If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape. — schopenhauer1
hence the motif of divine union, merging with the divine, etc. There's a theme I'm exploring in medieval philosophy, 'the union of knower and known'. Too large a digression for this thread. — Wayfarer
Intellectual Reception of Forms: According to Aquinas, when the intellect knows an object, it receives the form of that object. However, unlike sense perception, which apprehends particular, individualized forms, intellectual knowledge apprehends universal forms. This means that the intellect abstracts the essence from the particular instances and grasps it in its universality.
'According to Schopenhauer, corresponding to the level of the universal subject-object distinction, Will is immediately objectified into a set of universal objects or Platonic Ideas. These constitute the timeless patterns for each of the individual things that we experience in space and time. There are different Platonic Ideas, and although this multiplicity of Ideas implies that some measure of individuation is present within this realm, each Idea nonetheless contains no plurality within itself and is said to be “one.” Since the Platonic Ideas are in neither space nor time, they lack the qualities of individuation that would follow from the introduction of spatial and temporal qualifications. In these respects, the Platonic Ideas are independent of the specific fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, even though it would be misleading to say that there is no individuation whatsoever at this universal level, for there are many different Platonic Ideas. Schopenhauer refers to the Platonic Ideas as the direct objectifications of Will and as the immediate objectivity of Will.
Will is identified as the noumena of Kant- the Thing-in-Itself. — schopenhauer1
so Will's expression via Representation is to have a subject that perceives, experiences, and knows objects — schopenhauer1
as Kant proposed, is mediated by a priori categories such as time/space/causality, such that when it looks upon the object, it manifests the idea of the object in space/time/causality and the PSR (the world of phenomenon). — schopenhauer1
The objects for Schopenhauer, are akin to some kind of Platonic Forms. These Forms are the direct manifestation of Will unmediated by a subject — schopenhauer1
WHY is it that Will has the double aspect? — schopenhauer1
That is to say, Will cares not for its individuated expressions that are its manifestations. We end up suffering as being taken along for its ride as beings who strive constantly, being expressions of Will. — schopenhauer1
It is purely experiencing the Will without willing, if you will. — schopenhauer1
If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape. — schopenhauer1
if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism. — Mww
Unless the thing K said we couldn't possibly "know" we simply "are". — ENOAH
Instead of things being given to sensibility, it is representations that are so given, which leaves the gaping explanatory hole in the form of…..how the HELL can a mere representation be of physical substance???????? How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses? — Mww
And if S’s representations are conditioned by space and time in order to make them appear real for our senses, as Kant’s things appear to us, then it remains questionable how the will can be a source of such conditions insofar as will is the origin of them. And if will doesn’t originate space and time, in that they still belong to the subject as pure a priori intuitions of transcendental deduction….S hasn’t done anything Kant didn’t already do. — Mww
Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. Turn-about is fair play? If he can do it so can I, kinda thing? Dunno, but maybe…. — Mww
As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us. — Mww
How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses? — Mww
Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. — Mww
Yes. I don't project a sunny Pollyanna view onto our imperfect world. But I also can't subscribe to Schop's gloomy-give-up outlook. I wouldn't want to model my personal worldview on his example of analytical intellectual critical methodology*1. His scientific approach to criticism is reductive, but I look to philosophy for a more holistic & creative big picture, including both the bad and the good stuff. Since I am a sentient creature, I can experience pain & suffering for myself. I don't need Schop's help to touch it where it hurts, to feel the exquisite agony of physical & psychological trauma. But I could benefit from a longer-broader view that envisions some "end" of suffering, preferably in the here & now world.In other words, it's not suffering all the way down - suffering has a cause and an end. I wouldn't look to Nietzsche for insight on that, however. — Wayfarer
Interesting summary of general philosophical principles, extracted from real-world details. Forms are the essential idea of a thing that is instantiated in actual real things. The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind. The World-Will concept has been represented both as an unstoppable destructive tidal wave, and as an ongoing creative process, suitable for the evolution of thinking & willing & adapting beings. We are all in the same world, but we can choose to look at the dark side, or the brighter side of the same cloud.PLATO
Forms(X)-->Particulars(Y)
KANT
Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y)
SCHOPENHAUR
Will(X)-->Representation(Y)
ALTERNATIVELY
Being(X)-->Becoming(Y)
[Body]-->[Mind]*
[Living]-->[knowing]* — ENOAH
While there are seemingly significant qualifiers differentiating each beyond nuances, is it not true that the following can be "extracted" from the "root" of each (i.e. before the differences emerge)?
Y is the "ground" where difference, therefore, meaning, therefore, desire, therefore, suffering is "constructed." This ground is mediated reality.
X is the "ground" where there is only the will to survive. No difference, etc., therefore no constructing suffering. This ground is direct reality.
And if X and Y are indivisible, inseparable, and not "two" distinct "grounds," why does this line of philosophical history separate them?
*is it "Body-->Mind"/"Living--knowing" which is "problematic"? — ENOAH
Where below am I naive or inconsistent? — ENOAH
Goal of Liberation: Schopenhauer and Buddhism both propose that liberation from suffering involves overcoming the driving force of desire. For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirvāṇa.
Differences: — Wayfarer
This is getting very esoteric, but can it be argued that Schopenhauer's famous "denial of Will", is actually a sort of existence of unmediated existence? — schopenhauer1
The better consciousness in me lifts me into a world where there is no longer personality and causality or subject or object. My hope and my belief is that this better (supersensible and extra-temporal) consciousness will become my only one, and for that reason I hope that it is not God. But if anyone wants to use the expression God symbolically for the better consciousness itself or for much that we are able to separate or name, so let it be, yet not among philosophers I would have thought. — Schopenhauer
In Urs App's book Schopenhauer's Compass, there's a whole chapter on what Schopenhauer describes as 'better consciousness' (apparently what we would call higher consciousness) — Wayfarer
But how is it you suppose, one can "deny" if one IS will. What is this "other" of "denial" which would not be part of "Will" itself, thus self-refuting the effort from the start? — schopenhauer1
It sounds like something I'd say :smile: as a criticism.For if Will is only one of an untold number of the universe’s dimensions, there would be no reason to expect that the individuating effects of the principle of sufficient reason would generate a world that feasts on itself in the manner that Schopenhauer describes. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/#7
One analogy I've found for Schopenhauer's 'will' is the Buddhist 'tannha' (craving or thirst). — Wayfarer
As to why his line of philosophical history separates them, I would have to understand what you mean exactly. — schopenhauer1
The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind — Gnomon
Ok, if that's the case, then definitely he places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being). — ENOAH
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