any coherent referent, and thus terms which tell of nothing in particular.

The fact is, the process, the connection, the very contact between the perceiver and the rest of the world is direct, and we can use any experiment, observation, and system of measurement to prove this.

if a process which necessarily disconnects the end receiver from the distal object is “direct”, alrighty :)

What is your "end receiver"? Or is it just another noun without a referent?

That depends on what your conception of a perceiver is.
It is the experient. The consciousness who apprehends the end-result of the process of perception. It has a referent - if you're not able to adequately fine-grain your thinking here, I get that - largely, because whether fine or coarse grained, we could all be wrong.

The idea you're putting forward to seems to rest on the idea that we cannot pin-point a perceiver. If that were the case, we should be able to show that we share minds or experiences. We cannot.

We perceive light. Not objects. Quite literally, we see the converse of a shadow: a light-refracted image which represents the object enters our eyes. We don't even have the 'direct' contact put forward by DRs who seem to think an indirect sense system is directly perceiving things. It isn't, even on that account. But, I thank you for giving me a wider circle to walk around in. It is now clear that we perceive representations of a representation.

I’m a perceiver. You’re a perceiver. Are we not?

Light is of the world. Light is distal. We perceive light. Isn’t that so?

Do perceivers have eyes? Human perceivers do. Light comes into direct contact with the eyes. So how is the perception of light indirect?

Meaning, for example, emerges as a result of correlations being drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Meaning is necessary for experience.
— creativesoul

I agree meaning is a result of correlations, but I prefer to allot the correlations to understanding, and the meaning thereof emerging from the correlations, to judgement, but for me both of these are procedurally far in advance of experience. For you, then, is meaning one of the simpler things experience consists of, hence necessary for it? — Mww

As you said, using slightly different words, experience presupposes meaning. I would be okay with claiming simultaneity regarding meaning and experience. Co-dependency. Invoking understanding and judgement makes sense from you, being a Kantian and all.

We agree that correlations can be drawn prior to(far in advance of) experience, but I suspect for very different reasons. I have a strong methodological naturalist bent, a preference for ontological monism, and find it imperative to offer explanations that dovetail nicely with, or are otherwise compatible with, an evolutionary timeline.

It's the difference between detection and perception, or between sensitivity and sentience.
— creativesoul

Meaning is that difference? Sorry, you’ve lost me now. What you mean by those terms helps me locate them in the discussion. — Mww

Yup. Drawing correlations between different things is the difference between the motion sensor outside my shop and my dog when they both perceive the intruder. The experience is meaningful to the dog, but not the sensor. The sensor detects and the dog perceives the very same thing.

Last I checked "perceptual experience" wasn't something I invoked.
— creativesoul

I know, and didn’t mean to imply you did. I was kinda hoping you wouldn’t because you’d already recognized the lack of justification for doing so. — Mww

To me, it's akin to saying creamy ice cream. I mean, perception is one element of experience.

I agree that all experience is meaningful but would add that it is meaningful to the creature having the experience. This delineates the discourse. Are you okay with that?
— creativesoul

Absolutely, insofar as meaningful to the creature, if you meant only to the creature, is a purely subjective predication. What goes on between the ears stays between the ears, kinda thing. For me, this is a strictly metaphysical paradigm, and through the years here, I got the impression you didn’t wish to be so limited. — Mww

Your impression is accurate. All predication comes through a subject, hence the terminological use is redundant similar to "perceptual experience" and "creamy ice cream". We're thinking using words to help us. They're not between our ears. Nor are our correlations. I would not even agree with saying anything much at all stays between the ears aside from the biological structures residing there.

I reject language use for that which the discussion is about, for the first-hand, immediate occurrence of it, by the creature having the experience, which must include all that by which the experience he has, is possible, whatever that may be.

I think you're saying something along the lines of not all experience includes language use. I agree.

Biological machinery(physiological sensory perception) completely determines what sorts of things can become part of a creature's correlations. Of course, there are definitely hard limits to what we can know about that, especially given the hard limits regarding what we can know about our own meaningful experience. People are very often mistaken about their own mental events.

None of this relates to the discussion/distinction we're talking about. We are perceivers - I was trying to avoid the chess move a lot like to make which is to retreat into the "No true homunculus" type of reasoning. I get that objection, but don't think its reasonable to then infer that there's no distinct perceiver. It wasn't at you, just to clear that up.

Light is of the world. Light is distal. We perceive light. Isn’t that so? — NOS4A2

Hmm. Kind of (imo), and I see where you're going (i think). Light can be distal (obviously), but even distant light physically enters the eye to produce anything in our mind. The light from a galaxy far, far away might have taking 10,000 years to get to your eye, but it still physically enters the eye to initiation perception of it (and visual experience of hte object which reflected the light).

Do perceivers have eyes? Human perceivers do. Light comes into direct contact with the eyes. So how is the perception of light indirect? — NOS4A2

I did not claim that this was the case, at all. The light directly entering the eyes is one of the 'way points' mentioned earlier, which, quite obviously, causes our visual experience to be indirectly of whatever objects caused that light to enter the eye/s.

If the position was that we 'directly perceive light, which represents distal objects, of which we have no direct perception' i'd be fine with that, because that appears to be the case. Again, the need to hold on to certain language, that doesn't not best-fit the position seems to be causing a big problem here.

But they couldn't possibly be this. It isn't a move open to you, and you have rejected the two possible versions where it's true: physical objects in your mind, or non-mediated vision. — AmadeusD

You continue to equivocate on the meaning of “perceptual experience”. In what sense is vision mediated? It is only mediated in the production of the perceptual experience, not in the experience itself. In other words, we do not perceive the process(es) of perception which produce the perceptual experience. Yet, that is the indirect realists’ reason for why our perceptual experiences are indirect.