For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirvāṇa. — Wayfarer
In the OP, ↪Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable. — Gnomon
Not exactly, look at our conversation right above: — schopenhauer1
But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it. — schopenhauer1
I mean to say, for me the two categories summarized as X and Y are ontologically(?) separate. The one being, "Being", the other being a modified "reality" mediated or projected solely by the emergence of human minds. If I am mistaken, and for all of these philosophies, X and Y are indivisible (I.e. suffering cannot be isolated to Mind or resolved in being, independent of mind), then why are they consistently spoken of as if one is the ground of being and the other projections of Mind? — ENOAH
Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same. — schopenhauer1
Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless
1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
? — ENOAH
also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation — schopenhauer1
Whence the illusion? — schopenhauer1
This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).
I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real. — ENOAH
Will literally IS the illusions. — schopenhauer1
still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. — schopenhauer1
One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right? — ENOAH
He's not saying this law is a feature of the universe, it's a feature of thought. We can't think beyond it, so it's like a signpost of the border of thought. — frank
definitely he (Schop.) places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being). — ENOAH
the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether. — schopenhauer1
I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out. — schopenhauer1
it is that it is "double-aspected" — schopenhauer1
I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue. — ENOAH
not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. — Wayfarer
Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why. — Wayfarer
If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive? — ENOAH
If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive? — ENOAH
then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something — schopenhauer1
it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know. — schopenhauer1
Y….is mediated reality. X…..is direct reality.
KANT: Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y) — ENOAH
If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object? — Mww
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.
The Greek word νοούμενoν, nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα, nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν, noeîn, 'to think, to mean', which in turn originates from the word νοῦς, noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος, nóos, 'perception, understanding, mind'. A rough equivalent in English would be "that which is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".
in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. ...Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. — Edward Feser
And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it. — schopenhauer1
the wise man always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow, and no event disturbs his ἀταραξία [ataraxia]. — Schopenahuer, vol 1 p.88
it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said. — Wayfarer
it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t. — Mww
Kant was an admitted dualist — Mww
That is along the same lines as the 'critical reflection' in the SEP entry that I mention above. But I'd say, it's deeper than a feature of thought, it is inextricably part of organic life, as all living things strive to survive (although only humans come along and ask why.) — Wayfarer
You're doing what Witt warned against: you're giving in to the desire to see the world from a vantage point you can't have. But there wouldn't be much philosophizing going on if everyone took Witt's point. :razz: — frank
...although Schop himself used Greek terms some of the time, e.g. (I hope relevantly, I mainly know about Schop in relation to music not metaphysics):
the wise man always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow, and no event disturbs his ἀταραξία [ataraxia].
— Schopenahuer, vol 1 p.88 — mcdoodle
No, you are not immune either, bro. — schopenhauer1
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