Again, unfortunately I still don't have too much time to deconstruct in detail all of your misconceptions and correct them — boethius
.Yes, obviously the point of pointing out Russia can be invaded from Ukraine is to point out that is therefore a legitimate security concern of Russia, as well as to emphasize that Russia will be much more committed to the war than the US — boethius
.It's in the situation of wanting to come to an agreement with Russia that assigning legitimacy to some of their concerns is necessary. Some of that could be purely pragmatic (we don't genuinely agree, but some compromise is needed for a deal) and some could be genuine agreement (for example because we would have the same concern if the situation was reversed; aka. the Soviet Union placing missiles in Cuba) — boethius
Now, if you say "Bah!! Nothing the Russians want is legitimate!!" then ok, you can hold that position but what follows from that is therefore more fighting and if that's your position then you need to justify more fighting as a worthwhile endeavour: aka, what's the plan? how to win? what does more fighting achieve for Ukraine? and so on. — boethius
Which you've never done!! It's always ... well Ukrainians want to fight, it's their choice. — boethius
To which my response is that coercion is not free choice and the West bribing Ukrainian elites as well as bold faced lying to the Ukrainian people is called coercion. Likewise, forcibly drafting people and forcing them to front is also coercion and not "Ukrainians want to fight". — boethius
You're theory around these questions is so hopeless confused that unfortunately I don't have the time at the moment to explain exactly why they are hopelessly confused. — boethius
And this is on top of never answering simple questions such as how many Nazis in Ukraine would be too many Nazis with too much power and therefore appeasement of said Nazis to not invade? If you have a theory of just war then you should be able to answer this question and then go onto explain that the Nazi levels in Ukraine do reach the required number and influence to morally require un-impeasement which would therefore be exactly the invasion we see. — boethius
Also, generally speaking, everything I have predicted is now coming to pass, so it seems redundant to point it out everyday. It's sort of perfunctory at this point, but I'll keep repeating myself when I have a moment. — boethius
.I'll quote myself when I have the time, but within the first weeks of the war I predicted that as soon as it no longer served US interest the throwing-under-the-bussing would commence and that at anytime the US can simply paint the Ukrainians as losing, and one thing Americans don't like is people who lose, and that the loss is Ukrainians fault, that they should have tried harder and won instead — boethius
The purpose of this article by CNN is to signal to the American elite that the "Ukraine show" is just about wrapped up and to inform them who the blame will be assigned to. — boethius
But they also appear to be struggling with problems of their own making. — CNN
So ... who's to blame for the West putting the Ukrainians up to fighting a war with the Russians that every single Western analyst and "decision maker" knew they would lose? (especially as they 100% knew that "whatever it takes" and "for as long as it takes" are obvious lies) — boethius
If memory serves me right, when I said the Ukrainians will be thrown under the exact same bus that we threw our "Afghani friends" it was you that explained that it's different because the Ukrainians are more "culturally close" or something along those lines (aka. we wouldn't let down white people) — boethius
This is reminiscent of the old sentiment about the weakness of democracy in a fight with authoritarianism, isn't it?
I think the reality is more complicated. Democracies are often clumsy and inefficient, but the plurality of views they offer also makes them more resilient. History has not been kind to autoritarian regimes that assumed that a democratic state would just fold because it's people and government would lack the will to fight. — Echarmion
With regards to aid for Ukraine especially, one aspect that seems underrepresented in the discussion is that there might be more going on internationally than we are directly aware of. The narrative is usually that western governments limit aid and restrict weapon use in order to not anger domestic constituencies. And that is certainly the case. But it might also be the case that a number of important international actors wouldn't be too happy to see the west throw it's entire armaments capacity in behind Ukraine. Chief among them China.
It seems plausible that China is threatening western nations with much more significant support for Russia because China does not care to hand the West a clean "win" in Ukraine. — Echarmion
Another prediction I'm pretty extremely confident on is that these kinds of hopeless offensives are mainly about getting rid of these dangerous morons: you want to fight Russians? You think "not-attacking-Russia" has been the big mistake? Have we got the operation for you!!! — boethius
So you'd agree countries are not literally forced to start an offensive war? — Echarmion
I see 573 pages has done no good. We’re apparently still at “If you disagree with me you think Putin is good.” Pity. — Mikie
This is convenient framing that you, like some other posters, like to proscribe for us. — Echarmion
US as the great Satan and the Ukrainians as the hapless victims. — Echarmion
That framing is leading you to exclude the russian war dead — Echarmion
This war is also a russian tragedy. How do you propose to understand it if you're not even seeing that side of the equation? — Echarmion
It’s a framing because that’s what you, and others, are constantly doing. You just did it above, and you know it. — Mikie
I think it’s an unfortunate move by Russia— even stupid in a political and strategic sense. But they do seem to be winning, and now have a lot of leverage. I don’t necessarily like that, but that seems to be the case so far. — Mikie
You mean that Biden has bribed Zelensky to get rid of the Ukrainian ultra nationalists by sending them to certain death with "these kinds of hopeless offensives" because they do not serve anymore the US and then Biden will pay some CNN journalist to write an article to fault the Ukrainains also for this, right? — neomac
- Blame Zelensky for sacrificing its best combatants and dooming his country to certain defeat since other Ukrainians are too peaceful, coward or corrupt to fight patriotic wars as only Western men of honor can do, right? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac
- Blame Zelensky for sacrificing its best combatants and dooming his country to certain defeat since other Ukrainians are too peaceful, coward or corrupt to fight patriotic wars as only Western men of honor can do, right? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac
- Or blame Zelensky for understanding too late ultra-nationalists were a real danger (since they pushed him and all Ukraine to a catastrophic war after committing a 8-year genocide in Donbas) after years of lies to silence Western concerns about Ukrainian neo-nazis? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac
- Or blame Zelensky for realizing too late that defeat was inevitable and getting rid of the ultra-nationalists was the only way to finally surrender to Russia's peace conditions, which he didn't need to. Indeed, if he only accepted the Russian deal (see Instanbul Communiquée) as advised by Biden behind doors (to keep publicly honoring Ukrainians' free decision) instead of spreading the lie that the West tried to block it, none of this would happen. And therefore blame Zelensky should be also blamed for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac
This is convenient framing that you, like some other posters, like to proscribe for us. — Echarmion
CHAPTER FOUR
Geopolitical Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 — Extending Russia - Rand
The United States could increase its military assistance to Ukraine—in terms of both the quantity and quality of weapons. — Extending Russia - Rand
The United States could also become more vocal in its support for NATO membership for Ukraine. Some U.S. policymakers—including Republican Senator and 2016 presidential candidate Marco Rubio—backed this approach in the past and Ukrainian President Porosh- enko recently promised to hold a referendum on the issue in the near future. While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washing- ton’s pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while lead- ing Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development. — Extending Russia - Rand
Benefits
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. — Extending Russia - Rand
Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the conflict at a somewhat higher level of intensity. — Extending Russia - Rand
Likelihood of Success
Eastern Ukraine is already a significant drain on Russian resources, exacerbated by the accompanying Western sanctions. Increasing U.S. military aid would certainly drive up the Russian costs, but doing so could also increase the loss of Ukrainian lives and territory or result in a disadvantageous peace settlement. This would generally be seen as a serious setback for U.S. policy. — Extending Russia - Rand
Rand discusses exactly the measures that would likely lead to "escalation" by Russia: — boethius
Which a full-blown large scale war I'm pretty sure qualifies as "somewhat higher level of intensity". — boethius
This is all generally a serious setback for U.S. Policy. — boethius
Notice nowhere in this document nor any other similar US policy analysis document you'll find anything describing how Ukraine can actually "win" or discussing US direct intervention to "save the day" if the likely outcome of expanding the war occurs.
Why you may ask? — boethius
The only question this brings up is why does the US not follow the Rand advise and "calibrate" support to avoid a larger war that Russia would win and thus embarrass the US. — boethius
This document in 2019 an answers the question of how to start a larger war in Ukraine, also why that's bad for both Ukraine and US long term interests. — boethius
Well, this exact war we are considering accomplishes those two things. — boethius
What you'll do is have the military war game things out (just not publicly as with this Rand paper) and what those war games will reveal is that Russia has no means of simply overrunning all of Ukraine. The initial invasion will run out of steam, then more will need to be mobilized as Russias standing army in 2022 was simply not that big, with the addition of the problem of pacifying conquered regions and so on. They don't know what Russia will do exactly but what they do know is that Russia is very unlikely to win in direct military terms in any short period of time. They'd also know on the off chance they're wrong and Russia does simply overrun Ukraine then that doesn't really embarrass the US as we all knew "Russia would win in 3 days" anyways, and then Russia is anyways the big meany and sanctions can continue and gas sold to Europe and so on. — boethius
So, what we can glean from the US establishments own documents is that they knew exactly how Russia would respond to their actions described in their publicly available document dedicated to finding ways to harm Russia, and then Russia did respond in exactly that way in response to those actions. — boethius
If you can look at all this publicly available info and come up with quibbles about Ukraine's status as a US proxy to advance US interests at the expense of Ukraine, then you're engaging in what is obvious propaganda to advance US interests at the expense of Ukraine. — boethius
As for Russia's actions, they are a signatory and so also guarantor of the Minsk agreements, both Ukraine and Western leaders have publicly admitted those accords were done in bad faith with no intention of following them — boethius
indeed Ukraine didn't follow them as was the plan and so therefore Russia is entirely justified in forcing Ukraine to abide by the accords, such as respect the people of the Donbas and stop shelling them. — boethius
An important question we should be asking is why the US is insisting on escalating the war in ways that do nothing to improve Ukraine's position on the battlefield, and are similarly unlikely to hurt Russia in any meaningful way. — Tzeentch
The only thing to change is that the US bribes all the Ukrainian elites with billions of untraceable funds and weapons as well as essentially de facto full immunity for laundering the money anywhere in the West. It's not just Zelensky getting bribed and also Zelensky is an idiot so I have little problem believing that the money is less important to him than playing the war hero in the script given to him. — boethius
These idiots were needed to start the war (i.e. keep shelling the Donbas for 8 years), and impose a terrorizing fascist dictatorship on the Ukrainian people in order to force people to the front (i.e. just straight up assassinate anyone engaging in critical thinking), as well as be propped up as elite soldier heroes for the part of Ukrainian society that actually wants to drink the coolaid. — boethius
Like, you're talking as if these people are accountable to someone or something and would need to like someday makeup justifications or something for their actions and even try to make those make some sort of sense or whatever.
You're honestly really starting to scare me. — boethius
And did any of that actually happen? — Echarmion
No, it doesn't, since what we're seeing is an entirely different category of conflict. The paper clearly does not describe a full blown war by Russia, since the writers did not expect Russia would take such a step. If they did want to predict that, they'd have stated it directly. — Echarmion
Alternatively, and more likely, Russia might escalate, possibly seizing more of Ukraine, supporting further advances of the Damascus regime, or actually occupying a wavering Belarus. Such moves would likely impose serious additional strains on Russian defense and economic capacity, but would also represent a serious setback for U.S. policy. Given this range of possible responses, any U.S. moves of the sort described in this chapter would need to be carefully calibrated and pursued within some larger policy framework. — Extending Russia - Rand
You're not reading that properly. It says that a disadvantageous peace settlement of the Donbas conflict would be a setback to US policy. But we're no longer in that stage of the conflict anyways. — Echarmion
Because putting boots on the ground in Ukraine would be so widely unpopular that no government could afford it. — Echarmion
It doesn't, and you can't start a war that's already ongoing. — Echarmion
It doesn't, and you can't start a war that's already ongoing. — Echarmion
A war which does not exist. You're talking about a theoretical scenario which did not end up happening. — Echarmion
So why the hell did Russia invade? — Echarmion
What actions did the US take? And the result is not remotely described in the document. The document does not describe a full blown invasion by Russia. — Echarmion
You haven't actually described any of the actions the US took to escalate the conflict so this is an empty claim. — Echarmion
Yeah you're making sweeping claims and then accusing everyone who disagrees with you of being a propagandists. Weren't you the one complaining about being called a propagandist? Pot, meet kettle. — Echarmion
This is a lie. If you don't want to be accused of being a russian propagandist, maybe don't lie. — Echarmion
This is complete nonsense. Russia did not abide by the terms either. Not only is your conclusion that Russia would be justified to escalate the war in order to enforce Minsk complete nonsense, it's also factually wrong. — Echarmion
But if billions of funds used to bribe ALL Ukrainian elites by the US are “untraceable”, how can you claim with such a certainty that the US is bribing ALL the Ukrainian elites, besides Zelensky?! — neomac
I prefer to review criteria, compelling facts and, possibly, metrics backing up such sweeping assertions. So far you didn’t offer much to me, but you keep talking as if you did. Rather surreal. — neomac
Don’t be scared man of honour, it was just a passtime exercise about you predicting the likely content of a future article which Biden would have "untraceably" bribed some CNN journalist to write.
At this point I think you yourself could write this article for CNN, since you have it all figured out. You could earn some dollars from the US (instead of the usual rubles) , you know,
and come back at us with: "once again, as I’ve predicted, motherfuckaaaas!" — neomac
The RAND paper describes what will likely lead to "higher intensity conflict":
1. Supplying arms
2. Keep saying Ukraine will join NATO — boethius
Which RAND predicts is exactly what has happened. — boethius
The authors are clearly describing a process of Russia conquering parts of Ukraine in high intensity conflict that causes serious strain: — boethius
The authors recommend seeking a diplomatic solution to the Donbas conflict in which lethal aid could be one point of leverage to do so but only makes sense in a larger diplomatic strategy. — boethius
The reason is not thinkable is because we know Western leaders are duplicitous, corrupt, ineffectual, and have no moral foundation — boethius
The result would actually be exactly what Russia has been asking for: a new security architecture in Europe that reduces tensions overall in the long term. — boethius
Why this is completely unacceptable to the people that actually rule us is that the long term effects are more peace, less arms profiteering, less buying up all the Ukrainian land (that's still Ukrainian) on the cheap, and actually rehabilitating Russia as a player in the Western political system. — boethius
For, in our system, separatism is completely legitimate — boethius
I use our language to explain the authors meaning. Of course, the authors don't know exactly what escalation will look like, how big it may get; they don't get into that analysis because they view any escalation as bad for US policy. — boethius
But thanks for your pointless quibbles that clearly demonstrate you are a a complete idiot. — boethius
Simply because the US provokes a larger war to extend Russia and Russia know the US is provoking a larger war to extend Russia does not imply that therefore Russia should not do exactly what the US is provoking.
The same RAND analysis that explains what would the US would need to do to provoke an escalation by Russia explains exactly why Russia would do that: it would be a setback for US policy and a win for Russia. — boethius
Putin made clear that we either come to a a deal, a new security architecture in Europe, or he'll invade Ukraine — boethius
Yes I have, I quoted RAND saying what would escalate the conflict: further arms to Ukraine and simply unilaterally declaring Ukraine will join NATO even if that won't happen soon due to ally objections, I then stated that's exactly what the US did. — boethius
Second, I literally just explained how I'm the only one who's actually explained how to "protect Ukrainian sovereignty" with Western power and why that would have likely worked, avoided all the death and destruction in Ukraine that has happened since, and that I would have been completely in favour of that. — boethius
However, because our leaders are exceptionally arrogant and stupid, simply came out and said they made the agreement in bad faith, never intended to abide by it and planned from the start not to, but instead prepare for the exactly the war that would result due to reneging on commitments. — boethius
Where's your proof? — boethius
We have proof of Western leaders own words they didn't abide by the agreement and never intended to — boethius
These agreements came into being with Ukraine and the West already violating them by already actively planning and continuing actions that breach them. — boethius
Now, feel free to provide actual evidence — boethius
It doesn't say that. You quoted it yourself, it said the US could become more vocal and increase lethal aid. How, specifically, has the US done either? — Echarmion
While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washington’s pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while leading Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development. — Extending Russia - Rand
Conclusion
The option of expanding U.S. military aid to Ukraine has to be evaluated principally on whether doing so could help end the conflict in the Donbass on acceptable terms rather than simply on costs it imposes on Moscow. Boosting U.S. aid as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to advance a settlement might well make sense, but calibrating the level of assistance to produce the desired effect while avoiding a damaging counter-escalation would be challenging. — Extending Russia - Rand
Most of these measures—whether in Europe or the Middle East— risk provoking Russian reaction that could impose large military costs on U.S. allies and large political costs on the United States itself. Increasing military advice and arms supplies to Ukraine is the most feasible of these options with the largest impact, but any such initiative would have to be calibrated very carefully to avoid a widely expanded conflict. — Extending Russia - Rand
Withdraw from the Treaty and Deploy Missiles in Europe
The United States could formally withdraw from the INF Treaty, develop and deploy ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and deploy those missiles in Western Europe. This would enable the United States to deploy ground-based nuclear missiles in more-secure locations that could still be used to target positions along NATO’s eastern flank that are potential, or at least hypothetical, targets for Russian invasion. More worryingly from the Russian perspective, the United States also could target locations inside Russia, enhancing the U.S. capability for a rapid strike on command and control systems or other strategic assets (although the United States already has air- and sea- launched missiles capable of such missions). This policy option could further enhance U.S. conventional capabilities to target Russian air defense assets that could hinder U.S. and NATO aircraft in the event of a crisis. Moreover, the deployment of missiles could send a strong signal that the United States intended to defend its NATO allies in Europe, including with nuclear weapons.
With regard to the potential benefits for extending Russia, deployment of such missiles in Western Europe would definitely get Moscow’s attention. Russia remains highly concerned about the potential for such decapitation strikes with the INF Treaty in place, given U.S. sea- and air-launched intermediate-range missile capabilities, as well as the potential for Aegis Ashore missile defense sites to be altered to fire GLCMs. Those concerns would spike in the event of the return of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe, particularly if they preceded the deployment of any substan- tial Russian intermediate-range nuclear missile capabilities, and could even be interpreted as a prelude to NATO aggression against Russia. This would almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is difficult to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities rather than offensive or retaliatory ones. It is worth noting that numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and launch platforms specific to their delivery are not constrained by New START, and that Russia likely retains vastly more such operational weapons than does the United States, with the potential to rapidly deploy more. — Extending Russia - Rand
The United States formally withdrew from the treaty on 2 August 2019. — Wikipedia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
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