Yes, these are expressions of thought - they form a crucial part of it - that part that connects to the quite obscure aspect of non-linguistic thought with linguistic thought, but it is the linguistic aspect that gets discussed virtually everywhere — Manuel
The linguistic expression of thought is direct, it comes from my brain and I articulate to you that aspect of thought which is capable of expression. — Manuel
We don't know enough about unconscious brain processes to say if non-linguistic thought is, or is not, language like. — Manuel
I have used thought in saying that it has likely has a non-linguistic basis, but this amounts to saying very little about it. — Manuel
You really enjoy pushing the idea of discomfort. — Manuel
I've said several times Kant's point — Manuel
we directly perceive objects — Manuel
Indirect would be something like attempting to find out a persons brain state if they are paralyzed — Manuel
They will tell you they are directly identifying an object by its colors, even if colors are no mind-independent properties. — Manuel
These people can speak about their thoughts despite having no corresponding mental language (ie, their mentation is not linguistic - not 'there is no mental language per se' - it could be a language of feeling, or otherwise (as discussed by another poster earlier)). — AmadeusD
It doesn't come from your brain. It comes from your linguistic faculties (larynx, tongue etc..) as a symbolic representation. Again, if you call that Direct, that's a side-step of convention. Fine. Doesn't really address the issue here, though. It's 'as good as', but it isn't — AmadeusD
I disagree. We have (arguably, more than half) of people describing non-linguistic thoughts. We're good. And we know the results. It doesn't differ from expressing linguistic thoughts in any obvious way until the speaker is interrogated. — AmadeusD
Because it is, to me, clearly the reason for your position. You ahven't addressed this, and so I'll continue to push it until such time as an adequate response has been made. This isn't 'at you'. This is the position I hold. It seems coherent, and I've not yet had anyone even deny it. Just say other stuff. — AmadeusD
And if Kant was wrong? As many, many people think? — AmadeusD
In the language you are using, I have to accept this because this does not suppose any kind of phenomenal experience and so doesn't adequately describe all of what matters.
But If what you're saying is the eyes directly receive the light, I accept that.
You'll notice that nothing in this is the object, or the experience, or the subject. So we're still indirectly apprehending. Hehe. — AmadeusD
Convention rears it's head again. You're also describing a process of allocation. That isn't apt for the distinction we're talking about. I could definitely tell a biologist they are not directly perceiving the distal object of a phloem. What their response is has nothing to do with our discussion. Your point is taken, but it speaks to conventions. — AmadeusD
We are in an empty black room, looking at a wall. Two circles appear on the wall. One of the circles is going to grow in size and the other circle is going to move towards us (e.g. the wall panel moves towards us). The rate at which one grows and the rate at which the other moves towards us is such that from our perspective the top and bottom of the circles are always parallel.
Two different external behaviours are causing the same visual phenomenon (a growing circle). It's impossible to visually distinguish which distal object is growing and which is moving towards us. — Michael
Do you believe that naive/direct realism cannot deny color as a property of objects? I mean, I suppose I do not see any reason that a position like naive realism cannot correct any flaws based upon newly acquired knowledge such as color perception. — creativesoul
I think that if they admit that colours are not properties of objects then they must admit that colours are the exact mental intermediary (e.g. sense-data or qualia or whatever) that indirect realists claim exist and are seen. And the same for smells and tastes. — Michael
Direct realists claimed that there is no epistemological problem of perception because distal objects are actual constituents of experience. Indirect realists claimed that there is an epistemological problem of perception because distal objects are not actual constituents of experience (and that the actual constituents of experience are something like sense-data or qualia or whatever).
I don't think there's necessarily anything narrow about the reductionism of a functionalist. A functionalist just doesn't separate functional consciousness from phenomenal. She views the two as necessarily bound together, so that explaining one explains the other. — frank
What you're saying here is already true of functional consciousness. Every part of your body is engaged with the whole. The flowchart for how it all works together to keep you alive is startlingly large and complex, and along the endocrine system, the nervous system is the bodily government. However, none of this necessarily involves phenomenal consciousness. This is where you become sort of functionalist: that you assume that phenomenality has a necessary role in the functioning of the organism (or did I misread you?). That's something you'd have to argue for, ideally with scientific evidence. As of now, each side of the debate is focusing on information that seems to support their view, but neither has an argument with much weight. We don't know where phenomenal consciousness is coming from, whether it's the brain, the body, or quantum physics. We just don't know.
Why can't distal objects be constituents of experience — creativesoul
I think that you've given indirect realism too much credit. I see no reason to think that if colors are not inherent properties of distal objects that the only other alternative explanation is the indirect realist one. They can both be wrong about color. — creativesoul
This suggests that there is more to the visual phenomenon than just the raw retinal data. There is a sub-personal interpretive or organizational component that structures the experience in one way or another before it is given to conscious experience. — Pierre-Normand
I agree. But it is still the case that all this is happening in our heads. Everything about experience is reducible to the mental/neurological. The colours and sizes and orientations in visual experience; the smells in olfactory experience; the tastes in gustatory experience: none are properties of the distal objects themselves, which exist outside the experience. They are nothing more than a physiological response to stimulation. That, to me, entails the epistemological problem of perception, and so is indirect realism. — Michael
But if you know someone who endorses the "functionalist" label and who views phenomenal states to supervene widely on the brain+body+environment dynamics (like I do), I'd be happy to look at their views and compare them with mine. — Pierre-Normand
Most of the examples that I've put forward to illustrate the direct realist thesis appealed directly to the relationships between the subjects (visible and manifest) embodied activity in the world and the objective features disclosed to them through skilfully engaging with those features — Pierre-Normand
"Correct", "Veridical", or not, is the wrong framing. — hypericin
but a question of whether or not we perceive the world directly. — Luke
You don't see the screen; you see sensations? — Luke
You can call this seeing the screen or you can call this seeing a visual sensation. It makes no difference. That’s simply an irrelevant grammatical convention. — Michael
The relevant philosophical concern is that the visual sensation is distinct from the screen, that the properties of the visual sensation are not the properties of the screen, and that it is the properties of the visual sensation that are inform rational understanding. Hence why there is an epistemological problem of perception. That’s the indirect realist’s argument. — Michael
It appears that you only want to argue against naive realism, which is fine, but I think I've addressed that in my post above. — Luke
I have yet to hear a meaningful description of non-naive direct realism. Every account so far seems to just be indirect realism but refusing to call it so. — Michael
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