You could think of a promise as an act prolonged through time, just like the turning on of a light. — Leontiskos

I guess you could. I don't.

Which still needs to be explained. Why won't you ever explain this? — Michael

I think I have explained the situation at some length, but perhaps more can be said.

Thanks for this topic, one more interesting than most. I think you make an ostensible point, and I suspect Anscombe may have agreed with you, but I think there is more going on here that needs attention.

In Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe talks of a sort of "ought" that has a "...special so-called 'moral' sense... a sense in which they imply some absolute moral verdict". From about p.11 she lists and dismisses various "standards" which might permit one to infer an ought. The list includes the following:

There is another possibility here: "obligation" may be contractual. Just as we look at the law to find out what a man subject to it is required by it to do, so we look at a contract to find out what the man who has made it is required by it to do. Thinkers, admittedly remote from us, might have the idea of a foedus rerum, of the universe not as a legislator but as the embodiment of a contract. Then if you could find out what the contract was, you would learn your obligations under it. Now, you cannot be under a law unless it has been promulgated to you; and the thinkers who believed in "natural divine law" held that it was promulgated to every grown man in his knowledge of good and evil. Similarly you cannot be in a contract without having contracted, i.e. given signs of entering upon the contract. Just possibly, it might be argued that the use of language which one makes in the ordinary conduct of life amounts in some sense to giving the signs of entering into various contracts. If anyone had this theory, we should want to see it worked out. I suspect that it would be largely formal; it might be possible to construct a system embodying the law (whose status might be compared to that of "laws"of logic): "what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," but hardly one descending to such particularities as the prohibition on murder or sodomy. Also, while it is clear that you can be subject to a law that you do not acknowledge and have not thought of as law, it does not seem reasonable to say that you can enter upon a contract without knowing that you are doing so; such ignorance is usually held to be destructive of the nature of a contract. — Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p.12

I've bolded the part that caught my eye. I think Austin and Searle are embarked on just the enterprise described. But they are not interested so much in prohibiting murder and sodomy - so far as I know - so much in providing a description of the social role played by our utterances, of how we do things with words.

Your girlfriend may well have intended to marry you, and this may have been so were it expressed or not. But she went further, making a promise, and thereby she also committed to marrying you, undertook doing so, binding herself to marrying you and placed herself under an obligation.

And all of that is a result of her having made the promise. It was an act done by her in making the utterance. One amongst many, many other acts we perform in making utterances - naming ships, asking questions, issuing demands or orders - and undertaking obligations.

We enter into these "contracts" by our participation in, and understanding of, these social facts.

Now I don't think this will convince you. You have a leaning towards notions of individualism that lead you to deny such social facts. But for me that's neither here nor there.

There is something of Moore's paradox here, the insincerity that English speakers see in "it is raining but I do not believe that it is raining". What would we make of your girlfriend saying "I promise to marry you, but I do not undertake an obligation to marry you"? Perhaps only that she has not understood what it is to promise.

Your girlfriend may well have intended to marry you, and this may have been so were it expressed or not. But she went further, making a promise, and thereby she also committed to marrying you, undertook doing so, binding herself to marrying you and placed herself under an obligation.

And all of that is a result of her having made the promise. It was an act done by her in making the utterance. One amongst many, many other acts we perform in making utterances - naming ships, asking questions, issuing demands or orders - and undertaking obligations. — Banno

Are we trying to teach Michael how to make a promise so he can have a real girlfriend and really get married? It's sort of a sine qua non quality in a man.

Obviously Michael is mistaken when he claims that to promise to do something is no more than to intend to do something, but if we are to teach him how to make a promise, what more is required than the intention to act in the future? Going back to Aquinas from my earlier post:

For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. — Aquinas, ST II-II.88.1 Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?

(Note that "praying" = "petitioning," i.e. asking someone to do something for you.)

Now if @Michael concedes that commanding and petitioning are real acts that he can really do, then we're only one step away from the act of promising. If a sergeant can successfully command the soldier to scout ahead and the child can successfully petition his mother for a candy, then apparently commands and petitions are alive and well in the world. If Aquinas is right then what is happening here is that the sergeant and the child are directing others, albeit in very different ways. And we can direct others. We can command and petition, both successfully and unsuccessfully.

Now if this is all conceded, then is the objector to maintain his position by claiming that although it is true that we can direct others, nevertheless we cannot direct ourselves vis-a-vis some other? If the mother can receive a petition from her child, cannot she also promise her child that the petition will be fulfilled? When our father says, "Yes, I intend for us to go on vacation next summer, and more than that, I promise you that we will go on vacation come hell or high water!," does the latter part of that sentence change nothing at all? As I have said in many ways, the sort of directing involved in promising extends over the temporal duration of the promise. We can "hold him to it." If summer is near and there is no sign of travel arrangements, we have a right to apply a pressure to our father in a way that we would not if he had not promised.

The reason I never really think Michael is being sincere is because he is never willing to do any of the leg work. How many times have we told him that to intend something is not yet to promise it, only to be met with mute silence? He is not the sort of person who would ever say, "Oh hey, you're right! Give me some time to revise my understanding of what a promise is and then get back to you." The eristic is too heavy. It seems to be a game where he tries to be as slippery as he can.

I suspect Anscombe may have agreed with you — Banno

I don't think so. I assume Anscombe understood what a promise is and how to make one. A promise is a special kind of obligation in that it is conditional and voluntarily entered into, and I don't think Anscombe's arguments cut against this form of obligation.

Edit: I am reminded of a "promissory note," which is what money is, or at least was. Or the simpler example of a coupon given out by the grocery store.

Just because obligations cease to be doesn't mean they never were, right? — Moliere

A promise establishes an obligation, and that obligation ceases if: 1) it is fulfilled, 2) the promise is "broken", or 3) the promisee releases you from the obligation. There are of course many subcategories of (2). Where legitimate exceptions fit in is arguable, and perhaps this is a fourth category.

I don't think so. — Leontiskos

I re-read MMP this morning and was again in awe of the complexity of her thinking. Better not to assume, so I went with "may". She almost certainly would have had much more to say on the issue, and I don't think she had a soft spot for Austin.

- Yes, in fact I had forgotten the bit you quoted. I have only done a close read of MMP once and then skimmed it a few times afterwards, but skimming Anscombe doesn't really work.

There is something of Moore's paradox here. — Banno

I was going to bring up the same point, which is why these matters are best discussed in the third person:

S promised to marry H but S is not obligated to marry H.

Whether or not this sentence is contradictory depends on what it means to be obligated to do something, but as previously mentioned it is barely a coherent concept. It seems to me that obligations are nothing more than commands fictitiously treated as truth-apt propositions.

Your reference to contracts does not explain them further. It simply asserts that a contract lists our obligations; it doesn't explain what obligations are. At best I understand a contract as a list of commands that if not followed entail a penalty. The introduction of further (abstract) entities certainly seems superfluous. See also my recent comment to Leontiskos, where we are discussing this very issue.

But still, do you at least accept that your claim that a promise is the undertaking of an obligation is not one of Searle's conditions, and nor does it follow from Searle's conditions? His conditions (7) and (8) only describe what S intends to happen, and intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

The reason I never really think Michael is being sincere is because he is never willing to do any of the leg work. How many times have we told him that to intend something is not yet to promise it, only to be met with mute silence? — Leontiskos

I'm still waiting on a reply to this.

I guess you're asking what "obligation" is supposed to be adding to the act of uttering a promise. — frank

Yes. I want to know what an obligation is, and why it is necessary.

To me, it's simple; we use the verb "promise" in conversation and sincerely intend to do what we say we promise to do.

No need to make things more complicated by bringing in some further conditions, especially conditions that entail/require the existence of some abstract object.

As a comparison, consider these two propositions:

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie

What does the addition of "I promise you that" add? Not much. It's more of an emphasis; an expression of certainty.

I think it's probably context dependent. Noam Chomsky said "real" is like an honorific, just specifying that a certain thing is special. Promising can be like that for a declaration of intent.

I mean, the emphasis placed on putting things in writing shows that verbal announcements are of dubious value.

As a comparison, consider these two propositions:

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie

What does the addition of "I promise you that" add? Not much. It's more of an emphasis; an expression of certainty. — Michael

As a further example, consider something like "I'll try to do this, but I can't promise that I will". This isn't me saying that I intend to but am not obligated to; it is me saying that I am not certain that I will.

The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen.

I am not sure what the ultimate relevance for moral realism will amount to in any case. If obligations are just rules in some game we "play," why is it good that we should play such games? Certainly deception can be better than honesty in some cases, e.g. promising a crazed friend that you will "give their knife right back to them" while having no intention of doing so.

If one condition for obviating any promise or obligation is just, as points out, breaking that obligation or promise, i.e. just ignoring it, what exactly does it do?

I don't see why likening morality or obligations to "truth conditionals" or "logic" helps cement morality. Why is it "good" to prefer truth to falsity or good faith arguments to bad ones?

Perhaps I am missing something since I have not followed the conversation. It seems to me that attempts to reduce practical reason to theoretical reason always seems to founder on the same rocks.

The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen. — Michael

Or it could come from an attempt to assure someone. Meaning depends on context.

I’m not really sure how your comments are related to mine? I am simply asking what “obligation” means, and how the sincere use of the verb “promise” entails an obligation.

As I understand it obligations are an incoherent concept and superfluous to the use of the phrase “I promise”.

It's "incoherent" to you that lifeguards are obligated to jump into the water when a child starts screaming "help I'm drowning," or that firefighters are obligated to try to put our fires?

I can't really imagine what the objection here is TBH.

It's not clear to me what "if someone is drowning then you are obligated to jump into the water and save their life" even means.

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition? Because that's all it seems to be to me.

No, it means your role entails a duty to perform that action. If you don't save drowning people when you easily could have you are a bad lifeguard, just as obviously as striking out at every at bat makes you a "bad hitter" in baseball.

We might ask: "Is it good that Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father's death?" without having to claim nescience about his obligations given his membership in ancient Greek society. The fact that he is "obligated" to kill his mother under his society's norms is an objective fact. The drama comes from the fact that he is also obligated to protect and care for his mother now that his father is dead and he is the sole living son, putting two obligations into conflict. But Aeschylus' plays aren't "incoherent," they are about the difference between justice and obligation and the potential for conflict between the two.

No, it means your role entails a duty to perform that action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What does "if someone is drowning then you have a duty to jump into the water and save their life" mean?

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition?

What the complaint here, that the claim that "lifeguard's primary purpose is to prevent drownings," has no truth value?

Sure. What the complaint here, that the claim that "lifeguard's primary purpose is to prevent drownings," has no truth value? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the concept of obligations isn't clear, and that it isn't clear that the sincere use of the phrase "I promise" entails the undertaking of an obligation.

What isn't clear? I'm finding it hard to believe that you cannot parse the meaning of sentences like: "soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers." The conditions under which this obligation is upheld or not is straightforward.

I'm finding it hard to believe that you cannot parse the meaning of sentences like: "soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why? Moral nihilism, fictionalism, and nominalism are legitimate philosophical positions.

None of those positions entail that sentences about obligations are "incoherent." That would be quite a claim to make. Moral nihilism claims that are no facts about whether or not it is good to uphold one's obligations, not that obligations, rules, laws, etc. don't exist or lack any content. Moral nihilism need not (and usually doesn't) even claim that there are no facts about what is "good" vis-á-vis certain contexts. E g., if moral nihilism made us claim that there was no truth value to the claim "Michael Jordan was a good basketball player," it would be a pretty silly position on the face of it. Moral nihilism generally tries to divorce "moral" and "practical" reasoning to deal with this, although how well this works in practice is debatable.

I would maintain that it is a silly position, in that people are always forced to smuggle practical reasoning back into their thinking, but not quite so obviously.

I didn't just mention moral nihilism.

I also mentioned nominalism: obligations, if they exist, are abstract objects. Abstract objects do not exist. Therefore, obligations do not exist.

But my main position is that there is no meaningful distinction between these two sentences:

1. Soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers
2. If you are a soldier then report all instances of sexual assault to your superior officers

(1) is just (2) but fictitiously treated as a truth-apt proposition. If you think that (1) means something more then please explain what that is because I promise you that I don't see it.

Here are two sentences:

1. You ought do this
2. Do this

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference between them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. It’s make-believe a la fictionalism. — Michael

Perhaps this has been cleared up earlier. As a caveat I have to say that what both propositions actually means, depends on context. They might come down to the same thing, for instance when a police officer utters the sentence, but they might also not. the different is that the first proposition appeals to an outside authority or process that has caused you to you being ought to do a certain something. The second proposition appeals to no such authority. It has al sorts of ramifications, the most important being that propsition 1 may be questioned and countered: "Why ought I to do it?, on what authority, for whom?"
The second proposition does not allow that.

As in, "If I don't build the house on time then some authority will fine me."

This is true if in the terms of the contract. But this does not prima facie entail "I ought build the house" (or "I ought pay the fine"). — Michael

You are fined because you disregarded an obligation and that is call for punishment. The punishment is the fine for breach of contract. It is not a sum of money you can or cannot pay. There is a moral dimension to it, which you disregard. Ultimately this moral obligation depends on the social rule that we should keep our promises, or in Latin, Pacta sunt servanda.

I think obligation is something people feel sometimes. "He didn't want to go to the party, but he felt obligated.". Or it could be something that people in the area believe. "Most Americans believed he was obliged to resign.". It's just describing how people feel or attitudes they have. — frank

There are of course multiple senses in which we use the word obliged. One indeed often feel obliged to do x. But consider the difference between these two sentences: "He felt obliged to go to the party" and "he was obliged to go to the party". They are not the same sentences, but in your account of obligation they are. That is because you think an obligation is subjective. The obligation though has an objective side to it. We are bound to certain acts and that bind we call an obligation. They arise out of certain procedures, being you signing a contract, or a legislator promulgating a law.

I've offered my own understanding of obligations; they are commands treated as if they were truth-apt propositions, but as commands are not truth-apt propositions obligations are a fiction, and barely even sensible. — Michael

Obligations are not the same as commands and the difference lies in the legitimacy of the procedure by which they are issued. A command makes no appeal to legitimate procedure whereas an obligation does. This discussion actually mirrors the Hart Austin debate on whence the law derives its legitimacy from. To Austin law was merely the command of the sovereign. Hart contested that and won, at least that is the current view of jurisprudence. https://thecolumnofcurae.wordpress.com/2020/07/20/h-l-a-hart-his-criticism-on-austins-theory/

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie — Michael

Nothing, just a figure of speech. I promise you ... here means: "I am sure you will..." You can though never promise someone else will like something. You would also never see someone asking for indemnification. With a marriage proposal it might be different though there may well be laws guarding against asking for indemnification in such cases. However, for instance if you promise to sell me X and I contract with Y that I will deliver him X after I have gotten it from you and you do not deliver, I might well ask for indemnification, under circumstances, even Y might.

What does "if someone is drowning then you have a duty to jump into the water and save their life" mean?

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition? — Michael

No, it means there is some rule that states that one should save drowning people. This rule may either be customary or codified somewhere. In the second case I might also be appealing to such a rule, but I might also be appealing to just my whim. In case one, we can try to find out if such a duty is there or not, by looking at law or custom.

I’m not really sure how your comments are related to mine? I am simply asking what “obligation” means, and how the sincere use of the verb “promise” entails an obligation. — Michael

Like in many cases of speech acts it depends on context. It may well be just a figure of speech, it may also put you under a pretty heavy legal obligation. Obligations are such are simply burdens imposed on you by way of legitimate procedure, are because you bound yourself to a certain course of action or because a legitimate outside force did so, such as the organs of a recognized state, or recognized custom.

This all seems to reduce to the claim that some authority has told me to do something. I understand and accept that. What I cannot make sense of is the conclusion "therefore I ought do as I'm told". What does this conclusion add that hasn't already been covered by the fact that some authority has told me to do something?

You seem to think that there is the command and then also the obligation. I don't know what this second thing is, or how/why it follows from the command.

Neither nominalism or fictionalism require people to claim that obligations are incoherent, nor to claim that they don't exist. They are theories describing the metaphysical underpinnings of such phenomena. Likewise, one can be a nominalist without denying that triangles exist.

Indeed, nominalists as much as anyone else often argue against realism precisely because of the "metaphysical obligations" it entails.

Likewise, one can be a nominalist without denying that triangles exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because nominalists don't claim that triangles are abstract objects. There are concrete objects with three sides, or there are instructions that one can follow to draw a triangle.

What would it mean to be a nominalist and to claim that obligations exist? Perhaps it amounts to nothing more than the claim that some relevant authority has told me to do something, and that if I don't do it then I will be penalised.

It seems to me that most nominalists are motivated by naturalistic intuitions (perhaps joined to an inadequate understanding of universals as necessarily existing in some sort of "spirit realm"). As such, an explanation of obligations purely in terms of statements that burst forth from authority figures seems like it will be unsatisfactory. We will be forced to ask "but why do authority figures make these claims on people?" Not to mention that it seems hard to trace all obligations back to some single authority figure in history making a pronouncement.

I think obligation is something people feel sometimes. "He didn't want to go to the party, but he felt obligated.". Or it could be something that people in the area believe. "Most Americans believed he was obliged to resign.". It's just describing how people feel or attitudes they have.
— frank

There are of course multiple senses in which we use the word obliged. One indeed often feel obliged to do x. But consider the difference between these two sentences: "He felt obliged to go to the party" and "he was obliged to go to the party". They are not the same sentences, but in your account of obligation they are. That is because you think an obligation is subjective. The obligation though has an objective side to it. We are bound to certain acts and that bind we call an obligation. They arise out of certain procedures, being you signing a contract, or a legislator promulgating a law. — Tobias

I think we're just going to disagree here. I said earlier that what exists is people saying and doing things. The rest is feelings and ad hoc explanations. I was hoping you'd agree that obligation comes down to personal sentiment because we could finally explore the way the private language argument blasts away the veracity of the stories we tell about obligation. But instead, you're saying the binding is out there for all to see. I'm not sure what you're talking about.

It's been interesting and fun to talk with you. :smile: