• NATO Enlargement (1999, 2004): Russia expressed opposition to NATO's expansion eastward, viewing it as a threat to its security. Russian officials argued that NATO enlargement undermined the balance of power in Europe and encroached on Russia's sphere of influence. However, Russia's ability to influence these decisions was limited, especially considering that the newly independent states in Eastern Europe were eager to join NATO as a means of enhancing their own security and sovereignty.
• Missile Defense Plans (2007): Russia strongly opposed the US plans to deploy missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian officials argued that these missile defense installations would undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent capabilities and upset the strategic balance in Europe. In response, Russia threatened to deploy Iskander missiles to its western enclave of Kaliningrad and warned of potential military countermeasures.
• "Reset" of US-Russian Relations (2009): While the "reset" of relations between the United States and Russia initially led to a thaw in tensions, Russia remained skeptical of US intentions, particularly regarding missile defense plans. Russian leaders continued to express concerns about the potential threat posed by the missile defense system to Russia's security interests.
• New Missile Defense Plan (2010): Russia reacted cautiously to the announcement of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and the revised missile defense plans. While the EPAA was seen as a somewhat more flexible and mobile approach compared to the previous plans, Russia continued to express reservations about the deployment of missile defense systems near its borders.
• NATO-Russia Missile Defense Talks (2011): Russia engaged in discussions with NATO on missile defense cooperation but ultimately failed to reach a breakthrough. Despite some attempts at dialogue, Russia remained suspicious of NATO's intentions and continued to view the missile defense system as a potential threat.
• Deployment of Missile Defense Elements (2013): Russia criticized the deployment of missile defense elements under the EPAA, particularly the Aegis-equipped ships in the Mediterranean and radar installations in Turkey. Russian officials argued that these deployments increased the proximity of missile defense systems to Russia's borders and could potentially undermine its security.
• Ukrainian Presidential Election (2014): Russia expressed skepticism about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian presidential election, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Moscow criticized the Ukrainian government's handling of the election and raised concerns about the treatment of Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine.
• War in Eastern Ukraine: Russia denied direct involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, despite accusations from Ukraine and Western countries that it was providing support to the separatist forces. Moscow portrayed the conflict as a civil war fueled by grievances among Russian-speaking populations in Eastern Ukraine and emphasized the need for a political solution to the crisis.
• MH17 Plane Crash: Russia initially denied any involvement in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 and suggested alternative theories about the cause of the crash. Moscow criticized the investigation into the incident, alleging bias and lack of transparency. However, subsequent investigations by international authorities, including the Joint Investigation Team (JIT), implicated Russian-backed separatists and pointed to the use of a Russian-supplied missile system in the downing of the plane.
• Minsk Agreements: Russia publicly supported the Minsk Agreements as a framework for resolving the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and called for their full implementation. However, Moscow also accused Ukraine of failing to fulfill its obligations under the agreements and highlighted alleged ceasefire violations by Ukrainian forces. Russia's support for the Minsk process was seen by some as a way to shape the terms of a potential settlement while maintaining leverage over Ukraine.
• Sanctions Against Russia: Russia condemned the imposition of economic sanctions by the United States, the European Union, and other Western countries in response to its actions in Ukraine. Moscow characterized the sanctions as unjustified and illegitimate and retaliated with its own countermeasures, including restrictions on food imports from Western countries and bans on certain individuals and entities.
• Continued Tensions and Ceasefire Violations: Russia called for renewed efforts to implement the ceasefire agreements in Eastern Ukraine and emphasized the importance of dialogue and diplomacy in resolving the conflict. However, Moscow also criticized what it perceived as provocative actions by Ukraine and its Western allies, such as military exercises and deployments near Russia's borders.

• Eurasian Economic Union (EEU): In 2015, Russia played a central role in establishing the Eurasian Economic Union, a regional economic bloc comprising former Soviet states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. The EEU would allow Russia to exert economic and political influence over its neighbors and to promote integration among post-Soviet states under Russian leadership.
• Georgia and Moldova: Prior to 2022, Russia had been involved in conflicts with Georgia and Moldova over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria, respectively. Russia's support for these separatist regions has been seen as a way to maintain influence and leverage over these countries and prevent them from aligning too closely with the West.
• Crimea and Eastern Ukraine: The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine have been widely interpreted as manifestations of Russia's efforts to assert control over parts of its former Soviet territory. Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have been viewed as attempts to prevent Ukraine from drifting closer to the West and to maintain Russian influence in the region.
• "Near Abroad" Doctrine: Russian leaders have articulated a doctrine that emphasizes Russia's special interests and responsibilities in its "near abroad," referring to the former Soviet republics. This doctrine suggests that Russia sees itself as having a legitimate role in shaping the political and security dynamics of the region.
• Military Buildup and Exercises: Russia has conducted military exercises and deployed troops near its borders with former Soviet states, signaling its readiness to defend its interests in the region. These actions have raised concerns among neighboring countries and the broader international community about Russia's intentions.

But an interpretation of these actions as "imperialist" isn't necessary where Russian security interests suffice to explain their actions. — Benkei

I had ChatGPT provide me with a list of geopolitical events relevant to Ukraine. — Benkei

Yes, it is possible that there's some way for Ukrainians to somehow win or then get better terms (... I guess join NATO).

I just don't see exactly how Ukrainians can actually deal with heavy artillery and Russians can simply avoid urban combat.

And, I'm sure you agree that lives should not be thrown away for no reason, they do need to have some real chance of accomplishing the goals you outline. — boethius

Russia is currently winning this war and no amount of social media is going to change that.
— boethius

Well, two years have gone from that remark from you and uh..., oh well. — ssu

Yeah, sure, explain the position of Ukrainian Jews to Putin as a diplomatic response if you want.

Or then ignore anything Putin says as your negotiation strategy ... but then why go speak about anything if the plan is just to simply ignore the points of the counter-party?

Or go fight in Ukraine and defend it from Russian aggression.

People seem to be debating based on the premise that keeping social media momentum that any act of defiance no matter how irrelevant militarily speaking (such as just "defying" Putin on this philosophy forum), is going to save Ukrainian lives.

It won't. Russia can't just be cancelled due to social media momentum like some talking head who said the wrong thing on a podcast.

Russia is currently winning this war and no amount of social media is going to change that.

Effective diplomacy can save thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of Ukrainian lives, and arguably millions due to energy price increases and food shortages by actively making this war more disastrous than it is.

Maintaining a stale-mate by flooding in arms can force an adversary to the negotiation table.

But there is no stale mate, Russia couldn't take all of Ukraine in a week because it's so big ... but for the same reason there is no practical way for Ukrainians to defend all of Ukraine. As long as Russian army is steadily advancing, then it is winning and will simply continue to do so until it has "clearly won", and then will negotiate.

Russia certainly had a very soft invasion to start the war to give the Ukrainians the chance to accept the demands of being a neutral country. For the sake of "having the right to join NATO" which NATO isn't offering, those demands are refused and civilians armed to demonstrate a existential battle to the death and call Putin's bluff.

Well, Putin wasn't bluffing about invading Ukraine in the first place, and isn't bluffing about doing things the hard way (relentless heavy artillery bombardment that javelines and manpads can't do much about, only equally heavy counter battery and the logistics to continuously supply shells and fuel, which Ukraine doesn't have).

It's common sense. If NATO isn't actually letting Ukraine in the club (which, to be clear, they could have done anytime) then if you call Putin's bluff about invading, rather than conceding something you don't even have (being in NATO), you better be right or you've wrecked your country and traumatized every citizen and gotten many killed.

If you stage a media campaign of "existential resistance" and passing out riffles to civilians (who will have no effect in a modern battle field and Russia being "less modern" than the US doesn't change that, and get sent a flood of small arms like javelines and manpads from sympathetic countries), to call Putin's bluff about willingness to use tactics that are effective against small arms (big arms), then, again, you better be right about Putin's bluff otherwise your cities get leveled under relentless heavy artillery bombardment and your small arms tactics are of no use.

If the outcome of the war is the same, Russia wins, what was the point of calling Putin's bluffs, which obviously weren't bluffs? Just to prove that Putin was willing to "do what it takes"?

Ukrainian government has had a "Putin defiance, zero compromises" policy since 2014, and goaded on in the West ... and, sadly it seems, truly believed the West was a friend and not just egging them on. Seems to me real tears over the no-fly zone and real frustration with NATO for not actually helping (small arms are effective against US ... because US is unwilling to level cities to the ground and US, at least pretends, to be occupying places for the citizens own good; and, even then, small arms tactics don't actually push US front lines back or overrun US bases, just harasses US patrols until the will to continue occupying the territory, more importantly the strategic purpose, is reduced to zero and then the American's leave ... and even then takes decades of small arms tactics to get to that result).

Yes, Russia does not have as many smart munitions ... but you don't need smart munitions if sending tens of thousands of incredibly cheap shells to obliterate the entire enemy position from tens of kilometres away, gets the job done.

Effective resistance can, in some cases, encourage a settlement on better terms.

Ineffective resistance is A. ineffective and B. likely just angers the counter-party more inviting harsher tactics and worse terms of a negotiated settlement.

And pretty much every military analysist interviewed on TV says the same things (including the former director of the CIA): Ukrainians are fighting so bravely, we got to support them with arms, punish Russia with sanctions so "they learn", blah, blah, blah, but obviously Russia is going to win and Ukraine can't do anything to change that outcome. Why the small arms then? Just virtue signaling that "we tried ... but not really cause you totally not welcome in our little NATO club"?

Sending someone to die should at least serve some strategic purpose, not simply play well on TikToc. — boethius

The real game changing weapons would be a lot of armor. There's a reason that Nato assumed that the Soviet Union could just roll through Europe: a shit ton more armor than Nato had. Turns out that the US wildly overestimated the Soviet capabilities (because they hired a Nazi to run intelligence on the Soviets who realized grossly inflating Soviet capabilities would get him more resources and reason to hire his friends), but the basic principle that only a bunch of armor is actually effective against a bunch of armor at the end of the day is pretty accurate (planes and other things can help, but any large scale offensive or counter offensive maneuver needs a bunch of armor--which is why the conscript mobilization playbook also calls for an insane amount of anti-armor mines everywhere). — boethius

Well I'm not sure, but I understood that to be a translation snarl. If one put it in the negative - as 96.5% employment, it would be catastrophic, because the old, the infirm, the sick, the insane, and children would be working in huge numbers. And that would be the result of the "disappearance" of men of working age either abroad or into the army/casualty lists. — unenlightened

Unemployment statistics only count people able and looking for work. — boethius

Teenagers, elderly people and even prisoners are plugging drastic holes in the Russian workforce created by people being recruited into the army or fleeing the country.

TV host Dmitry Kiselyov, a bullish ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, on Sunday boasted about the health of Russia's economy 15 months after the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

In an edition of his show on Russian state broadcaster Rossiya 1, Kiselyov said that it's "always important to visualise the overall proportions" and specifically "the proportions of the Ukrainian economy and how they've changed over the past year," reported BBC Monitoring 's Francis Scarr.

"This is especially important in comparison with Russian figures," he said. The spin doctor, known as "Putin's mouthpiece", went on to point to a number of factors he claimed showed that Russia was economically performing better than Ukraine.

He omitted how Russia's invasion has decimated the Ukrainian economy, and boasted that in Russia "unemployment is at an historic low."

Is that international law, or a law of Nature, or a local convention? — unenlightened

My reason for thinking this might be the case is the context of the figure in the video, and also things like this:

"Teenagers, elderly people and even prisoners are plugging drastic holes in the Russian workforce created by people being recruited into the army or fleeing the country."

if these workers aren't forced then it maybe a good thing that teenagers and old people can work if they want to or the pay is attractive enough to them. — boethius

the point of my little lecture about the unemployment statistics is that if you need to resort to the argument that low unemployment is some "great tragedy" that has befallen the Russian people then that's pretty much scraping the bottom of the barrel of available gripes. — boethius

↪neomac
The imperialist interpretation I'm referring to has been mostly forwarded by ssu, which I'm replying to. I take it as a given others have read that interpretation, so I don't need to set it out. — Benkei

And nowhere have I given justification, only explanation. I think most countries largely act immoral, driven by real politik considerations. I condemn Western’s needless fanning of the flames in Ukraine, increasing their own "security concerns" as a result, raising Russia's security concerns in return. — Benkei

But I note that the facts I raised do not concern Western security at all. Only Ukraine could be affected by the "near abroad" doctrine and we can hardly complain about economic integration. So we can wonder in what sense Western security concerns were protected by expanding eastwards. — Benkei

Those considerations can only be of a geopolitical nature and not a direct military threat for which NATO is in principle the answer. For existing NATO members there never was a reason to expand NATO after the cold war when the threat had actually largely dissipated. And yet we did it any way. — Benkei

My main problem with "real politik" views towards geopolitics is that they a) ignore the international legal framework (but of course it will be whipped out when it supports an argument) and b) a predisposition towards conflict that must be won if it materialises, instead of fundamentally aiming at avoiding conflict. — Benkei

But the West (particularly US) will pursue conflict if it furthers their geopolitical agenda even if facts don't support their position (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). — Benkei

If then historically we've seen the most successful roads to peace have been extensive integration and co-operation then these decisions are consequences of us-them divisions, maintaining status quos (to stay top dog, you have to kick down the competition) and projection of power. So to me, the very methodology of framing international relations in real politik terms is an important driving force towards conflict, instead of avoiding it. — Benkei

And yes security concerns can justify some action. Not all and certainly not war crimes. But again, I think that mixes geopolitical theory and international law. — Benkei

I think I've said before in this thread:

1. from a geopolitical/international relations point of view both Russia and the West are equally to blame for the war in Ukraine
2. from an international law perspective Russia is an aggressor

But since 2 is in any case an optional argument (pace every "humanitarian" intervention ever and western-led wars) it should be ignored in favour of 1 - as much as that goes against the grain of what I studied and worked for for decades as a human rights trained lawyer. 2 is more about how the world should be and could've been if international law hadn't been applied in such a double standard way — Benkei

Yes, Russia was winning the war 2 years ago, and is still winning the war. — boethius

Well, I'll hope this will be such an astounding victory like the Winter War was for Russia. And I'm sure to have found people like you saying so then. After all, they won a lot of territory (even if the Finnish proletariat wasn't liberated from the evil capitalists, but who cares about that), so let's hope for a similar decisive and outstanding Russian victory! — ssu

↪boethius If Putin and the top leadership had known the war would go on this long with this many Russian casualties, do you think they still would have invaded? — RogueAI

over 2/3rds of Ukrainians were against NATO — boethius

1991              · Ukraine-NATO relations start
1993-6            · Ukraine given some security commitments by Russia, UK, US
1997              · Ukraine joins Planning and Review Process (NATO)
1998              · NATO-Ukraine Commission
20100118-0207     · Yanukovych wins election
20131121-20140222 · Euromaidan
20140218-23       · Dignity Revolution
20140318          · Russia annexes Crimea
20140329          · Kyiv: Ukraine is neutral, non-aligned
201405--          · Roughly all polls switch from neutral to NATO
20140525-26       · Poroshenko wins election (CyberBerkut interference)
20190401-19       · Zelenskyy wins election
20220224          · Russia invades Ukraine
20220308          · Kyiv: Ukraine not insisting on NATO membership
20220930          · Ukraine applies for NATO membership
20230404          · Finland joins NATO
20240307          · Sweden joins NATO

whereas Ukraine is pervasively corrupt — boethius

join ranks of the top four global economies by the purchasing power parity

agro-industrial production volume should grow by 25%

But an interpretation of these actions as "imperialist" isn't necessary where Russian security interests suffice to explain their actions. — Benkei

Only Ukraine could be affected by the "near abroad" doctrine and we can hardly complain about economic integration. So we can wonder in what sense Western security concerns were protected by expanding eastwards. — Benkei

Those considerations can only be of a geopolitical nature and not a direct military threat for which NATO is in principle the answer. For existing NATO members there never was a reason to expand NATO after the cold war when the threat had actually largely dissipated. And yet we did it any way. — Benkei

1. from a geopolitical/international relations point of view both Russia and the West are equally to blame for the war in Ukraine — Benkei

Therefore, Finland, while not being in a position to "win" on the battlefield, was in a position to impose a cost great enough to compel the Soviets to settle the conflict. — boethius

The Finnish military defence was not "for the sake of it" or as some "quaint gesture" to posterity but was a military strategy imbedded in a larger diplomatic strategy to achieve the political objective of retaining as much independence as possible. — boethius

A strategy of compromise that persisted after the war in order to avoid being re-invaded or otherwise absorbed by the Soviet Union; a diplomatic strategy referred to as "Finlandization", which did not involve just telling the Soviets to fuck off at every possible opportunity (but pretty much the contrary). — boethius

What I take issue with most of all is having no diplomatic strategy. — boethius

In compelling the Soviets to negotiate, the Finns were realistic and made offers the Stalin maybe willing to accept and ultimately did accept — boethius

However, when the US started directly attack Russian interests — boethius

Aren't security interests in foreign countries inherently imperialistic? — Echarmion

But since NATO has no doctrine for expanding into Russia, the same can be said of Russian security interests. The idea of security interests presupposes the sides inherently have imperial objectives, or at least that such objectives are always significantly likely. — Echarmion

This is a bit of a catch 22 in geopolitical terms though. Expanding into areas not under threat is bad because it increases tensions for no immediate gain. Expanding into areas under threat is bad because it can lead to a direct confrontation. So never expand at all? But then all security concerns are meaningless. — Echarmion

What does it mean to say that someone is "to blame" from an explicitly amoral geopolitical point of view? — Echarmion

For existing NATO members there never was a reason to expand NATO after the cold war when the threat had actually largely dissipated. And yet we did it any way. — Benkei

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Aren't security interests in foreign countries inherently imperialistic? — Echarmion

I don't think so. Only when those security interests are expressed through policy action that extends power over foreign countries. But just investing in defensive capabilities, for instance, would not be imperialistic. — Benkei

And then came the actions that Russia took, which forced even Finland and Sweden to change their course. You had to do a lot to change the stance these two countries had, actually. — ssu

But "unfortunately" NATO has a charter and there is this article, number 10: — ssu

Some could uphold the figleaf of the other's sovereignty, yet blatantly intervene in all aspects of internal politics of a country. That would be the modern way of (neo)imperialism. Yet in this case when Russians talk of other countries being "artificial", that the countries should be part Russia and do annex territories and start with forced assimilation, that should tell people that this is classic imperialism. — ssu

Being part of NATO isn't the same thing, however some seem to want to make it. — ssu

I don't think so. Only when those security interests are expressed through policy action that extends power over foreign countries. But just investing in defensive capabilities, for instance, would not be imperialistic. — Benkei

I think you're correct in identifying that most analyses presuppose such (potential) objectives - as I mentioned later with my gripe about typical real politik analysis. Russia has always argued that the potential capabilities of NATO lead to its security concerns. The same is NATO's reason for expansion; the potential capabilities of Russia to invade Europe. I think those capabilities and the Soviet political framework supported that assessment during the Cold War; they found the invasion plans in Eastern Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall after all. But after the disintegration of the USSR, I don't think this was realistic for a long time and there certainly was no reasonable fear to justify expansion for the existing members at the time. That was driven by a policy of containment, which in turn fed Russia's fear of NATO capabilities. — Benkei

I don't see that expansion as fundamentally different from Russia placing ballistic missiles in Cuba. — Benkei

Expansion is inherently aggressive (and imperialistic) yes. So there's no catch-22 in my view. In the absence of an actual threat, expanding so-called "defensive" alliances is an aggressive geopolitical move. NATO's "expansion" into space is an aggressive move as well. — Benkei

I would think the goal of geopolitical policy is to avoid costly wars so you'd expect parties to manoeuvre away from them, instead of towards them. — Benkei

Yes, you like to ignore twenty years of warning in favour of a single instance and then focus on one speech by Putin in which he claimed Ukraine was artificial. So one country and not countries. And my definition of imperialism doesn't relate to figleafs at all. The imperialist ambitions of Russia are limited if they existed at all since the dissolution of the USSR. — Benkei

Either you lead by example and build a rule based order, or you do what has been happening in the past 3 decades and fuck up the UN. — Benkei

Combined with the swift deteroriation of democratic principles in almost every Western democracy and we'll have a nice fascist alliance in a few decades. — Benkei

ridiculous — Benkei

As far as the threat to former Eastern European states was concerned. NATO was doing fine when it was all Warsaw Pact. — Benkei

Yes, you like to ignore twenty years of warning in favour of a single instance and then focus on one speech by Putin in which he claimed Ukraine was artificial. — Benkei

The assumption also that NATO, or any group of countries, is (or indeed will be) a force for good forever is ridiculous. — Benkei

red lines — Tzeentch