ristotle text is just drawing out what we already know about the virtuous man — Leontiskos

This has a lot of unjustified assumptions.. such as, why should virtuous men matter? If you say that because the know how to live a "good life", AN always knows that starting a life for someone else means you have a project for them to follow. But here belies an actual UNVIRTUOUS thing- the forcing of someone else into the burdens of life to live out the project of X (the virtuous man!.. cue marble statue staring into the horizon clutching robe!!). It reeks of an aggressive paternalism and assumption (for someone else), that their negative rights should be violated (and that is indeed part of the debate, is it a violation), because you think "someone living out a virtuous life" is okay to go head and be aggressively paternalistic to allow for a deontological violation to take place.

The Lord of the Rings, obviously, an author and work who would be against my philosophy or antinatalism, however, does have themes that I am getting at. The Ring itself can represent the controlling nature of humans- the ability to want to control people, destiny, the world. Wanting to see X thing from another person, even if it means burdening them is perhaps one of these unconscious factors that we hold. The Ring seems to be a good idea.. it seems to have the answers, but in fact, it is simply the human desire to control things, to see their projects carried out by way of using other people, even their sufferings to make this happen. '

You will claim "NO! LOTR was talking about unrestrained control- like Sauron wanting to enslave everyone!". But there is indeed where the debate lies. "Does procreation represent an aggressive paternalism.. does this too go too far in how we want to control people, even violate ethical principles, to see our project carried out?". And I get the impulse to defend it.. It's the very basis for which our whole society has operated. But perhaps it isn't as unassailable as you might think. And for millennium, as long as there has been societies that had the abilities to reason beyond the tribal unit, there have been lifestyles of ascetics who eschewed the worldly projects. I am not necessarily advocating that, however, but just showing that this difference in notions of established familial traditions exist.

In fact I was recently at my cousin's wedding, and the food at our table was extremely late, arriving about 90 minutes after dinner was supposed to begin. At about 30 minutes into the dinner my nephew received his kid's meal: chicken strips, mac and cheese, and cauliflower. Everyone was gratified to see that at least someone had received their meal, and it looked to be the ideal meal for a hungry toddler. But to everyone's surprise he lost his shit and had a complete meltdown. This caused the whole table to erupt in laughter and festivity. We later learned that his mother had been misinforming him for weeks that the wedding would be wonderful and he would have a delicious meal of chicken strips and French fries - oops! I don't know that he even prefers French fries to mac and cheese, but the expectation threw him. It was a teaching moment for him where he learned that life is bigger than his misplaced French fries, and in time he will learn that life is bigger than many other disappointments, too. As Eichendorff said, "Thou art He who gently breaks about our heads what we build, so that we can see the sky—therefore I have no complaint." (The irony here is that children solve the problem of antinatalism, for it is hard to believe that anyone with the task of parenting a child could subscribe to antinatalism.)

It seems that all the opposed are agreed that antinatalism will not be cured by more of the overly serious, self-centered gravity of analytical argument. Such is not its cause and such is not its cure. What the antinatalist lacks is the subtle virtuous demeanor that Aristotle attempts to paint, and such a thing cannot be bought and sold with mere arguments. The cure for the ridiculousness of antinatalism is laughter, for like the child on the parent's lap we cannot help but laugh at the prognosis. You need only join in and we will be laughing with you and not at you. :wink: — Leontiskos

Far be it from me to begrudge anyone laughter. But as I indicated with the Lord of the Rings analogy above, there is a bit of a weird aggressive paternalism in the notion that you need to teach someone, and see your project carried out... I have wants and desires, but do I have the right to unnecessarily and non-consentingly burden you with them? Well, no I don't have that right. But somehow a blind eye is seen in the case of procreation because of the romantic notions of learning and virtue of the philosophies you describe here. Don't get me wrong, go have fun.. don't be a dour asshole to your children, but my point is perhaps we may even question the impetus for control and wanting to see projects carried out from others, rather than assume that this is what is right. The doting grandfather laughing at his grandchildren in merriment as they work through the small problems of life gradually being raised to become productive members of society, etc. But what of this? I question this project, its motives, and what we are wanting from other people.

I don't vociferously disagree with it actually. Depending on how "it" is presented. E.g. If someone said to me, "I don't want to have children because the world is a dangerous and corrupted place and I don't want them to suffer", I'd say "makes sense". But as we discussed before, you were creating literally dozens of threads on the same theme, and it is a niche topic, hence this is the solution. — Baden

I get that, but how does one differentiate between all the threads of argument dealing with the subject?

That difficulty is the trade-off. 58 pages of continued effort to discuss the issue suggest, that while the context is not ideal, the results have not been fruitless.

only you know if there is anyway to close the rifts in your own family. — universeness

Aging can help. I should leave each individual in my family a personal letter they can read when I die and hopefully keep to read again when they are old and enter the purgatory of old age. That time when our lives are behind us and all that is left is the memories and a need to make peace with our lives.

I appreciate my grandmother so much more today than when I was young and rushed away from home to have my own life. I kept in touch with family but lived far from family.

I get that, but how does one differentiate between all the threads of argument dealing with the subject? — schopenhauer1

Loose one's memory, then each time is the first time and new things can be discovered. I just called old age purgatory but I am also enjoying, thinking, and rethinking things and noticing changes and new awareness. What really matters is if am enjoying the moment.

New people are constantly coming into the arguments and really can't we treat each day as a new day? It really sucks to be enjoying a thread and then reading the subject has already been covered and a grumpy demand that the discussion end. If someone doesn't want to cover the subject again, just stay out of the discussion but there is no reason to ruin everyone else's fun. Especially not a newcomer's first-time experience of the subject. We can not be a part of the past discussions, only the present ones.

Anti-life discussions (personal or otherwise) will be merged below. Please join this discussion rather than starting any new threads on this theme. — Baden

That really bites! I usually avoid threads that are too long. I really don't care what all the important people here have to say about anything. If I want to participate in a discussion of something, I want that to be my experience, not your only spoken thoughts. My thoughts and your reaction to them is what makes being here fun. If all I want is knowledge, I will buy a book that is highly recommended and read that. I do not come to forums and look for subjects to read that were closed discussions 5 years ago. If any of you have written books I should read, let me know.

I do wish there was a middle ground whereby the AN topic can be cogently discussed in separate threads without "cluttering" the main forum. The only other way would be to banish it to The Lounge, but then that doesn't show up on the main feed, so I'm opposed to that too. I also think, as loathsome as it might be to some sensibilities, it is squarely philosophical (generally in the realm of ethics), and should be discussed robustly and openly in the main forum.

So this is why we shouldn't debate Benatar's full position here without actually having Benatar's full positions available to us. — schopenhauer1

Whenever we are considering a position on TPF we are considering a determinate and static position. Thus "Benatar's position" within our conversation denotes the argument you attributed to Benatar early in our conversation (link). You used a Wikipedia article and a personal gloss to represent the argument. That is what I am referring to.

Now it seems that you recognize that his argument cannot meet my objection, and the logical thing for you to do is to say, "Okay, I see the problem. I will have to get back to you on this. Maybe I will look at my Benatar books and see if he has anything to say to this."

It is not a legitimate move to say, "No, that objection doesn't count because you haven't read his book(s) on the topic." If we had to read a book on TPF every time we made an argument there would only be a few posts each week. You presented a version of Benatar's argument, I responded to it, and now the onus is on you to respond in your own words. Take your time and review Benatar's books if you like, but don't say that my objection is null because I haven't read a book. Besides, the first you've spoken about his books addressing this objection was yesterday.

Take your time and review Benatar's books if you like, but don't say that my objection is null because I haven't read a book. Besides, the first you've spoken about his books addressing this objection was yesterday. — Leontiskos

No bro, you haven't answered my objections and we seem to be at an impasse, as I have answered you about the stabbing that reanimates. That's my answer to it if we are talking about the "statistical approximation of Benatar" and not Benatar himself.

Also to add, yet again, when I mentioned Benatar, it was to bring up AN (not THE ONE AND ONLY) asymmetry that I then elucidated on, as my take on it. It wasn't to introduce Benatar simpliciter.

as I have answered you about the stabbing that reanimates — schopenhauer1

No you haven't. You haven't answered <the most recent post> on the so-called "stabbing counterargument." You just pointed to Benatar's book hopefully without engaging any of the points.

Also to add, yet again, when I mentioned Benatar, [...] It wasn't to introduce Benatar simpliciter. — schopenhauer1

Well it sounds like you were not talking about Benatar simpliciter and I was not talking about Benatar simpliciter. So we can stop talking about Benatar simpliciter and instead talk about the determinate and static argument that we have associated with him.

Why should I believe 3a or 4a?

The other problem here is that most 2a's presuppose the falsity of 1a, whereas 2 does not presuppose the falsity of 1. Or in other words, Benatar's argument contains no implicit logical clause, "...Unless the world is situated such that happiness far outweighs suffering for all." That's the very problem with his argument that is being highlighted.

Contrariwise, prohibitions against stabbing are premised on pain, injury, and mortality, and therefore the sort of world you suggest logically invalidates the prohibitions (and hence 3a). This is completely different from Benatar's argument, for the case I gave clearly does not invalidate his prohibition. That's why, in a fit of honesty, you told me that the question may need to be reconsidered in light of such new circumstances. So if you want to pull your head out of the sand you will answer the question: What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos

So I said way back that a world where pain was ONLY comprised of a pinprick is NOT OUR WORLD. That is an interesting one, but not this one. I present to you this world is the following, as taken from my profile:

Life has necessary and contingent suffering. Necessary suffering is often considered "Eastern", similar to how Buddhism defines it. That is to say it is a general dissatisfaction stemming from a general lack in what is present. Relief is temporary and unstable. If life was fully positive without this lack, it would be satisfactory without any needs or wants.

Contingent harms are the classic ones people think of. It is the physical harms, the emotional anguish, the annoyances great and small. It is the pandemics, the disasters, the daily grind of a tedious work day. It is the hunger we feel, and the pain of a stubbed toe. It is any negative harm. It is contingent as it is contextual in time/place, and situation. It is based on historical trajectories and situatedness. It is based on the "throwness" (in Existentialism terminology). It varies in individuals in varying amounts and intensity, but happens to everyone nonetheless.

With that being said, does Pinprick World have the necessary suffering in it? Is it the case that ALL contingent harms are reduced to a single pinprick at one instance in time? If so, none of that resembles the NATURE OF SUFFERING as it pertains to this world. Thus, how am I going to compare morality when it is centers on suffering in such a world where suffering is so redefined and the realities of the situation thus so radically different? This world would have no suffering due to feelings of dissatisfaction, lack, boredom. It would have no force social situations like doing tasks and work one would rather not do, or come into contact with anything negative whatsoever. How can I speak to such a world without all that is the reality of the situation when suffering is so redefined into one instance of a pinprick and nothing else?

If so, none of that resembles the NATURE OF SUFFERING as it pertains to this world. — schopenhauer1

So you have at last provided a shadow of a counter-argument. You are effectively claiming that an equivocation is occurring such that the "pinprick of pain" in premise (1) is an equivocation on the suffering in Benatar's (2). Your argument requires that the pinprick of pain is not a legitimate instance of Benatar's "presence of pain" or the "suffering" that you say one is morally obligated to prevent. You are saying, "Ah, but that pinprick isn't the sort of suffering that Benatar and I think need be prevented." Thus you deny that premises (1) and (2) imply conclusion (3).

Congratulations on finally making a counterargument, though I'm not sure it is a very good one. It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed.

---

For reference:

1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate — Leontiskos

which sorts of suffering need to be prevented — Leontiskos

I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have (and honestly, the one whcih is usually attempted cross-positionally). The type though doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thrad) between suffering and other considerations. The position is that suffering always wins out

I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have — AmadeusD

I can't remember who I have all spoken to about antinatalism on this forum (and therefore who has shaped my understanding of it), but I can say that schopenhauer1 has been my primary interlocutor, and that I have not seen him engaging in this discussion of balancing suffering with other considerations. Perhaps there are different approaches than his.

it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thread) between suffering and other considerations — AmadeusD

Because I see @apokrisis' objections as apt I see it as inevitable that questions of balance must emerge.

The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD

The position of antinatalism? If the position of antinatalism is that suffering always wins out then how could there ever be a balance between suffering and other considerations?

Congratulations on finally making a counterargument, though I'm not sure it is a very good one. It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

I can make another argument along the lines of @AmadeusD':

The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD

That is to say, what is the asymmetry about? It's about the following:

3. the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
4. the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

That is to say, the thrust of the argument is the obligations we have towards adding happiness to the world versus adding suffering/harm/pain into the world in the case of non-existent but potential people (that is someone who could exist if X, Y, Z actions are taken). The antinatalist will always say that in the case of future people, we have no obligation to add happiness for them, but ALL the obligation to prevent the harm.

Thus, I generally make sure to qualify the notion that "One should not cause unnecessary suffering unto another if it can be prevented. Why do I add "unnecessary"? Because a "potential future person" (one in consideration of whether it should exist or not), would suffer without any need for this to happen to them. At least in the case of the "procreational decision", we are in a unique vantage point, where we can prevent ANY suffering for another person, by simply not doing something, full stop. After someone is already born into the world, then we must play the game of "mitigation ethics" whereby we now start dealing not in digital but analog whereby we cannot avoid suffering, and in some cases it might be incumbent to cause it to prevent greater harm (e.g. raising children, education, inoculations, all sorts of learning experiences and enculturation). But the idea that one should cause suffering SUCH THAT we can THEN LATER MITIGATE IT (i.e. favoring OUR positive projects over SOMEONE ELSE'S negative ethics), is what is the violation going on here.

Edit: Added bold statement. That was important.

The antinatalist will always say that in the case of future people, we have no obligation to add happiness for them, but ALL the obligation to prevent the harm. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and because of this the "balancing suffering with other considerations" evaporates into thin air and you are placed into the same quandary where you began. If the pinprick is acceptable for posterity in the pinprick world then it cannot be true that one has "all the obligation to prevent the (future) harm," for if one had "all the obligation" in this sense then there could be no balance between suffering and other considerations for posterity.

I think you're overlooking the simple fact that premise (1) was already about posterity. If mitigation and balancing considerations can only be applied to the current generation and not to posterity, then Benatar's argument succumbs once again to the reductio.

I think you're overlooking the simple fact that premise (1) was already about posterity. If mitigation and balancing considerations can only be applied to the current generation and not to posterity, then Benatar's argument succumbs once again to the reductio. — Leontiskos

So I am offering two arguments:
1) Suffering in Pinprick World isn't "suffering" as we know it, and thus disqualifies for 2 in the asymmetry.
2) Since there is no one to miss out on the "good", no obligation was intendent on the missed opportunity. In other words, your world could be COMPLETELY all BLISS.. and if you did not create someone into that world, you are still NOT in the wrong by preventing that birth.

So I am offering two arguments — schopenhauer1

I see the first as the only real argument.

1) Suffering in Pinprick World isn't "suffering" as we know it — schopenhauer1

Okay, and I assessed this argument <here>.

2) Since there is no one to miss out on the "good", no obligation was intendent on the missed opportunity. In other words, your world could be COMPLETELY all BLISS.. and if you did not create someone into that world, you are still NOT in the wrong by preventing that birth. — schopenhauer1

Put differently, "If we omit the pinprick from (1) then (3) does not follow from (2)." I agree and I have not said otherwise.

Perhaps there are different approaches than his. — Leontiskos

Fair

Because I see apokrisis' objections as apt I see it as inevitable that questions of balance must emerge. — Leontiskos

Yep. I don't see them as apt at all given they were responding to me making that point.

It seems like your position is that there must be balance - not "carry out a balancing exercise". That is not reasonable at all, if that;'s the take. And if it's not then you've missed that ANs do the balancing exercise, and suffering tips the scales. Given this is the case across the board in relation to procreation then the exercise has been carried out and the answer is clear. I'm not sure what else you could want? To deny the result of hte exercise (on their account, that is?)

how could there ever be a balance between suffering and other considerations — Leontiskos

There is no need for one, unless for some strange metaphysical reason you believe this is hte state of things, arbitrarily. That seemed to be apokrisis' position. I found it funny, and a not just a little silly.

ANs do the balancing exercise, and suffering tips the scales. — AmadeusD

Ah, okay, I see what you are saying.

The question then is this: Why does the suffering of the pinprick do nothing to tip the scale?

I see two possible answers. Either the suffering of the pinprick is for some reason not counted as suffering; or else the antinatalist is in fact balancing suffering with some other consideration, in which case suffering does not always tip the scales.

Either the suffering of the pinprick is for some reason not counted as suffering; or else the antinatalist is in fact balancing suffering with some other consideration, in which case suffering does not always tip the scales. — Leontiskos

Generally, AN is about suffering AND consent- that is to say, the deontological principles of non-harm and non-autonomy are both broken in regards to procreation. So there is that, and one can go down that line of reasoning as well.

However, keeping it just to suffering, for the sake of this particular argument, the consideration is that there are no people deprived of good and that is not bad. Therefore, in the decision for procreation, at least, the balance is always against causing the violation of the non-harm principle because it was unnecessary to cause to another individual. It is undisputed that, in this actual world, at least there will be suffering, and therefore a state of affairs will occur which violates the principle and someone will suffer. This should be prevented of course.

the consideration is that there are no people deprived of good and that is not bad — schopenhauer1

Who is making this consideration? Certainly not me, as I explained above.

It is undisputed that in this world, at least there will be suffering — schopenhauer1

I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. The prima facie answer is that it does count as suffering.

Who is making this consideration? Certainly not me, as I explained above. — Leontiskos

That is the consideration of the “balancing”. No one exists who is deprived of good. Someone will exist who will suffer and thus non harm violated.

I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. — Leontiskos

And I answered you. If you want to attempt again to read it charitably, have a go.

I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have (and honestly, the one whcih is usually attempted cross-positionally). The type though doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thrad) between suffering and other considerations. The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD

@schopenhauer1 seems to assume that "other considerations" could only be positive experiences, which I was not assuming.

That said, I don't really understand Amadeus' post here. This is how I read it:

I think the discussion of which sorts of suffering need to be prevented is more or less the discussion that antinatalists have among themselves (and it is also the discussion that others wish to have with antinatalists). The type of suffering doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance between suffering and other considerations that is interesting. The antinatalist position is that suffering always trumps any other consideration. — Interpretation

And I answered you. — schopenhauer1

You haven't. Getting answers out of you is like pulling teeth. It literally took three months to get a real answer to my reductio, and that was the simplest argument on offer by design. Even then I had to draw out the argument you were intimating. Answers are not forthcoming, and you fall into petitio principii at the drop of a hat. :roll:

It's certainly possible I'm not quite groking the question, so if this doesn't seem apt - that'll be why lol.

Prima facie, I would say it doesn't tip the scales because other pleasures out weight a pinprick (scratching a decent itch would be enough v a pinprick). But the suffering of life is vastly more intense, prolonged and intractable than a pin prick.

That said, I don't really understand Amadeus' post here. This is how I read it: — Leontiskos

Ill try to re-word your interp. to see if it gets you anywhere..

I think the discussion of what level of suffering need be prevented is more or less the discussion that antinatalists have among themselves (and it is also the discussion that others wish to have with antinatalists). The type of suffering doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance between the "intensity, length and meaningfulness of the suffering" and other considerations* that is interesting. The antinatalist position is that suffering always trumps any other consideration.

As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. But the problem with all of this is it's speculation. We're only talking about unborn people - in this way, we can see that suffering is ensured (by the journey to Death) but positive experience is not vouchsafed by being born. One could have an all-in-all 'good' life, but that's highly unlikely on the view of the world and life ANs take, and at any rate, the suffering which comes with one's death (ones anxiety, fear etc.. and the pain of those around us) would usually trump that possibly-good life. Only religion can break that loop, and I think that's a poor way to gt around it myself.

As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. But the problem with all of this is it's speculation. We're only talking about unborn people - in this way, we can see that suffering is ensured (by the journey to Death) but positive experience is not vouchsafed by being born. One could have an all-in-all 'good' life, but that's highly unlikely on the view of the world and life ANs take, and at any rate, the suffering which comes with one's death (ones anxiety, fear etc.. and the pain of those around us) would usually trump that possibly-good life. Only religion can break that loop, and I think that's a poor way to gt around it myself. — AmadeusD

This seems in line with my interpretation to

Also, this is on line with what I was getting at here:

But the idea that one should cause suffering SUCH THAT we can THEN LATER MITIGATE IT (i.e. favoring OUR positive projects over SOMEONE ELSE'S negative ethics), is what is the violation going on here. — schopenhauer1

Projects is a good word IMO as it captures exactly what is hoped for or tacitly desired- character-building, someone to learn through trial and error, achievement, the “goods” of life. It need not be bare “pleasure”. But it’s the parents’ positive project, overriding (“I want X to happen) over the child’s negative ethic (right for non-harm and non-consent to be unnecessarily violated).

Prima facie, I would say it doesn't tip the scales because other pleasures out weight a pinprick (scratching a decent itch would be enough v a pinprick). — AmadeusD

Okay, so are you saying that a pinprick (or small amount) of suffering would not suffice for antinatalism? There must be more suffering before the arguments in favor of antinatalism become plausible. Is that right?

But if it is right then it seems like suffering does not always trump any other consideration, for the suffering of the pinprick does not trump the consideration of other pleasures.

Ill try to re-word your interp. to see if it gets you anywhere.. — AmadeusD

Good, this is my main concern: If suffering always trumps any other consideration, then how is it that the balance between suffering and other considerations constitutes an interesting discussion? How could one be talking about balancing suffering with some other consideration if suffering always outweighs any other consideration?

As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. — AmadeusD

Okay. Well at first blush it seems like you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not.