You've given yourself a way to refer to the content of an assertoric utterance -- what's asserted is a belief -- but you've left yourself no way to refer to the content of a belief.

If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is "Lighthouses are lovely," not "I believe lighthouses are lovely," unless you like infinite regresses.

My believing lighthouses are lovely is a fact about me; lighthouses being lovely is not a fact about me. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me, that you have confused the issue, and have done exactly what you accuse me of doing.

The thing is, that you are removing the utterance of the statement, just like Janus wants to do. But the utterance of the statement is an action which must be respected as real and very necessary. The utterance is "lighthouses are lovely". The form is the physical presence of the words, and the content is the underlying belief.

We have to be able to make a real distinction between what the utterance means to me, and what it means to you (differences of interpretation), so we cannot say that the content is "lighthouses are lovely", because this assumes that the same content is within your mind and mine. It is not, therefore it is false to claim that this is the content. So, to lay out the content, the belief which is signified, what you believe by this statement, we must refer to something further. The fact that the "something further", will most likely be an expression in words, creates the appearance of infinite regress. But the infinite regress is not real, it is just an appearance created by the desire to express the content in words. The true content cannot be expressed in words because the words are always a formal representation of the content.

That appears to be the problem, you want to express the content in words. And that's what we do naturally, express our beliefs in words. But the words are always a representation of the content, which is the belief itself. So when you put the belief into words, you have a formal representation of the content, not the content itself. You can continue to explain the belief, using words, to an infinite regress, but all you have here is the formal representation, not the content itself. You can never get to the content this way.

So the real content is something assumed, just like we assume real content in the physical world. This is the material aspect of reality. We assume content as fundamental to the existence of beliefs, just like we assume content (matter) as fundamental to the existence of the physical world. Trying to understand the existence of content, or matter, plunges us into mysticism, because it has already been designated by the structure of language and logical systems as that which cannot be spoken about, due to its apparent capacity to defy the fundamental laws of logic.

Sentences as well as actually being said are in potentia as things that could be said. The existence of a language means (in the sense of 'entails' in case you are confused) that there are potentially an infinite number of sentences that could be said; each with at least one literal meaning. — Janus

These potential sentences you refer to have no existence, because they have not been created, They have no meaning because they do not exist. You continue to back up this nonsense train of thought with more meaninglessness.

The thing is, that you are removing the utterance of the statement — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

. But the utterance of the statement is an action which must be respected as real and very necessary — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's an action. Actions are not truth-apt.

We have to be able to make a real distinction between what the utterance means to me, and what it means to you (differences of interpretation), so we cannot say that the content is "lighthouses are lovely", because this assumes that the same content is within your mind and mine. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or you could take that as proof that the content is not something in my mind or yours. Can we both believe that Donald Trump is President? I think so. How is this possible on your view? We can't have the same thing in our minds, so how can we share a belief?

How do we agree or disagree about anything? How do we even communicate?

Yes, it's an action. Actions are not truth-apt. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, that's the point I made way back at the beginning of the thread, it's not the statement itself which is judged for truth, but the meaning of the statement which is judged. Here, we have been talking about that meaning as the content, what I called "the belief", what you called "what is believed".

Or you could take that as proof that the content is not something in my mind or yours. Can we both believe that Donald Trump is President? I think so. How is this possible on your view? We can't have the same thing in our minds, so how can we share a belief? — Srap Tasmaner

We share the belief by means of its form, the words which express the belief, "Donald Trump is President". The content is not the same though, because you and I will have different images of what it means to be Donald Trump, and different ideas of what it means to be President. So as much as we say "Donald Trump is President" represents a belief which is shared by you and I, we say this as a matter of convenience. What is really the case is that these words have different associated ideas for you from what they do for me, so it's not really one belief which is shared, it is different, yet compatible beliefs. That's why the content is different.

How do we agree or disagree about anything? How do we even communicate? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't understand the reason for these questions. We agree and disagree depending on the compatibility of our beliefs. This compatibility is what makes communication possible. We are all different though, having different ideas and beliefs within our minds. The fact that our ideas and beliefs are compatible, and we can agree and communicate, does not necessitate the conclusion that our beliefs are one and the same. Nor does it necessitate the conclusion that there is an independent (Platonic) Idea which our own ideas partake in (Platonic participation).

I'm not sure which argument about metacognition you're asking me to provide. There are many I employ, depending upon the context of the discussion. I'm also unsure if those are necessary at this point.

Do you recognize a meaningful distinction between thought/belief and reports thereof?

These potential sentences you refer to have no existence, because they have not been created, They have no meaning because they do not exist. You continue to back up this nonsense train of thought with more meaninglessness. — Metaphysician Undercover

The meanings are obviously in potentia also. Do you deny that there are many possible sentences that have never yet been spoken? I could write a poem in five minutes time and prove you wrong. Sure, that poem does not yet exist, but its existence is possible in virtue of the range of words in the English language and their possible coherent combinations.

The same kind of potential existence obtains with numbers. There are infinitely many prime numbers, for example, which will never be written out, never be known about at all.

Do you deny that there are many possible sentences that have never yet been spoken? — Janus

No I don't deny this but I don't see how it is at all meaningful. And I don't see how a potential sentence has meaning, nor does "meaning in potentia" have any meaning either. Just like a potential sentence does not exist as a sentence, and is therefore not a sentence, potential meaning is not actual meaning and therefore does not have any meaning either.

The thing is, that you are removing the utterance of the statement — Metaphysician Undercover

I want to have another look at this.

The sentence "It is raining" does not imply, for any given person, that they believe that it is raining, but there is an exception: the person who utters "It is raining." This is the point of Moore's paradox: making an assertion implies belief, and this implication cannot be canceled. It is nonsensical to say "It is raining but I don't believe it."

That does not make "It is raining" synonymous with "I believe that it is raining." We can see this by looking at the audience rather than the speaker. Suppose I ask you what it's like out, and you reply "It's raining"; if "It's raining" is synonymous with "I believe it's raining," I could respond by saying, "I didn't ask what you believe. I asked what it's like out." There is nothing you could say that I could not take as an expression of belief, and therefore not responsive to my question. But we don't do that.

But there is a situation where we do something similar. Suppose your commanding officer has tasked your unit with holding a bridge. As the battle advances, and decisions must be made about deploying reinforcements, the Colonel radios and asks if your unit can hold the bridge. Now suppose you respond, "I think so, sir." The Colonel might very well reply, "I didn't ask you what you think, Captain. I asked if you can hold that bridge."

Let's compare this to the other case. If I ask you what it's like out, and you answer, "I think it's raining," what does that amount to? That you are not certain it's raining? Yes. But so am I, and I have no idea at all. It indicates you have some reason to believe it's raining, but you are not sure that it is. Just answering, "It's raining" would usually imply that you're certain it is.

Now what is the Colonel in our other example asking for? Certainty? In a sense, yes, but everyone knows that certainty about such events is a sketchy business. What would be the point of asking for certainty about the events of a battle?

I don't think it's certainty the Colonel is after exactly. What he needs is to know whether he should send reinforcements. He needs an appraisal of the situation at the bridge that he can rely on in making plans. An honest appraisal. If the bridge needs reinforcements, it doesn't help for you to play John Wayne and say you can handle it, only to be overrun.

The way the Colonel gets the kind of appraisal he needs is by holding you accountable. And not just him, but lots of people. And not just people, but the events about to unfold. If you say you don't need reinforcements when you actually do, it may be the last decision you make.

Unforeseen events may mitigate your responsibility. Nevertheless, I think the essence of the matter is here: what we assert is what we expect to be held to account for. It's not just our "willingness" to be so held, but our expectation that we will be. (This mechanism was at work in the test-taking model I was fooling with a while back, but I didn't notice: the answers you give on the test are exactly what you will be held to account for.)

I would say further that assertion implies certainty indirectly: we need reasons for committing outright to "It is raining," for accepting the accountability of naked assertion, rather than drawing in our horns and sticking with "I think it's raining." Certainty provides such a reason. Certainty means you can welcome being held accountable.

(I'm not addressing whether anything else might provide sufficient reason. Note also that the usual gambling analysis of certainty can still be used here: if you give yourself good odds, you might stake your reputation on an assertion. (See how that idiom works?) It depends a lot on what's at risk, etc. etc.)

What the Colonel needs in the bridge example is not certainty about what will happen, but about the process by which the appraisal is made. It's your confidence in your ability to accurately gauge the strength of your position that will underwrite your willingness to be held accountable for that appraisal. The Colonel knows that you have been trained to make such judgments; he needs to know that you have actually done so. If you tell him, "Yes we can" or "No we can't" without weasel words, he can trust that you have made the best appraisal that can be made. (If you say "I think ..." that implies that you have not been thorough enough in making your appraisal, that you have only gotten as far as finding some reason but nothing definitive.)

(None of this deals directly with truth. I'm just trying to clarify what assertion amounts to.)

Do you recognize a meaningful distinction between thought/belief and reports thereof? — creativesoul

I really don't know. How do you use the distinction?

We're not talking about introspection here. Propositional reports are also propositional attributions. It's just how we talk about beliefs, our own or those of others.

Is your report of another's belief equal - in content - to the other's belief?

The reason why "It is raining" implies belief but isn't equal to "I believe it is raining" is because sometimes "I believe" implies doubt/uncertainty.

No I don't deny this but I don't see how it is at all meaningful. And I don't see how a potential sentence has meaning, nor does "meaning in potentia" have any meaning either. Just like a potential sentence does not exist as a sentence, and is therefore not a sentence, potential meaning is not actual meaning and therefore does not have any meaning either. — Metaphysician Undercover

Think about a poem you are yet to read; does it not have a potential meaning?

Potential meaning is an empty concept.

The reason why "It is raining" implies belief but isn't equal to "I believe it is raining" is because sometimes "I believe" implies doubt/uncertainty. — creativesoul

"It's raining" is also not synonymous with "I'm certain it's raining." Your certainty that it is raining is a fact about you; rain currently falling outside isn't.

It's not the degree of certainty that matters here at all. But yes, the hierarchy in everyday English seems to be from "I think ..." near the weaker end, through "I believe ..." and up to "I am certain ..."

Why do you say that?

Think about this example: there are 8 ancient writing systems that are yet to be deciphered. MU claims that writings only have meaning in the act of being interpreted. So, it would seem to follow from that claim that those undeciphered writings have no meaning.

So, if we are to distinguish them from mere meaningless marks we must say they currently either have a meaning or at the very least a potential meaning which would become actual when they are deciphered.

Ancient writing systems are meaningful. There are no examples of potential meaning.

Meta is just plain wrong.

So Srap...

What about the last question I asked regarding the content of another's belief and your report thereof?

I think "yes," although I'd also want to gloss "content" as "semantic value"-- the content that counts for truth, reasoning, etc.

If you and I watch a cat chasing a mouse, and an open-top box falls over trapping the mouse underneath, like an opaque cake-keeper, I would attribute to you and to me and to the cat the belief that the mouse is under the box. What else is there to do?

None of this deals directly with truth. I'm just trying to clarify what assertion amounts to.) — Srap Tasmaner

I follow your clarification. It is my argument that it is within this certainty which is inherent within the assertion, that we find the essence of truth. The difference which you speak of between saying "I believe it is raining", and "it is raining", is that the latter is to say "it is true that it is raining", and the former implies no such certainty. And in your example of the captain in the army, his assertion that the bridge will be held, is equivalent to a claim that it is true that the bridge will be held. So this is where we find the meaning of "true", and therefore "truth" itself, within this confidence which allows one to make an assertion.

The difficult issue, as I mentioned already, is that sometimes when we claim such certainty we are proven to be wrong. Therefore the thing which is true, according to the true essence of truth, as outlined above (the confidence which inspires the assertion), may turn into a falsity when one recognizes one's own mistake. So there is false confidence, false truth. The people who oppose true with false will never recognize the true nature of truth, due to their adherence to that artificial definition of truth, which is inconsistent with what "true" is actually used to refer to.

Think about a poem you are yet to read; does it not have a potential meaning? — Janus

That poem has already been written, so I don't see how the example is relevant.

MU claims that writings only have meaning in the act of being interpreted. — Janus

No, I was talking about the act of creating the sentences, not interpreting them. I said that a potential sentence cannot have meaning, it has to be created to have meaning. And it has meaning to the one who composed it, even if it hasn't been interpreted by anyone else.

Ok.

I asked:

Is your report of another's belief equal - in content - to the other's belief?

You answered:

I think "yes," although I'd also want to gloss "content" as "semantic value"-- the content that counts for truth, reasoning, etc.

And yet not all thought/belief counts as truth, reasoning... So why should it's content?

If you and I watch a cat chasing a mouse, and an open-top box falls over trapping the mouse underneath, like an opaque cake-keeper, I would attribute to you and to me and to the cat the belief that the mouse is under the box. What else is there to do?

Good question.

We could determine whether or not it makes sense to say that the cat believes that the mouse is under the box. If it does, then the content of the cat's thought/belief is equivalent to our own. Yet, the cat cannot think in the English language. How then, can the content of the cat's thought/belief be equivalent to our report of it?

If we're willing to ignore the inherent problems with attributing statements of thought/belief to the cat, we could continue and arrive at the conclusion that the cat has true belief. Continuing on, we find that either true belief does not require truth or truth is not existentially contingent upon language.

None of that seems quite right though, does it?

To me, the issue is how we are to talk about beliefs, our own and those of others. I see nothing wrong with the usual folk psychology that attributes beliefs based on behavior, behavior which sometimes includes speech or other symbolic actions.

If the cat paces around the box and swats at it occasionally, I'd say its behavior is grounds for attributing a belief to it. I have no reason to think any English sentence is in its mind. If my phone makes a certain sound, I know someone is texting me. Here too, there is no reason to think the English sentence "Someone is texting me" was in my mind, even though I speak English passably well.

Suppose Jerry gets trapped under the box, but there's a hole in the floor he can slip out of. Tom paces around the box, swatting at it occasionally. Why not say that Tom thinks Jerry's still in there but he's wrong? If you don't see Jerry slip out, you have that same belief. You can provide further evidence by saying something, and Tom can't. If I lift the box, you'll each display something like confusion. But at this point, you'll be able work out how your belief was mistaken, and Tom probably won't.

To me, the issue is understanding what non linguistic thought/belief consists in/of.

It's not statements.

Agree?

By the way, there's nothing in the last reply that I find unacceptable. I mean, it seems we agree on all that as well... I was moving onward prior to checking. Poor form. My apologies. None-the-less, I think that we still agree here, right?

Tom has no conception of truth, and yet has true belief.

How, exactly can it be the case that Tom has true belief? If true belief requires truth, and truth is prior to language, then Tom can have true belief despite not being able to talk about it, and we can accurately report upon it by virtue of properly taking account of it.

Tom does not think in statements, and yet we report upon Tom's thought/belief. The content of our reports is not equivalent to the content of Toms thought/belief.

If our reports are accurate then it must be the case that true belief is capable of being formed and/or held by a language-less agent.

Either true belief exists without truth, or truth exists prior to language.

Here, we must pause and consider the different sense of "truth". Which one(s), if any are capable of existing prior to language?

Tom has no conception of truth, and yet has true belief. — creativesoul

Tom does not think in statements, and yet we report upon Tom's thought/belief. The content of our reports is not equivalent to the content of Toms thought/belief. — creativesoul

I'd start here: if you believe that Jerry is under the box, you believe something about Jerry (and the box and so on), not something about the sentence "Jerry is under the box," such as it being true.

When we describe your belief, we use the sentence, "Jerry is under the box," so we're also talking about Jerry (and the box and so on), not the sentence "Jerry is under the box."

If you want to say that the sentence "Jerry is under the box" is true, I'd say you're talking not only about Jerry (and the box and so on) but also about English. Truth is for sentences, really, not beliefs, although it may do no harm now & then to call a belief that something is the case when it really is a "true belief." I expect I've done it somewhere in this thread, but that's speaking loosely.

That ambiguity is not the basis for my claim that the content of Tom's belief can be the same as the content of our report of his belief: the basis for that is that Tom has a belief about Jerry (and the box and so on), and that's exactly what we say he has. We're not talking about language and truth anymore than Tom is.

In the case of ancient writings the "one who composed it" no longer exists, so their intentions could never be known, and the meaning thus no longer exists. But this would mean that the writings can never be deciphered.

I follow your clarification. It is my argument that it is within this certainty which is inherent within the assertion, that we find the essence of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pretty sure I didn't say certainty is "inherent within assertion"; I said it could function as a reason for you not to fear being held accountable for what you say, but there may be other reasons. For instance, just following consensus or authority is probably all the reason we need much of the time.

In what follows, we need a word for variable certainty and a word for certainty that's absolute or passes some other threshold. I'm going to use "confidence" for the variable one, and "certainty" for something like maximal confidence.

Let's say you have some belief and reasons for that belief. Your confidence is, at least, a measure of the strength of your reasons for that belief. Your confidence is not itself a reason for holding the belief; if you give "I'm certain" as a reason for your belief, you'll just be asked why you're certain.

Acting on your belief, for instance by asserting it, carries risk, and we can naturally extend the above: the greater your confidence the greater the risk you are prepared to take; the greater the risk you expect to face, the greater your confidence in your choice of action must be. Thus, following consensus or authority is generally, but not always, so low-risk, you barely need any reason at all.

But I think where confidence comes in is not as a reason for a particular action; various reasons will line up with various possible courses of action. I think confidence plays a role in the decision to act, and in the choice among various options.

For example, we may be faced with a choice between saying, "I think it's going to rain," and saying, "It's going to rain," or "I know it's going to rain." We have described these before as less and more confident versions of the same belief. (That's not quite true, of course, because the first could actually express greater confidence by means of understatement.)

What we need to sort out, to start with, is the difference between the reasons for holding a belief, which will be attended by a certain level of confidence that the belief is correct (or something), and the reasons for taking the action of asserting that belief, which will be attended by a certain level of confidence about producing the desired effect by your action.

A standard example to show that these need not be the same: you're listening to someone tell a story about a princess and a dragon and all the usual stuff. Now suppose the storyteller at some point in the story asks, "What do you think the princess will do?" You have a compelling reason to think there is no such princess and so she won't do anything; is that a reason for saying, "She will not do anything"?

Tom has no conception of truth, and yet has true belief.

How, exactly can it be the case that Tom has true belief? — creativesoul

It is only your judgement of Tom's belief which says that it is true. You do have a conception of truth, and base your judgement in this. Tom does not believe that his belief is true, he just believes.

If true belief requires truth, and truth is prior to language, then Tom can have true belief despite not being able to talk about it, and we can accurately report upon it by virtue of properly taking account of it. — creativesoul

Tom's belief is not true unless it is judged by someone as being true. I think we went through this already in this thread, true is a judgement. Consider "the grass is green". It might appear like the grass is green without the need for any judgement, but this is not the case. Someone must judge the thing referred to by "grass", as qualifying for being called "green", in order that the grass is green. There's no way around this. You could say "if the grass reflected the right light, then it would be green regardless of whether or not it is judged as green", but all this does is make that necessary judgement. Without that judgement it is impossible that the grass is green, and also impossible that Tom's belief is true.

If our reports are accurate then it must be the case that true belief is capable of being formed and/or held by a language-less agent. — creativesoul

I don't agree with this. A stone is only a stone because it is judged to be a stone. A tree is a tree because it is judged to be a tree. A true belief is a true belief because it is judged to be a true belief. A language-less agent cannot judge a belief as being true, that requires language. It is true that you, a person with language, could judge the language-less agent's belief as true, but since that agent has no language to express that belief to you, that judgement is purely speculative and very unreliable. This is not at all suited to the use of "true", which implies certainty.