Map-making does not "contradict" using[/u] a map for navigating terrain..Why are these two statements not a contradiction? — ucarr
The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact from which physical laws are generalized (i.e. abstracted) physical. I haven't claimed or implied otherwise.Why are "regularities of nature" not concrete matters of fact?
Where are you getting this? This question has nothing to do with what I've argued.How are "matters of fact" concrete but not empirical?
Incoherent strawman. Formalisms, like numbers, do not have "interests", persons who use them in specific contexts of meaning have "interests".If self-descriptions ("formalisms...do not refer beyond themselves") have nothing to do with the world (nature), instead being interested only in themselves, how are they meaningful and useful?
No....that physical laws are computable does not entail that the physical universe is a computer.
— 180 Proof
Does this argument cast doubt on whether we can know reality beyond its human translation? — ucarr
Idk what you mean by "translations".Are the disciplines of epistemology and ontology merely products of human translations?
No. The senses don't lie, only how we mis/interpret (mis/use) our senses lies to us (vide Epicurus et al).Is Platonic Realism correct: humans dwell within a (cognitive) dark cave, sealed off from direct and complete experience of reality?
I do not know. Either outcome is possible.Can we hope to eventually reason beyond the current state-of-the-art observations limited by imprecision of measurement and incompleteness of decompression? Or is it the case the limited measurements of the wave function and the limited decompression of axiomatic systems reflectexistentiallimitationsembedded in[of] nature?
Possibly.Now perhaps we come to a crux of the faceoff between the sciences and the humanities. If the observer is always entangled with the observed, does that mean the two great modalities of discovery: the what and the what it’s like of the what are linked by the biconditional operator?
Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy)... — 180 Proof
rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof
Why are these two statements not a contradiction? — ucarr
Map-making does not "contradict" using a map for navigating terrain.. — 180 Proof
Why are "regularities of nature" not concrete matters of fact? — ucarr
The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact from which physical laws are generalized (i.e. abstracted) physical. I haven't claimed or implied otherwise — 180 Proof
Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact...rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof
How are "matters of fact" concrete but not empirical? — ucarr
Where are you getting this? This question has nothing to do with what I've argued. — 180 Proof
If self-descriptions ("formalisms...do not refer beyond themselves") have nothing to do with the world (nature), instead beinginterested only in themselvesonly self-referential, how are they meaningful and useful? — ucarr
Are the disciplines of epistemology and ontology merely products of human translations? — ucarr
Idk what you mean by "translations" — 180 Proof
...that physical laws are computable does not entail that the physical universe is a computer. — 180 Proof
...you also say formalisms do = regularities of nature — ucarr
False. Stop shadowboxing with your strawmen, you're further confusing yourself. — 180 Proof
Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are... used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof
...they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof
The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact — 180 Proof
Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy)... — 180 Proof
Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy), rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof
Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr
No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof
Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr
.No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof
Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr
Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr
Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr
No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof
As I've pointed out already ...Can a number have an application to matter and yet have no connection to matter? — ucarr
In this sense, I think so: a map is an abstraction from aspects of the terrain (e.g. regularities of nature) that is instantiated in some other aspect of the terrain (e.g. observers' brains-discursive practices).Does a map have some type of relationship _connection with/to terrain?
Does a number have any type of connection to matter? — ucarr
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.7433
Schlesinger (2014)
Irreversible phenomena – such as the production of entropy and heat – arise from fundamental reversible dynamics because the forward dynamics is too complex, in the sense that it becomes impossible to provide the necessary information to keep track of the dynamics.
I do like the lens metaphor - it seems to me to be very useful and I shall use it at every opportunity.Speaking of looking through lenses, someone who studies humanities would likely disagree with the idea that science deals with "what" and humanities deal with "how". From a certain perspective, if humanities is the focal point, then it is the what, and science is just about understanding the universe in which events happen. — Igitur
It would, surely, be more accurate to say the science is about understanding the universe conceived of as a machine, or the universe insofar as mathematics can be applied to it. Philosophy certainly includes how we fit in, but also includes the question how far the scientific project fits in to the universe. Are you assuming that the study of literature and history are essentially philosophical? That's an interesting thought. I think there's a case to be made.Science is about understanding the universe, humanities are about understanding our past (generally) and philosophy is about understanding where we, either as individuals or as a larger group, fit into that universe. — Igitur
You may be right. But, surely, in the end, the question why people are drawn to philosophy is empirical.There are discussions that don't aim to answer that question, but I feel as though that particular "Why" is the main reason people try to create or improve philosophies, or feel drawn to it. — Igitur
Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr
Are you both sure that the difference between you is not just a question of language. I can't see what is at stake here.No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof
I think it’s likely we would make more progress.But I wonder if we would find it easier to make progress if we stopped amalgamating a complicated and multi-dimensional issue into one, and treated the various sub-issues piecemeal, leaving the grand distinction to fall into place (or to fall into disuse) as it may. — Ludwig V
It would, surely, be more accurate to say the science is about understanding the universe conceived of as a machine, or the universe insofar as mathematics can be applied to it — Ludwig V
Are you assuming that the study of literature and history are essentially philosophical? That's an interesting thought. I think there's a case to be made. — Ludwig V
So that's why you posited "What" and "How" at the beginning! (I'm still wondering where "Why?" fits in).The present state of my general descriptions of the two great modes: science/humanities goes as follows: science asks: what is existence? Humanities asks: how is human? — ucarr
I like the first sentence, because it explains why mathematics is so necessary to science. It is the methodological decision at the start of what we now call science.For science the focal point is on measurement. For humanities the focal point is on consciousness. — ucarr
H'm.When you measure something you contain it. Containment of existing things drives toward understanding. — ucarr
That's true. But is it relevant? I suppose we'll see.When you experience something you assemble a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into a narrative of an enduring point of view, your personal history. — ucarr
In a sense, that's true. As a matter of history, it can't be. Or are you saying that no-one before the Egyptians invented arithmetic had a personal history? I don't think so. So it needs a bit more explanation.Every human individual is both scientist and artist. The human individual needs both the understanding of measurement and the knowing-what-it’s-like of a personal history in order to live. No understanding? No personal history? No life. — ucarr
So if you assemble enough measurements, you'll develop a new understanding of yourself? I would have thought you need more than that.The scientist measures, i.e., she sounds the dimensions of a thing, thereby revealing the what of a mysterious thing that mystifies her own knowledge of the what of her being until she finally surrenders her understanding to a radically new picture of the what of the state of being of herself. — ucarr
I can see how you are developing your starting-point. But this is perilously close to a stipulated definition. I have a feeling that it would not correspond to the actual life and practice of actual artists, never mind what they might say if you ask them.The artist assembles a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into an arc of change and discovery that is a personal history through the start of adventures, the middle section assessing battles won/lost and finally reaching the summit/plateau of a new state of the how of her being. — ucarr
I'm glad you are locating logic and math as an exception in the what/how dualism and sad that you're just combining the two. I think that what you say boils down to the idea that logic and math underpin both "what" and "how", defining the permanent framework of possibility for both. Is that what you are saying?Logic and math cover the two great modes thus: scientifically they mark and track the what of the position of the state of being; artistically they narrate a continuity of the direction of the how of being towards a conclusion of the what-it’s-like to reside in validity-as-truth, or not. — ucarr
Not quite the hard problem, but close.In each mode, one of the greatest mysteries is the location of the inflection point linking the immaterial and the material. This linkage and its circumambient mystery establish the wholely picture of life: substance grounding immanent form endlessly variable, albeit grounded within the ambiguity that animates the what and the how. — ucarr
That explains it.Why” is basic to both modes, and this conversation is about their differences, so I haven’t dwelt on it. — ucarr
I'm taking you to mean by "focal range" because there is always an object of understanding - the "what" that I'm seeking to understand. Sometimes, I agree, there is a well-defined goal (answer). But is that true of understanding of Heidegger or Wittgenstein or even my dog? I don't think so.The two great modes have an important difference WRT focal range: “understanding “ has a well-defined focal range coupled with a well-defined goal, where as experience, potentially drawing from all of existence, has a focal range and pallet of goals unspecifiable. — ucarr
I can agree with that, at least as a generalization. But I would want to add that sometimes understanding drives itself forward, by asking questions. Is that wrong?Experience always holds the potential to explode understanding. The two modes, being in creative conflict, animate each other. New experience drives understanding forward and new understanding drives new experience forward. — ucarr
Well, I've told you what I think about the question. To be honest, I couldn't give you a straight answer right now. One day I need to write something about it. Still, I don't think you need that question, because matter is inherently defined as "not mind" and "mind" is inherently defined as "not matter". There's no need for any other link, is there?“What it’s like to be a bat.” What it’s like to be something is the great question that links consciousness with matter. — ucarr
It would be very satisfying if it did. "Return of the Repressed" springs to mind. The talk of the observer as a necessary part of theories in physics promises much.As we answer the question “What is matter?” do we discover that our deeper questions on the subject require that we answer the question what is consciousness, thereby suggesting all material road maps lead to consciousness? — ucarr
Well, there are certainly many things that exist even though they are not known to exist. So I would have though that the answer to your question is clearly Yes. Or have I misunderstood?Can there be an existence not known to be existence? — ucarr
Off hand, I would have thought that it must. We would not exist if it didn't. But I don't know if that's relevant because I don't understand the rest.Does causality persist in a world without consciousness? If consciousness must filter reality to a small sample of what’s there, then an unfiltered reality might have an unparsed version of relativity that features unlimited temporal differentials super-animated beyond cause and effect into simultaneous everything. That might play as a beyond-sequencing explosion of uncontainable potential. An unspeakable fullness of possibilities. — ucarr
Do you mean "Does causality persist in a world without consciousness?" I wouldn't have thought so. How do you think it lends a hand?We can’t answer this question, but it lends a hand with answering the question: Why is there not nothing? — ucarr
Your answer is a good one, because it appears to be an answer, but isn't one.It’s because you ask the question.
You can’t ask “Why existence?” if existence isn’t known. — ucarr
Which nicely illustrates why I can't understand your enthusiasm for "What?" and "How?"Perhaps the greatest dialog between the “What” and the “How” is the “What” of the “How” and the “How” of the “What”? — ucarr
The first question is certainly a good candidate for its place. I don't see why the second is there. It has its place, but surely not this high up the ranking. Perhaps it's because you think the personal history is so important - which it is, in a way.The first question in our jingling duet is What is the good life? The second question is “What is the status of narrative? — ucarr
Worthy of what, by what criteria? You make experiences your own by being there, awake and attentive. Or have I missed the point?There’s experience, but what experience is worthy, and how do you make it your own? — ucarr
I can't answer that because I don't know what you mean by "generative". Narrative, on the face of it, always includes description, but no description is "merely" descriptive. For example, what's left out just as significant as what's included. How things are described are just as important as what is described. "Spade", "Bloody shovel", "Agricultural implement",Is narrative merely descriptive, or is it also generative? — ucarr
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