Yes, that's exactly how Berkeley presents his argument - officially - and why he thinks he can maintain that he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists. (Notice how ambiguous that is - he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists, but then he doesn't think that matter exists.)
His book was met with widespread ridicule, as the anecdote about Dr. Johnson illustrates. Another illustration of that ridicule is the name given to his doctrine ("immaterialism"). In case you hadn't noticed, it is a pun. His text is full of references to philosophical ideas being laughed at.
I don't know whether he didn't really know what he thought or he was upset by all the ridicule, he equivocates, oscillating between presenting his immaterialism as common sense (especially in the Dialogues and as a technical dispute within philosophy and between presenting his doctrine as a revolution in thought and as requiring no significant changes at all. — Ludwig V

What Berkeley did was ridicule the common notion of "matter", and this invited a reciprocation of the ridicule. The difference is that Bishop Berkeley's ridicule of the common notion of "matter" was well formulated and based in solid principles, whereas the reciprocated ridicule was more like a knee-jerk reaction.

Notice, that "matter" represents the temporal continuity of existence (as you say, what persists through change) and this is presented to us through sense perception. Isaac Newton had represented matter as having the property of inertia, and his first law takes inertia for granted. But Newton had said that this law is really dependent on the Will of God. Bishop Berkeley merely emphasizes this point.

Now, when Hume removes God, and portrays temporal continuity as something produced within human intuition, by representing sense perceptions as distinct instances, discrete impressions, instead of portraying the sense organs as providing us with continuous activity, he makes a false description. So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises.

There was a general realisation that doubt cannot be the whole of philosophical method. — Banno

Does Midgley address the philosopher's appeal to God?

.Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system... — ENOAH

Through the mystical method, philosophers often claim to have union with a divine source. Unlike Moses and "the burning bush" portrayal, the mystic's communion with the divinity is internal. Consider Socrates and his "daimon" for example. The common form is "prayer".

So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

:clap:

the mystic's communion with the divinity is internal. Consider Socrates and his "daimon" for example — Metaphysician Undercover

If that was intended to address Midgley's notion that consciousness is not isolated to each individual, I think you are highlighting her point in your reference to mysticism. The possibility of communion suggests to me, that notwithstanding the "internal" source of the mystical exercise, it's end result is that consciousness can "break free" from isolation and commune with "other" consciousness(es).

The point was the reality of our communion with the divine. It shows that Midgley's representation ("Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system") is a strawman. Philosophers, in general, do not represent an individual's consciousness as a closed system.

But the true way to understand that the individual consciousness is not a closed system, is through one's internal communion with the divine (like Socrates' daimon), not to apprehend the connection as an external relationship with other consciousnesses. The external relations, with the misgivings of lies, deception, disappointments, and the general failures of communication with others, only reinforces the feeling of isolation. Yet the internal relation with the divine remains the most true and honest, allowing for one to really "break free" from isolation.

What Berkeley did was ridicule the common notion of "matter", and this invited a reciprocation of the ridicule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair point. But I'm not comfortable with it, whoever is doing it. It is purely rhetorical and has no proper role in a supposedly rational discourse. Mind you, there's much ridicule in mid-century philosophy, which hides itself under the (not unreasonable) doctrine that analytic statements are trivial.

But Newton had said that this law is really dependent on the Will of God. Bishop Berkeley merely emphasizes this point. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know about Newton's God. But there is the difference between Malebranche's occasionalism and Berkeley's, and one notices that Malebranche did not attract the same ridicule as Berkeley, so that difference must have seemed important at the time.
I had the impression that Berkeley's understanding of inertia was very different from the standard version. I think many of his arguments don't stand up if one allows that inert objects can interact, as when one billiard ball hits another.

Now, when Hume removes God, and portrays temporal continuity as something produced within human intuition, by representing sense perceptions as distinct instances, discrete impressions, instead of portraying the sense organs as providing us with continuous activity, he makes a false description. So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you that he thinks of impressions as atoms, and I agree that is a misleading account. The whole issue of individuating ideas, impressions, sense-data has been woefully neglected.
One of Berkeley's principles is "esse" is "percipi aut percipere", which, on the face of it and in fact, is false. He seems to treat this as a axiom, so I don't know why he believed it.

One of Berkeley's principles is "esse" is "percipi aut percipere", which, on the face of it and in fact, is false. He seems to treat this as a axiom, so I don't know why he believed it. — Ludwig V

I don't understand why you would say this. How can you conclude that the principle is false? To be, or as you state it, "esse", is to be something, and that means to have been judged as having a whatness, or "what it is". This, "what it is", is a judgement based on perception. You cannot dissociate the whatness from the judgement, to give a thing an independent whatness, or "esse", because the whatness. "what it is", is a product of the judgement.

Is it possible to be too preoccupied with defending Descartes to see Midgley's point? — Banno

I think some here are too preoccupied with defending Descartes to see Descartes' point. If someone wishes to engage in Descartes gnosticism, that is fine (e.g. revamping everything he wrote in terms of historical circumstances or imputed intentions). Some of that may even be true, but to excoriate Midgley for taking Descartes at his word is, well, dumb. Only in an age as silly as ours could one be taken to task for interpreting a philosopher in light of what he actually wrote. I think there are many philosophers who are rolling in their graves because people are paying more attention to the "subtext" than their texts.

I think some here are too preoccupied with defending Descartes to see Descartes' point. — Leontiskos

As far as I am concerned Descartes is not in need of any defense from me. He has done quite well on his own. I am not interested in defending him but in understanding him.

Only in an age as silly as ours could one be taken to task for interpreting a philosopher in light of what he actually wrote. — Leontiskos

I think you have this backwards. In our age of free speech we fail to take into consideration what philosophers of the past had to contend with.See the appendix to Arthur M Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines" which contains numerous first hand accounts by philosophers.

A few of the many from Descartes:

Upon hearing of Galileo’s arrest for his pro-Copernican theories, Descartes suppressed the
publication of his just-completed exposition of his own mechanistic and pro-Copernican physics,
The World. Instead, eight years later, he published his Meditations, a work ostensibly confined
entirely to metaphysics and theology. But in a letter to Mersenne, he reveals:

...there are many other things in them; and I tell you, between ourselves, that these
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But that must not be spread abroad, if you please; for those who follow Aristotle will find it more difficult to approve them. I hope that [my readers] will accustom themselves insensibly to my principles, and will come to recognize their truth, before
perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.

– René Descartes to Mersenne, January 28, 1641, Œuvres de Descartes,
3:297–98, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in The Origin of
Subjectivity, 17

From the first paragraph of Descartes’ early, unpublished “Private Thoughts”:
I go forward wearing a mask [larvatus prodeo].

– René Descartes, “Cogitationes Privatae,” in Œuvres de Descartes, 10:213

From Montaigne's Complete Essays:

The wise man should withdraw his soul within, out of the crowd, and keep it in freedom
and power to judge things freely; but as for externals, he should wholly follow the
accepted fashions and forms.

– Ibid., 86 (1.23)

It is not new for the sages to preach things as they serve, not as they are. Truth has its
inconveniences, disadvantages, and incompatibilities.

– Ibid., 769 (3.10)

By profession they [the philosophers] do not always present their opinion openly
and apparently; they have hidden it now in the fabulous shades of poetry, now
under some other mask. For our imperfection also provides this, that raw meat is
not always fit for our stomach; it must be dried, altered, and corrupted. They do
the same: they sometimes obscure their natural opinions and judgments and
falsify them to accommodate themselves to public usage.

– Ibid., 408 (2.12)

And from Bacon:

I have no objection to your enjoying the fruits of your [old] philosophy…. [A]dorn your
conversation with its jewels; profess it in pubic and increase your gravity thereby in the eyes of the masses. The new philosophy will bring you no such gains…. It does not flatter the mind by fitting in with its preconceptions. It does not sink to the capacity of the vulgar except in so far as it benefits them by its works. Therefore keep your old philosophy. Use it when convenient. Keep one to deal with nature and the other to deal with the populace. Every man of superior understanding in contact with inferiors wears a mask.

– Francis Bacon, The Refutation of Philosophies, 108

Only in an age as silly as ours could one be taken to task for interpreting a philosopher in light of what he actually wrote. — Leontiskos

What he actually wrote is, as quoted earlier:

I decided to pretend that everything that had ever entered my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams ...

(Discourse Part 4)

I don't understand why you would say this. How can you conclude that the principle is false? To be, or as you state it, "esse", is to be something, and that means to have been judged as having a whatness, or "what it is". This, "what it is", is a judgement based on perception. You cannot dissociate the whatness from the judgement, to give a thing an independent whatness, or "esse", because the whatness. "what it is", is a product of the judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have explained myself. To exist is one thing, and Berkeley gives me no reason for supposing that existence of anything depends on being perceived or judged to exist. I can make some sense of the idea that anything that exists is capable of being perceived - especially if indirect perception is allowed.

Berkeley is no doubt relying on his argument against abstract objects. It supplies a way of accommodating abstract objects in his system, but is not obviously effective in the absence of his axiom. But his introduction of the notion of "notions" undermines his slogan, since he accepts the existence of my own mind and other minds, and God, even though they are not (directly) perceived. It is clear that he accepts that they are not (directly) perceived, because he introduces notions to get around the problem that my ideas do not themselves include the idea of myself. It's the same objection that was raised against the cogito.

I prefer "to be is to be the value of a variable".

To exist is one thing, and Berkeley gives me no reason for supposing that existence of anything depends on being perceived or judged to exist. I can make some sense of the idea that anything that exists is capable of being perceived - especially if indirect perception is allowed. — Ludwig V

To "exist" is not well defined, and we tend to use it in whatever way we find suitable for the occasion.

Berkeley is no doubt relying on his argument against abstract objects. It supplies a way of accommodating abstract objects in his system, but is not obviously effective in the absence of his axiom. But his introduction of the notion of "notions" undermines his slogan, since he accepts the existence of my own mind and other minds, and God, even though they are not (directly) perceived. It is clear that he accepts that they are not (directly) perceived, because he introduces notions to get around the problem that my ideas do not themselves include the idea of myself. It's the same objection that was raised against the cogito. — Ludwig V

I agree, it is likely that a thorough analysis would reveal that minds don't actually "exist" if we adhere to Berkeley's principles. That is the problem I referred to earlier, which inclines me to think that we need to bring matter in, through the back door. He provides no principles to provide a separation between one mind and another, or a human mind from God's mind. If we want to conceive of separate minds we need something (like matter) to separate them. Having distinct and separate ideas, in itself, does not suffice because something needs to separate the ideas, one from another.

- I can see that you are very fond of Descartes, but what does this have to do with Midgley? It is commonly recognized that Descartes helped occasion a shift towards the individual subject, and thus Midgley’s reading is not controversial. Do you have any arguments to offer against Midgley’s thesis, or are you just upset that she spoke against a philosopher you are fond of?

With the exception of your posts, I'm afraid I haven't been following this thread.
Folk engaged so closely with Cartesian views may have difficulty with externalism about the mind. The discussion here remains in the quiet solitude of Descartes' warm room, not in the noisy, busy Kitchen. So it remains both privileged and irrelevant, and produces no sustenance.

Do you have any arguments to offer against Midgley’s thesis, or are you just upset that she spoke against a philosopher you are fond of? — Leontiskos

I shouldn't complain, I supose, that a thread about Granny has achieved seven pages of historical exegesis. But I would have liked to read more about plumbing.

I can see that you are very fond of Descartes, — Leontiskos

Not particularly. I am fond of interpreting texts. He plays an important role in the history of philosophy and is worthy of careful reading. Like others, he is subject to re-evaluation from time to time.

but what does this have to do with Midgley? — Leontiskos

She brought him up. She gives a standard textbook reading of him which in my opinion does not hold up under scrutiny.

Descartes helped occasion a shift towards the individual subject — Leontiskos

I agree.

Midgley’s reading is not controversial. — Leontiskos

True. But non-controversial does not mean correct. There is always room for differences in interpretation but there are others that I find hew closer to the text and are more interesting.

Do you have any arguments to offer against Midgley’s thesis, or are you just upset that she spoke against a philosopher you are fond of? — Leontiskos

First of all I am not upset. I find the assumption odd. Second if you look through my posts on this thread you will see that I have made several points where I disagree with her.

She gives a standard textbook reading of him which in my opinion does not hold up under scrutiny. — Fooloso4

Even if Midgley has misconstrued Descartes, her misconstrual is shared by others. So I'll go back to a point I made earlier, that even if she is wrong about what Descartes said, she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy.

That is, what you have said here in your many posts is irrelevant to the argument Midgley presents.

Even if Midgley has misconstrued Descartes, her misconstrual is shared by others. — Banno

It is shared by others, it is the fruit of a plain reading of his texts, and it is this received interpretation that has had its effect on the history of philosophy. If such is a misreading, then this misreading is in large part Descartes’ own fault. Philosophers should have foresight about how their texts will be interpreted and how their method will influence their message.

Oh, I agree. I don't see that @Fooloso4 has carried his case. Yet even if he had, it does not count against Midgley.

- :up:

Even if Midgley has misconstrued Descartes, her misconstrual is shared by others. — Banno

Right. And she perpetuates it.

she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

Descartes was following a common meditative and contemplative practice in both the East and West. In both the same questions arise regarding whether this practice should be solitary and removed from the concerns and activities of public life.

As Midgley attests there have always been solitary thinkers. This is not because of Descartes and will not be changed by some yenta advocating marriage.

She says:

It is commonplace today that this branch of philosophy got into confusion by first artificially separating the Knower from the Known ...

I agree that this has led to confusion and that Descartes is as the center of the subjective turn. I also agree that it is a commonplace today. But philosophy has moved past this. Apparently no one told her. This movement began before her and has continued after her.

It is shared by others, it is the fruit of a plain reading of his texts, and it is this received interpretation that has had its effect on the history of philosophy. — Leontiskos

And yet when I question the received interpretation you assume this is because I am fond of Descartes and upset, as it all of this is personal. Part of the movement of the history of philosophy has been the reevaluation of major figures.

Philosophers should have foresight about how their texts will be interpreted and how their method will influence their message. — Leontiskos

No one has the ability to anticipate all the different ways in which they will be interpreted. This too is part of the history of philosophy. There has never been an important and influential philosopher who has not been interpreted in various incompatible ways.

, so you back away from your defence of Descartes only to be oddly antagonistic towards Midgley.

At the least, there might be some philosophical merit in considering the place of those who are not reclusive white bachelors.

Or will you deny this, too?

So I'll go back to a point I made earlier, that even if she is wrong about what Descartes said, she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

I take it that no one wants to address the issue of the philosopher's (whether the philosopher is a solitary white man or not) relationship with the divine. It appears to me like the issue is not the hegemony of any particular human being, but that of the divinity which some appear to establish a relationship with.

she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

She probably is, though, given this is 2024 and not 1954.

but that of the divinity which some appear to establish a relationship with. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. Almost all non-white-male philosophy prior to 1900 was in the exact same mode as best I can tell, just different values.. All heading towards relationship with the divine.

She probably is, though, given this is 2024 and not 1954. — AmadeusD

Indeed, things have been so much better since the patriarchy was dismantled.

And yet when I question the received interpretation you assume this is because I am fond of Descartes and upset, as it all of this is personal. — Fooloso4

We're still waiting for you to give an argument that bears on Midgley's thesis.

No one has the ability to anticipate all the different ways in which they will be interpreted. — Fooloso4

Sure, but what is at stake is not some bizarre or implausible interpretation.

I agree that this has led to confusion and that Descartes is as the center of the subjective turn. I also agree that it is a commonplace today. But philosophy has moved past this. Apparently no one told her. This movement began before her and has continued after her. — Fooloso4

It's as if you first concede that Midgley is right and then, unaccountably, assert that she is confused, again without a supporting argument. Your rebuttal? "Philosophy has moved past this. Nothing to see here, folks!"

Not sure what you want me to glean from an opinion piece asserting several faulty claims... in the Guardian. Let's just cut through it:

"To date, I’ve not encountered any direct racism or sexism in academia..."

Nice.

"To date, I’ve not encountered any direct racism or sexism in academia..." — AmadeusD

Not selective at all.

Ironic.

To "exist" is not well defined, and we tend to use it in whatever way we find suitable for the occasion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, quite so. What makes a particular use suitable for the occasion? Berkeley is quite open about why he thinks his criterion for existence or not. It's in the title. "Matter", he thinks, gives sceptics and atheists a foundation for their pernicious ideas. We delude ourselves if we try to pretend that metaphysics is ethically neutral (in spite of Hume). Perhaps it could be, but people looking for a foundation for ethics will look for something helpful in metaphysics - and the natural sciences, which also claim to be ethically neutral.

I agree, it is likely that a thorough analysis would reveal that minds don't actually "exist" if we adhere to Berkeley's principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry, but I think the problem lies in the question. It is a classic example of what Hume calls "augmentation" - the tendency of philosophers to extend the application of certain ideas beyond their contextualized scope.

See the appendix to Arthur M Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines" which contains numerous first hand accounts by philosophers. — Fooloso4

Thank you for this. There is a book that investigates whether the God-elements in Descartes' meditations are fully sincere. I have forgotten the name of the book.

It does seem that Midgely has a track record of purposefully(?) misunderstanding, she has done so before with Dawkins:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/in-defence-of-selfish-genes/81402A555B9BBDC8988B3DDE881E3A58

It is funny how so many people here have taken to defend that the half-satirical take of a largely irrelevant "scholar" actually stands up against the father of modern philosophy in a way that 300 hundred years of philosophy does not.
Scholar, though apparently she never even earned a doctorate.

she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy — Banno

Any hegemony in a field like philosophy is due to simply better ideas. All you are saying is that non-whites and women are incompetent at philosophy. But it is not like the historical track does anything to disprove that.

Indeed, things have been so much better since the patriarchy was dismantled. — Banno

Did you dye your hair blue this past week or is this your new style of trolling? Being racist against the most successful groups is very 2017.