The war in Ukraine is just the appetizer - not the actual goal. War between Europe and Russia is the American dream scenario here, and the conduct of Russia in this war so far clearly shows they are trying to avoid giving the suicidal Europeans enough reason to fall for Washington's warmongering. — Tzeentch

They can't get the war between Europe and Russia without the war in Ukraine though.

Or are you supposing there'd be NATO tanks rolling into Russia?

If the Americans had their way, sure.

They had hoped the Russians would more aggressively push Ukraine, which would have given NATO an opportunity to punish Russia via a guerilla war and which would have fueled Russophobia and the propaganda machines. (In a cruel twist of irony, it would be Israel that fell for such a trap in Gaza)

The Russians showed restraint though, giving NATO ample opportunity to back out of escalation and sit down for talks, which is why US warmongering is only finding limited success.

The situation is still dangerous, though. Economic decoupling, the spreading of war sentiment and a measure of militarization has been achieved, so there is fertile soil for another conflict down the line.

The US has proven it is willing to bomb its allies' infrastructure to further its agenda, so it's entirely thinkable the US may do something extreme to create the proverbial spark in the powder keg and thus we may be closer to the threshold for full-scale conflict between Europe and Russia than we think.

If the Americans had their way, sure. — Tzeentch

So how does this look? What's the war aim? Recapture Kaliningrad for Germany?

They had hoped the Russians would more aggressively push Ukraine, which would have given NATO an opportunity to punish Russia via a guerilla war and which would have fueled Russophobia and the propaganda machines. (In a cruel twist of irony, it would be Israel that fell for such a trap in Gaza)

The Russians showed restraint though, giving NATO ample opportunity to back out of escalation and sit down for talks, which is why US warmongering is only finding limited success. — Tzeentch

This theory is nothing short of amazing. So the Russians, knowing the US wants war, are unfortunately forced (by reasons which are apparently unknowable) to oblige the US and repeatedly invade their neighbour.

But, in a stroke of genius, after eventually invading with their entire maneuver forces, they cleverly avoid winning the war. Thus depriving the US of the desired guerilla warfare. They instead engage in a total war of attrition. This, apparently, is somehow safer because, and I'm guessing here, if the war is already total, it cannot get worse.

Foiling the US by snatching defeat from the jaws of victory is truly 4D chess.

The situation is still dangerous, though. Economic decoupling, the spreading of war sentiment and a measure of militarization has been achieved, so there is fertile soil for another conflict down the line. — Tzeentch

After all, you never know when Russia will again be forced by circumstance to invade another neighbour.

The US has proven it is willing to bomb its allies' infrastructure to further its agenda, so it's entirely thinkable the US may do something extreme to create the proverbial spark in the powder keg and thus we may be closer to the threshold for full-scale conflict between Europe and Russia than we think. — Tzeentch

Luckily Russia has so far safer us from being bombed by the US by selflessly taking on the duty of starting the wars.

So how does this look? What's the war aim? Recapture Kaliningrad for Germany? — Echarmion

Who knows, whatever the US could lure the ignorant Europeans into accepting.

This theory is nothing short of amazing. — Echarmion

Thanks. :up:

I wouldn't expect someone who seems still to be stuck in "unprovoked invasion" territory to really get it, but still, thanks.

I wouldn't expect someone who seems still to be stuck in "unprovoked invasion" territory to really get it, but still, thanks. — Tzeentch

That's what it boils down to. "You just don't get it". You either accept the metaphysical premise that all events must trace back to the "Great Satan", in this case the USA, or you don't.

Why does Ukraine seek western integration? The US engineered it.

Why don't Europeans act according to their geopolitical interests? They're in thrall to the US.

Why did Russia invade Ukraine? The US forced them too.

This is just another world conspiracy. Replace the USA with your favourite villain, the Illuminati, Hollywood billionaires, etc. the story remains the same.

Why does Ukraine seek western integration? The US engineered it.

Why don't Europeans act according to their geopolitical interests? They're in thrall to the US.

Why did Russia invade Ukraine? The US forced them too. — Echarmion

That's right. There are plenty of western scholars who voice these ideas, and it fits neatly in the historic behavioral pattern we see from the United States.

Where I diverge from these scholars is that they believe this to be a result of US incompetence, whereas I believe there is no way the US would pursue and double down on these policies for as long as they did, if they weren't getting exactly what they wanted.

An American accusing me of Hollywood bias is quite rich, though. There's not a nation on earth that has wreaked as much destruction on the world as the United States. It doesn't deserve anyone's benefit of the doubt. The only proper way to view its actions is through a lens of utter cynicism, which comes natural to a realist anyway.

An American accusing me of Hollywood bias is quite rich, though. There's not a nation on earth that has wreaked as much destruction on the world as the United States. It doesn't deserve anyone's benefit of the doubt. The only proper way to view its actions is through a lens of utter cynicism, which comes natural to a realist anyway. — Tzeentch

I'm not american, but this is a neat encapsulation of your reasoning. You're emotionally committed to seeing the Great Satan at work, the facts come second.

For someone who is not an American, you sure seem invested in threads pertaining to US domestic politics. :chin:

I think you're lying.

I think you're lying. — Tzeentch

Naturally.

What causes people to disagree with me on a public forum? Must be US agents doing it.

It's really hard to catch up with Tzeench's inconsistent and auto-referential bullshit rate:

Tzeench: “deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it.”

What a dumb rebuttal. Sure, “deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it” once you “have a credible deterrent against Russia”. Not yet if one wants to build it up to catch up with his neighbour’s deterrence build-up, especially if your neighbour wants to subdue you.


Tzeench: “NATO leaders admitted to signing a peace agreement not with the intention of maintaing peace, but with the intention to arm for war”.
“First-hand accounts from Merkel and Hollande tell us that NATO entered the Minsk Accords in bad faith, and used it to buy time to arm Ukraine.”.

What is he even talking about? Any evidence of this admission?
If he refers to Merkel’s statement from the Zeit interview: ”The 2014 Minsk Agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as you can see today.” The expression “not with the intention of maintaing peace” is not there, nor it can be LOGICALLY inferred from that statement, arguably NOT EVEN SUGGESTED. Indeed, you must have heard the Latin adage "si vis pacm, para bellum" (= "if you want peace, prepare for war") therefore admitting that Minsk Agreements bought time for Ukraine's military build-up is no sufficient evidence that peace agreements were made "not with the intention of maintaing peace" AT ALL. So the alleged admission is just your manipulative and defamatory interpolation based on your implicit and highly questionable understanding of the situation. This is evidence of your intellectual misery.
The same goes with Holland’s claims: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point," he told the Kiev Independent media outlet, while commenting on Merkel’s remark that the Minsk agreements allowed Kiev to gain time, but by no means prevented further hostilities in the Donbass. "Since 2014, Ukraine has strengthened its military posture. Indeed, the Ukrainian army was completely different from that of 2014. It was better trained and equipped. It is the merit of the Minsk agreements to have given the Ukrainian army this opportunity." https://tass.com/world/1558075
And notice how Holland complements his claims: “for a dialogue to be fruitful, it must be based on a balance of power.”, but how does one state pursue balance of power on matter of security? Russia’s own behaviour shows it: military build-up and economic dependence, he himself suggested it.


The following Tzeench's claim is more foolish than the foolishness he attributes to Westerners:
”This is why I emphasize the foolishness of combining the build up of a deterrent (presumably to avoid war) with economic decoupling, refusal of diplomatic talks and maximalist war rhetoric, etc.)”.

Indeed prior to 2014, the West (including the US) and Russia was NOT decoupled, there was no refusal of diplomatic talks no maximalist war rhetoric, there was not even build-up a deterrent (NATO was brain dead, expenditures for NATO was declining, NATO membership for Ukraine always postponed). Actually it was doing business with Russia that FINANCED Russia’s military build-up and it was security cooperation in the Middle East that proved Russia’s power projection wasn’t at risk. The US-led West was dominated by a logic of APPEASEMENT of Russia (despite voices contrary to it within the US, INCLUDING Mearsheimer's) not provocation/humiliation, hence the push for Ukraine to return the nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for a promise of respecting the Ukrainian territorial integrity and national self-determination (while the warmongerer Mearsheimer was against this! now tell me if NOT returning the nuclear arsenal to Russia was a provocation from the US and Ukraine!).
And yet having discussions of Ukraine inside NATO and EU was perceived as an unbearable provocation and security threat worth a conventional war against Ukraine and its Western allies?! WTF?! What the fuck can Russia sensibly expect from the US which just beat Russia in a world hegemony competition and while Russia was at its lowest also economically and politically (remember the August Coup by revanchist hardliners?!).
AND THAT's NOT ALL, IF Tzeench CLAIMS EUROPEANS ARE THE US's LACKEYS THEN IT MUST FOLLOW FROM HIS OWN LOGIC THAT THE US WANTED THE WEST TO DO BUSINESS WITH RUSSIA AND TO DE-ESCALATE WITH A MILITARY BUILD-DOWN AND TO POSTPONE UKRAINE ACCESS TO NATO IN ~20 YEARS OF GLOBALIZATION PRIOR TO 2014. SO IF THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN LACKEYS WERE SO COOPERATIVE TOWARD RUSSIA SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION, IT IS THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN LACKEYS WHICH WERE BETRAYED AND PROVOKED INTO WAR BY RUSSIA FIRST WITH A GROWINGLY HOSTILE RHETORIC AND THEN WITH AN ACTUAL ACT OF WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND, INDIRECTLY, ITS WESTERN ALLIES (BTW SHELL WE MAKE A COMPARISON WITH PUTIN’s MAXIMALIST WARMONGERING RHETORIC AND NUCLEAR THREATS AGAINST THE WEST, REALLY?), NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

I can get that there are honestly compelling reasons for Europeans to bring Russia on their side, for cynically exploiting its resources to benefit corrupt Russian oligarchs who then spend money in Europe and get European elites richer, and to defend christian societies from Islamic terrorism, immigration and the LGBTQ "perverts", and economically compete with the US or look less as US lackeys to non-Westerners: no matter how despotic its political leadership is, no matter how brutal is their repression of independence movements, no matter how exploited materially and intellectually its society is. And I can get that there are compelling reasons for honestly committed European pacifists and humanitarian advocates to radically question military interventions and their actors.
And, notice, even these reasons wouldn't suffice to me. I just would find them honestly compelling for Europeans (for sure, to many Europeans). And I can't dismiss this fact.
But, really, all this talking about provocations, broken promises, bad faith agreements, 15 years warnings about vital strategic interests, refused peace offers, Western warmongering bullshits (allegedly grounded on historical analysis and geopolitical realism) with such self-conceited moral indignation and intellectual self-entitlement is intellectually disgusting. I feel shame for you, really.

What I find bizarre is that you keep switching between different premises.

On the one hand, the geopolitical realities are supposed to be impersonal and irresistible forces. But when you have to explain why events don't conform to these forces, you suddenly invoke very personal and contingent reasons. European diplomats are incapable of even basic solutions. Unspecified actors are influenced by the US in unspecified ways. Europeans are "acting in bad faith" or are "ignoring realities". — Echarmion

I agree with this objection but it’s nothing new: Mearsheimer too can be easily accused of such bipolar attitude. On one side he claims to describe “geopolitical realities” when he talks about Russia’s behaviour, on the other he is all about condemning “geopolitical choices” which do not seem to match his “geopolitical theory” when he talks about US’s behaviour.

Tzeench's double standard reflects on his rhetorically conflicting claims such as:

A - “What the US or Europe want is hardly a factor in this. These are geopolitical realities - forces of nature, almost - that they cannot ignore (though admittedly, Europe has been a king at ignoring geopolitical realities).

B - “Where I diverge from these scholars is that they believe this to be a result of US incompetence, whereas I believe there is no way the US would pursue and double down on these policies for as long as they did, if they weren't getting exactly what they wanted”.

“there's no way the US would have provoked this conflict unless the Europeans were willing participants”.

A - “Europe in terms of its economic, intellectual and human potential is way too big for US to maintain its artificial status as suzerain. which is why Europe will simply break free from the US orbit once the US is forced to divert its attention elsewhere”.

“the US is seeking to prepare its pivot to Asia by leaving long-lasting conflict as its parting gift to Europe.”

B - “Even when the US pivots, it doesn't mean the US 'is gone’, and you're suggesting handing the US the biggest trump card it could hope for? Haha, what a 'sensible' strategy”.[/I]

The will and ignorance of the West is contrasted to the Russian geopolitical realities and forces of nature (…almost). The US is doomed to leave Europe, but not really.

Unfortunately, he himself can’t help but talking about the Putin’s “sensible” choices and intellectual failures in light of perceived “vital strategic interests”.

“the Russians after over a decade of warnings chose to use force to secure what they believed to be their vital strategic interests”

“Putin probably banked on the Europeans pursuing a sensible strategy. They didn’t”.


Double standard is still at play when Tzeench is lecturing people about history and propaganda.
While from the US history (”There are plenty of western scholars who voice these ideas, and it fits neatly in the historic behavioral pattern we see from the United States”) it should follow that “despite all the historical evidence, Europe seems chronically incapable to view the United States as a ruthless great power which follows realist logic” or “The only proper way to view its actions is through a lens of utter cynicism, which comes natural to a realist anyway”. An yet from “Ukraine and especially Crimea are of great geopolitical and historical importance to Russia and always have been”. doesn’t follow any claim about Russian cynicism or ruthless behaviour according to realist logic.
While Europeans are under the pernicious spell of the US propaganda machine, apparently Russian-spun propaganda in the West has no pernicious impact on the West worth mentioning. Putin’s claims are cherrypicked to support a defensive, minimalist, unequivocal, and self-contained understanding of Russian posture and war goals (what about Ukrainian denazification? What about demilitarising Ukraine? What about the denial of Ukrainian national identity as opposed to Russia? What about nuclear threats and escalatory rhetoric made him and his lackeys like Lavrov and Medvedev?), while European claims get shamelessly misreported to make them look as confessing their warmongering oompah loompahs proclivity.


Notice also how much his arguments need to rely on painstakingly mystificatory and question-begging expressions like “geopolitical realities”, “forces of nature, almost”, “vital strategic interests”, “the realist framework that says cooperation cannot happen when it is rational to cooperate” which he is rather reluctant to elaborate, especially on how they would apply to all relevant actors beyond Russia, including the US, Ukraine, European countries.

Take the example of the role played by the Black Sea Fleet as part of Russia’s “vital strategic interests”.
First of all the Black Sea Fleat is gone from Crimea despite the annexation (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-retreat-from-crimea-makes-a-mockery-of-the-wests-escalation-fears/). So there is no vital link between Black Sea Fleat and Crimea, and so far this is an unquestionable success by the totally disastrously Ukrainian losers. This was in defence of Ukrainian vital strategic interests as the Ukrainian economy still heavily relies on its wheat exports (https://www.cfr.org/article/how-ukraine-overcame-russias-grain-blockade).
Second, what is the purpose of the Black Sea Fleat really? Sure it CAN be used to DEFEND Russia proper from NATO hostile activities (if there are any), absolutely true. What however is also absolutely true is that the Black Sea Fleat is ACTUALLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY used for hegemonic power projection i.e. to undermine Ukraine’s exports, to keep control over the Caucasus regions, to support friend-countries in the Middle East, to expand presence and control over North African countries or in the Balkans, and sea routes in the Mediterranean. These are the kind of “geopolitical realities” has to take into account when reasoning over the alleged “vital strategic interests” of Russia, and margins of economic cooperation with Russia.

There are posts here (in the thread I mean) that are illegal·outlawed·dangerous in Putin's Russia. No invasion of Russia, like the one of Ukraine, has taken place, nor have such threats been issued.

I don't recall any posts here that are illegal in the Kremlin's assumed adversary countries (but it is 2 or 3 or so continents). German laws against Nazism came to mind, which might be the closest, but not applicable here. Ukraine is in a precarious situation at the moment, which works as a temporary excuse.

That at least should give some indication of what's going on (plus bits and pieces of related past).

^{• United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 (2014)
• Legality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine}

I agree with this objection but it’s nothing new: Mearsheimer too can be easily accused of such bipolar attitude. On one side he claims to describe “geopolitical realities” when he talks about Russia’s behaviour, on the other he is all about condemning “geopolitical choices” which do not seem to match his “geopolitical theory” when he talks about US’s behaviour. — neomac

What I find interesting is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was such an unusual event that even Mearsheimer's take on geopolitics - which due to being offensive should have been better able to account for it - struggles with the consequences.

Maybe that's an argument to be sceptical about such grand narratives in general, but then again I already am sceptical about them so this might just be confirmation bias on my part.

Anyways I find it pretty interesting that Mearsheimer now claims that the invasion was essentially fake, in that it's main objective was to somehow induce a negotiation rather than a military victory. I think this idea is pretty obviously wrong for a number of reasons, but I still find it interesting to speculate why Mearsheimer is proposing it in the first place.

I have an intuition that it's an attempt to somehow create a plausible motivation for the invasion that fits the notion of "abstract geopolitical forces". While plenty can be said about Russia's strategic interests in Ukraine, it's much harder to explain how these interests are supposedly served by the invasion. About the only clear advantage would be direct control of land and natural resources, but that doesn't seem like a good motivation given the extremely high risks. So we're forced to either conclude that Russia's geopolitical interests alone do not explain the decision (which is my view) or we must invent reinterpret the decision as something other than a committment to full scale total war.

What I find interesting is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was such an unusual event that even Mearsheimer's take on geopolitics - which due to being offensive should have been better able to account for it - struggles with the consequences. — Echarmion

Which planet are you living on? History is filled with invasions.

The only thing that's unusual in terms of the last few decades it's not the US and co. doing the invading.

So already you start with complete delusion.

Then you go deeper into your delusional fantasy that Mearsheimer somehow struggles to account for the invasion. Russia invading Ukraine is what Mearsheimer has been predicting since the fall of the Soviet Union (going so far as to argue Ukraine should not give up its nuclear weapons) and especially in response to NATO expansion.

That a state will attack another state on its border forming alliances with hostile other states is exactly what you'd expect in the offensive realism point of view.

Anyways I find it pretty interesting that Mearsheimer now claims that the invasion was essentially fake, in that it's main objective was to somehow induce a negotiation rather than a military victory. I think this idea is pretty obviously wrong for a number of reasons, but I still find it interesting to speculate why Mearsheimer is proposing it in the first place. — Echarmion

More total delusions.

Nearly all wars end in a negotiated settlement. It's pretty rare for people to fight to the last person.

The idea Russia attempted and failed to conquer all of Ukraine in 3 days was a Western talking point, made up first by propagandists and then promulgated by delusional sycophants such as yourself, in order to portray Ukrainian losing 20% of its territory in about a week as some sort of victory.

In normal military terms, losing 20% of your territory in a week is called a major defeat.

The reality was that the start of the war was a big debacle for Ukraine. Ukraine offered zero resistance to Russian troops crossing a series of bridges from Crimea to the mainland and could not strike a 70km convey sitting on a highway with anything.

However, in order to sell both Ukrainians and the West on repudiating any negotiations to end the war, it was necessary to portray losing as somehow winning and that Ukraine could simply continue to fight until victory.

If the reality was acknowledged that Ukraine had just lost 20% of its territory in a week and had essentially no chance of recovering that territory with force (having a significant disadvantage in artillery, armour, air power and electronic warfare), then trying to negotiate an end to the conflict makes a lot more sense than the prospect of near total economic collapse, losing hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and causing a mass emigration which would reverse less and less the more the war drags on.

The narrative that Russia tried and failed to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine was invented simply to make some sort of standard by which Russia conquering and occupying a further 20% of Ukraine was somehow a failure.

That Russia committed roughly 200 000 troops instead of the +2 000 000 troops that would be needed to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine, is Mearsheimer (and plenty other analysts) main evidence that Russia was not trying to conquer all of Ukraine.

I have an intuition that it's an attempt to somehow create a plausible motivation for the invasion that fits the notion of "abstract geopolitical forces". — Echarmion

Well, your intuition is stupid.

The motivation of Russia to invade a state trying to form deeper and deeper military cooperation with states hostile to Russia, literally publishing giant tomes with titles like "Overextending and Unbalancing Russia", referring to Russians as "rivals" when being polite and simply enemies when "straight talking", labelling the Russian leader as literally Hitler, and so on, is a pretty obvious and common sense motivation.

In addition, there was the civil war in the Donbas where Russian speakers were being shelled by literal Nazis, which created significant domestic pressure to intervene to defend those populations.

Not only common sense motivations, but motivations that the US uses all the time to justify its own military actions: we need to bomb so-and-so because they are part of the "the axis of Evil" at worst or some sort of domino of bad at best, and / or we need to bomb so-and-so as a humanitarian mission to protect civilians.

So we're forced to either conclude that Russia's geopolitical interests alone do not explain the decision (which is my view) or we must invent reinterpret the decision as something other than a committment to full scale total war. — Echarmion

We are in no way forced to accept your two options.

Just like the US responded aggressively to the Soviet Union deepening military cooperation with Cuba beyond a tolerable threshold, it is completely adequate an explanation that Russia likewise would and has responded aggressively to the US deepening military cooperation beyond some tolerable threshold in Ukraine (in addition to the killing of Russian speakers in the Donbas for years).

Russia invading Ukraine is what Mearsheimer has been predicting since the fall of the Soviet Union — boethius

As far as I know, Mearsheimer never made any definite prediction that Russia would invade Ukraine. Notably he has not made any prediction on the 2022 invasion before it happened.

That a state will attack another state on its border forming alliances with hostile other states is exactly what you'd expect in the offensive realism point of view. — boethius

What you'd expect is that a state exploits the weakness of neighbours to gain (local) hegemony. Arguably Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine fits that bill. The problem with the 2022 invasion is that there was a huge and obvious risk it would weaken Russia's position instead.

The narrative that Russia tried and failed to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine was invented simply to make some sort of standard by which Russia conquering and occupying a further 20% of Ukraine was somehow a failure. — boethius

By which metric (except access to resources in eastern Ukraine, which I have mentioned) has Russia's geopolitical position improved as a result of the 2022 invasion?

Just like the US responded aggressively to the Soviet Union deepening military cooperation with Cuba beyond a tolerable threshold, it is completely adequate an explanation that Russia likewise would and has responded aggressively to the US deepening military cooperation beyond some tolerable threshold in Ukraine (in addition to the killing of Russian speakers in the Donbas for years). — boethius

Except that the US reaction did not in fact lead to a war. A comparable decision would be the US directly invading Cuba, but that is not what happened. Instead the US responded with an aggressive but calculated move that forced the ball back to the Soviet leadership who would then have been forced to escalate the conflict into open warfare.

It's exactly that difference between a calculated move to foil an opponent and a commitment to a total war without a clear exit strategy that makes Russia's 2022 invasion unusual.

You don’t seem to follow through your own reasoning here. Indeed, what is true for Russia, it is true for the US and Ukraine too: regardless of what you think about the US and Ukraine, “countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns.” — neomac

This is in no way the case.

The US has no legitimate security concerns in Ukraine. You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.

If Russia went and built up forces hostile to the US in Mexico, obviously the US would respond to that.

As for Ukraine, when you are a weaker nation beside a much stronger nation, your security is not served by forming military cooperation with another major power thousands of kilometres away that (precisely because you are of no relevance to their actual security) is not going to actually send any armies to come defend you if you get invaded due to becoming hostile to your more powerful neighbor.

For example, Mexico's security is not served by becoming a vassal to Russia to get a supply of arms to then lose a war to the United States.

A smaller state's security is served through a combination of defensive deterrence and diplomacy, without being a threat. Canada and Mexico coexist with the far more powerful United States because they don't threaten the US.

What is obvious common sense when applied to US neighbours does not change in the slightest when applied to Russian neighbours.

When you're a smaller state your legitimate security concern is to avoid being invaded by more powerful states.

As I've explained numerous times, rights are insufficient to determine justification.

Russia has both a right and can actually justify preemptive military action against a smaller state: because it is likely to win. A smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win.

That "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" is not a justification for trying to do so if the likely result is being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians.

If Ukraine's "rights" actually were sufficient justification, then the West would have all their militaries in Ukraine right now, but they don't because tying rights to justifications is a fallacy. What are the consequences of doing this or that also matter in forming a justification for actions. The West doesn't like the consequences of actually sending our armies to defend "Ukrainian rights" so we don't consider it justified on that account, and so we don't do it.

A logic that, super ironically, the US just used to try to argue that Iran shouldn't retaliate against Israel for assassinating a foreign leader hosted (and thus under the protection) of Iran because, sure Iran has a right retaliate and any Western nation would do the same without hesitation ... but ... consequences, consequences!!

A logic that is sound and equally applicable to Ukraine, just isn't because Ukrainians serving US administration interests to die to harm Russia is fine by the US administration.

In the case of Iran, we'll see soon enough if the logic is not only sound but also actually true that Iran cannot retaliate against Israel without unacceptable consequences.

In the case of Ukraine we have already seen what the consequences are to evaluate whether it was "worth it" to pursue a particular right.

As far as I know, Mearsheimer never made any definite prediction that Russia would invade Ukraine. Notably he has not made any prediction on the 2022 invasion before it happened. — Echarmion

Mearsheimer literally wrote an article titled "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent" in 1993 and has predicted since Eastward NATO expansion started that continuing to do so will result in Russia invading Ukraine, which has happened.

Mearsheimer did not predict the exact timing which is not what we expect from a theory of international relations, same way we don't expect an economic theory, much less the economists who develop such theories, to predict exact days bubbles burst.

You are trying to argue that somehow the Russian invasion of Ukraine cannot be accounted for in Mearsheimer's world view of offensive realism, "struggles with the consequences" is the words you use, which is simply a laughably stupid point to make.

To move the goalposts to Mearsheimer did not predict the exact timing of exactly when Russia would invade Ukraine is simply a weak and deluded mind defending its very much unreal view of the world.

What you'd expect is that a state exploits the weakness of neighbours to gain (local) hegemony. Arguably Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine fits that bill. The problem with the 2022 invasion is that there was a huge and obvious risk it would weaken Russia's position instead. — Echarmion

First, Mearsheimer puts significant effort in his theorizing to account for miscalculations. Indeed, it is a central theme of offensive realism that the distrust between states easily induces paranoia and miscommunication easily leading to miscalculation. So, even if what you said was true, that Russia is weakened by the invasion of Ukraine, that isn't unusual in the slightest in an offensive realism analysis. It can, and often is, argued that US was to be weakened by its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and those invasions and / or subsequent management of the occupations was a miscalculation. Likewise, it can and has been argued that the Israeli genocide in Gaza ultimately weakens its position and is a miscalculation. Offensive realism is first mostly a theory of the prevailing criteria and motivations of state actors in making decisions, i.e. what states tend to try to accomplish (self preservation), and second a theory about how those decisions processes succeed or fail (in seeking regional hegemony, Sadam may have miscalculated for example), and third a theory of the inherent instability of the nation state system (as, by definition, a system of violent competition has winners and losers).

Second, it is very much debatable whether Russia has been weakened or strengthened by the war in military, economic and political terms.

Obviously Russia has paid a cost, but paying a cost for something does not somehow inherently reduce one's position. Obviously, in order to evaluate things both the costs and benefits must be taken into account.

For example, if Ukraine was on an inevitable pathway of a military conflict with Russia, then even if the war is costly it is presumably less costly than a later war with a more powerful Ukraine. Sometimes costs cannot be avoided in which case paying the least price is best option.

Even if Russia has been weakened by the war, it's entirely possible that the end result is a far weaker Ukraine and therefore Russia vastly increasing its relative power to Ukraine. Obviously if we fight and I break my hand, I'm weaker, but if in the process you become entirely paralyzed I have increased my relative strength over you. This maybe nevertheless a mistake on my part if I have other foes to fight and can't prevail with a broken hand, but in the case of Russia there are only a limited list of candidates for further conflict.

So, even if we accept the premise Russia is weaker that is not sufficient to conclude it is weaker in relative terms over the parties that matter.

Then there is the argument that Russia has increased its power by increasing and refining its war machine, creating an essentially independent economic system (i.e. an alternative to dealing with the West), and, in the eyes of much of the world, it is Russia that is "standing up" to US Imperialism and Ukraine a hapless vassal state, and not Ukraine standing up to Russian imperialism.

By which metric (except access to resources in eastern Ukraine, which I have mentioned) has Russia's geopolitical position improved as a result of the 2022 invasion? — Echarmion

As mentioned above, there is increasing in relative power vis-a-vis Ukraine, increasing and refining its war machine, creating an economic system independent of the West and "standing up" to the US.

The narrative fed by Western states it that Russia didn't "win hard enough" and therefore is somehow losing, but the reality is that Russia has defeated Western intelligence and weapons systems as well as defeated Western sanctions. Russia has essentially created both a model, example and system of breaking with the West: intelligence that can deal with Western intelligence, weapons that deal with Western weapons, and an economic system that can deal without Western integration.

In terms of great power conflict with the US, this is the most significant end result of the war.

Except that the US reaction did not in fact lead to a war. A comparable decision would be the US directly invading Cuba, but that is not what happened. Instead the US responded with an aggressive but calculated move that forced the ball back to the Soviet leadership who would then have been forced to escalate the conflict into open warfare. — Echarmion

A blockade is an act of war. Had the Soviets repudiated negotiations because "Cuban rights" then both Cuba and the Soviet Union would be entirely within their right in international law to break the US blockade with force. Fortunately, Soviets viewed the likely end result of defending "Cuban rights" as a nuclear war and so preferred a settlement.

The US blockade was just as much an act of war as Russia invading Ukraine by land, only difference is that the nature of the sea is that a blockade can first result in a standoff.

And, obviously, the US did try to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs fiasco precisely to avoid a situation where the Soviets are bringing in nuclear weapons to Cuba in response to US placing nuclear weapons in Turkey.

The point is, obviously you easily understand why the Russians would get aggressive in response to Ukraine trying to form a close military alliance with a hostile great power, and you're argument is simply that the Russians miscalculated in their choice of aggressive action. Had Russia only blockaded Ukrainians ports, it seems you'd be in total support of that.

Now, whether the war is ultimately good or bad for Russia as a regional hegemon in conflict with the United States is very much debatable, but what betrays your role as a propagandist in this discussion is that you have zero concern whatsoever for Ukrainian wellbeing. Your only concern is with arguing US good and strong and Russia bad and weak, you not arguing that somehow Ukraine is better off by the war. You console yourself that Russia must be slightly worse off vis-a-vis great power competition with the United States, while completely ignoring that Ukraine is getting completely wrecked in this war.

If the war is a mistake for Russia because it's not gaining in international power ... well what is Ukraine gaining in the war? Has Ukraine's power and wealth increased?

Mearsheimer literally wrote an article titled "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent" in 1993 and has predicted since Eastward NATO expansion started that continuing to do so will result in Russia invading Ukraine, which has happened. — boethius

You're welcome to provide this prediction but again so far as I know Mearsheimer has never said anything as specific as "if NATO keeps expanding eastward Russia will eventually invade Ukraine". What he has said is that Russia would react, potentially with military force.

The US blockade was just as much an act of war as Russia invading Ukraine by land, only difference is that the nature of the sea is that a blockade can first result in a standoff. — boethius

Nothing in this contradicts anything I said.

And, obviously, the US did try to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs fiasco precisely to avoid a situation where the Soviets are bringing in nuclear weapons to Cuba in response to US placing nuclear weapons in Turkey. — boethius

And this failed, which is an argument against this being a good strategy.

The point is, obviously you easily understand why the Russians would get aggressive in response to Ukraine trying to form a close military alliance with a hostile great power, and you're argument is simply that the Russians miscalculated in their choice of aggressive action. Had Russia only blockaded Ukrainians ports, it seems you'd be in total support of that. — boethius

I would consider that move a lot more strategically sound, yes.

If the war is a mistake for Russia because it's not gaining in international power ... well what is Ukraine gaining in the war? Has Ukraine's power and wealth increased? — boethius

If the war is a mistake for Russia then we at least agree that it's not sufficiently explained by Russia's strategic interests in Ukraine.

@boethius, given their anti-NATO stories — those they want everyone to hear (and propagate) — what plans exactly is it you think the Kremlin has going for Donbas?
Use it as a mined buffer zone to keep the barbarians at bay? Give Donbas independence? Make it into a new iron curtain?
Well, no, they're trying to gobble Donbas up, switch flags entirely, call it their own, expand Russia, and have employed shamming (and :fire: more) to do so.
And, as explained a few times, that does nothing to fix their supposed NATO-phobia.
They already had a border, call it Ukraine's "red line".
So, do you think they did/didn't (do/don't) know that? (I'll just start out with the simplest coherent explanation.)

Well, no, they're trying to gobble Donbas up, switch flags entirely, call it their own, expand Russia, and have employed shamming (and :fire: more) to do so. — jorndoe

The terms of the Istanbul Communiqué did not include any territorial gains for Russia - not even Crimea.

Both the Ukrainian and the Russian negotiating teams signed this document.

The West blocked those agreements.


The "imperialist expansion" narrative lost all foundation literally a month into the war. Why are you still parroting it several years later? Repeating a lie in the hopes it may one day become the truth?

The terms of the Istanbul Communiqué did not include any territorial gains for Russia - not even Crimea. — Tzeentch

Because the agreement explicitly deferred these questions to a later date, supposedly to be resolved in direct talks between Putin and Zelensky.

The fact that it relegated the most difficult question (that of territorial concessions) to a later, completely undefined, process was one reason to be sceptical about the agreement.

The insinuation that the document indicated a russian willingness to forego territorial gains completely is unsubstantiated.

You're welcome to provide this prediction but again so far as I know Mearsheimer has never said anything as specific as "if NATO keeps expanding eastward Russia will eventually invade Ukraine". What he has said is that Russia would react, potentially with military force. — Echarmion

Which is exactly what Russia has done.

I hope you do realize how stupid you sound, and the fact that your moving the goalposts from Mearsheimer can't make any sense of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to ...

What he has said is that Russia would react, potentially with military force. — Echarmion

Creates the reality that you cannot be taken seriously and are simply a bad faith propagadists.

Nothing in this contradicts anything I said. — Echarmion

Yes, obviously it does.

What you stated was:

A comparable decision would be the US directly invading Cuba, but that is not what happened. — Echarmion

An act of war at sea is completely comparable to an act of war on land and considering Cuba is very much an island in the sea one would very much expect acts of war to commence in said sea.

And this failed, which is an argument against this being a good strategy. — Echarmion

The basic issue of contention here is your claim that somehow Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be made sense of, at least not in the realist point of view. So let's just note in passing that you can easily make sense of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

So obviously that part of the discussion is resolved, you can easily make sense of Russias invasion of Ukraine and your only actual issue is that Russia responded with the wrong act of war.

As for it being a good strategy or not, obviously time will tell.

The insinuation that the document indicated a russian willingness to forego territorial gains completely is unsubstantiated. — Echarmion

The Istanbul Communiqué is a strong piece of evidence that points in that direction, so obviously it is not 'unsubstantiated'.

Whether you find it convincing or not is a whole other matter, and one that I frankly don't care about.

Your goal here seems to be to bicker over minutiae.

If you are even unwilling to give credit to people like Mearsheimer for accurately analysing this conflict over the course of a decade, you're obviously not interested in an honest discussion.

The basic issue of contention here is your claim that somehow Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be made sense of, at least not in the realist point of view. So let's just note in passing that you can easily make sense of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

So obviously that part of the discussion is resolved, you can easily make sense of Russias invasion of Ukraine and your only actual issue is that Russia responded with the wrong act of war. — boethius

You're talking about "acts of war" as an abstraction, whereas I am looking at the invasion that actually happened in its concrete form.

My argument is that there's no good way to explain the invasion that happened within a realist geopolitical framework. It doesn't follow that there's no good explanation for any act of war, however we might define that.

If you want to divide the decision into "do we act?" and "how do we act?", then my issue is with the second part of the decision.

The Istanbul Communiqué is a strong piece of evidence that points in that direction, so obviously it is not 'unsubstantiated'. — Tzeentch

It's unsubstantiated insofar as it relies entirely on what you guess the russian intentions were.

To say the document is "strong evidence" is to say that in a world where Russia did intend to make territorial demands, we would not see a deferral of the question. But the deferral is equally compatible with a world where such demands are made.

It's unsubstantiated insofar as it relies entirely on what you guess the russian intentions were. — Echarmion

In what world is a draft peace agreement "just guessing"? :lol:

Your compass about what constitutes evidence seems all over the place.

In what world is a draft peace agreement "just guessing"? :lol: — Tzeentch

It was a ceasefire proposal not a "draft peace agreement".

No, it wasn't. It was a draft peace treaty. But here you go again, bickering over minutiae because clearly you've got nothing better.

Look kiddo, this is a philosophy forum and people here make a sport out of trying to 'win arguments', and that's what you're doing, and it's worth no one's time. You're even wasting your own.

No, it wasn't. It was a draft peace treaty. But here you go again, bickering over minutiae because clearly you've got nothing better.

Look kiddo, this is a philosophy forum and people here make a sport out of trying to 'win arguments', and that's what you're doing, and it's worth no one's time. You're even wasting your own. — Tzeentch

I'm not trying to win an argument, I'm pointing out false and misleading statements.

A peace treaty is a treaty that, if signed, ends the conflict. That's not what the Istanbul communiqué was. This is not bickering, this is you making an obviously false claim. Obviously false because as you know, the question of the further borders of Ukraine, which would be an essential part of a peace treaty, was not resolved.

A peace treaty is a treaty that, if signed, ends the conflict. — Echarmion

A peace treaty ends the war, ergo the "armed" conflict - which is obviously what it was meant to do.

I'm pointing out false and misleading statements. — Echarmion

Why not start with your own? :lol:


But sure - you can pretend to yourself that the Istanbul Communiqué was a ceasefire or whatever - then you can pretend that you 'won the argument', which apparently isn't what you're trying to do. (lol)

On the list of clowns you go.