Which one is that you mean to convey? — Bob Ross

One was a definition and one was not.

These are incoherent taken together. — Bob Ross

They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.

I need a bit of clarification on this one: do you NOT think rape is wrong, if it is committed by a dog? I seriously doubt that is what you are trying to convey, but that seems (to me) to be the implication of the above quote.

All I think you mean to convey, is that the dog isn’t a moral agent; which wasn’t ever in contention in the first place. I am saying that the act of rape that the dog committed is wrong, and the dog is not a moral agent (in the sense that the dog is not capable of being held responsible for their acts). — Bob Ross

If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.

What do you mean by “engage” here? I would say that a tornado does not “engage” in immoral or moral acts insofar as it is not culpable for the acts its commits but NOT that the tornado cannot perform what is an immoral or moral act (although it isn’t deliberate). — Bob Ross

Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act. After you do that you should try to give an argument for why your tornado is immoral.

I see your point to a certain extent, that you distinguish natural and moral evil; but this use of ‘evil’ just seems circular: isn’t that just a reference to something that is immoral? — Bob Ross

If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.

Just so we can find common ground, let’s forget semantics for a second. I agree with you that there is a difference between ‘evil’ (i.e., moral badness) which is done by indeliberate (i.e., natural) vs. deliberate (i.e., what you call “moral”) actions/events. I would merely add that the action/event is still ‘evil’ (i.e., morally bad: what I call ‘immoral’) if it is natural. I think, stripping the semantics out, you can agree with that. — Bob Ross

I can somewhat agree with this. I think you need to start defining the words you are using given the very strange way you are using them.

If natural evil is not moral evil, then some evil is not immoral. — Bob Ross

Yes, certainly.

My interpretation of your view, and correct me if I am still misunderstanding, is that you mean to denote a subtype of immorality (i.e., of evil) which is the realm of these 'moral realities' that you refer to; and in that sense I have no problem with it. — Bob Ross

No. In moral philosophy moral evil and natural evil are both subsets of evil. Once again:

Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. — SEP | The Concept of Evil

The semantics just seem weird to me. — Bob Ross

Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary. But even apart from that, your claim that amoral realities can commit immoral acts is logically incoherent. What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.

"why are you being like that?" "like what" "rude" "i didnt realize i was being rude, i thought i was being clear..." "do you know what im supposed to be being like" "why are you acting like that or why are you doing these things" being (blank) acting and living life at the same time.......2 things at once.




hi im kizzy im wondering, "how so?" i am genuinely curious

hi leontiskos, im kizzy...feel free to ignore this comment but its relevance to the op comes full circle...spheres are 3d, are you ready for those levels at this 2d point? how do you know if you are?

INTRODUCTIONS COULD use work? INTRODUCTIONS to persuade might need work ,but chet doesnt need to do that here...you should consider all interactions to your OP, and be thankful that anyone acknowledges it at all.

do you know the functions that exist in order to determine something "needs work" implies knowing how to improve....not only can you not know, even with chet explaining himself clear enough, but also it(your defensive comment in weakness) implies that an end is knowable and known by you, and thats why you THINK you can justify "ignoring" but can you justify in your own words with good reason?....you ought to want to for your own sake. When did you start to "ignore" chets posts? Now?? Thats fair...but when You ignore views by seemingly how bothered you become by them, an opposition you never foresaw to begin with. Consider that a blessing... how many others do you ignore? seems like you only tolerate what you can handle...bob ross? HE has the patience of a SAINT for entertaining! Or he believes in you...fair as well.

My model helps me to understand. Fear, anger, and desire are all three consciousness. They are all three involved in choice. The choice to be, anger, is still a choice. The choice to comply with instantiated patterns, involuntary acts, as you just gave an example for, are indeed still choices.

The power of choice is effectively infinite. But a weak will (desire in general) is hard pressed to carry out 'deliberate' acts that violate the tendencies of the weak current state. We are slowly evolving into more capable moral agents. That is a law of the universe. It is happening everywhere and it is, from what we can determine so far, reasonably rare that what we call life happens. As mentioned, that is a misunderstanding. The call of desire, the existence of nothing but consciousness in the universe, empowers free will for every particle in existence. The STATE of that particle determines the difficulty of choice. So it is nigh unto impossible for a rock to play poker for example. But that is only nigh and not finally actually impossible. Understanding and accepting these extremely rare cases of truth delving is a better way than what most people have of being aware what is going on.

Most people will not be comfortable discussing rocks that choose. But any other assertion is more than just incoherent. Everything in this universe is choosing constantly. And moral scrutiny DOES apply to rocks as well as humans. I realize I am probably alone in this assertion. No worries. — Chet Hawkins

Kick rocks!!!
evidence as base, grounded in self, motivated by [blank](insert drive-example=passions), intentions verifiable and valued, ready to judge BY ONLY EQUAL STANDING GROUNDED POSITION TO JUDGE PROPERLY, RIGHTFUL IN/OF/FOR THE GOOD of the possible outcomes. The good will come out of immoral choice and choosing agents regardless, but in another form no matter what choices were made but until digested for worth, its not in a place or position to judge from/of YET

Which is every single act in the universe that has happened, is happening, or will happen. No narrowing down of the scope occurred here. If you think it did, you are only deluding yourself and those that believe you. — Chet Hawkins

no, literally!

What clearly stated to you determines a non-hypothetical state? I promise you there is not one. To any experience of any chooser, any act past or present is hypothetical only. — Chet Hawkins

thats wise of you, chet!....

....proof is in the pudding. Watch what you eat....what happens when you bypass your intentions?

Intentions show that the individual has thought

Intention shows when the individual has thought not fully through an idea but enough to justify actions in planning to act...plans to act, thoughts become intelligent in designing ideas that are justified in and of them selves? when... the justifications show distinction and/of or distance of the real reality of self and real reality from self...whether it was goal focused or desire oriented......how far you came? how much you grew?

the space for thought is and is found when and in using the brain silently within the minds limits, which the self can control as boundaries constraints etc for what it really is thats happening..e.g. ////I dont actually like the people I work with but I will go to the bar with them when we get off at 5 because its an excuse to go to the bar and get loose and see where the night takes me.. It makes "us" ME feel better justifying why,how,when,with "you" i was "were" there in the first place.
"you" into "us"......
*reason=goal or desire?
goal=body action towards is needed eventually (motion) not always present in decision making actions, or acting in general, aware of goal? -VS- desire=body action not needed..(no motion required)

Certain outcomes always will/are/is out of our human acting control....some stronger than others, since BIRTH! Innate abilities and capabilities are limiting to equality, meaning subject in the whole is required to see worth of entirety in any morality debate

So to us moral agents that are not perfectevery act is hypothetical even after decisions are made and a new state is formed. We do not know the past. We do not know the present state. We do not know the future. All of it is hypothetical. — Chet Hawkins

I think even if its knowable (chet assumes BELIEVES its NOT (with good enough reason) the part or answer to the question, begs the questioning...if unknowable (due to capabilities) how does TIME influence or constrain something that can be known only by observation of existence in reality and from there judged rightfully and agreed upon from the place of judgement with good reasons that warrant detailed explanations in the decision its self? The jury should explain consensus and how they got there should be examined, for cases that are harder or easier than others to get to an answer, those decision making moments in group setting vs individual beliefs how they affect or alter that timeline, convincing, and doubting, and power....willing...justice serves itself in all natures, at certain/specific times for us. What do we do with that intel? Ignore it? Thats your call...or Bobs....we cant see what time tells us now, then! How could we?

We may be at an impasse, so please feel free, if you see nothing new or noteworthy to add to my response here, to just have us agree to disagree. That is not to say that I don’t want to continue discussing, and I will, but I just don’t want you feel that you have to keep circling back and reiterating (if that starts to happen, as I suspect it might).

They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.

I understand, but the problem is you said:

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable

Which implied that by ‘moral agent’, you are referring to not merely an agent capable of moral action but, rather, one that does right action. See what I mean?

If it is that you just mean the former, then I was right in thinking that ‘moral agent’, for you, is an agent capable of moral action and, thusly, one which can be held responsible for their actions (which, for you, is one which has deliberate actions). OR, if you mean that a ‘moral agent’ is the latter, then it is not true, and patently incoherent, to posit that anyone capable of moral action is a ‘moral agent’ (because they also, in order to meet the definition, must be doing the right acts, not just acts of which they are capable of being held responsible).

The interesting thing, is that I think you are using the adjective ‘moral’ in multiple senses, which is normal and fine, without realizing it. This would explain the seeming incongruence here.

There are two broad, traditional senses of the adjective ‘moral’, which you even expounded in your OP, which are a signification of (1) what is within moral discourse and (2) what is actually good. If this is the case, then it is perfectly coherent for you to posit the phrase ‘moral agent’ in both senses you noted, because one sense would be a ‘moral agent’ merely in the sense that the agent, qua agent, is within the sphere of moral discourse (viz., they are capable of being held, in action, accountable, as per the dictates of morality, for what they do) and the other sense would be a ‘moral agent’ in the more strict sense that the agent is not only ‘moral’ in the former sense but also doing the right actions (viz., doing what, as per the dictates of morality, is right). See what I mean?

I would like you to know, although I am not quoting it (for the sake of brevity), that I did read the SEP article and am familiar with it. Although I prefer using adjectives uniformly, I have, upon further reflection, no problem with the distinction of ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil, as incoherent as that may sound to you (relative to my view), because I know that the adjective ‘moral’ is being used yet in another sense (than the other two I already expounded). Here’s a rundown of all three:

1. ‘moral’ in the sense of within moral discourse (e.g., whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter [which is not to make a comment on if it is immoral or not]).

2. ‘moral’ in the sense of morally right (e.g., being kind is moral, being mean is immoral).

3. ‘moral’ in the sense of moral responsibility (e.g., you have a moral duty to not rape people, tornadoes are not moral agents, etc.).

These are all senses, I would argue, you are using; and they are divergent in meaning (and I see nothing wrong with this): I just need you to acknowledge and see these senses at work in your own theory.

By ‘moral evil’ in ‘natural vs. moral evil’, one is denoting with the adjective ‘moral’ what is evil in a deliberate sense: it is to use ‘moral’ in all three senses. The first because ‘moral evil’ is within the sphere of moral discourse; the second because ‘moral evil’ is NOT JUST what is in the sphere of moral discourse (such a statement like “whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter”) but also that it IS morally wrong; and the third because it is not just that it is morally wrong but also that it was deliberate (intentional).

So, let me break down what I mean by way of my dog example:

1. Dogs are not moral agents. ‘Moral’ is being used in the first (and consequently also in the third) sense. This is NOT to say that they are immoral agents, because ‘immoral’ here is being used in the second sense.

2. The act of rape is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense.

3. A dog raping another dog is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense, and is not referencing whether or not the dog is itself a ‘moral agent’ in the first (and consequently third) sense.

I guess, I view the adjective ‘moral’ as, for intents and purposes hereon, plural in meaning; and I see clearly that you are using it the same way (and correct me if I am wrong).

If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.

Correct, because by ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ you are referring here to the first and third sense and not the second: you are mentioning that the agent is not capable of being held responsible, and, in this sense, their actions are not within the sphere of moral talk which pertains to talk about moral responsibility.

This doesn’t negate the fact that rape, being committed by the dog, is ‘immoral’ in the second sense—i.e., that it is morally wrong/bad.

Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act.

I was meaning ‘morally bad’, which to me is ‘to be intrinsically bad or relate to something intrinsically bad such that it bad relative to it’, and this is in the second sense (I mentioned above). I am not commenting on whether or not, by saying it is an ‘immoral’ act in this manner, this act is within the ‘moral reality’ of moral responsibility talk—I just mean that it is morally bad.

Think of it this way, for my view, you can just, in this sense of ‘immoral’ (i.e., the second), just substitute ‘immoral’ for ‘evil’ (although I do think that ‘evil’ is specifically moral badness to an extreme, but that doesn’t matter for now).

If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.

Correct me if I am wrong, but all I got out of the SEP was that they are making a distinction between two general types of moral badness: those which are natural, and those which are done purposefully. The latter they use the adjective ‘moral’ to describe, and I don’t see how this negates the other traditional meanings of it. Do you think that the adjective ‘moral’ has one meaning?--and specifically that it refers only to the sense it is used in the SEP?

If so, then you have issues with your usages in the OP of the adjective. Just as some examples:

What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.

The underlined portion admits at least two of the senses I described.

In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act

“moral scrutiny” is being used in the first and third sense, and not the second; which is completely different from how it is used in the natural vs. moral evil distinction. By your own admission, “moral” in “moral scrutiny” is not referring to something morally right nor wrong: “moral” in “moral evil” is referring to something morally wrong, deliberate, and in the sphere of moral discourse.

What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.

By ‘moral reality’, I am assuming you mean ~”a society (or perhaps framework) comprised of beings capable of moral responsibility”. Is that not what you mean?

Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary.

I apologize, by ‘moral agents’ that are culpable for their actions; I meant capable of being culpable for their actions. I see now how that was confusing. But I don’t see anything wrong with my use (so far) of ‘immoral’.

Hopefully my expounding of the terms helps.

Bob

Hello Chet and Kizzy,

Although your intentions may be good, your responses are elongated, disrespectful, sporadic, intellectually lazy, and unsubstantive; and I say this with all due respect, as a person that wants to see you both grow and develop into better philosophers :kiss: . Please try to see it from your reader's perspective: they are reading an essay which conveys a plethora of different ideas (all of which are unrelated to each other) in incredibly confusing, convoluted, and incoherent ways...all while hurling insulting comments at them. How do you expect them to react?

This forum is all about a congregation of people willing to learn from each other with genuineness, respectfulness, and intellectual rigor. It is completely fine and understandable to have different views than other people on this forum, but I would strongly suggest that you try to make your future comments more concise, respectful, and intellectually rigorous.

By 'intellectually rigorous', I do not mean that you need to have extensive knowledge of the topic-at-hand; but, rather, demonstrate in your responses that you took the time to reflect on the topic and the person's post you are responding to (as opposed to just ranting). It goes a long way, when the reader of your response can see that you took the time to genuinely reflect, dissect, and contend with their ideas.

I say none of this with any ill-will intentions nor disrespect in mind: as I said before, I want to see you both become great philosophers (:

Bob

you should consider all interactions to your OP, and be thankful that anyone acknowledges it at all. — Kizzy

I don't agree with your opinion here. On the rare occasions when I write an OP I try to respond to more posts than I usually would, but I do not feel that I am in any way obliged to respond to posts that are long, rude, and lacking in what refers to as "intellectual rigor." This is especially true when it is a matter of introduction, i.e. when I do not have rapport with the individual.

We may be at an impasse, so please feel free, if you see nothing new or noteworthy to add to my response here, to just have us agree to disagree. That is not to say that I don’t want to continue discussing, and I will, but I just don’t want you feel that you have to keep circling back and reiterating (if that starts to happen, as I suspect it might). — Bob Ross

Okay. If we continue you may need to begin to shoulder more of the burden of proof, for your posts are becoming increasingly opaque to me.

Which implied that by ‘moral agent’, you are referring to not merely an agent capable of moral action but, rather, one that does right action. See what I mean? — Bob Ross

I explained in my last that one was a definition and one was not. Let's list some of my claims that you have identified or which are relevant:

1. That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts. (link)
2. Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable. (link - context: culpability)
3. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. (link)
   
   • i.e. Someone who does something right is someone who is [a moral agent].
4. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts. (link)
   
   • i.e. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is [a moral agent].

Now you have claimed that some or all of these statements are inconsistent. I tried to explain why they are not, and you continued to claim that they are. Our current disagreement pertains to whether these various claims are self-consistent.

If it is that you just mean the former, then I was right in thinking that ‘moral agent’, for you, is an agent capable of moral action and, thusly, one which can be held responsible for their actions (which, for you, is one which has deliberate actions). OR, if you mean that a ‘moral agent’ is the latter, then it is not true, and patently incoherent, to posit that anyone capable of moral action is a ‘moral agent’ (because they also, in order to meet the definition, must be doing the right acts, not just acts of which they are capable of being held responsible). — Bob Ross

In moral philosophy "moral agent" always means "an agent capable of moral action," and I am fairly certain that I have never used the term differently in this thread.

There are two broad, traditional senses of the adjective ‘moral’, which you even expounded in your OP, which are a signification of (1) what is within moral discourse and (2) what is actually good. — Bob Ross

In moral philosophy we never talk about moral agents in sense (2).

Regarding "moral," in this thread I have deliberately taken steps to indicate when I am using (2) rather than (1), because (2) is abnormal given the context of the OP. I indicate the difference with context (or by explicitly referencing the adjective "praiseworthy"), or more commonly by using "right" instead of "moral" to denote "morally right." I don't think I have been ambiguous on this score.

1. ‘moral’ in the sense of within moral discourse (e.g., whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter [which is not to make a comment on if it is immoral or not]).

2. ‘moral’ in the sense of morally right (e.g., being kind is moral, being mean is immoral).

3. ‘moral’ in the sense of moral responsibility (e.g., you have a moral duty to not rape people, tornadoes are not moral agents, etc.). — Bob Ross

1 & 3 are more or less the same. Rape is "within moral discourse" precisely because we can be held responsible for rape; because the act of rape falls within the species of "moral-and-immoral-acts." Now, I would rather talk about tornadoes than dogs, because some people will be prone to think that dogs—even on the supposition that they are not moral agents—are capable of raping in the moral sense. Maybe once we mete out tornadoes we can move to dogs, but if we can't sort out the fact that tornadoes are not moral agents then we won't be capable of addressing dogs.

By ‘moral evil’ in ‘natural vs. moral evil’, one is denoting with the adjective ‘moral’ what is evil in a deliberate sense: it is to use ‘moral’ in all three senses. — Bob Ross

Somewhat, but an act that is right or wrong in sense (2) entails that it is an act which belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts in sense (1), and this inference has been at play in my posts. For example, when I say, "Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is...," this inference is at play. Again, this is an inference, not a definition. We infer that they are a moral agent because they performed a right act. We could similarly infer that they are a moral agent if they perform an immoral act.

So, let me break down what I mean by way of my dog example: — Bob Ross

Let's come back to the dog example after we address the tornado example. To be honest, in my opinion your posts contain mounds of minor misunderstandings of the moral landscape, and throughout this thread I have been trying to focus on the largest ones and ignore the smaller ones, for the sake of time and manageability. Tornadoes are an example. Mistaking tornadoes for moral realities is a larger misunderstanding than mistaking dogs for moral realities, so let's focus on that first. Your dog misunderstanding relates to errors regarding the specification of acts and also of moral acts, and this misunderstanding is more subtle (and more widespread).

I was meaning ‘morally bad’, which to me is ‘to be intrinsically bad or relate to something intrinsically bad such that it bad relative to it’, and this is in the second sense (I mentioned above). I am not commenting on whether or not, by saying it is an ‘immoral’ act in this manner, this act is within the ‘moral reality’ of moral responsibility talk—I just mean that it is morally bad.

Think of it this way, for my view, you can just, in this sense of ‘immoral’ (i.e., the second), just substitute ‘immoral’ for ‘evil’ (although I do think that ‘evil’ is specifically moral badness to an extreme, but that doesn’t matter for now). — Bob Ross

Right: so you call "immoral" what SEP calls "evil" (before that "evil" becomes natural or moral)...?

Correct me if I am wrong, but all I got out of the SEP was that they are making a distinction between two general types of moral badness: those which are natural, and those which are done purposefully. — Bob Ross

Nope. SEP says, "Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil." It does not say, "Moral badness in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural badness and moral badness."

“moral scrutiny” is being used in the first and third sense, and not the second; which is completely different from how it is used in the natural vs. moral evil distinction. By your own admission, “moral” in “moral scrutiny” is not referring to something morally right nor wrong: “moral” in “moral evil” is referring to something morally wrong, deliberate, and in the sphere of moral discourse. — Bob Ross

Okay, this is helpful. Yes, when we add "evil" to the word "moral" we are no longer talking about acts that might be morally praiseworthy. This is the context because SEP is distinguishing natural evil from moral evil. We could also distinguish natural good from moral good. And thirdly, we could distinguish the natural (whether good or evil) from the moral (whether good or evil). The various distinctions do not all come together and interact in the way that one first supposes.

Perhaps I have been unclear. I originally pointed to the SEP article to show why tornadoes are not moral evils (and are therefore not immoral). I did not point to the SEP article to show that the distinction between natural evil and moral evil is the same as the distinction in the first paragraph of the OP. They are two different distinctions.

By ‘moral reality’, I am assuming you mean ~”a society (or perhaps framework) comprised of beings capable of moral responsibility”. Is that not what you mean? — Bob Ross

I mean anything that can perform moral acts, as defined in the OP. I will again ask you, "What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality?"

I apologize, by ‘moral agents’ that are culpable for their actions; I meant capable of being culpable for their actions. — Bob Ross

Okay, good. This is a mistake, and we should not talk that way. To be culpable for my action is not to be capable of being culpable for my action. To say, "He is culpable for committing the homicide," does not mean, "He is capable of being culpable for committing the homicide."

Hopefully my expounding of the terms helps. — Bob Ross

It did. This was a good, thoughtful post. :up:

If we continue you may need to begin to shoulder more of the burden of proof, for your posts are becoming increasingly opaque to me.

Fair enough: I will make my response more abrupt to make it less strainful (on the both of us).

With respect to your use of ‘moral agent’, the issue was really due to my accidental conveyance of ‘an moral agent is one which is capable of being held culpable for their actions’ with ‘an moral agent is one which is culpable for their actions’: I apologize, that was my mistake. The whole time I was thinking the former, but conveyed the latter. Your definition, in light of that, is fine and perfectly consistent.

"What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality?"

I honestly don’t know what a ‘moral reality’ is, at all (other than what I understand you to be meaning). I have never used that phrase, and don’t see any need to use it. Perhaps this is an indication of my ignorance...I don’t know.

Let’s talk about, as per your request, a tornado. To do that, I think we need to talk first about the concept of ‘evil’; because I think this is really the crux of our disagreement. I understand now better what you and the SEP article was conveying: it was conveying a concept of ‘evil’ which does not preclude amoral evil—this is a foreign and wholly implausible view to me.

‘Evil’, by my lights, is a morally-loaded term: there cannot be such a thing as amoral evil; and perhaps if you could elaborate on why you think that, then I may be able to account better for your position.

There is such a thing as amoral badness, by my lights, but not ‘evil’: the word itself implies moral relevance.

Bob

Despite the delusions of all people, morality is the only thing going on. Morality is objective and true. All acts are only of course moral acts in that they SHOULD be judged morally. There is no act, no substantive state, that is not merely a succession of choices amid free will. This universe is alive. It emerges life as a natural law. The seeds of life exist as choice down to the sub-atomic level. Choice is effectively the only act thing in the universe. States are all the consequential arrangements of matter and energy and we will say consciousness as well. Really though we could JUST say consciousness because matter and energy are both just forms of consciousness.

These and other seemingly absolute statements seem sort of at odds with your prior claims that no one can know anything and that any pretension to knowledge is a sort of delusion/vainglory, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not at all. As I have already mentioned many times in this thread, stating things with confidence as a belief IS NOT stating that one has objective knowledge. The assertions are hypotheses only and anyone may argue against it at any time.

That is incorrect.

All morals are forced to be hypothetical ought-judgments. We cannot know. So all beliefs are effectively hypotheses.

But I take it you don't actually know if what you've just. claimed is true or not. Is it only a hypothesis? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, clearly.

Weren't you saying something about how people shouldn't speak/write in such a way that they seem certain about things, but instead should always piously acknowledge their ignorance. But then... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I did not say that at all. I said the use of the word 'know' and its derivatives is inclined in the wrong direction. People more often take that to mean certainty. Stating your beliefs confidently is not the same thing at all. And here I am again saying, 'everything I say is partially wrong, by admission. What I say is my belief only. I am willing to argue the points based on evidence and reasoning.'

Consequentialism is a dangerous lie. Deontological morality is the only thing that makes any sense...

The good is objective.

Etc.

look like knowledge claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't use the word knowledge and they are only beliefs. Still my belief is that KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY BELIEF. That's the thread title. Is there something I said that denies that belief? No. What it means is that the colloquial use of the term 'know' and 'knowledge' partakes in our culture of too much certainty when it is only belief. I again, despite my ringing confidence, claim to know anything at all. I do claim to have strong beliefs and speaking JUST FOR ME I do not confuse those two things. Others do all the time.

All thinking is incoherent.

You should have led with this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You do not say why. You leave others to fill in the gaps AS IF your point is merely obvious. You believe in certainty then, at least more than I do.

All thought is belief impelled. Fear is only an emotion. The patterns it believes it understands are NEVER understood totally. So all thought is belief and all belief is partially in error. Any error corrupt the purity of the belief as objectively proper, so, it is then improper in all ways, simultaneously.

This means it is a tautology that all thought is incoherent.

What a REAL Pragmatist philosopher Scotsman should say is that probability is very high on the side of the least incoherent thoughts in existence. And that probability again shows up to help us accredit sources of thought and thought statements as less incoherent. That is also something I believe.

But you didn't go there. You just wat to discredit the notion that I believe as a tautology with japes and saying I am rude. Imagine how rude I believe it is for everyone not to notice what I am really saying and how it does work. Your incoherence on this is greater than mine. That is a belief, not a thing I know. And in any case, knowledge is only belief.

Aside from the piety of declaring ignorance, you might want to consider not being so rude lol. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is often consider rude to stand in the way of stupidity, but, I find myself called.

:up:

With respect to your use of ‘moral agent’, the issue was really due to my accidental conveyance of ‘an moral agent is one which is capable of being held culpable for their actions’ with ‘an moral agent is one which is culpable for their actions’: I apologize, that was my mistake. The whole time I was thinking the former, but conveyed the latter. Your definition, in light of that, is fine and perfectly consistent. — Bob Ross

Yes, good job catching this! I had noticed the same thing in my own head: that the conflation between the two senses of 'moral' had stemmed from your misuse of the word 'culpable.' As I sat down to point this out I read your post and realized that you beat me to it. :wink:

I honestly don’t know what a ‘moral reality’ is, at all (other than what I understand you to be meaning). I have never used that phrase, and don’t see any need to use it. Perhaps this is an indication of my ignorance...I don’t know. — Bob Ross

We can leave this aside, but I introduced that term to denote the kind of moral realities that could be broader than simply moral acts (e.g. acts, intentions, habits, agents, societies, systems, and potentially tornadoes).

But I still need to know what you mean by "amoral," as you continue to use this term. In the thread you have spoken about amoral agents and amoral acts. What are amoral agents and amoral acts?

‘Evil’, by my lights, is a morally-loaded term: there cannot be such a thing as amoral evil; and perhaps if you could elaborate on why you think that, then I may be able to account better for your position. — Bob Ross

Let's go back to that same SEP quote I originally gave:

Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evils are bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Hurricanes and toothaches are examples of natural evils. — SEP | The Concept of Evil

"A natural evil is a bad state of affairs that does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." Suppose a tornado kills 100 people. The suffering and death of 100 people is evil; it is a bad state of affairs. This bad state of affairs was not caused by the intentions or negligence of any moral agents. Therefore this evil is natural. It doesn't make a great deal of difference to me whether we say natural evil exists. If it doesn't then tornadoes are in no way evil.

I thought about it some more and came up with a somewhat convoluted counterexample that, under certain constraints, might show that your first thesis is wrong.

Alright, so let’s suppose someone has two rules:

1. Benefit humanity
2. Benefit humanity maximally through advancing knowledge

This person holds benefiting humanity as the highest good, and they probably have some set of naive ideas about it. These two rules may interact, but the more specific rule, 2, is informed by 1 insofar as what benefits humanity is achieved in 2 through advancing some knowledge. So, everything appears to be pretty straightforward at this point. But let’s inspect 2 a little more closely.

2. can be optimized if we move from a non-hypothetical ought like “we ought to benefit humanity maximally through advancing knowledge because we want to benefit humanity”, to “because we want to benefit humanity maximally by furthering advancements in knowledge, we ought to define what it means to benefit humanity so as to maximize benefit to humanity through advancements in knowledge.” In fact, this evolution seems inevitable because in attempting to maximize benefit to humanity, the only important consideration is that which maximizes that arbitrary value - and redefining what “benefits humanity” theoretically does this.

Accordingly, if we bring “that which benefits humanity” into line with “that which advances knowledge”, by redefining that which benefits humanity to be the effects of advancements in knowledge, we end up with a one-to-one relationship between the two that does indeed maximize benefit to humanity through advancements in knowledge.

We are now operating with a new premise: that which advances knowledge benefits humanity. If benefiting humanity is still the highest good, we can say that that which advances knowledge is good, and that that which hinders advancements in knowledge is bad. But this admits of some acts that must be neutral - not subject to moral scrutiny - because not every act furthers or hinders advancements in knowledge. This is different from the spectrum you describe in objection 2 because there are plainly acts that have no relation to what is good or bad now, even if there is still a sort of bifurcated spectrum.

But I still need to know what you mean by "amoral," as you continue to use this term. In the thread you have spoken about amoral agents and amoral acts. What are amoral agents and amoral acts?

By ‘amoral agent’, I was referring to an agent that is not capable of moral decision making (viz., not capable of being culpable for their actions); and by ‘amoral act’, I would be referring to an action which is not itself immoral or moral.

I am use ‘amoral’ here in the sense of denoting something about the sphere of moral discourse.

"A natural evil is a bad state of affairs that does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."

Is this “bad” state, morally bad? Or is it a sort of badness which is outside of the sphere of moral discourse—it is neither morally good nor bad?

Suppose a tornado kills 100 people. The suffering and death of 100 people is evil; it is a bad state of affairs.

Again, what do you mean by ‘bad’?

I would say that the suffering and death of 100 people is morally bad, because it is a morally bad state of affairs. If this is true, then ‘natural evil’ is not an amoral consideration.

Would you agree that, although the tornado is not a moral agent, the tornado is doing something “bad” when in the event of destroying those 100 people’s lives? If so, then what kind of “bad”? Is it just amoral badness (viz., “bad” that refers to something which is neither morally good or bad)?

Therefore this evil is natural.

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); and not that some evil is amoral.

Bob

The way I see it, either 'natural evil' is a matter of amoral consideration and is, thusly, not evil (viz., it is really 'natural badness'); or 'natural evil' is a matter of moral consideration and is, thusly, evil.

If the latter is true, then it may be, for intents and purposes hereon, better to portray it as 'natural vs deliberate evil' instead of 'natural vs. moral evil'; and if the former is true, then morality is restricted to essentially the sphere of deliberate acts and what relates thereto.

I reject the former, and accept the latter; whereas it seems like you accept the former and reject the latter.

I thought about it some more and came up with a somewhat convoluted counterexample that, under certain constraints, might show that your first thesis is wrong. — ToothyMaw

Okay, great.

Accordingly, if we bring “that which benefits humanity” into line with “that which advances knowledge”, by redefining that which benefits humanity to be the effects of advancements in knowledge, we end up with a one-to-one relationship between the two that does indeed maximize benefit to humanity through advancements in knowledge. — ToothyMaw

As an aside, I want to point out that while we could redefine, we could also simply predicate. For example, if I say, "X is green," I could either be defining X or else predicating green of X. If I am defining then X means the same thing as green. If I am predicating then I am saying that green can be said of X even though it does not exhaust the meaning of X. An example of this latter case would be, "[The bicycle] is green." Usually someone who wishes to advance knowledge in order to benefit humanity is working in the realm of predication, not definition. They are saying, "That which advances knowledge benefits humanity," rather than something like, "Only that which advances knowledge benefits humanity," or, "Benefitting humanity just means advancing knowledge."

But this admits of some acts that must be neutral - not subject to moral scrutiny - because not every act furthers or hinders advancements in knowledge. This is different from the spectrum you describe in objection 2 because there are plainly acts that have no relation to what is good or bad now, even if there is still a sort of bifurcated spectrum. — ToothyMaw

Yes, this is a good and insightful objection. :up:

I want to say that if we begin from discrete rules or norms then thesis 1 will only hold when these rules rule the whole of human life and human acts. Your objection pertains most directly to my Addendum. I would suggest having a look at the Addendum in its entirety, but here is an especially relevant excerpt:

...The scope of one’s non-hypothetical ought-judgments will extend as far as one’s normative end(s) extend(s). The breadth of one’s moral sphere will depend on what they conceive of as the end of their life and perhaps of all human life. Still, it seems to me that Aristotle conceived of this end and its scope rightly. — Leontiskos

(Or perhaps more relevantly, "The breadth of one’s moral sphere will depend on what they conceive of as the purpose of moral acts.")

Now we can approach your objection in a number of different ways, and I will not exhaust them here. First, for Aquinas if someone has only two rules or norms then all of the actions they choose to undertake should be traceable back to those two rules. If they engage in actions unrelated to those rules, then there must be other, implicit rules (or norms) at play.

Second and relatedly, it could be argued that someone who is spending time doing things that do not directly or indirectly benefit humanity is wasting their time and, in failing to use their time to benefit humanity, is acting immorally. Similarly, by failing to advance knowledge we might say that they are indirectly hindering advancements in knowledge. If this is correct then every act does further or hinder advancements in knowledge.

Third and also related to the first point, Aquinas often tends to work from acts to rules instead of working from rules to acts. For instance, instead of asking someone about their rules and then predicting how they should act based on those rules, he might observe how someone acts and spends their time and then infer which rules or norms they are implicitly following. So if he caught the objector feeding their child he would probably say, "Hey, you clearly think it is worthwhile to feed your child even though this act has no obvious relation to the advancement of knowledge. I therefore conclude that either there must be some rule or norm that you have not recognized, or else you should stop feeding your child."

What do you think of those responses? It is possible that I am missing part of the nuance of your objection.

(I think there are possible sets of moral rules that do not touch on all human acts, such as 's negative utilitarianism. But after recognizing those sets of rules the next step is to ask ourselves whether there is a good reason to call the acts which fall under those rules "moral" while calling acts that do not fall under those rules "non-moral." More specifically, we want to probe the question of whether someone's distinction between the moral and the non-moral is a firm, defensible distinction.)

By ‘amoral agent’, I was referring to an agent that is not capable of moral decision making (viz., not capable of being culpable for their actions); and by ‘amoral act’, I would be referring to an action which is not itself immoral or moral. — Bob Ross

Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?

Is this “bad” state, morally bad? — Bob Ross

It can't be morally evil. If it were morally evil then natural evil and moral evil would not be distinct, and SEP would be utterly failing to distinguish them.

Again, what do you mean by ‘bad’? — Bob Ross

Just bad (or evil). Call it a "primitive concept" if you like. Again, it doesn't matter to me whether non-moral evils exist. I have no dog in the fight. But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil). This suffering and death is not morally evil because it "does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."

I do not think it is controversial that suffering and death caused by a tornado is not morally evil. Whether it can be called evil at all (i.e. "naturally evil") is debated.

I would say that the suffering and death of 100 people is morally bad, because it is a morally bad state of affairs. — Bob Ross

You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.

Would you agree that, although the tornado is not a moral agent, the tornado is doing something “bad” when in the event of destroying those 100 people’s lives? — Bob Ross

Eh, to say that, "The tornado did something bad," is to use moral language metaphorically. You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes. Only moral agents engage in moral actions. With tornadoes we say things like, "The tornado left destruction in its wake." Any value imputed to the effects of non-moral realities is agent-relative. "The tornado destroyed my house, and this is bad insofar as it harms me."

If so, then what kind of “bad”? — Bob Ross

It is something like misfortune. Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral. Those who suffer from arthritis suffer misfortune; they do not suffer from an immoral act. Misfortune is bad, and if a tornado causes misfortune then we say that the tornado is bad (or evil).

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross

If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!

then morality is restricted to essentially the sphere of deliberate acts and what relates thereto — Bob Ross

Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.

The way I see it, either 'natural evil' is a matter of amoral consideration and is, thusly, not evil (viz., it is really 'natural badness'); or 'natural evil' is a matter of moral consideration and is, thusly, evil. — Bob Ross

The reason SEP is just accurately reflecting philosophical and historical usage is because, contrary to your beliefs, 'evil' and 'immoral' do not mean what you think they mean. To use the word 'immoral' to denote things unrelated to intention or negligence is to misuse the word. Once this is understood it becomes more clear why 'evil' is not reducible to 'immoral.' When the farmer in the drought says that a great evil has befallen him, he is not saying anything about immorality.

Although your intentions may be good, your responses are elongated, disrespectful, sporadic, intellectually lazy, and unsubstantive; and I say this with all due respect, as a person that wants to see you both grow and develop into better philosophers :kiss: . Please try to see it from your reader's perspective: they are reading an essay which conveys a plethora of different ideas (all of which are unrelated to each other) in incredibly confusing, convoluted, and incoherent ways...all while hurling insulting comments at them. How do you expect them to react? — Bob Ross

The fact that you and other 'readers' cannot connect connected ideas is not the fault of the poster, in any case. That goes as well from me to them and vice versa. I can accept these 'rude' comments about my efforts in stride, a tactic I advise you and many other fear-bound intellectuals (scoff) on this and many other sites to earn as wisdom. I like it that you have the strength to say such things and ostensibly mean them. I do not demand that you stop. You should not either.

The fact that you describe my posts as 'elongated' is hilarious and in the next breath you say they are not rigorous. It is the need for complete rigor that requires depth and breadth in these communications. And besides, I like being elongated. It's readiness.

I do make every effort to see things from the poster's perspective. And when I understand the errors, not just of their post, but their general approach to the issue, which is the greater problem, I do feel called to step in and show another, an actual other, perspective. All of these fear-side perspectives you label as intellectually rigorous partake of the same (low) quality of failing as a pattern. That does not discount their positive contributions (high) from the same approach. You are absolutely failing to understand the value in the anger and probably the desire side approaches to truth.

Of course fear calls anger rude. Quelle surprise! But anger has just as much to offer to truth seeking. So if fear really wants to be aware, faite attention! I call you coward. You call me rude. So what? On we go and everything is fine. I am substantial and I can take the blow. Can you?

We are, all of us by turns, cowards, lazy, and self-indulgent; the three major immoral mistakes. Again, so what? Every single choice and idea or belief partakes in these types of errors without exception. Your post is rude. What of it? I am undaunted! What is daunting about my posts to you and why? Address the points that were made OR if you can't understand them or prefer to pretend that there are none, then simply go about your business. Without attention, I assure you, I will get bored and move on anyway, engaging with others that do choose to resonate.

Again, the fact that you refuse to understand my posts leaves me asking you to re-read your own admonition here. Your ideas are not 'actually rigorous' as opposed to intellectually rigorous.

Conformity is a path aspect of fear-based immorality. Reality accepts all comers. THAT is actually rigorous. Which are you representing? Truth and wisdom include all.

This forum is all about a congregation of people willing to learn from each other with genuineness, respectfulness, and intellectual rigor. It is completely fine and understandable to have different views than other people on this forum, but I would strongly suggest that you try to make your future comments more concise, respectful, and intellectually rigorous. — Bob Ross

That is the trouble with supposed intellectual rigor. It isn't, finally. You can argue then that my approach is not then finally actually rigorous, and I would simply agree. That's how compromise really works. We are both failing some and we both contribute some. It is not just my views that are different, but my entire approach in all ways, and THAT is still good. Or, let's say it's better than ostracism or dismissal, the classic retreat of the cowards. Fear guy: 'We cannot convince you of the lies we have all settled for, so, exit stage left, if you please!' So kind in this immoral act!

I strongly suggest you grow a spine. That is a respectful idea. This is a place where mere words and concepts are bandied about with ... apparently something less than reckless abandon and passion, with something less than an attention to the incredible difficulty of approaching perfection. That something LESS thing is the typical miasma of limits born of fear.

I am totally with you all in the love of wisdom. I venture to say it matters somehow MORE to me, as I am willing to fight through any storm to earn it. If I am qualified as a storm, the ones who label me as such are not paying attention to the dread dangers of real reality enough. My avatar says it all in some ways. This cartoon is deadly serious and yet finally rather innocent and harmless. I lost the Illudium Q-36 space modulator. And I never really fired it yet. But in theory, it works great!

And here I am trying to spread what I do believe is wisdom. Have I come to the right place? Do they love wisdom here enough to grow in a new way?

By 'intellectually rigorous', I do not mean that you need to have extensive knowledge of the topic-at-hand; but, rather, demonstrate in your responses that you took the time to reflect on the topic and the person's post you are responding to (as opposed to just ranting). It goes a long way, when the reader of your response can see that you took the time to genuinely reflect, dissect, and contend with their ideas. — Bob Ross

And actually I have. The fact that you again do not realize this because I still disagree is telling, but not really of me, if you follow. I find here, as usual, people cannot escape their cage of patterns. And of course fear is more prone to that error in the first place. But that is just hyperbolic unconcise blather to you, isn't it? Who is not taking the time to really research and consider other points of view here? It is not me, I assure you.

I will say, that even in this community I have found people who are willing to flow with truly new ideas rather than ones that conform to a fear based need for comfort and propriety. 'Stuffy' is really a good word for the typical responses, but it's ok, there are people who get it, even here. And that means, it must have SOME value. Or at least, some few people actually take the time to treat a new approach as valuable. Someone might say something like 'We are not going to solve the problems of today with the same (lack) of wisdom that created them.' But you know, that OneMug guy, he was just a poser; a janitor really, a clerk. And yes I paraphrased, so sue me.

I say none of this with any ill-will intentions nor disrespect in mind: as I said before, I want to see you both become great philosophers (: — Bob Ross

I could repeat the backhanded compliment to you. But why stand on ceremony? It is not disrespectful to state a belief that nonsense is nonsense, even if that nonsense is not nonsense. All we have is belief. If the intent was genuine, then that is still ok.

Great philosophers LOVE wisdom. They DO NOT have to be intellectually rigorous. They do not have to be polite, although I admit I appreciate politeness as well. Assuming you are the example of politeness here, I could suggest someone is elongated, disrespectful, sporadic, intellectually lazy, and unsubstantive; and say that with all due respect.

We are all in the process of becoming better philosophers. That is at least a nod, albeit unintentional, to a better future together. I desire that as well, just intentionally, and for us all, admitting that work is needing from all parties, none of us having arrived yet at perfection.

Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?

I see what you mean, and now recognize that I need to be more clear with my terminology.

To answer your question outright: I accept the corollary as valid, but this leaves me no choice but to deny the existence of amoral agents and acts (in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is within its sphere [of discourse]) because I do think we can analyze acts and agents which are not responsible for their actions within [the study of] morality.

However, it is important (for me) to note that there are amoral agents and acts in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is morally wrong/right.

In other words, all agents/acts are within the sphere of moral talk, but not all agents/acts are necessarily being immoral/moral or doing immoral/moral things.

Moreover, there are two subtypes of immoral agents (in both senses of the term I expounded above): those capable of culpability and those that are not.

A tornado is a moral agent in the sense of being an agent subject to moral analysis; and it is, in fact, doing things and that are morally wrong and is being something that is inherently immoral—it is not just being or doing things that are amorally bad.

Evil, then, is always moral. There is no such thing as ‘natural evil’ in the sense that you outlined; instead, what I mean by ‘natural evil’ is evil which is does indeliberately (viz., in a way of which no one can be held responsible for it)—that’s it.

But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil)

The problem with this, is that under my theory moral goodness is identical to intrinsic goodness; so the obvious antithesis to this is intrinsic badness. Thusly, if what the tornado is doing is intrinsically bad, then it is morally bad. See what I mean?

I would presume that a person with your response (here), would deny that moral goodness is intrinsic goodness; otherwise their position is incoherent.

You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (
↪Leontiskos
). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.

I agree, except that (1) I don’t think it is idiosyncratic (but that’s a mute point) and (2) a very much am fine with the phrase ‘natural evil’...its ‘moral evil’ I have a problem with.

You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes

To your point, if I were to say to the common man “that tornado is immoral”, they will find it nonsense because they would interpret it the way you are.

To my point, if you said “evil is not always immoral”, they would also find this to be nonsense.

Likewise, to my point, if I clarified my statement about the tornado, such as “the tornado is immoral insofar as its acts (or the events it brings about) are immoral”, the common man would find no problem with it.

The only reason they would find it initially nonsensical, is because within the context of the use of ‘immoral’ in that particular sentence makes it sound like I am saying the tornado is culpable for its evil actions.

Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral

I disagree. Cancer is immoral, because I think it is intrinsically bad; and intrinsic badness is the antithesis to intrinsic goodness; and intrinsic goodness is moral goodness.

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross

If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!

No, so what I was pointing out is that the ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil distinction makes sense if (1) ‘evil’ is interpreted as immoral AND (2) ‘moral’, in ‘moral evil’, is interpreted as signifier the capability of being responsible (as opposed to being an assertion about it being within the sphere of moral discourse). Again, you have to admit (at least) that the adjective ‘moral’ is used in many senses.

Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.

I deny this. Anything that is intrinsically good, is morally good; anything that is intrinsically bad, is morally bad. Period. Morality is not just the study of what one ought to do: it is about what ought to be. What ought to be, is not itself necessarily dependent on what one ought to be doing.

For example, imagine agents could not exist in reality: it is, let’s say, metaphysically or logically impossible. Does that mean that there isn’t a state of supreme and ultimate (moral) good that would be applicable to that reality? I don’t think so. Do you?

Bob

There is no state of being that is inherently bad or inherently good.

Morality is only a resonance with choices made in the now. Choices are the only things capable of being good and bad (evil).

It is true that current states hold weaknesses and flaws based on all former choices since the dawn of time that brought that state into being.

The thing that has the state always also has choice. Humans are only one example.

So the state can make good choices harder, but that is only a delusion, a seeming.

Choice or free will is actually infinite in power. Our delusional or limited awareness (same thing) is self limiting and thus we deny ourselves SOME of the immense power of choice. Fear has a great role in imprisoning our choice, and it is our choice to empower fear with belief in such a way.

But all states and scopes are also part of delusional awareness. That means that the arbitrary decision to limit the scope of analysis to less than ALL, is effectively ... immoral. Proper awareness always factors ALL into the equation of analysis.

This eventually through some stuffy set of permutated assertions yields the Unity Principle, my label. This is the 'oneness' concept, or loosely, 'you are me and I am you and we are both cats, all cats, and the Swedish telephone system.'

So, if this universe has any purpose at all, it must be moral. That is the goodness of maybe even all choices is somehow relevant. And no choice is immune from participation in this effect. All choices are morally scrutinizable.

To declare or assert that any choice has no moral weight to it is ... immoral. This neat and tidy truth is no accident as it turns out the universe is quite an intentional place.

The balance of force impacting any scoped chooser is immense and infinite. This empowers free will and the infinite choice. But lacking perfect awareness, perfect form, and perfect desire we fail all the time and in all three ways. The nuances of each of these supposedly only three ways are infinite so you could be obtuse and say infinite ways instead of just boring old three. I am not good with holding on to infinity but three, yeah, ok, I can do three.

It is part though of the nature of perfection to permeate all reality in every way and to all depths. Therefore what color shirt you wear this evening is a moral choice. You can fail at that choice and your choice be less moral than it should be. No Godhead arrival for you. We will forgo the jail thing, because prisons are delusional, but go back two spaces, do not pass Go and do not collect 200$.

That is all (for now only, duh)

I see what you mean, and now recognize that I need to be more clear with my terminology.

To answer your question outright: I accept the corollary as valid, but this leaves me no choice but to deny the existence of amoral agents and acts (in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is within its sphere [of discourse]) because I do think we can analyze acts and agents which are not responsible for their actions within [the study of] morality.

However, it is important (for me) to note that there are amoral agents and acts in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is morally wrong/right.

In other words, all agents/acts are within the sphere of moral talk, but not all agents/acts are necessarily being immoral/moral or doing immoral/moral things.

Moreover, there are two subtypes of immoral agents (in both senses of the term I expounded above): those capable of culpability and those that are not.

A tornado is a moral agent in the sense of being an agent subject to moral analysis; and it is, in fact, doing things and that are morally wrong and is being something that is inherently immoral—it is not just being or doing things that are amorally bad.

Evil, then, is always moral. There is no such thing as ‘natural evil’ in the sense that you outlined; instead, what I mean by ‘natural evil’ is evil which is does indeliberately (viz., in a way of which no one can be held responsible for it)—that’s it. — Bob Ross

Okay, well now you are being consistent, and that's a good thing. But you are redefining words independently of their common and philosophical usage, and that's a bad thing. You need to talk about moral-agents-that-are-not-capable-of-culpability and moral-agents-that-are-capable-of-culpability. Everyone else simply talks about non-moral ("natural") realities and moral agents.

There are also deeper linguistic problems with your views, relating to the etymology and history of words like 'moral' and 'agent'. For example, an agent is "one who acts," which derives from the Latin agere, "to set in motion, drive forward; to do, perform..." This is the basis of Aquinas' distinction between both human acts and acts "of a man," as well as between moral realities and non-moral realities. An agent is something which is a self-cause, such that it itself is a cause of motion via its own intention and freedom. We do not call tornadoes moral, but we also do not call tornadoes agents, because they do not have the causal capacities that agents have.

The problem with this, is that under my theory moral goodness is identical to intrinsic goodness; so the obvious antithesis to this is intrinsic badness. Thusly, if what the tornado is doing is intrinsically bad, then it is morally bad. See what I mean? — Bob Ross

Not really. You are now using words in such thoroughly idiosyncratic ways that I have a hard time following what you are saying at all. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.

(1) I don’t think it is idiosyncratic (but that’s a mute point) — Bob Ross

It is not as moot as you might think. It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.

To your point, if I were to say to the common man “that tornado is immoral”, they will find it nonsense because they would interpret it the way you are. — Bob Ross

True.

To my point, if you said “evil is not always immoral”, they would also find this to be nonsense. — Bob Ross

Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.

Likewise, to my point, if I clarified my statement about the tornado, such as “the tornado is immoral insofar as its acts (or the events it brings about) are immoral”, the common man would find no problem with it. — Bob Ross

Perhaps, but perhaps not. Either way, the common man will not call tornadoes immoral of his own accord.

The only reason they would find it initially nonsensical, is because within the context of the use of ‘immoral’ in that particular sentence makes it sound like I am saying the tornado is culpable for its evil actions. — Bob Ross

And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.

Cancer is immoral, because I think it is intrinsically bad; and intrinsic badness is the antithesis to intrinsic goodness; and intrinsic goodness is moral goodness. — Bob Ross

Okay. I'm not going to engage this syllogism, but you can imagine what I would say.

No, so what I was pointing out is that the ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil distinction makes sense if (1) ‘evil’ is interpreted as immoral AND (2) ‘moral’, in ‘moral evil’, is interpreted as signifier the capability of being responsible (as opposed to being an assertion about it being within the sphere of moral discourse). Again, you have to admit (at least) that the adjective ‘moral’ is used in many senses. — Bob Ross

You believe that something which is not responsible for its acts can act immorally. I would suggest investigating this further, for it is commonly accepted to be false (and I too believe it is false). Perhaps you should also look at the usage, history, and etymology of terms like 'moral'.

For example, imagine agents could not exist in reality: it is, let’s say, metaphysically or logically impossible. Does that mean that there isn’t a state of supreme and ultimate (moral) good that would be applicable to that reality? I don’t think so. Do you? — Bob Ross

Of course I do, yes. But this would lead us into an investigation of your understanding of what it means to be an agent, and I don't think that is something I want to investigate. :wink:

Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.

---

Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."

• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.

If everything whatsoever is "moral" (in the sense that it is capable of producing good and evil effects), then "moral" turns out to be a vacuous word. The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral). Yet on your view, to posit non-moral realities would be to transgress the corollary set out in my last post.

Firstly, you are absolutely right to point out that a tornado is not an agent, as an agent is self-caused, and that it isn’t acting (in the strict sense of the word that relates to agents) either; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise. However, this doesn’t takeaway from my main point, which is is that what the tornado is “doing” is immoral. Likewise, I think there are still examples of agents which are not capable of being held responsible for their actions; like ants.

Besides that clarification, I think we are only disagreeing now about semantics. Even if ‘moral’ does signifies—with respect to one of its meanings—traditionally ~“something related to an agent that is capable of being culpable for their actions” (and, in this regard, agents constitute “moral realities”), I clearly doesn’t fit my theory on ethics at all.

I would also point out, to my favor, that ‘evil’ is traditionally a morally-loaded term; and so, technically, it doesn’t make sense to say “moral evil”: it’s redundant. I know you disagree, but I think you are heavily overlooking the fact that it is counter-intuitive to posit a sort of ‘evil’ which is not only natural (in the sense of being indeliberate) but also unrelated to what is morally bad; that means you are speaking about pragmatic goodness when discussing it, which isn’t what people are usually talking about with ‘natural evil’: evil is still always about something morally bad, in the sense that the “bad” being discussed is of moral constitution.

. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.

It’s just because I have my own ethical theory, which we haven’t discussed in depth. This does not mean that I am wrong; and surely doesn’t entail that I should stick to all the traditional terms IF there are better ones (for formative purposes).

It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.

Semantics, assuming it is syntactical and grammatical, doesn’t affect formal soundness; and, although you are right that unique theories are harder to convey to people, I don’t think it would be that hard to clarify my position with respect to the terminology. I say all agents are “moral agents” insofar as they are capable of moral analysis, but some are not held capably blameworthy for their actions; and if one wants to use “moral agent” in the sense of an agent which can be held responsible for their actions, then I have no problem using it that way if it helps them wrap their head around things. Anyone can understand this easily. The difficulty in our discussion was that I didn’t formulate it very well, initially.

Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.

I already explained why they would say yes/no; and I also would bet that the common person would find it nonsensical to say there is an evil which isn’t relevant to morality, as opposed to merely being natural. This is what you are committed to if you are saying that not all evil is a matter of moral discourse.

And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.

I’ve never had a problem with the SEP article, as, like I said, I have interpreted it as making a distinction between two types of evil; and that ‘evil’ still was completely in the sphere of moral discourse.

It makes absolutely no sense to claim that some amoral bad is evil. Something that is amorally bad is just pragmatically bad.

Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.

Fair enough! As always, great conversation Leontiskos! Feel free to stop the conversation whenever you wish...I will let you have the last word.

Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."
• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.

That everything is capable of moral analysis does not in any way entail that nothing is capable of moral analysis; and just because a property can be applied to everything, it does not follow it is vacuous (e.g., beingness).

EDIT:

I would also like to note that by saying everything is capable of moral analysis, I am not claiming there is a property of "moralness" that can be predicated to everything. "moral" was being used as an adjective, not a property.

The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral)

I feel like you keep forgetting that, by your own lights, ‘moral’ has multiple meanings; and you then proceed to conflate them.

Bob

Firstly, you are absolutely right to point out that a tornado is not an agent, as an agent is self-caused, and that it isn’t acting (in the strict sense of the word that relates to agents) either; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise. However, this doesn’t takeaway from my main point, which is is that what the tornado is “doing” is immoral. — Bob Ross

Okay, good. I see you used scare quotes around "doing." To illustrate just how idiosyncratic your language is, consider the sentence: <The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">. This level of idiosyncratic language and scare quotes is simply unwieldy. This applies to everything. Suppose I sit on an old chair, it breaks, and I get seriously injured. <The chair is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">. One could multiply bizarre claims to emphasize the reductio ad absurdum.

The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. We have a special word to denote this difference because the distinction is enormously important in human life, and that word is "morality." The difference determines whether blame can apply, and whether we should punish the thing that caused the evil.

The same could be said for "good" (as opposed to "evil"). There are moral goods and non-moral goods. A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops. What they have in common is goodness; what differentiates them is whether they are caused by an intentional agent. The word <moral> and its antecedents have always been used to describe the behavior of intentional agents, and they have never been used to describe the behavior of non-intentional agents.

I would also point out, to my favor, that ‘evil’ is traditionally a morally-loaded term; and so, technically, it doesn’t make sense to say “moral evil”: it’s redundant. — Bob Ross

Perhaps in English this is somewhat true, but it is not historically or philosophically true. And I already gave an English counterexample, "When the farmer in the drought says that a great evil has befallen him, he is not saying anything about immorality."

It’s just because I have my own ethical theory, which we haven’t discussed in depth. — Bob Ross

I concede and acknowledge this.

This does not mean that I am wrong; and surely doesn’t entail that I should stick to all the traditional terms IF there are better ones (for formative purposes). — Bob Ross

At a certain point of idiosyncrasy I think one ought to revert to traditional usage. More, in philosophy one should stick to philosophical usage (which differs slightly from colloquial usage).

I say all agents are “moral agents” insofar as they are capable of moral analysis, but some are not held capably blameworthy for their actions; and if one wants to use “moral agent” in the sense of an agent which can be held responsible for their actions, then I have no problem using it that way if it helps them wrap their head around things. Anyone can understand this easily. — Bob Ross

Relative to the general perspicacity of language, this is not easy to understand. And you require additional scare quotes around "moral analysis."

I’ve never had a problem with the SEP article, as, like I said, I have interpreted it as making a distinction between two types of evil; and that ‘evil’ still was completely in the sphere of moral discourse. — Bob Ross

I'm sorry but the SEP article directly contradicts your "interpretation." When the SEP distinguishes natural evil from moral evil it is obvious that natural evil is not "completely in the sphere of moral discourse." I have noted this multiple times.

It makes absolutely no sense to claim that some amoral bad is evil. Something that is amorally bad is just pragmatically bad. — Bob Ross

I explained non-moral evils above, with the tornado causing suffering and the death of 100 people.

Fair enough! As always, great conversation Leontiskos! Feel free to stop the conversation whenever you wish...I will let you have the last word. — Bob Ross

Okay, sounds good. Thank you as well. The one thing I think could be further meted out is my "argument from vacuity." Feel free to reply. Let me explain...

That everything is capable of moral analysis does not in any way entail that nothing is capable of moral analysis; and just because a property can be applied to everything, it does not follow it is vacuous (e.g., beingness). — Bob Ross

It does entail this. "Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."

I would also like to note that by saying everything is capable of moral analysis, I am not claiming there is a property of "moralness" that can be predicated to everything. "moral" was being used as an adjective, not a property. — Bob Ross

Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.

I feel like you keep forgetting that, by your own lights, ‘moral’ has multiple meanings; and you then proceed to conflate them. — Bob Ross

Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above).

To be clear, your "brk" is not "morally praiseworthy," but rather "moral (agent)."

I thought about it even more and came up with another argument. I hope you and Bob haven't hashed this one out yet, because I'm not going to read your guys' entire conversation right now.

I start by defining an amoral act as: an act that results from deliberation that is not intended towards a moral end. Note that this is a statement about intent. I also define an amoral judgement as: a non-hypothetical ought judgement resulting from consideration of non-moral hypothetical oughts (a non-moral all things considered judgement).

You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? What if there is an amoral act that flows from an amoral judgment that neither breaks nor acts in furtherance of any rules that could be made? Not only would it be neither good nor bad, but it would be amoral in the sense of being informed purely by non-moral hypothetical oughts and considerations, and thus would not be subject to moral scrutiny; given no intended moral consequences, there is no calculation that could be considered moral if you accept my definitions.

You could, of course, expand the moral sphere by eliminating space for such amoral acts and judgements, but they could never be fully eliminated, I think.

Nice thread and OP!

The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. — Leontiskos

Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above). — Leontiskos

I myself find the issue of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness to basically reduce down to the issue of causation—as in, what cause is to blame/praise for a given effect/consequence.

I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc.

That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does).

This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be]

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils.

You could, of course, expand the moral sphere by eliminating space for such amoral acts and judgements, but they could never be fully eliminated, I think. — ToothyMaw

Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral.

In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? — javra

Either way, one ought not use the same brush.

Either way, one ought not use the same brush. — Fooloso4

Funny, I previously assumed that to be self-explanatory. But now that you've pointed that out, yes, sure, of course.

Great OP.

I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5.

Objection 5: Morality correlates to importance

Moral acts are important acts
Not all human acts are important acts
Therefore, not all human acts are moral acts

This is similar to Objection 2. I would respond by saying that everything someone does is something they consider worthwhile or worth doing. The simple fact that time is scarce leads us to try to use our time wisely and do things that are worthwhile.

On the other hand, not everything is equally worthwhile, and someone might use the idea of morality to denote those things or rules that are worth taking especially seriously. This is fine so long as we do not forget that there is no qualitative difference between more important things and less important things, for all things that are worth doing have a minimum level of importance. — Leontiskos

Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.

But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.

But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable.

***

Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule.

I'm having a hard time articulating the difference into a proper theory though.

<The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">

Let me put it more precisely, then: “the events which transpire directly due to a tornado are intrinsically bad”. Do you disagree with that statement, or find it likewise idiosyncratic? If not, then I think we are just disagreeing on semantics: I identify intrinsic goodness with moral goodness, and by ‘moral’ I am referring to the sense of “within the sphere of moral discourse” and NOT your #1 or #2 (that you explicated in your response, quoted at the end of this response).

"Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."

The predication of generic “being” (i.e., generic ‘to exist’) is univocal predication, just like “Brk”.

Either way, I don’t see how univocally predicating a property to everything, would make it vacuous. If it is clearly outlined what “Brk” actually is, then it is not vacuous. For example, imagine that everything happens to be red: does that make ‘redness’ vacuous?

Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.

I am no longer claiming that a tornado is a moral agent; I was referring to the adjective, which I guess in a sense is a property, of ‘moral’ (perhaps ‘moralness’).

For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral

I highly doubt this. Would you not agree, that “moral” also signifies “that which is within the sphere of moral discourse”? You left that out in your analysis here.

If you deny this, then I must admit your theory of ethics is entirely too act-centric for me. The study is fundamentally about what is “good”, and this in a “moral” sense, and only as a biproduct does one discuss moral or immoral acts.

Again, if you think there is a morally ideal possible world IF there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that “moral” can be used in this third sense.

EDIT:

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts.

By #2, are also referring to moral and immoral acts, or what is morally bad or good simpliciter? I read it as acts, but if it is about just moral badness and goodness (in general); then I would say that my use of "moral agent" falls within this category, because #2 makes no reference to any sort of capacity for responsibility (of anything). 'moral' in #2's sense, assuming you aren't referring to only acts, would include uses like "this agent is doing moral things, even though they cannot be held responsible for their actions, because their actions align with what is morally good".

Bob

Great OP. — Moliere

Thanks, Moliere.

I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5. — Moliere

Okay.

Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.

But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.

But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable. — Moliere

Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"?

Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule. — Moliere

Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment.

I thought about it even more and came up with another argument. I hope you and Bob haven't hashed this one out yet, because I'm not going to read your guys' entire conversation right now. — ToothyMaw

Sounds good. I think the OP is still live, in that my conversations with other posters have not become necessary reading. The objections and agreements have been quite varied.

I start by defining an amoral act as: an act that results from deliberation that is not intended towards a moral end. Note that this is a statement about intent. I also define an amoral judgement as: a non-hypothetical ought judgement resulting from consideration of non-moral hypothetical oughts (a non-moral all things considered judgement). — ToothyMaw

Okay, this is very clear.

You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? What if there is an amoral act that flows from an amoral judgment that neither breaks nor acts in furtherance of any rules that could be made? — ToothyMaw

It's an excellent question, especially because you speak about "any rules" instead of "any moral rules." First I would want to say that if it doesn't break or adhere to any rules, then the hypothetical 'oughts' upon which it is based must be arbitrary. But I don't think hypothetical 'oughts' are ever arbitrary when they constitute a legitimate consideration for action, and so I don't think these hypothetical 'oughts' will be arbitrary. Because of this I think the hypothetical 'oughts' and the non-hypothetical ought-judgments that depend on them will be associated with rules and ends.

Not only would it be neither good nor bad, but it would be amoral in the sense of being informed purely by non-moral hypothetical oughts and considerations, and thus would not be subject to moral scrutiny; given no intended moral consequences, there is no calculation that could be considered moral if you accept my definitions. — ToothyMaw

Sure, but the definitions are at this point stipulative. You have defined amoral acts in an admirable way, but do these acts really exist? That seems to be the question. What would be an example of an amoral act?