I don't understand the question. :confused:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism (I interpret this reducing harm-caused-by-personal-conduct / judgment as normative morality ↪180 Proof) — 180 Proof
Negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism that can be described as the view that people should minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or that they should minimize suffering and then, secondarily, maximize the total amount of happiness. — Wikipedia | Negative Utilitarianism
From a 2023 thread Convince Me of Moral Realism, by 'harm' (in some of its various forms) I mean this...
And by 'injustice' I mean harm to individuals as a direct or indirect consequence of a social structure, or lack thereof, reproduced by customs, public policies, legistlation, jurisprudence or arbitrary violence. Thus, utilitarianism is a kind (or subset) of consequentialism.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_consequentialism (I interpret this reducing injustice (i.e. reducing harm-caused-by-social-structure / violence) as applied morality ↪180 Proof) — 180 Proof
Leontiskos – Assuming you intend to reply, I've just edited my previous post so that (hopefully) my statements are clearer. — 180 Proof
Because the word "quality" here is often up to personal preference, as I note: If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable. However, if I offer someone drugs, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them because what the drug is supposed to counteract may or may not be held positively, or may or may not be held more negatively than the other effects of the drug. — Lionino
Well, being fat would not be a quality — so would everybody say prior to 2013.
In most cases no, because being addicted is something that (almost) all would agree is not a quality but the inverse of it. — Lionino
I can think of one reason to preference the reduction of the negative over the maximization of some positive principle (e.g., pleasure for J.S. Mill). — Count Timothy von Icarus
Minimizing harm seems to be less likely to fall into the "min/max" trap. We are inclined to think of disease, dysfunction, etc. as a variation from some stability point or harmony. — Count Timothy von Icarus
However, when it comes to the acquisition of positive things, we often tend to look to maximize the good. For example, Mill wants to maximize pleasure (and we might consider here Plato's distinction of which pleasures are better than others in the Philibus or Aristotle's in Book X of the Ethics as counter examples). This makes a certain sense to me, because when it comes to the acquisition of external goods, food stores, money, etc., it is always nice to have more as a sort of "backup." More won't hurt, we can always just not use a resource we have "extra," of, or share it in exchange for some other good. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Harm, or suffering, is not merely subjective (as I've sketched previously ) whereas "happiness" is whollly subjective (e.g. hedonic set-points are not the same for everyone or constant through time for each individual); the latter, therefore, is not as foreseeable, or reliably known, as the former such that reducing harm / injustice is a more realizable and effective moral strategy than trying to "maximize happiness" (whatever "happiness" means).So apparently some negative utilitarians think there is a "second," namely, to "maximize the total amount of happiness." The question could then be rephrased: why choose the first form of negative utilitarianism over the second form? — Leontiskos
Yes? — Leontiskos
Really? Name a kind of harm that you have undergone and yet, because it's not "objective" phenomenon, no one else is vulnerable to it or can recognize it as harm. — 180 Proof
if I offer someone drugs, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them because what the drug is supposed to counteract may or may not be held positively, or may or may not be held more negatively than the other effects of the drug — Lionino
If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable.
However, if I offer someone alcohol, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them. — Lionino
Harm, or suffering, is not merely subjective (as I've sketched previously ↪180 Proof) whereas "happiness" is whollly subjective (e.g. hedonic set-points are not the same for everyone or constant through time for each individual); the latter, therefore, is not as foreseeable, or reliably known, as the former such that reducing harm / injustice is a more realizable and effective moral strategy than trying to "maximize happiness" (whatever "happiness" means).
However, it's my position that on avarage – all things being equal – we optimize well-being, or "happiness", in any situation where harm / injustice has been prevented and/or reduced as much as possible such that it's not a binary choice but rather is a matter of priority whereby the "secondary" consideration (positive utility/consequence (e.g. more sex)) is a function, or opportuned by, the "primary" (negative utility/consequence (e.g. less illness)) and yet not the other way around (e.g. health-wealth-fame-power-pleasure "maximizing" itself cannot prevent or reduce suffering, misery or (self)harm).
Some primary influences on my moral thinking are Epicurus, Spinoza, K. Popper, D. Parfit & P. Foot. — 180 Proof
Have you had such an experience? If not, then isn't it more reasonable than not to conclude that everyone is vulnerable to and can recognize the kinds of harm you've experience because they are objective phenomena? :chin: — 180 Proof
Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z) — Leontiskos
I’ll for now address the following last portion of your first reply since I see this as pivotal to most all of the other replies I might myself give. I know there is a lot left for me to address, but, before I do, please let me know if the following is something that you find fault with. If this leads to an insurmountable difference of perspectives, then I doubt you’d find any of my other further replies cogent. — javra
Via one analogy (which as analogy can only go so far), say that one strives to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible so as to win a prize. Were it at all possible to do so, one would then rationally follow a straight path from point A to point Z, this being the shortest path to travel. But there is an intractable obstacle in the way at point K. — javra
To then ask whether violence is moral or immoral will depend on the vantage taken: relative to the very actualization and thereby eventual actuality of Z, it will always be immoral. Yet relative to what is on occasion pragmatically needed to best approach the actualization of Z, it will in certain circumstances be moral. As was illustrated, this strictly contingent on—not its application per se—but the intention with which it becomes applied. — javra
For what its worth, it might be cumbersome to explain, but I all the same so far find it conformant to the living of a virtuous life (this as best one can, with the occasional mistake granted). — javra
Or perhaps the more pertinent question is, "What happens when we encounter unforeseen dilemmas?" — Leontiskos
What are the two ends?
Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible.
Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances. — Leontiskos
Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:
1) Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2) Survive as a community
These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."
But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"?
Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2). — Leontiskos
Hearkening back to the OP, my difficulty is the way that you are apt to class exceptions as non-human acts. — Leontiskos
If you wish to continue, it seems to me that we would need to discuss this issue of moral perplexity. It seems that on theories such as your own, which admit of perplexity, one must either transgress duties or else redefine those duties as being in some way non-obligatory. — Leontiskos
I see that I was addressing many presumptions which are not shared. This for instance. By "obstacle" I naturally assumed that that which stands in the way and thereby impedes is/was unforeseen. Otherwise I'd simply view it as part of the terrain to be traveled. If I see a house between me and the house's backyard to which I want to get to, I don't then discern the house to be an obstacle in my path. But if I expect the backyard gate to be unlocked when in fact it is, this I might then consider something that impedes my intended progress. — javra
Every voyage toward a destination is, consciously or unconsciously, idealized to go as expected or planed, i.e. for the circumstances to be as one best foresees, and thereby idealizes, them. If I take a flight from A to Z, unexpected weather conditions might have it that I get detoured and delayed. Or that I never arrive. Nevertheless, I will take the flight expecting to arrive on time as per the ideal circumstances of so arriving as scheduled. — javra
"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate. — javra
Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. — javra
Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people... — javra
How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra
Aside from certain parts of the second counterexample I've provided, where have i done so? — javra
I am now getting the sense that you might uphold a moral code of duties via systems of deontology that traditionally have made little sense to me. Namely, those which uphold a strict duty or obligation to absolute oughts and ought nots irrespective of consequence. — javra
If so, I would rather not continue this conversation, being fairly confident that it will result in disagreements without resolution. — javra
your experiences of kinds of harm which no one else is vulnerable to or can recognize as harm because such kinds are "not objectively defibed" — 180 Proof
These contradictions are producing further contradictions, — Leontiskos
I hope I didn't give the impression that perplexity-views such as your own are beyond the pale. I think they make a certain amount of sense given the complexity of the moral landscape. — Leontiskos
Thanks for the interesting conversation. :up: — Leontiskos
is still objective. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Of course, you're correct that what constitutes harm is, to at least some degree, bound up in the virtues, and the virtues are bound up in a given context, but I'm not sure how this leads to their not being at all objective. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Of course, you're correct that what constitutes harm is, to at least some degree, bound up in the virtues, and the virtues are bound up in a given context, but I'm not sure how this leads to their not being at all objective. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Being talkative is seen by some as avirtuequality, others asa vicenot a quality. — Lionino
The concept 'harm' seems to only pick out that which is subjectively held to be the case in the real world.
So, i say it's implausible to suggest that harm has an objective meaning, other than from a subjective pov (i.e experiences, for me, will either meet, or not meet my internal benchmark for having received harm).
The problem is that I had to replace "quality" with "virtue". Using quality originally, there will be qualities that are completely up to the aesthetic preferences of someone:
The fact that the definition of something no longer depends only on outside objects that may be referenced should be enough to say something is not objective.
It still seems like harm is fairly obvious in many cases, and these will also tend to be the more important cases (e.g., offending someone with a joke versus setting their home on fire). — Count Timothy von Icarus
If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable. However, if I offer someone drugs, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them — Lionino
For instance, in chess, the thing being referenced is the game itself, but the rules of chess are objective. — Count Timothy von Icarus
How a word is spelled correctly is also an objective fact, but it's the language that is referred to for this. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Begging the question is when you assume your conclusion. E.g., something like: "our perception of objects is indirect because we don't perceive things directly." — Count Timothy von Icarus
There are many variants of chess, but what constitutes a legal move in a given chess tournament is still objective. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If I raise my child to be a craven, licentious, covetous, and vicious glutton there is a sense in which people in my community can point to what I've done and talk about a "harmful upbringing," without having much difficulty agreeing with one another. — Count Timothy von Icarus
There are different motivations for writing this thread, but one of the primary motivations is to address a common claim. The claim is something like, “You should behave in such-and-such a way, but this has nothing to do with morality.” Our culture is filled with non-hypothetical ought-claims that masquerade as non-moral claims, and this seems to be nothing more than a mendacious technique for controlling other people — Leontiskos
To keep things short, I don't find that my account of ethics would make any sense whatsoever were it to in fact incorporate "contradictions", which I do not find my account to incorporate: At no juncture in my account can there ever be something that is both right and wrong at the same time and in the same respect. — javra
The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos
Say I've got the option to buy a new phone to replace my old one, but don't wish to, and claim "It's not due to financial reasons". Though the act of buying a phone is clearly related to my finances and would be a financial decision, I'd have meant that my decision was motivated instead by other factors. — Judaka
The question is then whether one can say that, "My decision was instead motivated by non-moral factors," which according to the OP would entail that it involves no non-hypothetical ought-judgment. — Leontiskos
Here is what I said:
The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos — Leontiskos
So, for example, on your scheme violence is simultaneously right and wrong. It is right qua survival and it is wrong qua using-another-as-a-means. The problem is that your principles are not necessarily in sync, and in certain cases they oppose one another (and lead to perplexity). So you could do what most perplexity-views do and weight your principles, but before that you would need to admit that you have two principles in the first place (i.e. that "survival" is distinct from a prohibition on violence).
It doesn't matter that something is not right and wrong in the same respect; such is not needed to produce perplexity. It only matters that something be simultaneously right and wrong. — Leontiskos
If we agree that indeed, wanting to buy a phone for non-financial reasons may lead to the financial decision of buying a phone, then we can apply that to "moral judgements" defined in the OP. "Moral judgements" are non-hypothetical ought-judgements, and would parallel with the financial decision of buying a phone. If we non-financial motivations can lead to a financial decision, can't non-moral motivations lead to us making a "moral judgement"? — Judaka
Perplexity does not equate to the occurrence of contradictions — javra
Yet an affirmation of X does not of itself justify X being true. — javra
And I so far find no contradictions in what I’ve previously stated: Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); therefore being simultaneously right and wrong but in different respects. — javra
Am I mistaken in understanding the quote to conclude that my arguments make use of contradictions? And does not a contradiction require that incongruent givens simultaneously occur in the same respect? — javra
Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to "minimize harm and maximize harmony," then these two things which were formally ends now become means. — Leontiskos
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