But, knowledge of first principles and causes, Aristotle says are most knowable. — 013zen

It might appear as if he is saying that these are things that we can know. That we can be wise. But we are not wise. We do not know these first principles and causes. Perhaps the gods do.

In the Phaedrus, Plato discusses the soul’s journey and the role of divine madness in achieving true insight and wisdom. — Wayfarer

In the Phaedrus Socrates says:

I think it would be a big step, Phaedrus, to call him ‘wise’ because this is appropriate only for a god. The title ‘lover of wisdom’ or something of that sort would suit him better and would be more modest.

(278d)

and:

But the person who realises that in a written discourse on any topic there must be a great deal that is playful ...

(277e)

Starting where Aristotle does, with man, do we know what it is to be a man? What is the final cause, the telos of man? The question asks us not simply to give an opinion or account of it, but to know it by having achieved it, by the completion of our telos. Aristotle begins by saying that all men by nature desire to know. Is the satisfaction of that desire our telos?

The question of the telos of man is the question of self-knowledge. Socrates said his human wisdom is knowledge of ignorance. This is not expressed as an opinion but as something he knows. Is Aristotle’s wisdom, like that of Socrates, human or is it divine?

I know this is an old thread, but if you only got around to the Metaphysics, this is really discussed most in detail in Book X of the Ethics. It isn't a long book, but if you're just curious on this question you could probably get away with just reading Book I and Book X. Aquinas has a very good commentary on Book X.

But, with some caveats, the answer to the bolded is "yes." There are many ways to live a good, flourishing life, but the life of contemplation is highest and most divine.

But, with some caveats, the answer to the bolded is "yes." There are many ways to live a good, flourishing life, but the life of contemplation is highest and most divine. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is the life of contemplation one that is suitable or even desirable for all men? However attractive this might appear to be to would be philosophers, it is not the telos of all men. Even for those who do desire such a life, it is not clear that the desire to know is satisfied by contemplation.

The contemplative life requires either self-sufficiency or having someone else do the work in order to afford your leisure. Human beings, unlike the gods, are not self-sufficient.If the good man requires a proper education and training, then some form of community and legislation must be in place. From
the height of the contemplative life Aristotle moves, as the philosopher in the Republic must, back to the necessities and demands of city/cave.

Yup, he addresses those precise issues. They are why the answer is a qualified "yes." I think his reasoning is fairly straightforward, so it's probably best to let him speak for himself in Book X.

I do think there are some holes there that Aquinas fills in in the "On the Human Good," section of the Summa Contra Gentiles, but that is not as straight forward of a read (I personally dislike Thomas' style) or as short.

I think his reasoning is fairly straightforward ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't. I think his reasoning is dialectical and aporetic. The attentive reader is not led to conclusions but to questions and problems without answers.

Interesting comment on one sense of divine, but he is talking about divine beings. — Fooloso4

Ari did seem to assume the existence of some kind of supernatural beings, beyond the limits of human senses*1. But to me his "unmoved mover" sounds more like an abstract Nature-God than the Judeo deity, who walks in the garden with his creatures, and communicates his divine Will in no uncertain terms. In any case, I was using the term "to divine" in a colloquial metaphorical sense, not to be taken literally.

More to the point, I'll address your question "Is Aristotle wise?". I suppose the answer depends on whether you agree with Ari on the requirements for wisdom : one being the knowledge of Causes. In the quote below*2 though, he sets a high standard : "knows all things". But also admits to limits : "as far as possible". One cause of the limitation on human knowledge may be the aloofness of the deity, who gave humans the ability to "divine" via intuition & reason, instead of by direct revelation & slavish acquiescence.

Socrates opined that “Wisdom begins in wonder", and Ari's treatise on Phusis reveals a sense of encyclopedic inquisitiveness. Both of those paragons of sagacity also paradoxically expressed doubt about their own wisdom*3. So, Wisdom seems to require childish curiosity constrained by adult skepticism. :smile:


*1. What does Aristotle say about the divine?
Here Aristotle bases his doctrine of God on his cosmology. He conceives of an unmoved mover or first cause, eternal, invisible and unchangeable, who initiates all change in the universe by his attractive power, by arousing the desire to be like him in those heavenly beings which most nearly resemble him.
https://academic.oup.com/book/26477/chapter-abstract/194921046?redirectedFrom=fulltext

*2. “The wise man knows of all things, as far as possible, although he has no knowledge of each of them in detail.” — Aristotle

*3. Why did Socrates say I know nothing?
The meaning of Socrates' reflections in the phrase “all I know is that I know nothing” consisted of two paradoxical things. Firstly, Socrates doubted his own wisdom's superiority over other people's wisdom.
https://www.thecollector.com/all-i-know-is-that-i-know-nothing-socrates/

Ari did seem to assume the existence of some kind of supernatural beings, — Gnomon

I cannot say whether or not he assumed that there are supernatural beings, but it is clear not only that many believe and others speak and write about them.

But to me his "unmoved mover" sounds more like an abstract Nature-God than the Judeo deity — Gnomon

His is not the God of the Bible.Talk about Aristotle's unmoved mover usually assumes a single entity, but Aristotle says:

But whether one must set down one or more than one such independent thing, and hut ow many, must not go unnoticed...

(Book Xll, Chapter 8)

In order to set down how many he looks to the heavens and finds that there are many independent things. That is, things not dependent on any other.

But also admits to limits — Gnomon

Yes. My argument is that those limits are determined by our experience, particularly our lack of experience of the source of the whole.

Both of those paragons of sagacity also paradoxically expressed doubt about their own wisdom — Gnomon

Such doubt is an essential element of their wisdom.

Wisdom seems to require childish curiosity constrained by adult skepticism. — Gnomon

Yeah, something like that.

One question on the link to note 3: where does Socrates say he knows nothing? I think it is a misquotation but would be glad to be shown that I am wrong.

One question on the link to note 3:where does Socrates say he knows nothing? I think it is a misquotation but would be glad to be shown that I am wrong. — Fooloso4

He probably didn't say that in so many words. But the common quote attributed to the "wise man" is an English paraphrase of the Greek original, intended to indicate that it's wise to not be too cocky about your all-knowingness. Especially on philosophy forums, where you will be called to account. :wink:

Socratic Paradox :
"I know that I know nothing" is a saying derived from Plato's account of the Greek philosopher Socrates: "For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing..." (Plato, Apology 22d, translated by Harold North Fowler, 1966).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing

There are many ways to live a good, flourishing life, but the life of contemplation is highest and most divine. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Metaphysics connects the concerns stated in Nichomachean Ethics and Politics by asking if it is wrong to pursue the primary causes:

{6} What in fact happened is witness to this. For it was when pretty much all the necessities of life, as well as those related to ease and passing the time, had been supplied that such wisdom began to be sought. So clearly we do not inquire into it because of its having another use, but just as a human |982b25| being is free, we say, when he is for his own sake and not for someone else, in the same way we pursue this as the only free science, since it alone is for its own sake. It is because of this indeed that the possession of this science might be justly regarded as not for humans, since in many ways the nature of humans is enslaved, so that, according to Simonides, “a god alone can have this |982b30| privilege,” and it is not fitting that a human should not be content to inquire into the science that is in accord with himself. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine, it would probably occur in this case most of all, |983a1|and all those who went too far [in this science] would be unlucky. The divine, however, cannot be jealous—but, as the proverb says, “Bards often do speak falsely.” Moreover, no science should be regarded as more estimable than this. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b24, translated by CDC Reeve

The search for causes is theological in the context of how it challenges other views of what our place is as humans. Asking what is good by nature is at odds with other ideas of justice.

Hmmm...maybe you're right. I'll have to respond once I've spent a little more time re-reading a bit of the metaphysics.

But then it what sense can we call some person wise, as Aristotle does?

But if happiness (eudomonia) consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect (nous), or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation — Nichomachean Ethics 7. 1. (1177a11)

it's wise to not be too cocky about your all-knowingness. — Gnomon

I think in the case of Socrates there is a great deal more to it. It is not enough to acknowledge that you are ignorant. Human wisdom means to know how best to live while being ignorant of what is best.

I reckoned as I was going that I am wiser than this man, for it is likely that neither of us knows anything noble and good, but he thinks he knows something, when he does not know, while I do not actually know.

(Apology 21d)

But then it what sense can we call some person wise, as Aristotle does? — 013zen

We have, then, such and so many accepted opinions about wisdom and those who are wise. Now of these, the knowing of all things must belong to the one who has most of all the universal knowledge, since he knows in a certain way all the things that come under it; and these are just about the most difficult things for human beings to know, those that are most universal, since they are furthest away from the senses.

(982a 20)

It should be noted that he does not simply say that this is what wisdom is, but "of these" that is,the accepted opinions about wisdom. We might ask:

Why he does not just tell us what wisdom is? Does he know? Is he wise? Can we know if he or anyone else is wise if we are not?

Your translation is slightly different than mine :razz:

But, in the quote you reference, I take Aristotle to be saying:

"We say wise people have qualities x,y,z...of these qualities y is the most crucial"

Namely, knowledge of universals or what is common to all particular instances.

It seems as though Aristotle is telling us what he takes wisdom to consist in.

Namely, knowledge of universals or what is common to all particular instances.

It seems as though Aristotle is telling us what he takes wisdom to consist in. — 013zen

While I agree, recall that modern culture is generally nominalist and empiricist. There are still advocates of scholastic realism and hylomorphism but they're mainly Catholic philosophers or specialised academics. (See this index.) As far as the mainstream of philosophy is concerned, Aristotelian metaphysics was retired pretty well around the same time as Aristotelian physics, with the scientific revolution and the abandonment of geocentrism.

This is a theme I have been pursuing but I'm woefully under-prepared to really tackle it. But it's based on my belief that the decline of scholastic metaphysics was a momentous and generally calamitous change in Western culture. I'm always harking back to the supposedly spiritual elements of Greek philosophy but they get pretty short shrift on this forum and elsewhere.

Your translation is slightly different than mine — 013zen

I am using Joe Sachs. From his introduction

For convenience I sometimes copy and paste from the online translation from Perseus:

Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man.

Those opinions, as he goes on to discuss, vary. They cannot all be his opinions. We should not take any of them to be his opinion in more than a tentative and preliminary way, subject to further consideration.

The problem of universals is taken up in book VII, Chapter 13. What is universal is not some additional thing separate and independent of those things that come under it. The central question of the Metaphysics is the question of being, or ousia. Being is not a universal.

Again, thinghood [ousia] is what not attributed to any underlying thing, but the universal is always attributed to some underlying thing.

(1038b)

In other words, what is first is not a universal.

This is a sharp contrast from the language of "participating in Forms." As he says a little further:

And in general it follows—if the human |1038b30| and whatever is said of things in that way are substance—that none of the things in their account is substance of any of them or is separate from them or in something else. I mean, for example, that there is not some animal—or any other of the things in the account—beyond the particular ones. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1038b30, translated by CDC Reeve

This focus on the limits of what can be known through distinctions of kinds is evident in the discussion of actual being contrasted with potential or capacity:

Activity, then, is the existence of the thing not in the way in which we say that it exists potentially. And we say, for example, that Hermes exists potentially in the wood and the half-line in the whole, because it could be abstracted from it, and also we say that even someone who is not contemplating is a scientific knower if he is capable of contemplating. And by contrast we say that other things exist actively. What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, |1048a35| and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, |1048b1| and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. |1048b5| But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter. — ibid. 1048a30

Those opinions, as he goes on to discuss, vary. They cannot all be his opinions. We should not take any of them to be his opinion in more than a tentative and preliminary way, subject to further consideration. — Fooloso4

Yes, but immediately following that he says:

"Such in kind [20] and in number are the opinions which we hold with regard to Wisdom and the wise. Of the qualities there described the knowledge of everything must necessarily belong to him who in the highest degree possesses knowledge of the universal, because he knows in a sense all the particulars which it comprises."

Notice how he says "Of the qualities described..."... it seems to be that he is articulating what he takes to be the essential aspect of the qualities previously described. It's like if I were to say, "people say a "good general" is brave, intelligent, and loyal; its therefore necessary that a good general be a good person". Idk I admit I could be misreading it, but that's how I always took it.

Metaphysics is the question of being, or ousia. Being is not a universal. — Fooloso4

Yes, but as he says:

"It is clear that we must obtain knowledge of the primary causes, because it is when we think that we understand its primary cause that we claim to know each particular thing. Now there are four recognized kinds of cause. Of these we hold that one is the essence or essential nature of the thing (since the "reason why" of a thing is ultimately reducible to its formula, and the ultimate "reason why" is a cause and principle); another is the matter or substrate; the third is the source of motion; and the fourth is the cause which is opposite to this, namely the purpose or "good";for this is the end of every generative or motive process. We have investigated these sufficiently in the Physics".

To obtain knowledge of a universal or to know each particular that falls under it without need of experience, we must know primary causes. Aristotle lists four, one of which is matter.

While I agree, recall that modern culture is generally nominalist and empiricist. There are still advocates of scholastic realism and hylomorphism but they're mainly Catholic philosophers or specialised academics. (See this index.) As far as the mainstream of philosophy is concerned, Aristotelian metaphysics was retired pretty well around the same time as Aristotelian physics, with the scientific revolution and the abandonment of geocentrism. — Wayfarer

Indeed they were, but that's not to say that there is nothing that can be learned from Aristotle. I don't think he's wrong here...universal knowledge, which draws many particulars under a single concept is what we are after; that's what Newton did with his laws of motion, and what we continue to do by articulating laws. But, its even what we do when we understand something, in general. But, anyways, his notion of the actual primary causes, and what they entail is totally outdated; but the reasoning has always seemed sound to me (everything isn't made of fire, water, earth, air for example).

This is a theme I have been pursuing but I'm woefully under-prepared to really tackle it. But it's based on my belief that the decline of scholastic metaphysics was a momentous and generally calamitous change in Western culture. I'm always harking back to the supposedly spiritual elements of Greek philosophy but they get pretty short shrift on this forum and elsewhere. — Wayfarer

I'd be interested to hear more. Do you say this because you think that something was lost in the transition?

I don't think Aristotle is wrong about that, either. I understand much of his actual science is outmoded - no surprise there - but elements of the metaphysics and other aspects of his philosophy are still current (or in fact timeless). I've learned that there's been a minor revival of interest in Aristotle's biology, due to the inescapable teleological features of, well, all living things. Edward Feser has a book on the revival, Aristotle's Revenge.

As it happens, the very first post I entered on the predecessor forum to this one, was about what I now understand to be Platonic realism, i.e. that abstracta (in that case numbers), are real but not materially existent. I've discussed and debated the issue many times but I find that it's neither well understood nor widely supported - principally because it is obviously incompatible with physicalism.

In any case, after much more reading and deliberation, I decided that some form of scholastic realism - realism concerning universals - simply must be true, for the reasons you've sketched out. What I'm referring to as the calamity of the decline of Greek metaphysics is subject of some influential books. One is Ideas have Consequences, which was a surprise best-seller by a Uni of Chicago English professor in the post-war period. It is all about the longer-term consequences of the decline of metaphysics:

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver

(This book is rather unfortunately nowadays associated with American political conservatism, with which I have no affinity, but I believe his basic argument still stands.)

Another more recent book is The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie, around 2008. THere's a snynopsis here.

Then there are Lloyd Gerson's books, the most recent being Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy. Gerson's books are not very approachable for the lay reader as they are aimed very much at his academic peers, but he too supports Aristotelian or scholastic realism. But his main argument is to the incompatibility of Platonism and Naturalism, and the contention that Platonism is coterminous with philosophy proper. (Rather a good online lecture on this book here.)

Finally an essay called What's Wrong with Ockham - actually the source of that Weaver quote - which is on Academia (originally published on a now extinct website.) It too is a dense scholarly work, but the concluding section on what was lost with the Aristotelian 'aitia' (fourfold causation) is important:

Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.

In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom.

I am surprised to have discovered these sources, because they're mainly associated with Catholicism - Edward Feser and author of that last paper are Catholic professors - but I'm myself not Catholic. But I like to think of it as a uniquely Western manifestation of the philosophia perennis, which apart from the kinds of sources I've referred to, is nowadays mainly lost and forgotten.

Sorry about such a long and dense post, but it's a very large topic.

We have disagreed over Gerson in the past. As a devoted student of Plotinus, I cannot fault his view of Plato since Gerson follows Plotinus' reading.

But I object to Gerson's picture of Aristotle as an anti-naturalist. It elides Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle.

Gerson's version of materialism ignores the limits of the universal that Aristotle discusses in the Metaphysics, which my quote above is taken from.

- What are the arguments against the idea that Aristotle was an anti-naturalist or anti-materialist, on Gerson's definitions? (Cf. "Platonism versus Naturalism")

When one goes to the first page of the search for Gerson, the comments I made there are some arguments against his view. Further in the past, I expressed differences with Gerson's interpretation of De Anima unrelated to this thesis.

As time has passed, I have been thinking about his thesis as a "philosophy of history" that searches text to find the steps he is looking for. Up to now, I was mostly approaching it as a competing interpretation of the text.

I will think about how to expand upon the historicist angle.

- Okay, well I would be interested in the expansion. I think Aristotle had often been read against Plato, and I think Gerson is in part trying to correct this. It seems that although Aristotle does disagree with Plato at various points, they really do both form a single school vis-a-vis Gerson's "Ur-Platonism." Plato's enemies are always also Aristotle's enemies. There is an interesting two-minute clip from Myles Burnyeat where he touches on this question of anti-materialism, and the way that Plato and Aristotle differ in this matter while being in the same general camp (link).

Perhaps for Gerson it came down to the question of either including or excluding Aristotle from Ur-Platonism, and the rest follows from being unable to exclude him.

As it happens, the very first post I entered on the predecessor forum to this one, was about what I now understand to be Platonic realism, i.e. that abstracta (in that case numbers), are real but not materially existent. I've discussed and debated the issue many times but I find that it's neither well understood nor widely supported - principally because it is obviously incompatible with physicalism. — Wayfarer

This is very interesting...

I've heard a line of reasoning that reminds me of this....I think it might have been Searle? Well, regardless...they made a case that there are things that are:

1. Epistemically objective
2. Epistemically subjective

3. Ontologically objective
4. Ontologically subjective

Something could be ontologically subjective which has a different mode of existence than ontologically objective things. But, this is not to say that they cannot also be epistemically objective.

I don't know if this helps or is similar to your line of thinking, but it reminded me of it, and thought it might help.


As for the rest of the post...I’ll admit, it’s a bit out of my element, but from what I gather, I’m interested, or at least have been doing a lot of thinking, on a tangential problem myself. What I mean is, it seems like in part aspects of the debate you pointed out are focused on the gutting of traditional metaphysics starting from around the time of Ockham, Bacon, and Descartes, which came to a head around the end of the 1800s, reducing metaphysics to nonsense, and our access to reality almost nonexistent.
But, interestingly enough, I believe that the metaphysicians won that debate... I think the general population simply hasn’t caught up yet so to speak. There is always a tidal effect as knowledge populates through a population, and words change meanings. Classical conceptions need to be updated, but it’s difficult to see how something thought of in one fashion could be intuitively and defensibly wrong, but in another acceptable and informative.

But, truthfully, I think a modern notion of forms is defensible. The forms are simply the arrangement of quarks, leptons, and bosons that make up protons and neutrons, or the form that a carbon atom takes, etc

I've learned that there's been a minor revival of interest in Aristotle's biology, due to the inescapable teleological features of, well, all living things. — Wayfarer

This is very true, and I believe it's a key point toward understanding Aristotle's metaphysics. The teleological aspect of biology necessitates that there is a sort of "form" which is temporally prior to the material existence of a living body, as the cause of its being an organized body. This implies an immaterial form which the Greeks knew as the soul.

The second point, I believe is to understand the distinction between the immaterial "form" which is prior in existence to a material body, as cause of that body being the unique body which it is, and the "form" as we know it, in the sense of the formula of our understanding. This produces a duality of "form" in Aristotle, as one sense is proper to final cause, and the other is proper to formal cause. The revival of Aristotelian principles which you refer to, as displayed in this forum by participants like @Dfpolis and @apokrisis, commonly does not reflect this distinction, and it is common to find a conflation of these two distinct senses of "form".

We have disagreed over Gerson in the past. As a devoted student of Plotinus, I cannot fault his view of Plato since Gerson follows Plotinus' reading.

But I object to Gerson's picture of Aristotle as an anti-naturalist. It elides Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle.

Gerson's version of materialism ignores the limits of the universal that Aristotle discusses in the Metaphysics, which my quote above is taken from. — Paine

The difference between Neo-Platonist interpretations of Plato, and Aristotelian interpretations of Plato, I have described to Wayfarer in the past. The problem with Pythagorean idealism which Plato exposed, is that the theory of participation, which is the theory that supports the reality of these separate Ideas, makes these Ideas passive, and does not allow that the independent Ideas are active in the real world. Today this is known as the problem of interaction. Plato introduced "the good", as a principle of action.

What Aristotle did was define "form" as the active aspect of reality, and then he showed the need for independent active "Forms" as causal in the sense of teleologically causal, final cause, to account for the reality of the role of "the good" in the world, demonstrated by the free will.

The Neo-Platonists, as demonstrated by Plotinus, did not follow this principle, and adhered more to Pythagorean participation, but turned participation around to be emanation. However, the first principle "the One" is pure potential, passive, and so this cannot account for the act, the cause of emanation. In this way the Neo-Platonist metaphysics hits a dead end, the first principle is purely potential, and not actual. That contradicts Aristotle's cosmological argument. Christian theologist like Augustine and Aquinas, turn to the active "Form" of Aristotle, to account for the reality of the free will, and of God in general, as the first cause.

There are many meanings of "form" in Aristotle and Aquinas, related by an analogy of attribution. As Aquinas explains:

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. (ST I, 13, 5)

In other words, we may call things "forms" not because they are the same as the form of a body, but because they either cause that form, or are caused by that form.

Forms can be "prior" in two ways:

• God's intention to create whatever he creates, which is in the order of primary (metaphysical) causality, and not temporally prior because God is unchanging and so timeless.
• Immanently, it the laws of nature and the initial conditions that will evolve into the informed object. This is in the order of secondary (physical) causality, and is temporally prior.

In addition, there are "posterior" forms, which are the (1) (incomplete) neural representations and (2) the consequent concepts that result from the action of informed bodied on our nervous system and our awareness of these representations respectively.

But, truthfully, I think a modern notion of forms is defensible. The forms are simply the arrangement of quarks, leptons, and bosons that make up protons and neutrons, or the form that a carbon atom takes, etc — 013zen

In the Aristotelian tradition, forms are neither Platonic Ideas nor physical arrangements, but the actuality of what was potential (hyle -- poorly translated "matter"). Since "elementary particles" are not immutable, but can interact and decay to form other particles, they themselves are a combination of form (actuality = what they are now) and hyle (potentiality = what they can become). Their potential aspect is imperfectly described by the laws of physics (e.g. quantum electrodynamics and chromodynamics). See my article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle"

Since "elementary particles" are not immutable, but can interact and decay to form other particles, they themselves are a combination of form — Dfpolis

We have to be careful, though. The use of the word "decay" isn't being used in the traditional sense of say a uranium atom decaying and releasing an alpha particle or something of the sort. When elementary particles decay, they transform into other elementary particles, like an up quark becoming a down quark. There is no internal relation shifting or loss of constituents in the process. It's merely a potential transition into another actuality.

See my article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle" — Dfpolis

I downloaded it! I'll work through it here and there. :smile: