No rhe second just says that the belief is true. Whether I am certain about it is irrelevant. Saying a belief is true, no matter how certain of that I might be, does not make it so. — John

I don't understand you, and don't see your point. How does saying "this belief is true" differ from saying "I am certain of this belief"?

This Stanford article lists by my count 118 titles in the bibliography, many - most - with the word "truth" in the title, and none that I saw that had the word "true." And this makes sense, because the the subject is truth, not "true." — tim wood

We were referring to common usage at that time, not philosophical speculations, you had said that there was difficulty with "truth" in common usage. And that's what my comment referred to, common usage. There is no such difficulty in common usage, "truth" refers to what is true. In philosophy one might look to a concept of "truth", and try to determine what that is. In my opinion, this would be like asking what it means to be true.

Perhaps we should give up the pursuit of Truth (with a capital T) and begin thinking that truth is really a way we have of speaking of what we agree on and what we find persuasive. In this way we should focus on truths (with a small t)." — tim wood

This is what I disagree with. Truth is not necessarily what we agree on. What we agree on is what is justified, and the things we agree on may not be the truth. Do you recognize that there is a difference between true and justified?

As I explained earlier, truth is of the subject, it is subjective. So it cannot be what "we" agree on. If I am certain of something, I will claim that it is the truth regardless of whether or not we agree on it. Truth does not require agreement. I may have information which neither you nor anyone else has access to, so I know the truth without agreement from anyone else. And if I persuade you, so that you agree, this persuasion is justification it is not truth. Truth is not "what we agree on".

If I recall, your definition of "true" is that which, after a tiresome number of iterations of justifications, falls under a comfortable assumption we can have confidence in. — tim wood

No, the point is that "true" is not what "we" can have confidence in at all, it is what "I" have confidence in. Individuals claim "X is true", and they will insist that X is true even if others claim something contrary. This is very evident here at tpf. They will attempt to convince others that X is true, to justify their claims. But when "X is true" is claimed, "X" always refers to how I understand X, not how we understand X (of course there is no such thing, because understanding is the act of an individual).

An example occurs to me: You have a large pot of beans, thousands of them. I hold up a bean and ask, "What is this?" "A bean," you answer. "Prove it," sez I. And you do. Then I hold up another bean and ask, "What is this?" At a fundamental level this is a fair question and one that can be asked of every single bean. — tim wood

This is exactly the nature of "truth". Each individual instance of truth, must be proven, justified. Each item in the pot must be proven as a bean before we can say that it is true that there are only beans in the pot.

So: truth is the -ness of anything that makes that thing what it is. It is real, the reality of the thing. Condensing a bit, we end up with truth is reality and reality is truth. — tim wood

I agree, that truth has to do with the reality of the thing, but each thing is unique and individual, so truth cannot be a generality. Furthermore, since each thing appears to be different from itself, depending on the perspective it is observed from (i.e., how a thing appears from one perspective is different from how it appears from another), "the reality of the thing" is in itself somewhat contradictory. If the reality of the thing is that it is different from itself, then this defies the law of identity. But that's exactly what a multitude of different perspectives demonstrates to us, that a thing is different from itself.

Or it could be the brick-ness of bricks, or the -ness of anything. The point is the "-ness." It bridges, it seems to me, the gap between the thing and the idea of the thing. How I'm not sure, maybe by putting them together. To have bricks and brickness, you need both. And this is unremarkable. We do it every day, all day, without a second thought, or any thought at all. This -ness is a fact, is real. It has an "always already" quality. Just as a hammer is always already a hammer, even before we have a use for it, or even know what a hammer is. — tim wood

I believe that attempting to bridge this gap with "truth" is a mistaken approach. The truth is that there is a difference between the individual, particular brick, and the "brick-ness" of the generality, which cannot be dissolved. It is an ontologically real, part of reality (and therefore truth itself according to your def.). The trend of modern philosophy to shy away from dualism, toward monism, inspires the desire to bridge this gap as if the gap were not something real. I believe it is a more appropriate approach to recognize the reality of this gap, and attempt to see what it consists of. What is the ontological status of the separation between the individual brick, and the generality "brick-ness"?

Yeah, I don't know about all that tim. Here's my go to test regarding definitions...

If a term is defined, one ought be able to take the definition and replace each and every use of the term with the definition and lose nothing meaningful while retaining coherence.

I don't understand you, and don't see your point. How does saying "this belief is true" differ from saying "I am certain of this belief"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The first statement concerns the truth of a belief, and the second concerns your attitude towards the belief. They are two very different things. I think it is incredible that you cannot see the distinction.

The first statement concerns the truth of a belief, and the second concerns your attitude towards the belief. They are two very different things. I think it is incredible that you cannot see the distinction. — John

The first statement affirms what the speaker thinks of the belief, "it is true", it does not confirm that the belief is true.

There is a speaker of each statement. The first statement says that the speaker believes that the belief is true. It in no way confirms that the belief is true, as you imply. The second statement says that the speaker is certain of the belief.

I really don't see the difference between the first and second. In the first, the speaker affirms confidence in the belief "it is true". In the second, the speaker affirms confidence in the belief "I am certain of it". Where are you seeing this difference?

The first statement affirms what the speaker thinks of the belief, "it is true", it does not confirm that the belief is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No that would be "I think this belief is true". 'It is true that X' affirms that it is true that X. Someone for example could say that "people believe that it is true that X, but I don't believe it". The "it is true that X" part is independent of anybody's beliefs. Of course it doesn't confirm that it is true that X, it merely affirms it; but that is irrelevant in any case.

When someone says "this belief is true", what it means to me is "I think this belief is true". If to you, it means that the belief is true, then you'll believe anything anyone ever tells you, and be forever deceived.

The "it is true that X" part is independent of anybody's beliefs. — John

This doesn't make sense, it's meaningless. You have taken the statement "it is true that X", and removed it from any speaker, claiming that no one has spoken it. This is to completely and absolutely remove it from any possible context, and leave it meaningless.



.

When someone says "this belief is true", what it means to me is "I think this belief is true". If to you, it means that the belief is true, then you'll believe anything anyone ever tells you, and be forever deceived. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, when someone says "this belief is true" it just means that this belief is true. Of course it indicates (if they are not lying) that they think the belief is true, but that is not what is explicitly being said. The fact that "'X' is true" means that it is true that X does not entail that X is true. You are equivocating on the word 'means' between its semantic sense and its use that is coterminous with 'entails'.

I can say 'it is true that snow is black' and that sentence means that it is true that snow is black, but it does not entail that it is true that snow is black.

No, when someone says "this belief is true" it just means that this belief is true. — John

OK, so when Donald Trump says "this belief is true", that's what it means to you, that the belief is true? Good luck with that approach.

Obviously the same statement, someone saying "this belief is true" means something completely different to you from what it means to me. You're set in your interpretation, and I'm set in mine. I warn you though, you'll be deceived if you actually follow through with your interpretation.

Again, you failed to get my distinction between the two senses of "means". So, when Donald Trump asserts that something is true his words mean that the something is true; but it certainly is not entailed by the fact that his words mean the something is true, that the something is true.

Or to put it in way using the word 'mean' in both senses, which hopefully will make it clear to you:
'When Donald Trump asserts that something is true his words mean that the something is true; but the fact that his words mean the something is true, does not mean that the something is true.'

I shouldn't have to explain this again.

It's clearer if you leave out "is true":

If I assert that lighthouses are lovely, what I assert is that lighthouses are lovely, and it can be inferred from my asserting this that I believe it. But I am not asserting that I believe it. At some point you have to get to something that you're willing to call the content of the belief or the assertion. If you're always sticking "I believe" or something in front, you'll never get to what you believe.

And truth attaches or doesn't to the content of your beliefs. We say, "What you believe is true (or false)."

Again, you failed to get my distinction between the two senses of "means". — John

As I explained, I view your second sense of "means", as meaningless nonsense. You remove the statement from its context, the thinking mind which spoke it, and having no context the statement is no longer a statement, it's meaningless.

You can explain it as much as you want, and insist that I don't get it. What is the case, is that I completely get it, but I disagree, because I think it's nonsense to talk about the meaning of a statement with no context.

If I assert that lighthouses are lovely, what I assert is that lighthouses are lovely, and it can be inferred from my asserting this that I believe it. But I am not asserting that I believe it. At some point you have to get to something that you're willing to call the content of the belief or the assertion. If you're always sticking "I believe" or something in front, you'll never get to what you believe. — Srap Tasmaner

The content is the belief. When you say "lighthouses are lovely", the content is the belief that this "lighthouses are lovely" refers to. What more are you looking for with your concept of "content"? I don't see the need to assume anything more. I know that you are not asserting "I believe lighthouses are lovely", but as you yourself admit, it is implied that you believe it. Therefore I can assume that you believe it, unless you are acting in deception. So the content is the belief, what is implied by the statement. It is only when you speak in deception, that the content, which is the belief, is negated. But it would be pointless to seek a further content in the act of deception, because there would be no identifiable relationship between the statement and the content, that is the nature of deception.

And truth attaches or doesn't to the content of your beliefs. We say, "What you believe is true (or false)." — Srap Tasmaner

"What you belief" is often referred to as "the belief", and this is the content, which is said to be true or false, what you believe, the belief. The statement is a representation in words of what you believe, or, the belief.

This is nonsense; sentences don't get their meanings by being said; sentences can only be sayings at all insofar as they are already meaningful, otherwise it would not be "saying", but would just be meaningless noise or scribble.

This is nonsense; sentences don't get their meanings by being said; sentences can only be sayings at all insofar as they are already meaningful, otherwise the saying would just be meaningless noise or scribble. — John

Sentences do not exist unless they are said. Being said is what gives existence to a sentence. So first off it is nonsensical to speak of a sentence which wasn't said, unless you are referring to one which someone has in their head without speaking it. But even that sentence in the person's head has an author, that person. So to speak of a statement without an author is nonsense. Secondly, the meaning of a sentence is what is meant by that sentence, and "what is meant" refers to the intention of the author. These are two good reasons why your talk about the meaning of a statement without an author of that statement is nonsense. 1) There is no such thing as a statement without an author. 2) The "meaning of the statement" refers to what was meant by the author.

Sentences do not exist unless they are said. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sentences as well as actually being said are in potentia as things that could be said. The existence of a language means (in the sense of 'entails' in case you are confused) that there are potentially an infinite number of sentences that could be said; each with at least one literal meaning.

You've given yourself a way to refer to the content of an assertoric utterance -- what's asserted is a belief -- but you've left yourself no way to refer to the content of a belief.

If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is "Lighthouses are lovely," not "I believe lighthouses are lovely," unless you like infinite regresses.

My believing lighthouses are lovely is a fact about me; lighthouses being lovely is not a fact about me.

This is exactly what I have been trying to, unsuccessfully it seems, explain to him.

We've been doing this off & on for a while. You can go down this road, but it's longer and harder than some people think. You have to give up truth and knowledge completely and just talk about rational belief. You also have to give up logic and have rational inference instead. It's not crazy by any means, but you need to be clear about what you're getting into.

I don't see how there could be any rational belief at all in the absence of truth and knowledge. A rational belief is a belief that is measured (ratio); if there is no actuality (truth) then there is nothing to be measured or measured against, and if there is no knowledge then we wouldn't know how to measure even if there were something to measure and be measured against.

Not my thing so I don't know how it's supposed to work. I suppose you end up some variety of pragmatist. Whatever works better, however you define that, is more rational.

The Bayesians are coming, so we're all going to have to get used to this way of thinking. They might even be right, whatever that means.

LOL, I've never been an admirer of pragmatism except for Peirce's version, and I have reservations about that. If truth is what the community of enquirers come to, or would come to, believe; then it follows that the only knowledge we have is knowledge about what is most consistently believed. No way to guarantee that is in fact rational though, unless you redefine 'rational' I guess. :s

Should've said "less wrong," where I said "right."

I realize that the following quote wasn't directed at me, but it is something I find quite interesting...

If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is "Lighthouses are lovely," not "I believe lighthouses are lovely," unless you like infinite regresses...

Doesn't this imply that thought/belief is existentially contingent upon language?

:s

On page one the following was written...

...when different propositions within, or across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent.

The above has all the different senses of "truth" as it's target, and then mistakenly implies that checking for coherency is the only method of discrimination between conflicting senses of "truth".

It's not.

Explanatory power. Fewest unprovable assumptions. Necessary consequences.

I was -- let's call it "simplifying."

What I'd prefer to say there is something like this:

If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is what I might as a speaker of English express by asserting such a sentence as "Lighthouses are lovely."

I'd like to be as neutral as possible here.

I realize that the following quote wasn't directed at me, but it is something I find quite interesting...

If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is "Lighthouses are lovely," not "I believe lighthouses are lovely," unless you like infinite regresses...

Doesn't this imply that thought/belief is existentially contingent upon language? — creativesoul

I think you are pretty much right about this. I had to think about it for a minute. Thinking about animals, who do not possess language, I suddenly find that I don't particularly think they have beliefs or thoughts.


They have a certain basic level of consciousness / awareness, but I wouldn't go as far to say that animals have beliefs. A dog might stare at a lighthouse, even find it pleasant in some way, but I am not thinking that a dog could have a fully formed belief that the lighthouse is indeed lovely.

If I really do hold a belief, I think I have to be able to express it in at least some kind of basic language, verbal, written, mental, on paper, etc.

That goes even more for thought. i don't think you'r really doing what I would call real thinking without some kind of ability to express it in language. Would you agree?

On my view, you're reporting upon your own thought/belief, and identifying the content of the report on it's own terms, and then calling that the content of your belief.

That is the historical mistake.

It is an inevitable consequence of not drawing and maintaining the distinction between cognition and metacognition, and following in the mistaken footsteps of philosophical giants.

Hey Brian!

You wrote:

I think you are pretty much right about this. I had to think about it for a minute. Thinking about animals, who do not possess language, I suddenly find that I don't particularly think they have beliefs or thoughts.

Just to be clear. I was pointing out the consequence of a specific linguistic/conceptual framework(schema, if you prefer) that I do not agree with.

They have a certain basic level of consciousness / awareness, but I wouldn't go as far to say that animals have beliefs. A dog might stare at a lighthouse, even find it pleasant in some way, but I am not thinking that a dog could have a fully formed belief that the lighthouse is indeed lovely.

I agree, but why not?

If I really do hold a belief, I think I have to be able to express it in at least some kind of basic language, verbal, written, mental, on paper, etc.

But that is precisely what needs to be argued for, doesn't it?

There is a necessary distinction to be drawn and maintained here. Your belief and your report upon your belief are not one in the same thing.

That goes even more for thought. i don't think you'r really doing what I would call real thinking without some kind of ability to express it in language. Would you agree?

No.

I would definitely agree that the overwhelming majority of what most folk call "thinking" is existentially contingent upon language. I would definitely agree that the limit of one's language is the limit of one's worldview.

On my view, you're reporting upon your own thought/belief, and identifying the content of the report on it's own terms, and then calling that the content of your belief. — creativesoul

Hmmmm. I haven't followed your argument about this, so I'm at a disadvantage here, and I apologize for that.

But my instinct is that I'm okay with this.

"Belief" is a term from folk psychology. If you say it rained yesterday, you are taken to have a belief that it rained yesterday. (Moore's paradox drives this home.) It's a report verb. If there is something "underneath" or "prior to" the report, or the attribution, it is of interest perhaps to cognitive scientists but not to me either in my capacity as a person who aspires to rationality or in my capacity as a philosopher who aspires to understand rationality.

One cannot understand rationality if one does not understand one's own thought/belief.

That ought be of prime interest.

"Understanding" covers a lot of territory. I can understand that it is wrong to cause someone pain without understanding the physiology of pain.

But how about I read through your argument about metacognition before we continue this?